Thesis (M.A.B.S.)--International School of Theology, 1990. / Abstract. "Three magazine articles ..." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 52-54).

Thesis (Th. M.)--Liberty Baptist Theological Seminary, 1997. / Includes bibliographical references.

Published also as author's thesis, University of Paris. / Cover dated 1921. Description based on print version record. "Bibliographie": p. [263]-266.

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Agradecemos a compreensão. on 2016-05-19T17:12:43Z (GMT) / Submitted by ROQUE PIRES VERCESI null (rpvercesi@hotmail.com) on 2016-05-20T12:52:26Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Roque_Dissetação -final.pdf: 1290554 bytes, checksum: f4ed86c7ef444aa9fde6621e3e82bc57 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Paula Grisoto (grisotoana@reitoria.unesp.br) on 2016-05-20T20:21:24Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 vercesi_rp_me_mar.pdf: 1290554 bytes, checksum: f4ed86c7ef444aa9fde6621e3e82bc57 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-05-20T20:21:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 vercesi_rp_me_mar.pdf: 1290554 bytes, checksum: f4ed86c7ef444aa9fde6621e3e82bc57 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-03-31 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / Este trabalho está inserido no contexto da Filosofia da Lógica e no tópi-co teorias da verdade. As reflexões das teorias da verdade colocam em evi-dência a seguinte questão de interesse no ambiente filosófico, científico e ló-gico: “O que é a verdade?”. Esta tradição é bem longa, com reflexões que remontam à Antiguidade e ainda hoje são bastante pertinentes no mundo acadêmico, como podemos observar pela recente literatura sobre o assunto. Aristóteles foi um precursor desta busca ao propor que a verdade pode-ria ser caracterizada segundo sua máxima: “Dizer do que é, que ele não é, ou do que não é, que ele é, é falso; enquanto dizer do que é, que ele é, ou do que não é, que ele não é, é verdadeiro”. Posteriormente, essa questão referente à verdade foi minuciosamente tratada por muitos autores, que elaboraram teorias e/ou buscaram princípios para determinar o que é verdade ou o que torna algo verdadeiro (critério de verdade). Entre as teorias da verdade usualmente discu-tidas encontramos as teorias correspondencial, coerencial, pragmática, da re-dundância e a concepção semântica de Tarski. Dedicaremos um capítulo inicial a estas teorias da verdade, quando elencamos as suas características essenciais. Recentemente, a teoria da qua-se verdade tem conquistado importância nas reflexões sobre a verdade, que tem como um precursor o professor Newton da Costa, expoente brasileiro no âmbito da Lógica. Em 1986, Mikenberg, da Costa e Chuaqui introduziram a teoria da quase verdade no artigo Pragmatic truth and approximation to truth, publicado no “The Journal of Symbolic Logic”. Uma segunda meta desta Dissertação é o entendimento desta concep-ção de verdade, a quase verdade, e seu respectivo formalismo. Como este de-senvolvimento teórico da quase-verdade foi motivada pela concepção semân-tica de Tarski, a qual é entendida como uma das muitas teorias da quase ver-dade, então antes do nosso desenvolvimento sobre a quase-verdade, faremos um capítulo sobre a verdade segundo Alfred Tarski. A seguir, apresentamos o nosso entendimento da quase-verdade. Revi-sitamos os textos iniciais e outros que trouxeram novas contribuições para a quase-verdade, como a quase-satisfação de Bueno e de Souza de 1996. Tam-bém tratamos da recente versão de Silvestrini, de 2011, que traz inovações so-bre a formalização da quase-verdade. No Capítulo seguinte, apresentamos outra concepção filosófica relevan-te para esta Dissertação, o pragmatismo. Como está no título do artigo inicial da quase-verdade de 1986: “Verdade pragmática e aproximação à verdade”, a quase-verdade foi vinculada com aspectos do pragmatismo. O pragmatismo é um tema filosófico muito amplo e, certamente, não da-ríamos conta de retratá-lo no texto. Mesmo a versão da concepção pragmática da verdade é bastante extensa. Assim, consideraremos uma apresentação de três pioneiros do pragmatismo: Charles Pierce, Willian James e John Dewey. Procuramos destacar aspectos que destacam suas visões sobre a teoria da verdade. No capítulo final, faremos uma análise de quanto há de pragmatismo na teria da quase-verdade que buscamos entender no desenvolvimento desta Dissertação. / This work is inserted in the context of the Philosophy of Logic and in the topic theories of truth. Reflections of theories of truth put in evidence questions of interest in the philosophical, scientific and logical environment: "What is the truth?". This tradition is very long, with reflections that go back to antiquity and are still very relevant in the academic world, as can be seen by the recent litera-ture about this issue. Aristotle was a precursor of this search by proposing that the truth could be characterized according to their maximum: "To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true”. Posteriorly, this question of the truth was carefully treated by many authors who have developed theories and/or principles to de-termine what is true or what makes something true (criteria of truth). Among the theories of truth usually discussed, we find the theories: correspondence, co-herence, pragmatic, redundancy and semantic conception of Tarski. We dedicate an initial chapter to these theories of truth, when we list their essential characteristics. Recently, the theory of quasi-truth has gained importance in the reflections about the truth, which has as a precursor Profes-sor Newton da Costa, Brazilian exponent in the context of Logic. In 1986, Mikenberg, Costa and Chuaqui introduced the theory of quasi-truth in the arti-cle Pragmatic truth and approximation to truth, published in "The Journal of Symbolic Logic". A second goal of this Dissertation is the understanding of this concep-tion of true, the quasi-truth, and their respective formalism. As the theoretical development of quasi-truth was motivated by the semantic conception of Tar-ski, which is understood as one of many theories about quasi-truth, then be-fore our development on the quasi-truth, we will present a chapter about truth, according to Alfred Tarski. Next, we presented our understanding about the quasi-truth. We visited the original texts and others who brought new contributions to the quasi-truth, as the quasi-satisfaction of Bueno and Souza (1996). We also discussed about the recent version developed by Silvestrini (2011) that brings innovations on the formalization of quasi-truth. In the next chapter, we present another philosophical relevant concep-tion to this thesis, the pragmatism. As described in the title of the first article of quasi-truth of 1986: "Pragmatic truth and approach to the truth," the quasi-truth was linked with aspects of pragmatism. Pragmatism is a very broad philosophical theme and for this reason, we will discuss just a part of this theory in the text. Even the version of the prag-matic conception of truth is quite extensive. Thereby, we consider a presenta-tion of three pioneers of pragmatism: Charles Pierce, William James and John Dewey. We emphasize the aspects that highlight their views about the theory of truth. In the final chapter, we will analyze how much exist of the pragmatism in the quasi-truth theory, which we sought to understand during the thesis devel-opment.

The world is currently afflicted by unstable and undemocratic political systems which are frequently a product of failed political transitions. At the point of transition, states are often presented with the unique opportunity to address past human rights violations and restore divided societies, through the implementation of thorough and effective transitional justice processes; truth commissions remain one of the most influential tools in orchestrating these practices. However, as recent history demonstrates, when implemented incorrectly, the transitional justice processes facilitated by truth commission enquiries can not only be ineffective but also damaging. To account for these inadequacies, this thesis seeks to address three key issues: a common misunderstanding of the core concepts promoted by truth commission investigations, the need to notate and comprehend the positive and negative outcomes of past commission enquiries and the current lack of 'case-specific' guidance for future truth commission architects. With reference to these studies, the thesis will then seek to develop a three-pronged truth commission guidance framework to account for the three modes of political change through which transitional states can pass and recommend the establishment of a 'Truth Commission Advisory Body' to oversee and assist the process. These frameworks will then be applied to the case study of Zimbabwe, which is considered to be a candidate for political transition in the near future. The current proliferation of truth commission investigations reflects the common belief that they are the best response when confronting a transitional state's troubled past; this belief can only be vindicated by a substantial increase in the positive and lasting effects of future commission endeavours. Ultimately, this will only be achieved by an increased understanding of these complex processes and the provision of more extensive guidance to those seeking to foster them; this thesis represents a step closer to this eventuality.

No description available.

The practice of inquiry, in which we seek and pursue true beliefs by forming justified beliefs, is important to us. This thesis will address two questions concerning the significance of this practice. These are the question of what explains our preference for this particular belief-forming practice, and whether this value can be explained by the value of true belief alone. To answer these questions I will examme a variety of our intuitive commitments to particular values, assuming their general accuracy. I will use an inference from the goal of a practice to the value of a practice, an inference based on the assumption that when we pursue something it is valuable. I will discuss our intuitive commitments to the value of justification. I will also rely on the implications of the presence of pride and admiration in relation to the outcome of an inquiry (especially in situations where a belief is difficult to form). By using this methodology, I will argue for three sources of value that explain the unique significance of the value of inquiry. The first is the value of its unique role in our being able to form reliably true beliefs. Second, I will argue for Wayne D. Riggs' account of epistemic credit; Riggs defends the value of our being responsible for true beliefs, they are our achievements. Third, I will argue for an additional the value of delivering a skilful epistemic performance, another kind of achievement. I will show that although the value of true belief plays a role in explaining some of the values, the third value for inquiry is independent of the value of true belief. This means that there are intellectual rewards, which can be gained from this practice, that extend beyond the value of true belief. / KMBT_363 / Adobe Acrobat 9.54 Paper Capture Plug-in

One of the hot topics in doxastic epistemology at the moment is how to characterise the relationship between beliefs and truth. The extant literature is dominated by two views; a teleological understanding of the relationship – championed by people such as Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen – and a normative understanding of the relationship – championed by among others Nishi Shah. I argue that neither view does an adequate job of capturing the relationship between beliefs and truth. I argue that these two views should be abandoned in favour of a third model that sees beliefs as part of a doxastic system that aims at rationality.

No description available.

<p> Sceptical passages in Hume's writings tend to lead readers to assume that he opposes theories of evidence and methods for judging the truth and falsehood of our knowledge claims. But interpretations such as this overlook passages where Hume insists that we have methods of judging the truth of our claims about a priori relations of ideas and matters of fact and real existence. My intention is to make sense of these passages, taking them literally, and thereby avoiding both the sceptical and sceptically based naturalistic interpretations. I do not oppose the view that Hume is sceptical about metaphysical claims, such as our knowledge of the existence of impression-causing objects, but I argue that he is not sceptical of scientific claims in the sense that we have no reasonable basis for judging their truth or falsehood. The point is made by formulating Hume's theory of scientific judgement.</p> <p> The focus of this interpretation is on Hume's conception of philosophical relations, which provides the basis for predication and judgement. Predication arises by the comparison of ideas; a priori judgement is the "agreement or disagreement" of an idea with other ideas, while empirical judgement is the correspondence of an idea with an existing object (impressicn). </p> <p> The bulk of the dissertation formulates the scope and content of each of the seven philosophical relations as they are divided into those judged a priori, those judged by an immediate sense impression, and those judged by empirical reasoning in terms of cause and effect. In each case we find that Hume is neither sceptical of our methods for judging truth, nor is any method grounded in a presuppositional "natural" belief.</p> / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)