Between 1957 and 1963, both Anglo-American discussions of nuclear cooperation and the wider debate on nuclear strategy within NATO were often dominated by the question of whether Britain’s deterrent would be amalgamated or integrated into a wider NATO or European force, such as the proposed MLF (Multilateral Force). This dissertation discusses the development and impact of competing British and American proposals for “nuclear sharing” within the context of European economic and political integration as well as that of discussions within NATO of the appropriate strategy for the alliance in an age of mutual nuclear vulnerability between the superpowers. Particular attention is paid to the context of successive nuclear crises in world politics during this period, from Sputnik to the Soviet ultimatum over Berlin through the Cuban missile crisis. The divergent opinions among the leaders of the major powers over the appropriate responses to these crises shaped the debate over nuclear sharing and form a previously neglected dimension of this topic.

Between 1957 and 1963, both Anglo-American discussions of nuclear cooperation and the wider debate on nuclear strategy within NATO were often dominated by the question of whether Britain’s deterrent would be amalgamated or integrated into a wider NATO or European force, such as the proposed MLF (Multilateral Force). This dissertation discusses the development and impact of competing British and American proposals for “nuclear sharing” within the context of European economic and political integration as well as that of discussions within NATO of the appropriate strategy for the alliance in an age of mutual nuclear vulnerability between the superpowers. Particular attention is paid to the context of successive nuclear crises in world politics during this period, from Sputnik to the Soviet ultimatum over Berlin through the Cuban missile crisis. The divergent opinions among the leaders of the major powers over the appropriate responses to these crises shaped the debate over nuclear sharing and form a previously neglected dimension of this topic.

Master of Arts / Department of History / Mark P. Parillo / Detachment 101's experiences provide a microcosm view of the evolutionary nature of warfare, and also demonstrates the understanding of Fourth Generational Warfare concepts by the Detachment.

The present study was intended as a new approach to the study of the military equipment of the Late Assyrian period which has traditionally relied upon the pictorial representations of the palace reliefs. By examining extant artifacts from the first millennium in their own right, with the reliefs merely serving to contextualize them, a truer understanding of Assyrian arms and armour can be gathered. This is necessary because the artwork only provides us with a filtered view of the real world, the reliefs are as much works of propaganda as of history. The approach taken here is to first examine the existing weapons typologically, and then to evaluate whether such weapon types appear to be accurately represented in contemporary artwork. Textual sources are also used where they can aid in the discussion. Five categories of arms and armour were studied: swords and daggers, spearpoints, shields, armour and helmets. The quality and quantity of the items in these categories varied significantly, providing for a much better representative sample of some items than others. Further questions concerning the possible ritual, rather than military, use of some of the existing artifacts were raised. However, the main conclusions reached were that the reliefs suffer not only from a propagandistic viewpoint which sometimes obscures the reality of Assyrian warfare, but that they also suffer from artistic license and spatial restraints, the difficulties in representing three-dimensional objects in a two-dimensional manner, the possible unfamiliarity of the artists with changing military technology and methods of construction, and finally, our inability to understand artistic short-hand for what were commonplace objects to the contemporary viewer. These have led to misunderstanding both as to the dating and chronological changes in weaponry, and also to the tactics used by the Late Assyrian military. This study of the artifacts themselves reveals a more mundane, utilitarian, and conservative military force which shows both a basic homogeneousness throughout the empire, and the myriad tiny variables of an army on the move drawing weapons and troops from many regions.

Doctor of Philosophy / Security Studies Program / Jeffrey Pickering / Ideas about why US foreign policy actors have turned ever more frequently to private military contractors (PMCs) and private security contractors (PSCs) over the past decade and a half abound. Descriptive accounts of the rise of these corporations have become something of a cottage industry over the past decade or so. The various ideas advanced have yet to be placed under rigorous empirical scrutiny, however. This dissertation builds from the existing descriptive literature to advance a new theoretical framework to explain the rise of private contractors. It analyzes this framework as well as alternative ideas using both quantitative and qualitative analysis, marking the first time this important subject has been systematically examined with both social science methods.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Donald J. Mrozek / This study analyzes the effect of the Army Air Forces’ wartime experience on the selection and training of aviation cadets and the steps taken by the Army Air Forces to reduce the number of accidents and fatalities. Over the course of the war, the US Army Air Forces suffered over 54,000 accidents in the continental United States. These accidents accounted for over 15,000 fatalities, the equivalent of a World War Two infantry division. As a result of this wartime experience the Army Air Forces began instituting and enforcing stricter safety measures and emphasizing safety in all phases of training. By the end of the war, the Army Air Forces had transitioned from an organization with loose standards for selection, training, and safety to one with formal procedures for all three. In the process, the Army Air Forces established a new culture of professionalism for the US Air Force.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Donald J. Mrozek / After the Second World War, the leaders of the Department of the Army (DA) worked to inform those in the service that they had a duty to help the American people understand what the Army was doing to provide security for the nation. Their goal was for the public to have, at a minimum, the same amount of understanding of the Army as it had during World War II. To achieve this goal they believed that the officer corps had to be convinced that explaining to the public what the service was doing was in the best interest of the Army. The effort of the leaders to convince the officer corps was conducted by two primary means. First, the leaders made many public statements announcing that the Army would continue to inform the American people. Second, they added a requirement for those setting the curricula at the senior two schools of the service to provide instruction about the program that the Army had, which had three sub-programs, to update the American public. Between AY 1947 and 1989, the leaders continued to talk about the importance of informing the public. However, those approving the curricula at the two Colleges of the Army placed decreasing emphasis on educating students about what public affairs was and how to conduct it. This assertion is based on three primary findings. First, there is a clear decrease in the number of hours allocated to teaching about public affairs. Second, over the course of this period students were provided with fewer chances to apply what they were learning. Third, the coverage of the instruction went from covering at least two of the components of the Army’s program to at best only one. In the end a gap is clearly visible between what the leaders of the Army were saying regarding the importance of educating officers about public affairs and what was included in the curricula of these two schools: deeds did not match words.

No description available.

On June 1, 1866, one thousand heavily-armed Irish-American Fenian insurgents invaded Upper Canada across the Niagara River from Buffalo, NY. The next day near the town of Ridgeway, 800 Fenians battled with 850 Canadian volunteer soldiers, including a small company of 28 University of Toronto students who ended up taking the brunt of the attack. The Battle of Ridgeway (or Lime Ridge or Limestone Ridge) ended with a disastrous rout of the Canadians who in their panicked retreat left their dead and wounded on the field. It was the last major incursion into Canada, the last battle in Ontario and the first modern one fought by Canadians, led in the field exclusively by Canadian officers, and significantly fought in Canada. The Fenian Raid mobilized some 22,000 volunteer troops and resulted in the suspension of habeas corpus in the colonial Province of Canada by its Attorney General and Minister of Militia John A. Macdonald, but the battle which climaxed this crisis is only prominent by its obscurity in Canadian historiography. Almost everything known and cited about Ridgeway springs from the same sources—four books and pamphlets—three of them published in the summer of 1866 immediately after the event and the remaining one in 1910. This dissertation argues that the history of the battle was distorted and falsified by these sources and by two military board of inquiries staged to explicitly cover up the extent of the disaster. This study investigates the relationship between the inquiries and the contemporary author-historians of two of the sources: Alexander Somerville, an investigative journalist in Hamilton, Ontario, a recent immigrant from Britain with a controversial history; and George T. Denison III, a prominent young Toronto attorney, a commander of a troop of volunteer cavalry, a former Confederate secret service agent, author-commentator on Canada’s military policy and presiding judge on both boards of inquiry. This study describes the process by which Ridgeway’s history was hidden and falsified and its possible scope and significance in Canadian historiography. New archival and published sources are identified, assessed and assembled for a newly restored and authenticated micro-narrative of the battle.

On June 1, 1866, one thousand heavily-armed Irish-American Fenian insurgents invaded Upper Canada across the Niagara River from Buffalo, NY. The next day near the town of Ridgeway, 800 Fenians battled with 850 Canadian volunteer soldiers, including a small company of 28 University of Toronto students who ended up taking the brunt of the attack. The Battle of Ridgeway (or Lime Ridge or Limestone Ridge) ended with a disastrous rout of the Canadians who in their panicked retreat left their dead and wounded on the field. It was the last major incursion into Canada, the last battle in Ontario and the first modern one fought by Canadians, led in the field exclusively by Canadian officers, and significantly fought in Canada. The Fenian Raid mobilized some 22,000 volunteer troops and resulted in the suspension of habeas corpus in the colonial Province of Canada by its Attorney General and Minister of Militia John A. Macdonald, but the battle which climaxed this crisis is only prominent by its obscurity in Canadian historiography. Almost everything known and cited about Ridgeway springs from the same sources—four books and pamphlets—three of them published in the summer of 1866 immediately after the event and the remaining one in 1910. This dissertation argues that the history of the battle was distorted and falsified by these sources and by two military board of inquiries staged to explicitly cover up the extent of the disaster. This study investigates the relationship between the inquiries and the contemporary author-historians of two of the sources: Alexander Somerville, an investigative journalist in Hamilton, Ontario, a recent immigrant from Britain with a controversial history; and George T. Denison III, a prominent young Toronto attorney, a commander of a troop of volunteer cavalry, a former Confederate secret service agent, author-commentator on Canada’s military policy and presiding judge on both boards of inquiry. This study describes the process by which Ridgeway’s history was hidden and falsified and its possible scope and significance in Canadian historiography. New archival and published sources are identified, assessed and assembled for a newly restored and authenticated micro-narrative of the battle.