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The term Europe was omnipresent in the Third Reich during the Second World War. An abundance of primary sources attests to the German interest in a new European order. Nevertheless, historiography is in disagreement on the Europeanness of this New Order and on its actual relevance for National Socialist policies. This study argues that these differing appraisals are the result of a mistaken understanding of the National Socialist New Order. National Socialist Germany did not pursue a single, stable, and clear-cut notion of Europe-to-be, but constantly kept negotiating its war aims and the future of Europe under the heading New Order. By means of a discourse-analytical approach, this thesis reconstructs this New Order and shows that its defining dimensions were long-standing and well-established knowledge and belief systems: the idea of European economic cooperation and völkisch beliefs. Depending on the military situation and the scope of the German sphere of influence, the discursive weight of these interpretive frames varied during the war. Nevertheless, they produced temporarily stable visions of Europe-to-be. Contrasted with this development, an analysis of German policies clearly demonstrates that the New Order discourse did matter. A hermeneutical approach which draws on discourse-analytical concepts of power relations makes clear that the New Order discourse was powerful. It defined the permissible ways of thinking and speaking about the future of Europe and it endowed the activities of German occupation authorities and private companies with meaning. Thus, this study and its innovative perspective shed new light on the New Order and broaden our understanding of National Socialist wartime policies. Its findings suggest that the National Socialist Europe must not be dismissed as anti-European. National Socialist Germany discursively constructed and realised its own ideals of Europe-to-be. This völkisch and economic reorganisation not only guided the policies of German occupation policies and informed the actions of private businesses, but it also fits well into the German tradition of European thinking.

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Während des deutsch-sowjetischen Krieges war ab Herbst 1941 das Gebiet um die russische Stadt Brjansk von der Wehrmacht besetzt. Die 2. Panzerarmee verwaltete dieses Territorium über den Kommandanten des rückwärtigen Armeegebietes 532. Wie überall im besetzten Gebiet verübten die Einsatzgruppen des SD zahlreiche Morde und es kam zum Massensterben der Kriegsgefangenen in den Durchgangslagern. Starke, in den ausgedehnten Waldmassiven versteckte sowjetische Partisanenverbände erschwerten die Beherrschung des ausgedehnten Raumes. Aufgrund des Mangels an deutschen Soldaten wurden zahlreiche Bewachungseinheiten aus Einheimischen und Kriegsgefangenen gebildet. Der Kommandeur der Armee Generaloberst Rudolf Schmidt ging sogar so weit, einen von der russischen Bevölkerung vollständig selbst verwalteten Bezirk zuzulassen. Kollaboration mit den deutschen Besatzern war ein weit verbreitetes Phänomen, während gleichzeitig in den Wäldern die Partisanen herrschten. Die Sicherungsverbände führten zahlreiche Antipartisanenunternehmen durch, die meist ohne anhaltende Erfolge blieben, aber in deren Verlauf zahlreiche Zivilisten als vermeintliche Partisanen getötet wurden. Obwohl die Besatzungsherrschaft der Wehrmacht in diesem Gebiet von der in Berlin beschlossenen Generallinie der Ausbeutung, Unterdrückung und Vernichtung in vielem abwich, wurde nicht für eine ausreichende Ernährung der Bevölkerung gesorgt. Dem Hunger und dem Partisanenkrieg fielen bis zum Rückzug der Wehrmacht im Herbst 1943 tausende Zivilisten zum Opfer. / During the German-Soviet war by autumn 1941 the area around the Russian city Bryansk was occupied by the Wehrmacht. The Second Tank Army administrated this territory through the commander of the backward area of the army 532. Like everywhere in the occupied territories the Einsatzgruppen of the SD committed numerous murders and it came to the widespread deaths of the prisoners of war in the transit camps. Strong Soviet partisan groups hidden in the vast forest massifs complicated the control of the vast area. On account of the lack of German soldiers numerous guarding units from locals and prisoners of war were formed. The commander of the army senior general Rudolf Schmidt went even so far of admitting a district completely administered by Russians themselves. Collaboration with the occupying forces was a widespread phenomenon, while at the same time in the woods the partisans ruled. The guarding troops carried out numerous anti-partisan operations which mostly remained without during success but killed numerous civilians as putative partisans in the course. Although the occupation of the Wehrmacht in this area in many aspects deviated from the in Berlin concluded general line of exploitation, suppression and destruction, it was not provided for a sufficient supply of food for the population. Until the retreat of the Wehrmacht in autumn 1943 thousand of civilians fell victim to hunger and partisan warfare.