How do we understand ourselves? How do we relate with others? How do we build communities? These are some questions David Velleman’s theory of mutual interpretability appears to answer. In Foundations For Moral Relativism, Velleman argues that self-understanding is interlinked with one’s ability to understand others; in other words, with one’s ability to be mutually interpretable. However, being mutually interpretable requires that a person share some set of beliefs or a perceptional framework with another person that would allow the two to interact successfully with one another. Thus, communities are simply a collection of individuals whose shared beliefs enable them to more or less understand one another and engage in successful interaction Although Velleman goes on to use this theory to argue for the existence of Moral relativism, I analyze how this theory affects a bi-cultural or multi-cultural person’s self-understanding and personal identity. In other words, I explore how a multi-cultural person that learns to be mutually interpretable in more than one place forms self-identity and learns to understand him or herself.

An argument for the compatibility of causal determinism and free will. Draws on recently conducted philosophical experimentation related to intuition and development of the intuition of agent-causal accounts of free will in children. Argues that regardless of the intuition held, the manner in which people arise to these intuitions shows that the working definition of free will is different than people posit. Lays groundwork for why the working definition of free will is compatible with causal determinism.

This thesis uses Amy Kind’s defense of epistemic relevance in imagination to examine how and when true beliefs imparted in literary imaginings are justified as knowledge. I will show that readers’ literary imaginings must pass a test of epistemic relevance, as well as be paired with a strong affirming emotional response in order to justify the truth behind the beliefs they impart. I believe the justificatory affective response is a kind of non-propositional emotional imagining, distinct from the type of literary imaginings that initially imparted the beliefs. Due to this thesis’ focus on the justificatory power of literary imaginings related to emotion, my work shows how literature can provide new knowledge to the philosophical realms of ethics and emotion. Literary implications in other types of philosophical inquiry still remain unexplored.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--State University of New York at Binghamton, Department of Comparative Literature, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Michigan State University. American Studies Program, 2008. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on Mar. 31, 2009) Includes bibliographical references (p. 171-176). Also issued in print.

Thesis (doctoral)--Université de la Sorbonne Nouvelle Paris III, 1992. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.) (English))--University of Pretoria, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--University of Texas at El Paso, 2009. / Title from title screen. Vita. CD-ROM. Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.

Thesis (D.C.L.). / Written for the Institute of Comparative Law. Title from title page of PDF (viewed 2009/08/31). Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity International University, 2007. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 90-91).