No description available.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / Twenty-three years ago, Israeli fighter pilots destroyed the Osiraq nuclear reactor and made a profound statement about global nuclear proliferation. In light of the recent preventive regime change in Iraq, a review of this strike reveals timely lessons for future counterproliferation actions. Using old, new, and primary source evidence, this thesis examines Osiraq for lessons from a preventive attack on a non-conventional target. Before attacking Osiraq, Israeli policymakers attempted diplomatic coercion to delay Iraq's nuclear development. Concurrent with diplomatic actions, Israeli planners developed a state of the art military plan to destroy Osiraq. Finally, Israeli leaders weathered the international storm after the strike. The thesis examines Israeli decisionmaking for each of these phases. The thesis draws two conclusions. First, preventive strikes are valuable primarily for two purposes: buying time and gaining international attention. Second, the strike provided a one-time benefit for Israel. Subsequent strikes will be less effective due to dispersed/hardened nuclear targets and limited intelligence. / Major, United States Air Force

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Defense Decision-Making and Planning))--Naval Postgraduate School, Sept. 2004. / Thesis advisor(s): Peter R. Lavoy. Includes bibliographical references (p. 61-62). Also available online.

The scope of the thesis is to study India's nuclear behavior and the international responses in the period following India's nuclear weapons tests in 1998 leading up to the waiver for India by the nuclear suppliers group in 2008. The thesis explores this process of nuclear reconciliation in the context of a quest for international nuclear legitimacy. Nuclear legitimation is understood as a two-sided process and the explanation assumes two sides to the story: the Indian side and the audience side. Grounding the conceptualization within a theoretical framework of constructivism, the thesis explores the legitimation strategies employed by the Indian government to assuage international apprehensions about its possession of nuclear weapons. Additionally, the thesis analyzes how and why selected states in the international audience received and responded to India's strategies. In doing so, the thesis acknowledges but goes beyond an apparent power and interest explanation underlined by geo-political/security considerations and economic/trade interests - to include an analysis of shared norms and beliefs that constituted a basis for legitimacy judgments, circumscribed the interaction between India and other states, induced certain responses on the audience side and made possible certain claims on the Indian side. The principal argument is that normative evaluations and ideational factors served as important resources on both sides and also played an important role in determining the timing as well as the nature of nuclear reconciliation with India. By allowing a strategic employment of different arguments that appealed to the different states in the targeted audience, a legitimation process reduced the political, economic and diplomatic costs for the Indian government. Similarly, it enabled other states in the audience to support (as the P3: France, Russia and United Kingdom did), not come in the way (as the game-changers: Australia, Canada, Germany and Japan did) or not block India-specific waiver (as the white knights: Ireland, Austria, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden and Switzerland did) - and to justify their responses, cost-effectively.

No description available.

Using the IAEA as a case for focused study, this thesis argues that the construction and reconstruction of the Secretariat’s legitimacy has been dependant upon several different legitimating influences at different stages in the IAEA’s evolution. In brief, it will be demonstrated that early on, in the absence of clear non-proliferation norms, power wielded by critical and self-interested actors functioned as the primary legitimator – promoting early development and insulating the organization from outside pressures. However, based upon this particular case, I will also argue that state power alone is insufficient to guarantee legitimacy and the exercise of international public authority, especially in light of the degree to which these institutions are increasingly expected to challenge the territorial sovereignty of member states. In order for an organization to acquire adequate legitimacy to exercise public authority over the long term, it must develop beyond the point at which state power is instrumental, and assume a degree of organizational autonomy. This happened with the evolution of organizational expertise recognizing the IAEA’s bureaucracy as an authority, development of specific nonproliferation rules and norms that placed the IAEA in authority, and “right” processes within the bureaucracy that reinforced these and other substantive norms, positioning the Secretariat as a trusted agent within international society. Thus, the development of a professional identity, successful norms and rules, and the elaboration of a “right” process were key to the creation of legitimacy, and as a consequence, the Secretariat’s exercise of public authority in support of the safeguards regime.

University of Macau / Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities / Department of Government and Public Administration

Made available in DSpace on 2014-06-11T19:28:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2011-02-25Bitstream added on 2014-06-13T18:57:13Z : No. of bitstreams: 1 batista_gff_me_mar.pdf: 444860 bytes, checksum: c4a6a6b8f674b36be8b6a9757c906fbf (MD5) / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / A presente dissertação analisa as mudanças nos elementos domésticos e internacionais que influenciaram a decisão do governo brasileiro de aderir ao Tratado de Não-Proliferação de Armas Nucleares (TNP) em 1998, após três décadas de rejeição a ele. Essa rejeição era justificada pelo caráter discriminatório do Tratado, que concedia privilégios aos países possuidores de armas nucleares e impedia o desenvolvimento tecnológico autônomo daqueles que não as possuíam. A pesquisa revelou que, em consonância com a explicação oficial, a alteração de postura com relação ao TNP foi fruto das mudanças que ocorreram no plano internacional após o fim da Guerra Fria, juntamente com as mudanças internas, com o fim do regime militar. A manutenção da renúncia ao TNP pareceu, então, infundada por ser incapaz de trazer benefícios práticos para o país e, além disso, causar danos políticos à imagem e à credibilidade externa do país, característica considerada essencial para a obtenção de vantagens no novo contexto internacional / This Master's thesis analyzes the changes in domestic and international factors that influenced Brazilian government's decision to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1998 after three decades rejecting it. This rejection was justified by the discriminatory character of the Treaty, which granted privileges to countries possessing nuclear weapons and prevented the autonomous technological development of those which didn't possess them. The survey showed that, in line with the official explanation, the change of attitude to the NPT was the result of the changes that have occurred internationally since the end of the Cold War, along with internal changes, with he end of military regime. The maintenance of rejection to the NPT seems to be, then, seless, for being unable to bring practical benefits to the country and also for causing political damage to the country's external image and credibility, a characteristic considered essential to obtain advantages in the new international context

Orientador: Shiguenoli Miyamoto / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-17T14:13:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Batista_GabrielaFerroFirmino_M.pdf: 576912 bytes, checksum: 2a43cf162c5f082ce2dcc8e5e620c29a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011 / Resumo: A presente dissertação analisa as mudanças nos elementos domésticos e internacionais que influenciaram a decisão do governo brasileiro de aderir ao Tratado de Não-Proliferação de Armas Nucleares (TNP) em 1998, após três décadas de rejeição a ele. Essa rejeição era justificada pelo caráter discriminatório do Tratado, que concedia privilégios aos países possuidores de armas nucleares e impedia o desenvolvimento tecnológico autônomo daqueles que não as possuíam. A pesquisa revelou que, em consonância com a explicação oficial, a alteração de postura com relação ao TNP foi fruto das mudanças que ocorreram no plano internacional após o fim da Guerra Fria, juntamente com as mudanças internas, com o fim do regime militar. A manutenção da renúncia ao TNP pareceu, então, infundada por ser incapaz de trazer benefícios práticos para o país e, além disso, causar danos políticos à imagem e à credibilidade externa do país, característica considerada essencial para a obtenção de vantagens no novo contexto internacional / Abstract: This Master's thesis analyzes the changes in domestic and international factors that influenced Brazilian government's decision to accede to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1998 after three decades rejecting it. This rejection was justified by the discriminatory character of the Treaty, which granted privileges to countries possessing nuclear weapons and prevented the autonomous technological development of those which didn't possess them. The survey showed that, in line with the official explanation, the change of attitude to the NPT was the result of the changes that have occurred internationally since the end of the Cold War, along with internal changes, with he end of military regime. The maintenance of rejection to the NPT seems to be, then, seless, for being unable to bring practical benefits to the country and also for causing political damage to the country's external image and credibility, a characteristic considered essential to obtain advantages in the new international context / Mestrado / Política Externa / Mestre em Relações Internacionais

Since the end of the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979, Northeast Asia and its comprising countries have avoided international conflict as well as any regional set has done over the past few decades. The absence of nuclear weapons among Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, in particular, is striking, given their technological and scientific capabilities. Though each of those countries has come close at times to developing their own nuclear weapons, one factor or another contributed to the failure of those upstart programs. The United States has played a significant role in all of them. Still, other factors remain. The purpose of this thesis is to determine in detail what caused the lack of a nuclear arms race in northeast Asia, beyond the American angle, as far as could be done. Existential threats exist to each country involved in the study, theoretically and tactically. Additionally, what causes an outlier like North Korea, which has boldly moved forward with nuclear weapons development? An important work by Scott Sagan is utilized in the thesis to assist with developing some far-reaching conclusions, with great importance to other parts of the world, beyond northeast Asia. Other literature can assist with those conclusions, as well. The framework of this thesis will be to intermingle a somewhat amended version of Sagan's nuclear proliferation rationalizations with historical analyses to draft some region-specific conclusions about why northeast Asia has not had a nuclear arms race. Processes going on between countries, within countries, and among countries, militarily, culturally, and economically, play such important roles than none can be discarded. The economic power centered on the capitalist core of northeast Asia can show how nuclear weapons acquisition is no longer among the things necessary to gain international respect or even security.