The purpose of the current manuscript was to examine acquirer and market behavior surrounding a sample of international mergers and acquisitions. The first essay examined the existence of a private company discount and its connections to liquidity. It found that unlisted targets sell for less than their public counterparts, confirming earlier findings. The examination of a connection between the discount and liquidity mostly contradicted earlier studies (Officer 2007), depending on which subsample was selected. The second essay examined the existence of a target price runup preceding acquisitions announcements, existence of a substitution effect between runup and premium, and whether investor protection influenced the two. It confirmed the earlier findings of a significant runup preceding acquisition announcements, with the runup being more pronounced in those targets from weaker investor protection countries. Contrary to Schwert (1996), the study found a significant substitution effect between runup and premium, with the effect stronger if the acquirers are from countries with weak investor protection. The third essay examined acquirer stock price reaction to the three different components of the offer price: target's stand-alone valuation, pre-announcement runup and the offer premium. Each component was found to have an overall insignificant effect on the acquirer stock price in the overall sample. When the targets were from the countries with the weakest investor protection, the study found that the reaction to both the runup and stand-alone target valuation depend on both target and acquirer country investor protection. The study also found that when the targets were from the countries with the weakest investor protection, and only from those countries, acquirer stock price reacted negatively to any individual component of the offer price being higher. / Overall, the three studies confirm that behavior of both acquirer management and their stock markets i affected by the variance in investor protection among countries. / by Jurica Susnjara. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2011. / Includes bibliography. / Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, Fla., 2011. Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Many factors contribute to the outcome of an acquisition; these factors arise from both the objective of the target and acquirer. This dissertation focuses on how the bidding strategy, acquirer and target characteristics impact the transaction. The first essay examines how the timing and size of the acquirer's bid for a U.S. target firm impacts their return. I find that successful first and low bid acquirers experience significantly larger returns than successful secondary and non-low bid acquirers. The cross-sectional analysis determines that higher levels of target institutional ownership and acquisitions completed prior to the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley result in reduced returns to the acquirer. In addition, the likelihood of a successful first bid acquirer increases with a revised bid and when the acquirer is both the first and low bid acquirer simultaneously. The likelihood of a successful first bid acquirer decreases as the number of bidders increases and as the bidding process lengthens. I also find that the likelihood of a successful low bid acquirer increases the longer the bidding process. The second essay examines how the timing and size of the acquirer's bid for an international target impacts their return. I find that successful first and low bid acquirers experience insignificant abnormal returns following the acquisition announcement. In addition, the likelihood of a successful first bid acquirer increases when the acquirer and target have similar cultures, with higher levels of target government corruption and when the acquirer is both the first and low bid acquirer simultaneously. The likelihood of a successful low bid acquirer decreases with higher levels of target government corruption. I also examine what factors affect the target premium and find that larger transactions and successful first bid acquirers increase the target premium. / Conversely, similar cultures and higher levels of government corruption, rule of law, bureaucracy, expropriation and ethnic tension decrease the premium to the target. Lastly, successful first and low bid acquirers experience statistically larger long run abnormal returns than successful secondary and non-low bid acquirers. The third essay examines how a stake accumulation by a conflicted blockholder influences the target's return. I find that targets experience positive cumulative abnormal returns upon the announcement of the Family, ESOP, Management and High Profile Investor stake accumulation. The cross-sectional analysis determines that privately negotiated transactions reduce the return to the target and that higher levels of stake accumulation are positively related to the target's return. Finally, targets experience negative abnormal long run returns following all four types of stake accumulation. / by Mina C. Glambosky. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2009. / Includes bibliography. / Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, Fla., 2009. Mode of access: World Wide Web.

In Essay I, I analyze the impact of the target and bidder reference points on the probability of acquisition under general economic conditions as well as in strong/weak economic periods. I find that the target and the bidder reference points have a significant impact on the probability of a firm becoming a bidder or a target. While the target reference point also has a significant impact on the successful completion of the merger, the bidder reference point does not. In addition, I find that the target reference point is a significant determinant of management-led buyout mergers, while the bidder reference point has a significant impact on the probability of the bidder launching a hostile bid. In Essay II, I focus on the impact of the target and bidder reference points on the method of payment in the context of what the target seeks, what the bidder offers, and what the two parties use as their final method of payment. The analysis is performed under general economic conditions and in strong/weak economic periods. I find that while the target reference point has a strong impact on the method of payment agreed upon between the two parties, the bidder reference point does not. This is especially important given that the bidder reference point influences the consideration offered by the bidder but does not translate into a significant impact on the final method of payment. In essay III, I examine the impact of bidder reference point on public targets and the impact of bidder and target reference points on private firms. I analyze the aforementioned relationships under different economic conditions. Consistent with the literature on premium and public targets, I find that the target reference point has a strong and positive relationship with the premium paid for private firms. The relationship is stronger in weak economic times. / At the same time, I do not find any evidence that the bidder reference point exerts a significant influence on the premium paid for public firms. Interestingly, the relationship between the bidder reference point and the premium paid for private firms is negative and significant. / Inga Chira. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2013. / Includes bibliography. / Mode of access: World Wide Web. / System requirements: Adobe Reader.

by Mak Yuen-Kwan. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 161-189). / ABSTRACT --- p.i / TABLE OF CONTENTS --- p.iv / LIST OF TABLES --- p.viii / ACKNOWLEDGMENTS --- p.x / CHAPTER / Chapter I. --- INTRODUCTION --- p.1 / Background --- p.1 / Impact of Cultural Values on Buying- Selling Process --- p.3 / Chinese Bargaining Behavior --- p.8 / Chapter II. --- REVIEW OF LITERATURE --- p.18 / Definitions of Bargaining --- p.18 / Buyer-Seller-Situation Dyadic Interaction Process --- p.31 / Consumption Buying Vs Organizational Buying --- p.36 / The Chinese Cultural Values --- p.40 / Yang's Chinese Social Orientation Concept --- p.45 / Refined Labor-intensive Farming --- p.49 / Commonly Owned Family Property --- p.50 / Patrilineal Descent with the Father- Son Chain --- p.51 / Rigid Hierarchical Social Structures --- p.52 / Familistic Orientation --- p.52 / Relationship Orientation --- p.55 / Authoritarian Orientation --- p.72 / Other Orientation --- p.73 / Independent and Dependent Variables --- p.76 / Independent Variables --- p.76 / Friendship --- p.76 / Seller Job Status --- p.77 / Buying Situation --- p.78 / Dependent Variables --- p.79 / Seller Credibility --- p.79 / Bargaining Style --- p.80 / Outcomes of Bargaining --- p.82 / Research Hypotheses --- p.84 / Chapter III. --- METHODS --- p.89 / Experimental Design --- p.89 / Development of the Research Design --- p.95 / Pretests --- p.96 / Experiment --- p.99 / Subjects --- p.99 / Procedure --- p.101 / Manipulations of Independent Variables --- p.103 / Buying Situation --- p.103 / Friendship --- p.103 / Seller Job Status --- p.104 / Measures of Dependent Variables --- p.107 / Seller Credibility --- p.109 / Bargaining Style --- p.109 / Integrative Bargaining Style --- p.109 / Positive Attitude --- p.110 / Outcomes of Bargaining --- p.110 / Perceived Efficiency --- p.110 / Perceived Satisfaction --- p.110 / Demographic Information --- p.111 / Analysis --- p.112 / Analysis of Interdependence --- p.113 / Analysis of Variance Test --- p.114 / Chapter IV. --- RESULTS --- p.117 / Differences of Experimental Groups --- p.118 / Manipulation Checks --- p.119 / Factor Analysis --- p.122 / Results of Experimentation --- p.127 / Findings --- p.129 / Friendship --- p.129 / Seller Job Status --- p.130 / Buying Situation --- p.130 / Buying Situation - Friendship Interaction --- p.131 / Buying Situation - Seller Job Status Interaction --- p.132 / Seller Job Status - Friendship Interaction --- p.132 / Chapter V. --- SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION --- p.134 / Summary of Hypotheses Testing --- p.136 / Discussion --- p.141 / Seller Credibility --- p.141 / Bargaining Style --- p.142 / Integrative Bargaining Style --- p.142 / Positive Attitude --- p.144 / Outcomes of Bargaining --- p.146 / Perceived Efficiency --- p.146 / Perceived Satisfaction --- p.147 / Significance of the Study for Theory and Practice --- p.148 / Theory --- p.148 / Practice --- p.151 / Limitations --- p.156 / Experimental Design --- p.156 / Hong Kong Chinese Sample --- p.156 / Suggestions for Future Research --- p.158 / Experimental Design --- p.158 / Hong Kong Chinese Sample --- p.158 / Unexpected Findings --- p.159 / Conclusion --- p.160 / BIBLIOGRAPHY --- p.161 / APPENDICES --- p.190 / APPENDIX I. Questionnaire --- p.190 / APPENDIX II. One Way ANOVA and Chi-Square Tables --- p.206 / Exhibit 1 Sex --- p.207 / Exhibit 2 Education Level --- p.208 / Exhibit 3 Age --- p.209 / Exhibit 4 Number of Years of Working Experience --- p.210 / Exhibit 5 Ranking in the Company --- p.211 / Exhibit 6 Number of Years of Residence in Hong Kong --- p.212 / Exhibit 7 Level of Expertise on Computer --- p.213 / Exhibit 8 Amount of Time Involved in Business Bargaining --- p.214 / APPENDIX III. ANOVA Tables --- p.215 / Exhibit 1 Cell Means and Analysis of Variance of Seller Credibility --- p.216 / Exhibit 2 Cell Means and Analysis of Variance of Integrative Bargaining Style --- p.217 / Exhibit 3 Cell Means and Analysis of Variance of Positive Attitude --- p.218 / Exhibit 4 Cell Means and Analysis of Variance of Perceived Efficiency --- p.219 / Exhibit 5 Cell Means and Analysis of Variance of Perceived Satisfaction --- p.220 / Exhibit 6 Marginal Means for the Interaction of Buying Situation and Friendship on Seller Credibility --- p.221 / Exhibit 7 Mean Seller Credibility: Buying Situation by Friendship --- p.222 / Exhibit 8 Mean Seller Credibility: Friendship by Buying Situation --- p.223 / Exhibit 9 Analysis of Variance of Seller Credibility --- p.224 / Exhibit 10 Marginal Means for the Interaction of Job Status and Friendship on Integrative Bargaining Style --- p.225 / Exhibit 11 Mean Integrative Bargaining Style: Job Status by Friendship --- p.226 / Exhibit 12 Mean Integrative Bargaining Style: Friendship by Job Status --- p.227 / Exhibit 13 Analysis of Integrative Bargaining Style --- p.228

Who lies in negotiations—and when and why? While research has considered many factors, an important and understudied determinant is people’s expectancies about others. I argue that negotiators’ expectations about other people can help predict their own deceptive behavior. Chapter I explores how projection and pessimism shape deceptive behavior. Studies 1a-1d investigated negotiators’ expectancies and found evidence of projection and of rampant pessimism; negotiators consistently overestimated the percentage of other people who shared their own beliefs and the percentage of people who thought deception was appropriate in negotiations. Study 2 found that expectancies about others’ ethical standards predicted the degree to which negotiators were misleading or dishonest in negotiations. Study 3 manipulated expectancies and found that a higher perceived prevalence of gamers led to more misleading or dishonest behavior. Negotiators’ decisions to engage in deception were heavily influenced by an exaggerated pessimism about others’ ethical standards. In supplementary analyses, Chapter I also briefly addresses how expectancies about a specific counterpart’s level of deception shape deceptive behavior. Finally, Chapter II investigates how stereotypes shape deceptive behavior in negotiations, using the stereotype content model, which suggests that social groups are judged on two primary dimensions of warmth and competence. Study 1 provided evidence that deceptive negotiators are perceived to possess less warmth and greater competence than truthful negotiators. Study 2 showed that people from cold competent groups are perceived as more deceptive than people from warm incompetent groups. Study 3 tested actual behavior and demonstrated that manipulating the social category membership of a counterpart affected deception in a negotiation situation. Expectancies play a critical and understudied role in influencing a negotiator’s decision to be deceptive.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 2007. / Also available online.

Thesis (M.B.A.)--Carleton University, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 108-116). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (M.M.S.) - Carleton University, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 134-140). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hong Kong, 2007. / Title proper from title frame. Also available in printed format.