Recent research has suggested possible relationships between neuropsychological functioning and belief in superstitious and paranormal phenomena. The prefrontal cortex is of particular interest in this regard, as executive function and the mechanisms associated with faulty reasoning ability may maintain superstitious and supernatural beliefs. The present study investigated the relationship between executive function and superstitious and paranormal beliefs, in order to examine the extent to which the executive function abilities of individuals who subscribe to such beliefs differs from that of individuals who do not believe in such phenomena. The sample consisted of 43 male and female university students, between the ages of 21 and 28, from various ethnic groups. A non-experimental, cross-sectional, between-subjects, correlational mixed methods design was employed. Quantitative data was collected using a demographic questionnaire, a Modified Paranormal Beliefs Scale, the Neuroticism subscale of the NEO PI-R and an executive function and logical reasoning test battery. Qualitative data was collected by means of interviews. Few significant correlations were found between demographic variables and superstitious and paranormal beliefs, Neuroticism and executive function scores respectively. Relationships between Neuroticism and superstitious and paranormal beliefs were minimal. Both positive and negative correlations were found between superstitious and paranormal beliefs and executive function scores, suggesting that other neuropsychological factors may underlie illogical beliefs. Qualitative data revealed that superstitious and paranormal beliefs were perpetuated because of their links to familial environment and culture and beliefs assisted individuals in managing anxiety about the unknown by instilling a sense of control over the future. These results suggest that other neuropsychological mechanisms, such as emotion, may play a more significant role than executive function in superstitious and paranormal beliefs.

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Syftet med studien var att undersöka ifall intuitivt tänkande, analytiskt tänkande, tro påparanormala fenomen, tro på pseudovetenskap, förkastande av forskning kring klimat,förkastande av forskning kring vaccin, utbildningsnivå, maktlöshet samt tro på enkla lösningarpredicerar tro på konspirationsteorier. Insamlingen av data skedde genom ett icke slumpmässigtbekvämlighetsurval samt frivillighetsurval. Studien var av kvantitativ tvärsnittsdesign med 244deltagare, varav 112 män, 131 kvinnor samt 1 annan/vill ej uppge, i åldrarna 18–80 år (M=37.1,SD=14.5). Resultatet från analysen visade att modellen var signifikant samt att tro påparanormala fenomen (β=.36, p<.001), förkastande av forskning kring vaccin (β=.32, p<.001)och maktlöshet (β=.11, p<.05) var signifikanta prediktorer för tro på konspirationsteorier.Däremot var inte intuitivt tänkande, analytiskt tänkande, tro på pseudovetenskap, förkastandeav forskning kring klimat, tro på enkla lösningar eller utbildningsnivå signifikanta prediktoreri modellen. Resultatet kan ligga till grund för att vidare undersöka tro på konspirationsteorierssamband med andra faktorer än aktuell studies prediktorer i framtida forskning. / The purpose of the study was to examine if intuitive thinking, analytic thinking, paranormalbeliefs, pseudoscientific beliefs, rejection of science regarding climate, rejection of scienceregarding vaccine, education, powerlessness and belief in simple solutions predicts belief inconspiracy theories. The data was collected through a non-randomised convenience andvolunteer sampling. The study used a quantitative cross-sectional design with 244 participants,of whom 112 were men, 131 women and 1 other/wish not to say, aged 18–80 (M=37.1,SD=14.5). The result from the analysis showed that the model was significant and that belief inconspiracy theories was significantly predicted by paranormal beliefs, (β=.36, p<.001),rejection of science regarding vaccine (β=.32, p<.001) and powerlessness (β=.11, p<.05).However, the result showed that intuitive thinking, analytic thinking, pseudoscientific beliefs,rejection of science regarding climate, belief in simple solutions and education were notsignificant predictors of belief in conspiracy theories in the model. The result can be used as abasis for future research to further examine belief in conspiracy theories relationship to factorsother than the current study's predictors.