Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-07T14:27:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 2342350 bytes, checksum: a9f73d1ac68516307c06566efa4e39b5 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-03-15 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This work aims to discuss the corporate social responsibility of oil producers in Brazil and to point which would be the adequate regulatory framework to ensure that those groups are fulfilling their constitutional social function, as this activity presents risks to Brazilian real development. The Social Oil Fund does not ensure the country is exempt from Dutch Disease and petropolitics. By linking the corporate activity to the social function, the Brazilian Constitution shows that the company not only has to be lucrative, but it also has social liabilities, respecting legal obligations and the community. This is the idea of corporate social responsibility, a management view based on instrumental motivations that brings benefits to the company, increasing its profit even indirectly. Based on a case study, only nine of the 40 oil producers in Brazil have social responsibility programs implanted in Brazil. The majority of those projects, however, consist of financial support to NGOs and are not related to social, economical and environmental consequences of the oil production. To ensure the social function, the State and stakeholders can sue the company for social damages, and class actions are suitable. Also, those groups can be contractually obliged to issue social impact reports and describe the actions taken by the company to diminish those violations. Last but not least, legal demands to ensure social function increase the minimum requirements for corporate social responsibility. This way, the regulation is soft, but with a hard core. The more social interests are exigible, the better are society s welfare and development. / Objetiva-se, através desta dissertação, analisar a responsabilidade social das empresas produtoras de petróleo no Brasil, buscando indicar qual perfil regulatório deve ser adotado pelo Estado para garantir que os grupos exploratórios cumpram sua função social nesta atividade, já que E&P do petróleo geram riscos ao desenvolvimento brasileiro. Aponta-se que o Fundo Social do Petróleo não blinda o país contra a Doença Holandesa e petropolitics. Ao vincular a atividade corporativa à promoção de sua função social, a Constituição Federal de 1988 mostra que a empresa não se destina exclusivamente ao lucro, devendo ser socialmente responsável, respeitando as obrigações legais e a comunidade em que se insere. Neste sentido, surge a responsabilidade social empresarial, corrente de gestão adotada pelas empresas devido a uma motivação instrumental, já que, empiricamente, gera benefícios para a companhia, aumentando o seu valor, mesmo indiretamente. No Brasil, verificou-se, através de estudo de caso de amostra estatisticamente relevante que, dos quarenta grupos produtores de petróleo, apenas nove apresentam programas de responsabilidade social. Tais programas, no entanto, consistem majoritariamente em apoio financeiro a ONGs, não mantendo relação com os danos sócio-econômico-ambientais decorrentes da atividade petroleira, não denotando o cumprimento total da função social. Para buscar sua efetividade, propõe-se a responsabilização social, pelo Estado e pela sociedade civil, das empresas que causem danos sociais, inclusive utilizando a Ação Civil Pública como instrumento processual. Ainda, por meio contratual, pode-se exigir desses grupos relatórios de impacto social e a evolução das ações tomadas pela entidade, através dos balanços sociais. Por fim, o incremento de exigências legais para que as empresas cumpram sua função social aumentam o mínimo exigido pelo Estado para responsabilidade social. A regulação social desse assunto é, portanto, soft, com centro hard. Quanto mais esse núcleo duro for reforçado com interesses sociais, mais facilmente o desenvolvimento será atingido, garantindo o bem estar social.

Malgré l’enclavement du Tchad, le besoin de développement économique et social a conduit l’Etat à mettre en exploitation les gisements pétrolifères. Ces gisements étant ni « délocalisables », ni « déterritorilisables », leur exploitation dans un contexte on-shore, dans des milieux naturels et à vocation agropastorale pose des problèmes spécifiques que jusque-là le droit international et la plupart des systèmes juridiques des pays en développement peinent à saisir. Il s’agit notamment des problèmes liés à l’empreinte écologique et sociale des industries pétrolières on-shore. La prise en compte des préoccupations environnementales par le droit tchadien du pétrole est très embryonnaire et infime. Le droit tchadien de l’environnement et le droit foncier n’ont pas, non plus, pris en compte les risques liés à la recherche, l’exploitation et le transport par canalisation des hydrocarbures dans leurs dispositifs. Ils n’abordent pas aussi les problématiques relatives à la remise en l’état des sites pétroliers abandonnés ou en fin de vie. Dans un tel contexte, si le législateur ne procède pas à des reformes afin de prendre concomitamment en compte les opérations pétrolières et les préoccupations environnementales dans un dispositif juridique intégré, on risque d’assister à « un second Delta du Niger dans le bassin pétrolier de Doba ». / Despite the isolation of Chad, the need for economic and social development led the government of Chad to explore and produce oil reserves. As these deposits are neither "delocalizable or movable" nor "deteriorisable or destructible", their exploitation in onshore context and natural environments with breeding vocation raises specific problems that international law and most legal systems in developing countries have difficulties to overcome until now. These include issues related to the ecological and social’s footprint of onshore oil industries. The Chadian’s law related to oil is still tiny and is at its embryonic level therefore it doesn’t take into consideration detailed environmental concerns. Chad's environmental law and land’s law didn’t also take into account risks associated with the exploration, exploitation and transport by pipeline of hydrocarbons in their plans. They also didn’t address issues related to the restoration of abandoned or end-of-life’s oilfields. In this context, if the legislator does not carry out reforms in order to simultaneously take into account petroleum operations and environmental concerns in an integrated legal system, there is a risk of "a second Niger Delta in Doba’s oilfield".