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In this research the law making power of the Iranian parliament is studied at two levels: Firstly, the power of the parliament according to the Constitution is explored. Secondly its power in real politics is analysed. It is shown that the law making power of the parliament as an elected institution can be limited by the unelected institutions which are enshrined in the Constitution. Also the political composition of the elected institutions (parliament and executive) whether they are Conservative-dominated or Reformist-dominated, can define the actual law making power of the parliament. It is concluded that the law making power of the parliament oscillates on a spectrum: at one end there is a weak law making legislature and at the other end one can see a policy influencing legislature. The main content of the chapters is as follows: The first chapter is dedicated to introduction where the research questions and thesis methodology is explained. In the second chapter the most important literature, especially that which considers the external and internal variables and typology of legislatures, is reviewed. In the third chapter the historical evolution of the Iranian Parliament in the Qajar, First and Second Pahlavi Eras is briefly discussed. The fourth chapter is dedicated to the Iranian parliament in the Islamic Republic Era. The key concepts which can explain the logic of the distribution of power within the Iranian Constitution, the relationship of the parliament to the executive power (elected institution) and other power centres ( unelected institutions), and the type of the political regime on the basis of the amended Constitution of 1989, is explained. Theoretical propositions are tested in chapter five. The Sixth and Seventh terms of the parliament, where the political composition changed fundamentally from one to the other, are chosen for case study and their law making power during the budget process analysed. The dichotomy of elected and unelected institutions is applied to the case in this chapter. Then the contribution of the elected and unelected institutions during the budget process is explained. The next part of this chapter considers the Sixth Majlis and its political context in general. The Majlis and executive interactions and the interaction of these two elected institutions with the Guardian Council and Expediency Council especially during the budget process, are analysed. The same approach is deployed for the Seventh Majlis which in terms of political composition was in stark contrast to the Sixth Majlis. It is shown how the political composition of the elected and unelected institutions can increase or decrease considerably the law making power of the Islamic Consultative Assembly. The overall conclusion of the thesis is provided in chapter six.

The purpose of this study is to design a co-operative maritime security structure for Northeast Asia through the application of naval arms control and disarmament measures (both structural and operational), maritime confidence-building measures (MCBMs) and maritime cooperation measures (MCMs). In order to construct an analytical framework for such an application it is necessary to introduce sub-objectives. The first is to explore the options for providing co-operative maritime security, such as naval arms control. MCBMs and MCMs, and to assess the value of their contribution to the general co-operative maritime security framework. The second is to examine the particular points of the major regional powers' maritime security policies with a view to considering their relevance to the construction of a system of co-operative maritime security in Northeast Asia. The third is to delineate the regional geo-strategic security environment conducive to Northeast Asian co-operative maritime security in the framework of the various types of measures. The final part examines the potential conditions for the application of co-operative maritime security measures and suggests a priority of application on the basis of the regional maritime security environment. In the last decade, the United States and Russia have been forced to change their defence policies, trim their budgets, curtail operations overseas, and re-evaluate their fundamental purposes. Nonetheless, the medium powers, such as China and Japan, continue to build and deploy naval weapons and vessels that others find threatening. Unless they reconsider their positions toward co-operative maritime security, they may miss a critical opportunity to bring stability to the high seas. In Northeast Asia, the main boundary and territorial disputes are maritime in nature, e.g. Russia-Japan (South Kuril IslandslNorthern Territories), Korea-Japan (the Tok Islandsffakeshima), China-Japan (the Senkaku Islandsffiaoyu Tao), as well as Taiwan and, in the South China Sea, the Paracel Islands/Xisha Qundao (Vietnam-China), and the Spratly IslandslNansha Qundao (China, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan, Philippines and Brunei). Multilateral security activities cannot replace formal diplomatic/legal negotiations to settle maritime boundary and territorial disputes, but co-operative maritime security measures may be particularly valuable in minimising the risk of conflict in such circumstances. Among the MCBMs, the most promising areas involve modifying existing INCSEA agreements, and establishing or expanding measures of transparency, such as compliance with the UN or an eventual regional arms register and the regular issue of credible official Defence White Papers. In the current context of strategic uncertainty and maritime force development in Northeast Asia, information exchange measures and communication measures may be the most valuable MCBM, applicable region-wide. Co-operative maritime security measures can offer a number of benefits. The main goals of MCMs are cost reduction through shared efforts or by joint operations for humanitarian purposes, joint development of marine resources, the protection of SLOCs and prevention of sea pollution. MCMs can also be used as confidence-building measures in themselves to maintain communication when tensions heighten. MCMs indicate that neighbouring countries can work together to look after certain problems at the regional or subregional level. This can help not onJy to deter potential adversaries but also to assure extraregional countries that no direct threat would be posed to their sea-borne trade. With functional and operational approaches, MCMs cover marine pollution, search and rescue, illegal activities, including drug smuggling, piracy and fisheries infringement. The first area of naval arms control to be considered covers constraints on naval activities as operational naval arms control measures. General operational arms control measures could be used to cover other naval activities, or they could serve as a model for similar agreements in other areas. The provisions for notification of dangerous activities, for instance, could be broadened to include mandatory notification of all naval exercises. After the 1972 Incidents at Sea Agreement, the United States and Russia developed stabilising rules of behaviour as their navies came into contact with each other across the world's oceans. With the expansion of naval forces in Northeast Asia and the increased likelihood of accident and miscalculation, one could make a case for the negotiation of regional INCSEA agreements, particularly on a bilateral basis. Such agreements already exist in the North Pacific: Canada and Russia, the US and Russia, Russia-Japan and Russia-ROK. The United States and China have also signed a related agreement on maritime consultation. Operational measures at sea could be implemented by imposing restraints on naval activities and geographical limitations. Structural measures, as the second aspect of naval arms control, consist of quantitative and qualitative approaches. A quantitative approach based on ratios would inevitably affect the relative size of forces of different countries. Such agreements are difficult to achieve because of differences in geostrategic goals and asymmetries of naval forces in the region. This thesis argues that the development of co-operative maritime security measures to the point where they become a significant aspect of the regional maritime security framework in Northeast Asia will not be easy. It is a very diverse region, where there are quite different security perceptions and maritime territorial and legitimacy conflicts which require resolution. There is also little tradition of security co-operation, at least on a multilateral basis. The maritime issues themselves are generally complicated, and the practical and operational factors involved in the establishment of effective co-operative maritime security regimes are extremely demanding. Maritime confidence-building measures offer the greatest potentiaL as an initial step. As subsequent steps, maritime co-operation measures and naval arms control measures could be followed. The important question is whether or not the application of co-operative security models can be brought to the point where they can enable the effective management of the increasing complexities and uncertainties which characterise the emerging maritime environment in Northeast Asia. Current fiscal constraints might clearly provide an opportunity for Northeast Asian countries not only to consider more closely their threat perceptions but also to pursue regional co-operative maritime arrangements which rely more on mutual understanding and less on a naval arms build-up.

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The new prominence of authoritarianism ushered in a series of new studies that seek to explain the reasons behind the longevity of these regimes. An integral part of these studies is that the institutional arrangements contributed to the survival of autocrats and the maintenance of authoritarian regimes. In particular, they recently began considering the dark side of nominally democratic institutions under authoritarian regimes such as legislatures arguing that they predominantly serve as the means of regime survival. Given these facts, the overall goal of this study is to produce an understanding of the role of parliaments in the survival of authoritarian regimes by focusing on their institutional capacity and related performance. Using the Iranian parliament, Majles, as a case study, the major point of contention in this study are the conditions under which Majles contributed to the resilience of post-revolutionary Iranian regimes. Inspired by the legislative institutionalization approach, three main characteristics are identified to explain the authoritarian legislatures: subordination as opposed to autonomy, exclusiveness as opposed to representativeness and secrecy as opposed to deliberativeness. With respect to these criteria, it is demonstrated that Majles is marked as a subordinated institution, caught between powerful and influential formal and informal institutions. Majles also fell short of meeting the representativeness and deliberativeness identified as decisive criteria in distinguishing authoritarian from democratic legislatures. With respect to the Majles performance, it is shown that Majles has been at the centre of the regime co-optation strategies since the beginning of the Islamic Revolution to encapsulate the loyal oppositions and to exclude those were regarded as outsiders. Majles also acted as the main agent of manipulation of political institutions through its law making function and by this contributed to the stability of the Islamic Republic.

This study is the outcome of research carried out during my involvement with the Afghan resistance movement within Afghanistan and in Pakistan from 1983 to 1990. During this period I was associated with resistance groups in various parts of Afghanistan, particularly Kunar province. The enormous human sacrifice among the Afghan people finally forced the Soviets to withdraw their troops from Afghanistan. The anti-Communist resistance operated largely under the leadership of the ulama as well as the members of the intelligentsia. The decade-long struggle against the regime in Kabul and against the Soviets, has resulted in a tremendous socio-economic and political transformation in addition to the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives and the dislocation of millions of Afghans. Most of the former traditional leaders have lost or are losing power. They have been replaced by the ulama or young field commanders from relatively modest backgrounds. This study examines the emergence of the ulama as the new leaders in Nuristani society. Traditionally the ulama have played a very active role in national politics and have mobilized the masses in the name of Islam against the invaders. However, in the present crisis the ulama have been even more prominent than usual in the forefront of national and international politics. This study attempts to identify the socio-economic and political factors that were instrumental for the shift of the leadership pattern from the traditional elite to the ulama and commanders. Will the ulama be able to provide a viable socio-economic and political agenda? Will they be capable of sustaining ideological and financial support from other Islamic countries? These are the main questions found by the ulama and the commanders. The answers are not likely to emerge in the immediate future. Whatever happens the ulama and commanders will continue to remain a socio-political force in the future.

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