Magistro baigiamajame darbe analizuojamas priešpriešinės pareigos vykdymo sulaikymo institutas ir šio teisių gynimo būdo įgyvendinimo sąlygos Lietuvos teisėje. Pirmoji baigiamojo darbo hipotezė – priešpriešinės pareigos vykdymo sulaikymas yra dvilypė sąvoka, talpinanti savyje du institutus – prievolės vykdymo sustabdymą ir sutarties vykdymo sustabdymą. Ji darbe pasitvirtino. Atlikta lyginamoji analizė parodė, jog kai kuriose kontinento šalyse priešpriešinės pareigos vykdymo sulaikymas pozityviojoje teisėje yra įtvirtintas bendros prievolės vykdymo sustabdymo teisės ir exceptio arba sutarties vykdymo sustabdymo teisės forma. Tose šalyse, kuriose prievolės vykdymo sustabdymo teisė neįtvirtina, exceptio yra suprantamas šiek tiek plačiau – į jo taikymo sferą patenka ir tie atvejai, kurie kitose šalyse būtų priskirti prievolės vykdymo sustabdymui. Tačiau nepaisant to, prievolės vykdymo sustabdymas ir exceptio yra skirtingos teisinės prigimties ir turėtų būti skiriami net ir tuo atveju, jeigu to nedaro pozityvioji teisė. Viena pagrindinių to pasekmių yra tai, kad sutarties vykdymo sustabdymo, priešingai nei prievolės vykdymo sustabdymo, neįmanoma įveikti pateikiant adekvatų prievolių įvykdymo užtikrinimą. Antroji baigiamojo darbo hipotezė – pagrindinis priešpriešinės pareigos vykdymo sulaikymo instituto sutartiniuose santykiuose tikslas yra išsaugoti sutartinius santykius, paskatinti skolininką pašalinti pažeidimus bei įvykdyti savo įsipareigojimus (favor contractus principas). Ši... [toliau žr. visą tekstą] / This master thesis analyses the institute of withholding performance of a counter obligation and the necessary conditions of its lawful realisation by the creditor. The first hypothesis of the thesis is the following: withholding performance of a counter obligation has a structure consisting of two elements – general right of retention and suspension of performance of a contract, also known as exceptio. This hypothesis was confirmed by the thesis. The comparative analysis which was carried out in the thesis showed that in some continental countries withholding performance is implemented in two tier structure – in the form of the general right of retention and exceptio. In those countries where positive law does not establish general right of retention exceptio is provided with elements which in other countries is though in the terms of a general right of retention (exceptio is thought to be a broader right). Nonetheless, general right of retention and exceptio are different in their legal nature. Therefore, those rights should be distinguished even if the positive law of the respective jurisdiction does not do that. The main outcome of this is that exceptio cannot be overridden by providing the adequate assurance of performing the contract (security). The second hypothesis of the thesis – the main objective of withholding performance in contractual relations is to provide incentives for the parties of a contract to “keep the contract alive”, for the debtor to eliminate the... [to full text]

Road authorities around the world have been innovating and finding ways to cope with the high cost of road network maintenance, the growing demands of road users and the changing traffic type and volume. A well-maintained road is needed to make the network sustainable for future generations. Improving road maintenance management in the Philippines, based on New Zealand experience, is the goal of this research with the theme of managing the change from method-based specifications to the adoption of performance-based specifications for unsealed low-volume roads. The New Zealand Local Government Act 2002 prescribes the requirements for the provision, operation, and management of the local road network, consistent with the Land Transport Management Act 2002 and the New Zealand Land Transport Strategy. The maintenance management system used by New Zealand road controlling authorities (RCAs) was determined by survey and a profile of RCAs that have adopted performance-based specifications was established. RCAs that adopted performance-based specifications had employed asset managers, used the Road Asset Maintenance Management (RAMM) system as an asset management tool, engaged consultants for specialised skills, employed more engineers, had highly developed performance specifications, conducted customer surveys, and had more resources in terms of rates and revenues than RCAs that had not adopted performance-based specifications. The proposed performance-based specifications for sealed and unsealed roads were also presented in this thesis. The Department of Public Works and Highways of the Philippines has implemented three long-term performance-based maintenance pilot projects, all completed by 2005. The lessons learned from the pilot projects, together with the New Zealand survey results will guide road authorities in the Philippines to improve the implementation of future long-term performance-based maintenance contracts (LTPBMC) on national roads, and possibly apply the same to low-volume roads.

Sous le régime du Code civil du Bas-Canada, le devoir d’exécuter le contrat de bonne foi était une condition implicite de tout contrat suivant l’article 1024 C.c.B.C. Le 1er janvier 1994, ce devoir a toutefois été codifié à l’article 1375 du Code civil du Québec. Parallèlement à ce changement, le contrat a subi plusieurs remises en question, principalement en raison des critiques émises contre la théorie de l’autonomie de la volonté. En réponse à ces critiques, la doctrine a proposé deux théories qui supposent une importante coopération entre les contractants durant l’exécution du contrat, à savoir le solidarisme contractuel et le contrat relationnel. La notion de bonne foi a aussi évolué récemment, passant d’une obligation de loyauté, consistant généralement en une abstention ou en un devoir de ne pas nuire à autrui, à une obligation plus active d’agir ou de faciliter l’exécution du contrat, appelée devoir de coopération. Ce devoir a donné lieu à plusieurs applications, dont celles de renseignement et de conseil. Ce mémoire étudie la portée et les limites du devoir de coopération. Il en ressort que le contenu et l’intensité de ce devoir varient en fonction de critères tenant aux parties et au contrat. Une étude plus particulière des contrats de vente, d’entreprise et de franchise ainsi que des contrats conclus dans le domaine informatique indique que le devoir de coopération est plus exigeant lorsque le contrat s’apparente au contrat de type relationnel plutôt qu’au contrat transactionnel. Le créancier peut, entre autres choses, être obligé d’« aider » son débiteur défaillant et même de renégocier le contrat devenu déséquilibré en cours d’exécution, bien que cette dernière question demeure controversée. Le devoir de coopération n’est cependant pas illimité parce qu’il s’agit d’une obligation de moyens et non de résultat. Il est également limité, voire inexistant, lorsque le débiteur de cette obligation est tenu à d’autres obligations comme un devoir de réserve ou de non-ingérence, lorsque le cocontractant est de mauvaise foi ou qu’une partie résilie unilatéralement le contrat ou décide de ne pas le renouveler. / The duty of good faith in the performance of the contract was an implied condition of any contract under article 1024 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada. On January 1st 1994, however, this duty was codified at article 1375 of the Civil Code of Québec. In parallel to this change, the traditional understanding of “contract” based on the doctrine of the autonomy of the parties has come to be challenged. In response to this critique, two theories emphasizing the importance of collaboration between contractual parties during the performance of a contract have been suggested, namely, “contractual solidarism” and “relational contract” have been suggested. The notion of “good faith” has also recently evolved. It was originally limited to a duty of loyalty, consisting mainly in an abstention or in the duty not to harm anyone. Today, good faith also refers to a more active obligation which may require a party to act or to facilitate the performance of the contract. This general “duty to cooperate”, as it is called, has given rise to many applications, including the duty to inform or to advise. This paper examines the extent and limits of the duty of the contracting parties to cooperate during the performance of the contract. The content and intensity of this duty are influenced by factors pertaining to the characteristics of the contract or the contracting parties. Our study of the Québec jurisprudence focused on contracts of sale, contracts of enterprise, franchise agreements and contracts in the field of computers. It suggests that the duty of the parties to cooperate is greater in relational contracts than in transactional ones. For example, the creditor may, inter alia, be bound to “help” its defaulting debtor or to renegotiate the agreement when an unforeseen event has changed the initial contractual equilibrium. However, this last issue is still highly controversial. This duty to cooperate is not itself without limits. Firstly, it is an obligation of means, not one of result. It is also limited, even inexistent, when the debtor is bound by other duties such as a duty of “reserve” or of non-interference, when the other party is acting in bad faith or when a party unilaterally terminates a contract or does not renew it.

基金經理人與投資人間的代理問題起源於兩者目標的不一致，前者要求個人薪酬財富的極大化，後者要求投資組合價值的極大化。造成目標歧異的原因有兩個：其一是在資訊不對稱的環境下，投資人無法觀察到經理人投資組合是否真正從投資人利益角度出發，因此引發了經理人的道德危險；其二是在競爭激烈的基金產業□，年度定期績效評比結果與經理人薪酬紅利多寡相連結等制度的設計，加重經理人選擇持有一個高風險投資組合的逆誘因，特別是期中累積績效較差的輸家，隨著年終總績效結算日期的接近，在自利動機的驅使下可能會透過較高的操作風險調整幅度，企圖扭轉頹勢以求反敗為勝。 本研究首先利用卡方檢定、t檢定與Logistic迴歸模式，實證國內基金經理人是否具有自利性風險調整的行為傾向，接著從契約設計的觀點，以理論模式推導命題的方式，探討三種不同型態的誘因費契約對於抑制經理人自利性風險調整行為的作用，並間接利用問卷調查的方式來驗證其效果。研究的結果發現： 1.國內基金經理人不管是贏家或輸家，在越接近年終總績效的結算時，都會偏向選擇一個高風險的操作水準，同時，上述特性在非外資型投信公司所發行的基金、新基金、小規模基金、資淺經理人所操盤的基金特別明顯。 2.基金投資人對於季等短期績效的過分重視，是導致國內經理人操作風險調整幅度偏高的主要原因之一。 3.純粹誘因費契約以及只加上「上限條款」設計的契約，這兩種契約都無法抑制經理人冒高風險的傾向；而純粹誘因費契約加上「懲罰條款」的設計，有抑制經理人自利性調高操作風險行為的效果。 本研究成果的貢獻主要有兩點： 1.在政策應用上，本研究提出契約條款設計的理念，對於我國擬開放勞退等大型基金委託代客操作，雙方契約該如何設計以確保投資人的權益，有相當參考的價值，本研究同時也對投信公司、基金經理人等提出相關的制度性建議。 2.在理論推導上，本研究融合一般化均衡分析法與選擇權理論的應用，將不同型態的誘因費契約化成經理人向投資人所購買的歐式買權，標的資產為經理人所持投資組合的價值，履約價格為比較基準指數的價值，執行日期為一年期的績效評比，模型導証的重點是經理人所選擇投資組合的風險程度與該類比選擇權價值的關係。 / An important question for the contracting literature is the extent to which real behavior is driven by the financial incentives contained in compensation schemes. To address this issue, (1) we use the tournament concept as the framework, and focus on the competitive nature of mutual fund environments how to affect the managers' portfolio decision-making processes. (2) we also use the Black-Scholes option pricing model as the framework, and analyze the impact on the mutual fund managers' risk-manipulation behavior of a performance-based incentive plan. Given the asymmetric information financial markets, most investors of mutual funds can not measure the funds' risk without error, thus, agent-divergent behavior may potentially arise. In a tournament reward structure, the managers' rational attempting to maximize their expected compensation may revise the risk level or alter the composition of their portfolio during the assessment period. While there will be times when such changes don't serve the best interest of funds' investors. Our research demonstrates the following results: 1. An empirical investigation of 86 open-type mutual funds during 1995 to 1998 with the methods of test, t test and the Logistic regression shows fund managers with poor performance would become aggressive and tend to increase fund volatility in the latter part of an annual assessment period. The effect is obviously clear toward the end of the year and it is involved with the investors' myopic of the assessment to the managers' performances. 2. In our model, the bonus is similar to a call option on the funds' portfolio. Three types of incentive contracts are compared. The results show that the incentive contract with penalty can reduce managers to adversely alter the risk of the portfolio they manage. It dominates the pure incentive contract and only with a ceiling incentive contract. Questionnaires investigated by fund managers will support some hypothesis.

No description available.