The proliferation of nuclear weapons is a great threat to world peace and stability. The question of strengthening the nonproliferation regime has been open for a long period of time. In 1997 the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors (BOG) adopted the Additional Safeguards Protocol. The purpose of the protocol is to enhance the IAEA’s ability to detect undeclared production of fissile materials in member states. However, the IAEA does not always have sufficient human and financial resources to accomplish this task. Developed here is a concept for making use of human and technical resources available in academia that could be used to enhance the IAEA’s mission. The objective of this research was to study the feasibility of an academic community using commercially or publicly available sources of information and products for the purpose of detecting covert facilities and activities intended for the unlawful acquisition of fissile materials or production of nuclear weapons. In this study, the availability and use of commercial satellite imagery systems, commercial computer codes for satellite imagery analysis, Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT)verification International Monitoring System (IMS), publicly available information sources such as watchdog groups and press reports, and Customs Services information were explored. A system for integrating these data sources to form conclusions was also developed. The results proved that publicly and commercially available sources of information and data analysis can be a powerful tool in tracking violations in the international nuclear nonproliferation regime and a framework for implementing these tools in academic community was developed. As a result of this study a formation of an International Nonproliferation Monitoring Academic Community (INMAC) is proposed. This would be an independent organization consisting of academics (faculty, staff and students) from both nuclear weapon states (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS). This community analyzes all types of unclassified publicly and commercially available information to aid in detection of violations of the non-proliferation regime. INMAC shares all of this information with the IAEA and the public. Since INMAC is composed solely by members of the academic community, this organization would not demonstrate any biases in its investigations or reporting.

The comparison of nuclear facilities based on their barriers to nuclear material proliferation has remained a difficult endeavor, often requiring expert elicitation for each system under consideration. However, objectively comparing systems using a set of computable metrics to derive a single number representing a system is not, in essence, a nuclear nonproliferation specific problem and significant research has been performed for business models. For instance, Multi-Attribute Utility Analysis (MAUA) methods have been used previously to provide an objective insight of the barriers to proliferation. In this paper, the Proliferation Resistance Analysis and Evaluation Tool for Observed Risk (PRAETOR), a multi-tiered analysis tool based on the multiplicative MAUA method, is presented. It folds sixty three mostly independent metrics over three levels of detail to give an ultimate metric for nonproliferation performance comparison. In order to reduce analysts' bias, the weighting between the various metrics was obtained by surveying a total of thirty three nonproliferation specialists and nonspecialists from fields such as particle physics, international policy, and industrial engineering. The PRAETOR was used to evaluate the Fast Breeder Reactor Fuel Cycle (FBRFC). The results obtained using these weights are compared against a uniform weight approach. Results are presented for five nuclear material diversion scenarios: four examples include a diversion attempt on various components of a PUREX fast reactor cycle and one scenario involves theft from a PUREX facility in a LWR cycle. The FBRFC was evaluated with uranium-plutonium fuel and a second time using thorium-uranium fuel. These diversion scenarios were tested with both uniform and expert weights, with and without safeguards in place. The numerical results corroborate nonproliferation truths and provide insight regarding fast reactor facilities' proliferation resistance in relation to known standards.

Thesis (M.S. in Operations Research)--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2004. / Thesis advisor(s): Gerald G. Brown. Includes bibliographical references (p. 43-44). Also available online.

Thesis--School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala., 1992-93. / Title from title screen (viewed Nov. 3, 2003). "28 May 1993." Includes bibliographical references.

Between 1957 and 1963, both Anglo-American discussions of nuclear cooperation and the wider debate on nuclear strategy within NATO were often dominated by the question of whether Britain’s deterrent would be amalgamated or integrated into a wider NATO or European force, such as the proposed MLF (Multilateral Force). This dissertation discusses the development and impact of competing British and American proposals for “nuclear sharing” within the context of European economic and political integration as well as that of discussions within NATO of the appropriate strategy for the alliance in an age of mutual nuclear vulnerability between the superpowers. Particular attention is paid to the context of successive nuclear crises in world politics during this period, from Sputnik to the Soviet ultimatum over Berlin through the Cuban missile crisis. The divergent opinions among the leaders of the major powers over the appropriate responses to these crises shaped the debate over nuclear sharing and form a previously neglected dimension of this topic.

Between 1957 and 1963, both Anglo-American discussions of nuclear cooperation and the wider debate on nuclear strategy within NATO were often dominated by the question of whether Britain’s deterrent would be amalgamated or integrated into a wider NATO or European force, such as the proposed MLF (Multilateral Force). This dissertation discusses the development and impact of competing British and American proposals for “nuclear sharing” within the context of European economic and political integration as well as that of discussions within NATO of the appropriate strategy for the alliance in an age of mutual nuclear vulnerability between the superpowers. Particular attention is paid to the context of successive nuclear crises in world politics during this period, from Sputnik to the Soviet ultimatum over Berlin through the Cuban missile crisis. The divergent opinions among the leaders of the major powers over the appropriate responses to these crises shaped the debate over nuclear sharing and form a previously neglected dimension of this topic.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Defense Decision-Making & Planning))--Naval Postgraduate School, December 2007. / AD-A475 821. "December 2007." Description based on title screen as viewed on January 17, 2008. Thesis Advisor(s): Russell, James A. ; Kadhim, Abbas. Includes bibliographical references (p. 67-71). Also available via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Pennsylvania State University, 2007. / Mode of access: World Wide Web.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Defense Decision-Making and Planning))--Naval Postgraduate School, Sept. 2004. / Thesis Advisor(s): Peter R. Lavoy. Includes bibliographical references (p. 85-89). Also available online.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, Sept. 2004. / Thesis Advisor(s): Peter R. Lavoy, Mikhail Tsypkin. Includes bibliographical references (p. 51-56). Also available online.