Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2000. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 209-222). Also available on the Internet.

This research examines guanxi's influence on attitudes of the Chinese negotiators during international joint venture negotiations by applying the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM). / Before establishing international joint ventures, foreign and Chinese investors go through series of negotiations to settle or resolve any disagreements. However, the unique Chinese culture and the business environment in the transitional China often impose problems on these cross-cultural negotiations. To cope with these difficulties, foreign investors often use “guanxi” as a negotiation strategy to influence the attitude of the Chinese negotiators. / Guanxi is a cultural element inherent in the Confucian ideology. Being a collectivistic, high-contextual and hierarchical society, China places strong emphasis on guanxi between individuals which does not only represent the identification of individuals but is often used as a means to accomplish tasks. This makes guanxi a powerful tool to overcome many cultural and environmental problems. / By applying the influence of guanxi on the attitude of Chinese negotiators to the Elaboration Likelihood Model in this research, it is proposed that guanxi can motivate Chinese negotiators to think and influence the attitude of the Chinese negotiators under high and low elaboration. Under high elaboration, the attitude change is more predictive, stable, enduring and permanent while attitude change under low elaboration is less predictive, vulnerable, susceptible to counter-persuasion and temporary. / The research adopted the quantitative paradigm using hypothesis testing. A survey was carried out with one hundred and fifty-two questionnaires distributed by the snowball sampling technique. Eighty-three completed questionnaires were returned, accounting for 54.6% response rate. Frequency tables were used to analyse the distribution of the results. Chi-square tests were employed to test the representativeness of the samples to the population and the association between variables. / The results indicate that foreign investors' guanxi with the Chinese investors (GFC), the government (GFG) and other businesses (GFO) can motivate the Chinese negotiators to think (MOT) and influence the attitude of the Chinese negotiators to think (MOT) and influence the attitude of the Chinese negotiators under high (VAL) and low elaboration (ATT). GFC can influence VAL because the investors are bound by insider relationships and reciprocal obligations and influence ATT because it implies renqing between the investors. GFG can influence VAL because the government can update the investors with political changes and influence ATT because Chinese show high respect for the government. GFO can influence VAL because the Chinese investors value highly the relationship with the suppliers to secure necessary inputs for production and allow flexible credit payment. GFO can also influence ATT because it implies social validation of trustworthiness of the foreign investors. / This research has significant contributions to the area of study of the Elaboration Likelihood Model, the influences of guanxi on attitude of negotiators and practical suggestions to the Chinese and foreign negotiators who intend to form international joint ventures in China. / Thesis (PhDBusinessandManagement)--University of South Australia, 2006.

Thesis (Ph.D.) -- University of Western Sydney, Hawkesbury, 1999. / Spine title: Sino-foreign negotiation. Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Includes bibliographical references (p. 572-574).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2000. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 209-222).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2000. / Typescript. Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 209-222). Also available on the Internet.

This study sought to update the literature on gender and negotiations, generate new information on settlements in negotiations, and provide information on gender and competitive negotiations. The negotiation section of the CAMCO competition was used to determine the influence of gender on negotiated settlement. Settlements did not differ based on the gender of the negotiators, except in scenario two in which it was found that male/male dyads negotiate a less distributive outcome than female/female or mixedsex dyads. In all scenarios, male/male dyads did not settle with an impasse more often than women, and male negotiators in a mixedsex dyad did not negotiate a more winning settlement than women negotiators. The results of the study imply that businesses can feel free to hire men and women negotiators based on their individual qualifications instead of based on their gender. The results also raise some concerns about the perception of differences between men and women based on outdated stereotypes.

Do gender stereotype threat and racioethnic stereotype threat combine to adversely impact American women of African descents’ likelihood to approach financial rewards in a job-negotiation context? This experimental study used a 2 (gender stereotype threat: high, low) x 2 (racioethnic stereotype threat: high, low) between-subject’s factorial design in order to investigate this question. Measures of salary expectations and affect were collected using previously validated scales. Key findings include a significant interaction between sense of power and racioethnic stereotype threat on anticipated backlash, and a main effect of sense of power on approach-avoidance, positive affect, and negative affect. Post hoc analyses show that implicit power moderates the effects of racioethnic stereotype threat on negotiation behavior, that is, having a situational sense of power mitigates the impact of being under fear of confirming a negative stereotype about a group in which you hold membership in. Implications for theory and practice are discussed along with future research directions in organizational behavior and social psychology.

he assumption of a purely self-interested supervisor in a three-tier hierarchy (a principal-supervisor-agent framework) gives rise to the possibility of supervisor-agent collusion which lowers the principal's profits. It has also been shown that the transfer of information in side contract negotiations between the supervisor and the agent may hinder collusion and maintain high principal profits. In chapter 2, I show that imposing "credible" updating of type beliefs during negotiations can guarantee one of two outcomes that are Pareto superior for the supervisor-agent coalition. I further refine the equilibria by endogenizing the decision of who makes the side contract proposal, and a unique collusive equilibrium results. In allowing the principal to form a collusion-proof incentive contract, I find that the only plausible solution is for the principal to ignore the supervisor. It is clear that there is no value at all to the principal in hiring a self-interested supervisor. This casts doubt on the validity of the assumption that the supervisor is self-interested, and I discuss some possible alternatives. Chapter 3 studies job matching inefficiencies under two-sided uncertainty. I examine these inefficiencies in a setting of a single-stage, simultaneous-offer bargaining situation, where the applicant does not know his productivity with the firm, and the employer does not know the applicant's reservation wage. I compare linear bid strategy equilibria between the cases where the applicant is uninformed of his productivity and where he is informed. I find that the payoff to the applicant is higher if he is informed. He is thus willing to collude with an informed person within the firm, paying him up to the difference in payoffs to obtain his productivity information. It is noteworthy that the collusive equilibrium is always more efficient than the non-collusive equilibrium, and that most types of employer prefer the applicant to have the knowledge. In the cases that the employer does not wish the applicant to possess the information, I examine possible reward schemes for the employer to use to deter collusion. I find, however, that a successful reward scheme is too costly to the employer, and coalition formation always occurs in equilibrium. Chapter 4 studies the strategic choice of job tenures to maximize lifetime earnings. A worker's salary typically increases with tenure, and the possible net starting salary at a new job depends on such factors as search costs, training period duration, rate of human capital accumulation, and experience. The worker thus wishes to choose appropriate tenures considering the levels of these factors for the industry in which he works. I set up a general framework for the problem, and solve using specific functional forms for salary increments and the new starting salary. I find that these factors are important in determining the optimal number of jobs to work, and the optimal distribution of tenures among the jobs. It is easy to see how variations in these factors across industries can help explain variations in turnover rates and tenure choices of individuals at different points in their working lifetimes. Also, we see how realistic variations in these values over the course of a worker's lifetime yield results consistent with empirical findings. / Ph. D.

Information leakage before full acquisitions has been widely documented. The information leakage, and the resulting pre-bid runup in the target's stock, generally increases the total cost of the acquisition. That is, information leakage and the ensuing pre-bid runup is a gain to the target and loss to the acquirer. Herein, I first ascertain the characteristics of full acquisitions that affect the amount of information leakage. I find that if the acquirer borrows to finance the acquisition then information leakage is greater. Further if the acquirer is foreign, if the target is a high-tech firm, and if the target has options on its stock all increase information leakage. I find hostile deals are effective in reducing information leakage. Lastly, information leakage increases in the percentage of managerial ownership. I next hypothesize that the identity and intent of partial acquirers is known to market participants before the announcement of a partial acquisition. I find that the market can anticipate whether a partial acquirer intends to fully-acquire or take an active role in the management of the target. Also, the market anticipates whether the acquirer is a private investment find or a non-financial corporation. Further, the acquirer's identity or intent is fully reflected in the target's stock price before the announcement of the partial acquisition. These results help explain why there are few partial acquisitions as precursors to full acquisitions. / I next hypothesize that macroeconomic factors affect information leakage, and may serve as a signal of when to speculate on acquisitions. I find that information leakage is positively related to shocks in both expected economic conditions and financing costs, the latter signaling to speculators that acquisitions are imminent. I also find information about an imminent full acquisition is leaked earlier when there are positive shocks to economic conditions and financing costs. / by Matthew David Brigida. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2009. / Includes bibliography. / Electronic reproduction. Boca Raton, Fla., 2009. Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Flinders University, School of Politics and International Studies. / Typescript bound. Includes bibliographical references: (leaves 336-398) Also available online.