Jody Nagel completed his first piano concerto in 2005. I will discuss technical challenges within the piece and practice techniques to overcome these challenges so that one can perform the work successfully. I cover fingering, pedaling, texture, character, and harmonic issues. I also give performance advice to make the orchestral reduction more pianistic while still honoring the orchestra’s influence within the work.

New free improvisers may come across six major problems as they learn to improvise: imbalance between technique and music, incorrect perception of limitation, imbalance between rationality and emotion, lack of enthusiasm, inability to view criticism as a source of creativity, and misunderstanding of mistakes and risks. In this thesis, I propose a set of effective pedagogical tools as possible solutions for students and groups interested in exploring the beauty of free improvisation.

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En Irak et en Afghanistan, les EEI (engins explosifs improvisés) ont durement atteint les matériels militaires et les soldats occidentaux. Cette confrontation entre haute et faible technicité soulève la question des choix techniques. Les rapports institutionnels et les acteurs mettent habituellement en avant deux raisons pour justifier le choix de la haute technicité : la nécessité de jouir d'une supériorité technique sur l'adversaire pour vaincre, et l'imprévisibilité des futures interventions militaires. L'étude de terrain sur le système de missile antichars Milan et son successeur temporaire, le Javelin, montre que les combattants ne lient pas la polyvalence à la technicité, et que leur travail est en train d'être fonctionnalisé. En effet, les concepteurs (États-majors, DGA, industriels) ont recours à l'approche systémique pour améliorer la cohérence entre matériels et accroître la performance d'ensemble. Cette approche s'inspire de la rationalité managériale, qui pénètre de plus en plus le milieu militaire. Or, les combattants réinventent souvent leurs matériels du fait du caractère imprédictible des conflits, et la puissance née de cette rationalité gestionnaire se révèle sur le terrain en partie fragile et déréalisée. La complexité ressentie par les acteurs à propos des armements contemporains serait alors le révélateur d'une évolution technique hors sol et hors du temps commun, distante des êtres humains concrets. / In Iraq and in Afghanistan, IEDs (improvised explosive devices) severely hit Western military equipment and personnel. This high-tech / low-tech face-off raises questions about technical choices. Institutional reports and actors usually justify the choice of high technicity on two grounds: the need to have technical superiority over rivals to win and the uncertainty surrounding future military interventions. A ground study about the Milan antitank missile system and his temporary successor, the Javelin, revealed versatility is not related to technicity in users' mind, and showed servants are being functionalised. Indeed, designers (military HQs, DGA, private industries) have opted for a systemic approach to increase consistency among equipment and gain in overall performance. Users have got considered as a piece of the system — serving a function. This approach owes much to managerial rationality, which has pervaded the military organisation to a high degree. However, fighters often re-invent their equipment role due to war unpredictability, while power delivered by managerial rationality proves to be partly fragile and derealised. Complexity actors detect about contemporary weapons seems to be a pointer of a technical evolution carried out above ground and beyond time, remote from concrete human beings.