Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. / Despite decades of energetic international control efforts, nuclear weapons technology continues to spread worldwide. To understand how these complex weapons programs can be developed, we assume the role of a nation seeking to build a first fission weapon, and the ability to continue to build more. We introduce a large-scale project management model that includes alternate development paths to achieve certain key technical milestones. We show how such a project can be optimally accelerated by expe-diting critical tasks. Next, we present a new analysis tool to detect vulnerabilities in such a development program: we seek optimal actions to impede, set back and/or otherwise frustrate completion of a first weapon, even if the proliferator knows what we are doing to delay things. This two-sided project evaluation tool is implemented with a combination of off-the-shelf project management software, optimization software and custom code. An illustrative case study of a first fission weapon program shows how this new analysis tool can be used. Our methods also apply to chemical, biological and/or radiological dispersion weapons, as well as to more conventional strategic industrial and commercial activities. / Lieutenant, Supply Corps, United States Navy

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, September 2003. / Thesis advisor(s): James Russell, Peter R. Lavoy. Includes bibliographical references (p. 69-79). Also available online.

Faced with America's conventional military superiority, many countries are turning to weapons of mass destruction as a means to deter U.S. intervention in their affairs. At the same time, 11 September 2001 awakened the United States to a degree of vulnerability it had never experienced before, making it increasingly unwilling to tolerate such weapons in the hands of unstable and unpredictable regimes, particularly those with connections to terrorist organizations. These twin fears of American encroachment and American vulnerability create a modern security dilemma, forming a vicious cycle of insecurity that challenge straditional notions of deterrence. It is unquestionable that the United States possesses the strategic capabilities to retaliate with devastating effect to any attack, but regional asymmetries of interest may tip the scales of brinksmanship in favor of potential adversaries, thereby dissuading American involvement in responding to global security threats. While this might be a welcome change to some, the United States is developing Counter proliferation options to prevent, protect against, or destroy threatening weapons reserving the right to use preemptive force in order to retain freedom of action abroad and protect the homeland. This is a worthwhile objective, but deterrence will never be guaranteed by American strength, and unprovoked wars of disarmament will inevitably spark yet further proliferation and hatred toward the United States. Ultimately, the only reliable road to peace lies in nurturing and broadening friendly relations with nations that share the goal of destroying the threat posed by catastrophic weapons of mass murder and terror.

Thesis (M.S.)--Joint Miitary Intelligence College, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 69-72).

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2007. / Cover title. "December 2007." AD-A475 875. Includes bibliographical references. Electronic version available on the Public STINET.

Thesis (M.P.A.)--Bowling Green State University, 2009. / Document formatted into pages; contains vii, 91 p. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (doctoral)--Göteborgs universitet, 2007. / Thesis t.p. and abstract laid in. Includes bibliographical references (p. 253-263).

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2004. / Thesis Advisor(s): Edward A. Olsen. Includes bibliographical references (p. 105-112). Also available online.

Thesis (doctoral)--Göteborgs universitet, 2007. / Thesis t.p. and abstract laid in. Includes bibliographical references (p. 253-263).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Southern California, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 199-227).