Thesis advisor: Olivier Boulnois / Thesis advisor: Stephen F. Brown / The Dissertation Text has Three Parts. Each paragraph is referred at the end to the Part it summarizes. My dissertation places Saint Anselm’s Ontological Argument within its original Neoplatonic context that should justify its validity. The historical thesis is that Anselm’s epistemology, underlying the Proslogion, the Monologion and De Veritate, was a natural, often unaccounted for, reflection of the essentially Neoplatonic vision that defined the pre-thirteenth century mental culture in Europe. (Introduction and Part I) This thesis is shown through the reception of Anselm’s argument by 27 XIIIth-XIVth century thinkers, whose reading of it exhibits a gradual weakening of Neoplatonic premises up to a complete change of paradigm towards the XIVth century, the first reason being the specificity of the Medieval reception of Aristotle’s teaching on first principles that is the subject of Posterior Analytics (Part II), and the second reason being the specificity of the Medieval reception of Dionysius the Areopagite (Part III, see sub-thesis 4 below). The defense of this main historical thesis aims at proving three systematic sub-theses, including a further historical sub-thesis. The Three Systematic Sub-Theses: 1) The inadequacy of rationalist and idealist epistemology in reaching and providing apodictic truths (the chief one of which is God’s existence) with ultimate ontic grounding, as well as the inadequacy of objectivistic metaphysics that underlies these epistemologies, calls for another, non-objectifying epistemic paradigm offered by the Neoplatonic (Proclian theorem of transcendence) apophatic and supra-discursive logic (kenotic epistemology) that should be a better method to achieve certainty, because of its ability to found logic in its ontic source and thus envisage thought as an experience and a mode of being in which it is grounded. Within such a dialectic, there cannot be any opposition or division either between being and thought, or between faith and reason, faith being an ontic ground of reason’s activity defined as self-transcendence. The argument of the Proslogion is thus an instance of logic that transcends itself into its own principle – into ‘that than which nothing greater can be conceived’. Such an epistemological vision is also supported by contemporary epistemology (Russell’s Paradox and Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem) (Introduction and Part I) 2) In virtue of this apophatic and supra-discursive vision, God’s existence, thought by human mind (as expressed in the argument of the Proslogion), happens to be a common denominator between God’s inaccessible essence and the created essence of human mind, so that human consciousness can be defined as ‘con-science’ – the mind experiencing its own being as co-knowledge with God that forges being as such. (Part I) 3) However, God’s existence as a common denominator between God’s essence and the created essence of human mind cannot be legitimately accommodated within the XIIIth-XIVth century epistemology and metaphysics because of the specificity of relation between God’s essence and His attributes, typical of Medieval scholasticism and as stated by Peter Lombard and Thomas Aquinas. If this relation is kept, while at the same time God’s existence is affirmed as immanent to the human mind (God as the first object of intellect), God’s transcendence is sacrificed and He becomes subject to metaphysics (Scotus’ nominal univocity of being). In order to achieve real univocity between the existence of human thinking and God’s existence, one needs a relation between God’s essence and His attributes that would allow a real participation of the created in the uncreated. The configuration of such a relation, however, needs the distinction between God’s essence and His energies that Western Medieval thought did not know, but that is inherent to the Neoplatonic epistemic tradition persisting through the Eastern Church theologians and Dionysius the Areopagite up to Gregory Palamas. (Part III) Another Historical Sub-Thesis: 4) One of the reasons why Medieval readers of Anselm’s Proslogion misread it in the Aristotelian key, was that they did not have access to the original work of Dionysius the Areopagite, in which the said distinction between God’s essence and His energies is present. This is due to the fact that the Medievals read Dionysius through Eriugena’s translation. However, Eriugena was himself influenced by Augustine’s De Trinitate that exhibits an essentialist theology: in fact, it places ideas within God’s essence, which yields the notion of the created as a mere similitude, not real participation, and which ultimately makes the vision (knowledge) of God possible only in the afterlife. Since already with Augustine the relation between grace and nature is modified (grace becomes a created manifestation of God, instead of being His uncreated energy), God’s essence remains incommunicable. Similarly, God’s existence is not in any way immanent to the created world, of which the created human intellect is a part, so that it remains as transcendent to the human mind as is His incommunicable essence. This should explain why for the Medievals analogy, and eventually univocity, was the only way to say something about God, and also why they mostly could not read Anselm’s Proslogion otherwise than either in terms of propositional or modal logic. (Part III) The dissertation concludes that whilst Anselm’s epistemology in the Proslogion is an instance of Neoplatonic metaphysical tradition, the question of the possibility of certainty in epistemology, as well as the possibility of metaphysics as such, depends on the possibility of real communicability between the immanence of human predicating mind and the transcendence of God’s essence through His trans-immanent existence.

Ce projet de mémoire de maîtrise portera sur Descartes et la preuve dite "ontologique" de l'existence de Dieu. La présentation qui sera faite de cette preuve, de ses tenants et de ses aboutissants, tiendra compte: premièrement, du rôle et du statut de celle-ci dans l'ordre des raisons métaphysiques; deuxièmement, des relations entre la preuve "ontologique" et la preuve dite "par les effets"; et troisièmement, des différentes oeuvres de Descartes dans lesquelles il est question de l'argument ontologique. Ainsi, cette analyse permettra de noter les différences relatives qu'il pourrait y avoir chez Descartes quant au fond ou à la forme de cet argument. Nous évoquerons notamment la position différente qu'occupe cette preuve dans deux écrits, soient les Méditations métaphysiques (1641) et les Principes de la philosophie (1644). Ce genre d'analyse nous permettra de nous pencher sur le débat initié par Martial Guéroult et Henri Gouhier concernant la place de la preuve "ontologique" de l'existence de Dieu au sein de l'ordre des raisons métaphysiques ainsi que ses relations avec la preuve "par les effets". La postérité de ce débat sera également considérée. Aussi, nous serons à même de poser la question à savoir s'il y a une évolution de la preuve "ontologique" de l'existence de Dieu au fil des oeuvres dans la pensée de Descartes. En résumé, dans ce mémoire, nous aborderons deux problématiques: la question de l'autonomie ou de la non autonomie de la preuve "ontologique" par rapport à la preuve "par les effets", et le questionnement quant à la possibilité d'une évolution de la place et de la nature de la preuve dite "ontologique" de l'existence de Dieu dans les écrits de Descartes. / This master thesis project will focus on Descartes and the "ontological" proof of the existence of God. The presentation will be made of this proof, its ins and outs. It will take into account: first, the role and status of the latter in the order of metaphysical reasons; second, the relationship between the "ontological" proof and the "through the effects" proof; and third, the various writings of Descartes in which it is question of the ontological argument. Thus, this analysis will note the differences there might be in Descartes thought regarding the substance or form of this argument. We will discuss on the different position this proof occupied in two writings: the Meditations (1641) and the Principles of Philosophy (1644). This type of analysis will allow us to focus on the debate initiated by Martial Guéroult and Henri Gouhier concerning the place of the "ontological" proof of the existence of God in the order of metaphysical reasons as well as its relations with the "through the effects" proof. The posterity of this debate will also be considered. Also, we will be able to ask the question whether there is an evolution of the "ontological" proof of the existence of God in the thought of Descartes over his writings. In summary, in this thesis, we address two issues: the question of autonomy or non-autonomy of the "ontological" proof in relation with the "through the effects" proof; and the question about the possibility of an evolution of the place and nature of the "ontological" proof of the existence of God in the writings of Descartes.

Cette thèse se fixe comme tâche d’examiner la manière originale et inédite par laquelle Maurice Blondel revisite les preuves classiques de l’existence de Dieu, principalement, l’argument ontologique. Cet argument occupe, chez notre auteur, une place prépondérante, et constitue un moment essentiel dans le développement de sa doctrine. C’est une approche qui se comprend comme un retour à une doctrine ancienne (Cf. l’argument d’Anselme), mais en même temps comme une élaboration originale. De ce point de vue, la lecture suivie de L’Action laisse entrevoir trois axes d’interprétations de l’argument ontologique que notre thèse entend mettre en lumière.D’abord, Blondel relit les preuves de l’existence de Dieu dans la perspective de la dialectique de la volonté dont elles amorcent le « troisième moment » conflictuel, avant que le conflit ne se résolve en alternative ou en option. Car, il y a toujours une inadéquation entre ce qui est voulu et le dynamisme qui, en nous, est le principe du vouloir c’est-à-dire entre ce qu’il appelle la volonté voulue et la volonté voulante. En conséquence, c’est en vue de l’Unique nécessaire que Blondel ébauche une synergie des preuves et renouvelle, en quelque sorte, l’argument ontologique pour montrer que chaque homme y est inévitablement embarqué.Ensuite le recours « à un inconnu inaccessible, dont la présence est pourtant pressentie sans être encore reconnue » ou la référence explicite à des expressions apophatiques pour parler de l’Être ou de l’Absolu manifeste clairement un recours symptomatique à la théologie négative comme il le reconnaît, à la suite du Pseudo-Denys que « l’affirmation est moins juste, et la négation plus vraie », et d’autant plus qu’il ajoute : « c’est le néant qui le confesse ». Or, cette donnée n’affaiblit en rien la pertinence de la preuve, car Blondel en fait une véritable expérience spirituelle.Enfin la conséquence qu’il tire de cette relecture, en insistant sur la portée philosophique de l’option, constitue le lieu privilégié qui confirme bien que cette approche n’a pas pour visée la pleine possession de l’Être, mais une ouverture, une préparation nécessaire de notre indigence à admettre et à affirmer cette existence de Dieu. Car, pour chaque existence, « cette preuve est, moins une vue qu’une vie » et que suivant une influence de la preuve cartésienne « celle-ci n’est absolue que là où il y a idée parfaite de la perfection même, là où l’essence est réelle et l’existence idéale. Dans ces conditions, l’idée de Dieu, de l’Être est comme réfractée, conditionnée, obscurcie par notre imperfection. Cependant, elle nous contraint à affirmer, du lieu où somme toute elle n’est pas, sa réalité, sa perfection.À partir d’une reconsidération des articulations de la preuve dans L’Action, notre thèse aura eu comme tâche d’élucider la portée et la pertinence de ces trois axes qui constituent l’originalité de la lecture blondélienne de l’argument ontologique. / This thesis has set itself the task of reviewing the new and original way in which Maurice Blondel revisits the classic proofs of God’s existence, mainly, the ontological argument. This argument holds, in our author, a prominent place, and is a key moment in the development of his doctrine. It is an approach that makes sense as a return to an old doctrine (See the Anselm’s argument ), but at the same time as an original development. From this point of view, reading followed by L’Action suggests three lines of interpretations of the ontological argument that our thesis intends to highlight.Firstly, Blondel reread the proofs of God’s existence from the perspective of the dialectic of the will they begin the third time conflict before the conflict will be resolved in alternative or optional. Because, there is always a mismatch between what is wanted and dynamism which, in us, is the principle of the will that is to say between what he calls the necessary will and determination voulante. Consequently, it is for the One need Blondel draft synergy evidence and renewed, in a way, the ontological argument to show that every man is inevitably embedded.Then use an inaccessible stranger, whose presence is sensed without being yet still recognized or the explicit reference to apophatiques expressions to speak of Being or the Absolute manifests clearly symptomatic use of negative theology as acknowledges, following the Pseudo-Dionysius that “the statement is less just, and truest denial”, and especially as he adds, “ it is the nothingness that confess.” However , this data does not weaken in any way the relevance of the evidence , because Blondel makes a truly spiritual experience.Finally he draws the consequence of this replay, emphasizing the philosophical significance of the option, which is the central authority confirms that this approach has not referred to the full possession of Being, but an opening, a necessary preparation to admit our poverty and affirm the existence of God. For each existence, " the evidence is less a view that a life " and following the influence of the Cartesian evidence " it is absolute that where there is perfect idea of perfection , there where gasoline is real and the ideal existence . In these circumstances, the idea of God, of Being is refracted as conditioned , darkened by our imperfection . However, it forces us to state , after all, the place where it is not , its reality, its perfection.From a reconsideration of the joints of proof in L'Action, our thesis has had the task of clarifying the scope and relevance of these three areas which constitute the originality of the Blondel reading the ontological argument.