This thesis explores the implications of non-human primates’ propensity to hyperbolically discount the future. Hyperbolic discounting occurs when small, near-term rewards are preferred over larger rewards that are realized at a future point in time, but these preferences do not hold when the choice between long term and short term rewards is made at a time far removed from when the choice produces rewards-- i.e., at a time when the payoff of the choice is distant. I discuss two mutually exclusive models that attempt to explain why non-human primates hyperbolically discount: the cognitivist and the behaviorist model. I then present evidence that supports the cognitivist model and undermines the behaviorist model. I then argue that a “War of Interests” (WOI) occurs within the non-human primate mind. I explain this WOI model, discuss its philosophical implications, and then conclude with a general theory of the non-human primate mind.

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Thesis (PhD)--University of Stellenbosch, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Moral theories on abortion are often regarded as mutually exclusive. On the one hand, pro-life advocates maintain that abortion is always morally wrong, for life is sacred from its very beginning. On the other hand, the extreme liberal view advocated by the absolute pro-ehoieers claims that the unborn is not a person and has no moral standing. On this view there is no conflict of rights; women have the right to dispose of their body as they wish. Therefore, killing a non-person is always permissible. In between the two extreme views, some moral philosophers argue that a 'pre-sentient' embryo or fetus cannot be harmed because it lacks the ability to feel pain or pleasure, for it is 'sentience' that endows a living entity (human and non-human) with moral considerability. Therefore, abortion of a pre-sentient embryo or fetus is permissible. Neurophilosophy rests a philosophical conclusion on neurological premises. In other words, to be tenable sentientism - the claim that sentience endows an entity with moral standing - needs robust neurobiological evidence. The question is, then: What is the basic neuroanatomical and neurophysiological apparatus required to be sentient? The answer to that question requires a fair understanding of the evolution, anatomy and function of the brain. The exploration thereof shows quite convincingly that the advocates of sentientism do not provide convincing arguments to root their theory in neurobiological facts. Their claims rest rather on emotions and on behaviours that look like a reaction to pain. The other shortcoming of sentientism is that it fails to distinguish pain from suffering, and that as a utilitarian moral theory it considers only the alleged pain of the aborted sentient fetus and disregards the pregnant woman's pain and suffering. And, finally, sentientism leaves out of our moral consideration living and non-living entities that deserve moral respect. The main thrust of the dissertation is that the argument of sentience as its advocates present it has no neurophilosophical grounds. Therefore, the argument from sentience is not a convincing argument in favour or against abortion. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Morele teorieë wat handeloor aborsie word dikwels as wedersyds uitsluitend beskou. "Pro-life" kampvegters hou oor die algemeen vol dat aborsie onder alle omstandighede moreel veroordeelbaar is, omdat die lewe van meet af heilig is. Daarteenoor hou die ekstreem-liberale oogpunt, wat deur "Pro-choice" voorstaanders ingeneem word, vol dat die ongeborene nie 'n persson is nie, en as sulks geen morele status het nie. Volgens hierdie standpunt is daar geen konflik van regte hier ter sprake nie; vroue het uitsluitelike beskikkingsreg oor hulle eie liggame. Dus is dit toelaatbaar om onder hierdie omstandighede 'n "nie-persoon" om die lewe te bring. Tussen hierdie twee ekstreme standpunte argumenteer party morele filosowe dat die voorbewuste embrio of fetus nie skade berokken kan word nie, omdat dit nie oor die vermoë beskik om pyn of plesier te voel nie. Dit is juis bewussyn en die vermoë om waar te neem wat morele status aan 'n entiteit (hetsy menslik of nie-menslik) verleen. Dus is dit toelaatbaar om 'n voorbewustw embrio of fetus te aborteer. Neurofilosofie basseer filosofiese gevolgtrekkinge op neurolgiese beginsels. Met andere woorde, so 'n standpunt sal eis dat 'n argument oor bewustheid op betroubare neurologiese feite gebasseer word, om sodoende met sekerheid morele status, al dan nie, aan de fetus of embrio toe te ken. Die vraag is dan: Wat is die basiese neuroanatomiese en neurofiologiese apparatuur waaroor 'n entiteit moet beskik om as bewus beskou te word? Die antwoord op hierdie vraag vereis dan ook 'n redelik grondige kennis van die evolusie, anatomie en funksie van die brein. Wanneer die vraagstuk van naderby beskou word, word dit duidelik dat voorstaanders van die bewustheids-argument oor die algemeen nie hulle standpunte op oortuigende, neurologiese feite berus nie. Hulle beweringe rus dan eerder op emosie en op waargenome optredes wat voorkom asof dit 'n reaksie op pyn is. Nog 'n tekortkoming van die bewustheids-argument is dat dit nie 'n onderskeid tref tussen die konsep van pyn en die van leiding nie, en dat dit as 'n utilitaristiese morele teorie slegs die beweerde pyn van die ge-aborteerde fetus in ag neem en nie die leiding van die swanger vrouw nie. Ten slotte neem die bewustheids-argument ook nie morele status van lewende en nie-lewende entiete, wat geregtig is op morele respek, in ag nie. Die hoof uitgangspunt van hierdie dissertasie is dan dat die bewustheids-argument, soos wat dit tans deur voorstanders daarvan voorgehou word, nie neurofilosfies begrond kan word nie. Dus is die argument vanuit 'n bewustheids-standpunt nie 'n oortuigende argument hetsy vir of teen aborsie nie.

The empirical study of consciousness is a young field still in its pre paradigmatic stage and so in need of a unifying framework. This comparative literature review examines two theories of consciousness, Thomas Metzinger’s the self-model theory of subjectivity and Antti Revonsuo’s Biological realism, theories which both try to provide such a framework for the science of consciousness. This paper gives an overview of some of the more central parts of each theory, along with criticism directed towards them. The paper show that these theories, although on the surface very similar, disagree on some fundamental philosophical questions due to differences in their underlying background assumptions. The theories also slightly differ in their view on some methodological questions, as well as in their view of certain aspects on consciousness.

This cumulative dissertation consists of investigations the brain processes related to legal and moral decision-making as well as a philosophical reflection. The behavioral main finding is that lawyers perceive themselves to be less emotionally involved during legal and moral decision-making than other academics. Regarding brain processes, the major finding is that legal decisions are correlated with stronger activation in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, suggesting a stronger engagement of rule application. The philosophical part reflects the normative implications of these investigations and comprises a wider discussion of neuroimaging in the context of clinical research.

This investigation can be described as a long journey to a final destination: a truth in religion. We start by considering dualism of the subjective and the objective, the classical model of cognition that underlies notions of truth. Dualistic notions of cognition lead to serious problems, especially for religious truth. Religions claim to state truths about the nature of the universe and human destiny, but these truths are incompatible. With a dualistic model this problem of diversity of religious truths leads to fundamentalism or relativism. Thus, this research aims to turn to the roots of the cognitive situation and investigate the way we cognize and relate to the world to provide a better model. As we consider the philosophical theories and empirical investigations of cognition, we come to the conclusion that dualism of the subjective and objective is not tenable. As the findings of contemporary mind sciences and phenomenologically oriented research indicate, human cognition is embodied, embedded, enacted, extended, and shaped by language. Thus, I propose to re-conceptualize the cognitive situation to provide a better philosophical account. I put forward a tripartite model of cognition, which unites language, action, and environment. The consequent application of this model to the issues of truth and religion shows that we can avoid the problem of diversity of truth claims. A tripartite model allows us to explain how we can maintain religion as true, despite the diversity of religious truth claims. Additionally, as this model is fundamental, its application leads to various new findings and inferences, which render anew the world and the way humans relate to it. Thus, our journey brings us to new frontiers of investigation.