Thesis (Ph. D.)--Tufts University, 1987. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 540-604).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--George Washington University, 1999. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 353-370).

Ford Foundation. Energy Research and Development Administration.

No description available.

Though many international relations theorists have speculated that the spread of nuclear weapons may diminish the frequency - if not the severity - of military conflict among states, there are five reasons to expect that increased proliferation will increase the likelihood that nuclear weapons will be employed for coercive or destructive purposes. These dangers are independent of one another; that is, they are not interconnected as causes and effects. First, as nuclear weapons spread, the notion that these weapons are useful for purposes other than deterrence will spread concomitantly. Those who argue that the spread of nuclear weapons will diminish conflict wrongly assume that the leaders of new nuclear states will consider nuclear weapons useful only for deterrence. Second, actors within states may support policies that undermine deterrence stability. Specifically, such actors could support the deployment of weaponry and other technologies that could - in certain strategic contexts - provide incentives for pre-emptive attacks by one side or the other. Third, one side of an inter-state rivalry may acquire nuclear weapons long in advance of its vulnerable adversary. Often, the leaders of states that enjoy such advantages contemplate attacking their rival before it can acquire nuclear weapons, too. Fourth, though new nuclear states will be assumed to be as careful with their weapons as the older nuclear states, proliferation may nevertheless cause the probability of such accidents to grow at an accelerating rate. As the number of nuclear states increases, the distances between these states decrease, and some of them may assume dangerous launch-on-warning force postures to compensate for their perceived vulnerability to sudden attack. Launch-on-warning increases the danger that accidents could escalate into nuclear violence. Fifth, surreptitious attempts may be made by third parties to instigate nuclear war between other states. The likelihood that the provocateur of such an incident would remain undiscovered increases as the number of nuclear states grows - as does the temptation to instigate such an event.

No description available.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Virginia, 2006. / Title from v.1 t.p. (viewed Apr. 20, 2009). "UMI number: 3218417." Includes bibliographical references (p. 582-609). Also issued in print.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2007. / Thesis directed by Keir A. Lieber for the Department of Political Science. "July 2007." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 171-176).

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / The North Korean nuclear issue reached a dangerous impasse in the recent months as North Korea continues to resist international pressure to halt its nuclear weapons and missile programs. North Korea watchers and nuclear experts estimate that North Korea could have up to six or seven plutonium-based nuclear bombs by now. Indeed, North Korea announced to the world in October 2003 that they now have the capability of "nuclear deterrence." All would agree that a nuclear-weaponized North Korea will have grave consequences on the Korean Peninsula and the East Asia region. Accordingly, this thesis contends that the Bush administration miscalculated in its policy on North Korea by letting their "preemption" doctrine cloud their judgment on what is the most feasible and prudent policy vis--Ì vis North Korea. So, what now? What should the US policy toward North Korea be going forward? Given the events in the last year or so, this paper makes the assumption that North Korea already possesses nuclear weapons. Indeed, the CIA has made formal statements saying that North Korea, in essence, already possesses nuclear weapons. The intelligence service believes that conventional explosives tests, conducted since the 1980s, have allowed the North Koreans to verify that their nuclear designs would work. The agency believes North Korea has one or two nuclear weapons similar to what the United States dropped on Hiroshima during World War II. Given these circumstances and the policy options available to the Bush administration, the best course of action and the most elegant solution to this messy problem, is to adopt a policy of unifying the two Koreas. A reunified Korea would satisfy most U.S. interests and would solve the most pressing and dangerous problem: the nuclear issue. Granted, it is not the most optimal option and there are some potential drawbacks but, nevertheless, it is the best option available. In this scenario, there is no "good" option; one has to choose the "least-worse" policy option. In essence, the U.S. has to make the best of a bad situation. / Major, United States Air Force

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. / Despite decades of energetic international control efforts, nuclear weapons technology continues to spread worldwide. To understand how these complex weapons programs can be developed, we assume the role of a nation seeking to build a first fission weapon, and the ability to continue to build more. We introduce a large-scale project management model that includes alternate development paths to achieve certain key technical milestones. We show how such a project can be optimally accelerated by expe-diting critical tasks. Next, we present a new analysis tool to detect vulnerabilities in such a development program: we seek optimal actions to impede, set back and/or otherwise frustrate completion of a first weapon, even if the proliferator knows what we are doing to delay things. This two-sided project evaluation tool is implemented with a combination of off-the-shelf project management software, optimization software and custom code. An illustrative case study of a first fission weapon program shows how this new analysis tool can be used. Our methods also apply to chemical, biological and/or radiological dispersion weapons, as well as to more conventional strategic industrial and commercial activities. / Lieutenant, Supply Corps, United States Navy