I argue that autonomy is substantially relational by appealing to a variety of findings from the cognitive sciences. I gather findings related to a variety of paradigms of the cognitive sciences under the collective banner Relational Cognition and argue that these speak in favor of contingent relational accounts of autonomy by demonstrating the relational nature of cognition and agency. I focus on the ways in which these findings emphasise the embedded nature of cognition. I pay particular attention to the frameworks of 4E cognition because of their general emphasis on how cognition operates in concert with the external environment of the agent. This, I argue, speaks in favor of externalist approaches to autonomy. For example, 4E cognition explores how the human mind exploits its embodied nature to offload part of its internal, mental processing to features of its external environments. By operating in this fashion, an agent’s development and effective exercise of many of her cognitive capacities depend upon her prior embedding into particular environments. This perspective is conceptually very similar to relational accounts of autonomy which emphasise the situatedness of agents, positing that individual autonomy is necessarily contingent on certain social relations. I illuminate this conceptual overlap and bridge it in two ways. First, more broadly through a contingency argument, and second, by connecting relational cognition to the social self thesis which is a central conceptual component of relational accounts of autonomy. Finally, in light of all this, I claim that liberal theorizing on autonomy needs to grant a greater importance to the environments of agents for their ability to develop and practice autonomous agency. I criticise Joseph Raz’s conception of autonomy in this manner and suggest that a relational cognition perspective provides an instructive avenue for further developing a more externalist liberal understanding of autonomy.

Shepard and Metzler (1971) argued that mental rotation is analogous to the real world in that people imagine the rotation of an object as if it were being physically rotated. This study tested this assertion by exposing participants to physical shapes that increased in size and weight. Participants interacted with blocks designed after Shepard and Metzler mental rotation size that differed in size and weight then performed subsequent mental rotation. We found no difference in reaction time but found that increased size reduced accuracy. We discuss the implications of this study as they pertain to embodied cognition.

Die Medizintechnik Tiefe-Hirnstimulation ist nicht nur als naturwissenschaftlich-technisches Produkt zu sehen, sondern vor allem auch als kultur-technische Leistung mit historischen Wurzeln. Dieserart Schnittstellenhandlungen nehmen einen festen Platz in der Medizingeschichte ein und sind nicht losgelöst von dieser zu bestimmen. Ein- und zugreifende Praktiken wie Trepanationen und Schädelkulte sind vielfältig verankert und offenbaren einen menschheitsalten Wunsch nach Einflussnahme und Bemächtigung. Hierüber lässt sich der Mensch als verknüpf-, einstell- und gestaltbare Entität im Rahmen 'eutoper' Welt- und Technikbilder sowie deterministischer Menschenbilder darstellen. Mit der Integration aktiver, technischer Elemente in den menschlichen Körper verschieben wir die Grenzverläufe zwischen biologischen und artifiziellen Entitäten. Sowohl die Hardware-Software-Relationen als auch die Körper-Geist-Relationen unterliegen dabei Verknüpfungs- und Gestaltungsprozessen. Aus der Interaktion zwischen menschlichen und nicht-menschlichen Handlungsteilnehmern resultieren neuartige Wechselbeziehungen, welche unter Zuhilfenahme der Embodiment- und Embedded-Theorie nachgezeichnet werden. Den schwerwiegenden Aus- und Nebenwirkungen dieser Interkation wird mit einem empirischen Fallbeispiel nahegekommen. Dass diese Entwicklung hin zu einer konfigurierenden Gestaltungskultur risikobehaftet ist, wird unter Zuhilfenahme des Terminus 'Experimentalsystem' dargelegt. Dabei ist festzuhalten, dass die Tiefe-Hirnstimulation nicht trotz sondern wegen experimenteller Faktoren erfolgreich und faszinierend ist. Neurostimulationen in erster Linie als Konzept zu begreifen bedeutet, den Fokus auf kulturelle Anschichten und Handlungen zu lenken. In welchem Ausmaß wir zu ein- und zugreifenden Gestaltungen unserer Selbst bereit sind, hängt in letzter Konsequenz an unserem menschlichen Selbstverständnis. / Medical technology deep brain stimulation is not only a scientific and technical product, but also a cultural and technical achievement with historical roots. This kind of interface actions occupy a firm place in medical history and cannot be determined separately from it. Interfering practices such as trepanations and cults of the skull are rooted in many different ways and reveal an ancient human desire for influence and empowerment. In this way, man can be represented as a connectable, adjustable and configurable entity within the framework of 'eutoper' world and technology images as well as deterministic human images. By integrating active technical elements into the human body, we are shifting the boundaries between biological and artificial entities. Both the hardware-software-relations as well as the body-spirit-relations are subject to connection and design processes. The interaction between human and non-human action participants results in novel interrelationships, which are traced with the aid of the Embodiment and Embedded Theory. The serious side effects of this interaction are approached with an empirical case study. The fact that this development towards a configuring design culture entails risk is explained with the help of the term 'experimental system'. It should be noted that deep brain stimulation is successful and fascinating not despite but because of experimental factors. Understanding neurostimulation primarily as a concept means focusing on cultural strata and actions. The extent to which we are prepared to embrace and intervene in shaping ourselves depends ultimately on our human self-conception.

This investigation can be described as a long journey to a final destination: a truth in religion. We start by considering dualism of the subjective and the objective, the classical model of cognition that underlies notions of truth. Dualistic notions of cognition lead to serious problems, especially for religious truth. Religions claim to state truths about the nature of the universe and human destiny, but these truths are incompatible. With a dualistic model this problem of diversity of religious truths leads to fundamentalism or relativism. Thus, this research aims to turn to the roots of the cognitive situation and investigate the way we cognize and relate to the world to provide a better model. As we consider the philosophical theories and empirical investigations of cognition, we come to the conclusion that dualism of the subjective and objective is not tenable. As the findings of contemporary mind sciences and phenomenologically oriented research indicate, human cognition is embodied, embedded, enacted, extended, and shaped by language. Thus, I propose to re-conceptualize the cognitive situation to provide a better philosophical account. I put forward a tripartite model of cognition, which unites language, action, and environment. The consequent application of this model to the issues of truth and religion shows that we can avoid the problem of diversity of truth claims. A tripartite model allows us to explain how we can maintain religion as true, despite the diversity of religious truth claims. Additionally, as this model is fundamental, its application leads to various new findings and inferences, which render anew the world and the way humans relate to it. Thus, our journey brings us to new frontiers of investigation.