Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Maryland, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 257-269).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Queen's University, Kingston, Ont., 1990. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 130-137).

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs) Naval Postgraduate School, December 1993. / Thesis advisor(s): James J. Wirtz. "December 1993." Bibliography: p. 63-67. Also available online.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Boston College, 1994. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 262-293).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Kentucky, 2003. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 243-262).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of South Carolina, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 302-319).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Catholic University of America, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 271-291).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--West Virginia University, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 209-229).

This study analyzes the rule of the law of treaties permitting the provisional application of treaties or parts thereof, which usually occurs between signature and ratification (article 25 of the 1969 Vienna Convention). Chapter 1 reviews the negotiating record of article 25. Chapter 2 examines the reasons for provisional application, which include the urgency of the treaty and preparation for a new international organization. Chapter 3 considers article 25 in detail, while chapter 4 explores provisional application under customary international law, including the origins of the custom. The constitutionality of provisional application and the municipal effect of provisionally applied treaties are examined in chapter 5, along with provisional application in South African law and treaty practice. Chapter 6 considers the special role of provisional application in the field of arms control instruments. The main conclusion reached is that the principle of pacta sunt servanda applies during the provisional period. / Jurisprudence / LL.M

Nuclear deterrence is born from the two superpowers’ relations during the Cold War as they were the first countries to get nuclear weapons and they were the main and most powerful rivals in the world. Then new actors joined the game by testing their own nuclear bombs: the UK in 1952, followed by France in 1960, China in 1964, India in 1974, and Pakistan in 1998. Israel pretends it does not have any nuclear weapons but it is an open secret that they do 1. France helped Israel to get its weapons and the nuclear explosion in 1979 off the southern coast of Africa probably involved Israel and South Africa (sourced by the Federation of American Scientists, the Wisconsin Project on Arms Control, the Center for Defense Information, etc.). This was confirmed by Mordechai Vanunu, former Israeli scientist who worked on developing the bomb. The intrusion of new nuclear countries frightened the United States and the USSR because the balance was already fragile and newcomers could break it. Would the game remain "safe" with more players? Therefore in 1968 both countries drafted a treaty to prevent nuclear proliferation. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) came into force in 1970, at a time when five countries had successfully achieved a nuclear explosion. The NPT officially recognises only these five countries as nuclear-weapons states. They happen to be also the five permanent member states of the UN Security Council. India and Pakistan carried out a nuclear test after 1968 and are therefore referred to as non-official nuclearweapons states. The new nuclear states adopted and adapted the nuclear doctrine to their needs, their geopolitical interests and their place in international relations.