No description available.

In 2000, two international organizations—the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Organization for Economic Development (OECD)—attempted to attack the problems of money laundering and tax evasion through coercive soft law. Both organizations attempted to induce state compliance with international standards by placing noncompliant states on publicly available blacklists. The FATF blacklist, Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories, documented states that failed to implement international anti-money laundering standards and the OECD blacklist, Uncooperative Tax Havens, documented states that failed to implement international tax information-sharing agreements. This report examines the Cayman Islands’ quick compliance with these two international efforts. The report hypothesizes that the Cayman Islands’ complied quickly with both the FATF and OECD initiatives because the Cayman Islands’ had a strong financial institutional capacity and a high level of reputational risk from not complying. The report develops a methodology for testing this theory against other jurisdictions placed on both of the original FATF and OECD blacklists. The testing reveals that while financial institutional capacity and reputational risk may have contributed to the Cayman Islands’ and other states’ compliance with the FATF and OECD initiatives, these factors were not determinative. The report concludes that better metrics for state institutional capacity and reputational risk are needed to accurately measure states’ compliance with the FATF and OECD regimes. / text

During the 1980's, many European countries introduced flexibility measures in their labour market to fight high and persistent levels of unemployment. In particular, in many countries reforms consisted of the introduction of more flexible labour contracts (fixed-term contracts) in comparison to the predominant ones (permanent contracts). The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the effects of such contracts on the overall performance of the labour market. First, an economy with firing costs is analysed theoretically. Firing costs are generally considered one of the most important elements in making a labour market rigid. This chapter stresses the fact that it is not just the level of severance payments what matters, but a wider view of employment protection. In particular, dismissal conflicts are modeled explicitly and their cost is derived. In the second chapter, the effects on employment of introducing fixed-term contracts in an economy with only permanent contracts are analysed theoretically. Our findings are that higher employment at the expense of segmentation of the labour market only arises if wages are very flexible. Otherwise, employment is not necessarily higher than in a system with only permanent contracts. Moreover, from the social point of view, market segmentation is too large. The last two chapters are empirical work applied to Spain. The Spanish experience appears to be particularly useful in this context to draw some lessons of these policies because the unemployment rate is the highest among OECD economies despite the several "policy experiments" implemented in the last two decades. In Chapter 3 the duration pattern of fixed-term contracts and the determinants of the transformation of these into permanent ones are analysed. Evidence is found that fixed-term contracts are used as a screening device instrument. Also, employers use fixed-term contracts until their legal limit. In Chapter 4, we study the effects of fixed-term contracts on the duration distribution of unemployment. It is found that the chances of leaving unemployment for a reference group have increased at short durations, while they have decreased at long durations of unemployment.

I denna studie har den offentliga sektorns påverkan på tillväxt i OECD-länderna undersökts. Studiens frågeställning är: Hur påverkar den offentliga sektorns storlek och struktur ekonomisk tillväxt i OECD-länder? Undersökningen är gjord för åren 2007-2010 i en så kallad paneldata-undersökning. För att undersöka strukturen har den offentliga sektorns utgifter delats upp i sex delar - utgifter för utbildning, försvar, sjukvård, varor och tjänster, sociala avgifter samt övriga utgifter. I undersökningen har sex modeller används för att få fram resultat. Undersökningen visade inget klart samband mellan storleken på den offentliga sektorn och ekonomisk tillväxt. Inte heller strukturen på den offentliga sektorn visade något klart samband med tillväxt. Den enda variabeln som visade tydlig signifikant korrelation med tillväxt var investeringars andel av BNP.

No description available.

Diss. Göteborg : University.

Univ., Diss.--Uppsala, 2000. / Enth. 3 Beitr.

Thesis (M.Com.)(Agricultural Economics)--University of Pretoria, 2004. / Includes summary. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 100-107).

Zugl.: Bergen, University, Diss., 2009. / Zsfassung in norw. und dt.

Diss. Wirtschaftswiss. St. Gallen, 1995 ; Nr. 1702.