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Thesis advisor: Marina McCoy / Since antiquity, scholars have observed a structural tension within Plato’s Phaedrus. Thedialogue demands order in every linguistic composition, yet it presents itself as a disordered composition. Accordingly, one of the key problems of the Phaedrus is determining which—if any—aspect of the dialogue can supply a unifying thread for the dialogue’s major themes (love, rhetoric, writing, myth, philosophy, etc.). My dissertation argues that “soul-leading” (psuchagōgia)—a rare and ambiguous term used to define the innate power of words—resolves the dialogue’s structural tension. I clarify the conceptual and dramatic features of soul-leading by focusing on the dialogue’s uniquely prevalent use of the semantic network of “leading” and “following.” By continuing to foreground the language and drama of leading and following, I offer a new interpretation of the dialogue as a whole: the Phaedrus is Plato’s articulation of how the soul can be led into communion with reality. Chapter 1 discusses scholarly disputes about the unity of the Phaedrus and proposes that soulleading adequately satisfies the criteria put forward for what would count as a unifying element. I argue that soul-leading unifies the dialogue both thematically and non-thematically; moreover, soul-leading is a theme capacious enough to account for the other principal contenders for unity put forward. Chapter 2 develops the ambiguous character of soul-leading by examining how the dialogue showcases dangerous forms thereof. Love and language are dangerous when they lead the soul toward goods which can never truly fulfill it. In order to clarify how love and language can mislead the soul, Socrates develops a set of accounts of how the soul is led, both internally and externally, in the three speeches on love. If the soul is to be led into communion with reality (the proper end of soul-leading), it must be led internally by the right part of the soul and externally by the right object of desire. Chapter 3 argues that all souls can, in principle, be harmonized and directed in the way that Chapter 2 requires. I show that Plato’s view of philosophy is neither elitist (i.e., some are intrinsically incapable of philosophy) nor naively essentialist. All can come into communion with reality because all are by nature equipped to do so. While Plato recognizes that there are forces which tend to prohibit one from exercising one’s capability of being rightly led, none of them are intrinsic to human nature. Chapter 4 argues that successful soul-leading require neither the leader nor the follower to be already well-disposed to what’s ultimate in order for the pair to come to a communion with what’s ultimate. Plato’s depiction of soul-leading love shows that love can itself promote the formation needed for both leader and follower to come into contact with reality. Love can do so because it is always already bound up reality in its responsiveness to beauty. Beauty itself calls the lover to itself by shining through the beautiful beloved, who acts as a reminder of transcendent Beauty. The lover mediates this same experience for the beloved. Each comes to desire the other as well as Beauty itself. Chapter 5 argues that the drama of the lovers’ formation mythically depicted in the Palinode (Chapter 4) is written into the drama of the dialogue as a whole. In the relationship between Socrates and Phaedrus, we see an enactment of love’s formative role. Likewise, in the relationship between Phaedrus and Lysias, we see an enactment of the dangerous soul-leading discussed in Chapter 2. My focus on leading and following also allows me to show the thematic significance of the drama’s setting. Chapter 6 articulates the metaphysical conditions under which one can be led into communion with reality. Transcendent Beauty invites us into communion with itself and makes possible our ascent by providing us with divine guides and images which can transport us from our ordinary experiences to the true beings. Beauty accomplishes its work—leading us in a “divine dance” where we follow the gods up to Beauty and back down to each other—through images. When we handle images of reality rightly, they lead our souls into communion with reality. Further, when we have come into communion, we’ll be inspired to be co-workers of Beauty’s soul-leading work. When we articulate reality in language, we create new images that can serve to lead others toward reality. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2021. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

The central thesis of the dissertation is that in the Phaedrus philosophy is presented as a kind of madness in a strict sense, that is to say, the claim is not that philosophy is necessarily unappreciated by the many, hence considered by their standards as insane, but that the philosophical soul is in a way not in rational control, but in a state of mind that can fairly be defined as madness, and that the philosophical life is arranged in order to visit or revisit this state of mind. Socrates' account of eros and madness is based on his account of the soul, thus the first chapter shall give a close reading of Socrates' account of the soul. The second chapter, in turn, interprets Socrates' account of eros in light of his account of the soul. The third chapter, again, looks into Socrates' depiction of eros as a certain kind of madness in light of the first two chapters, focusing respectively on the following three characterizations: madness as the opposite of sōphrosunē, madness as the opposite of tekhnē, and madness as the core of the best human life, namely, the philosophical life. This dissertation, hopefully, gives a faithful interpretation of Socrates' account of eros in the Phaedrus on the one hand, on the other hand reveals the rationale behind Socrates' conception of eros and its highest form, philosophy, as a kind of divine madness. By doing so, I wish to contribute to our understanding of Plato's Socrates and his life as a paradigm of philosophy.

Although Plato's views on Friendship, or philia, are almost always found embedded in discussions of erotic love, I argue that these views nevertheless constitute a clear and compelling picture of the nature and value of the best kinds of friendship. Moreover, I suggest that these views on friendship present us with a surprising insight into Plato's overall conception of the practice of philosophy, as a personal process of striving for knowledge at the center of the best human life. To tease out these views on philia, I begin with a close reading of Plato's Phaedrus. As many have noted, this dialogue appears at first to be strangely disunified: its first half is concerned primarily with giving an account of erotic love, while its second half is devoted to a discussion of the nature and value of rhetoric. I begin by examining the theory of erotic love presented by Socrates in the 'palinode' at the center of the Phaedrus, and arguing that we can begin to see a theory of philia emerging from this account. I then argue that a central element of this theory of philia, as presented in the palinode to love, provides us with a link to the later discussion of rhetoric, and a unifying theme for the Phaedrus as a whole: the knowledge of souls. With this unifying theme in hand, I return to the account of philia, and eros, in the first half of the Phaedrus and, in light of this topic, draw further conclusions about Plato's views of the importance of philia, and eros, to philosophy. / text

The goal of this thesis is ultimately to answer the two questions raised and left unresolved in Plato’s Protagoras: What is virtue? Is virtue teachable? Following the dramatic order of Plato’s dialogues as outlined by Catherine Zuckert, I intend to show that the Meno returns to the issues raised and left unresolved in the Protagoras, but now with the idea of recollection. My intention is to look at how the idea of recollection, developed and associated with eros in the intervening dialogues, can help explain the nature of virtue and its teachability. I believe that we can come to answer both questions, “What is virtue?” and “Is virtue teachable?” posed in the Protagoras and the Meno by drawing on the ideas of anamnesis and eros as they appear in the Meno, Phaedrus, and Symposium.

The goal of this thesis is ultimately to answer the two questions raised and left unresolved in Plato’s Protagoras: What is virtue? Is virtue teachable? Following the dramatic order of Plato’s dialogues as outlined by Catherine Zuckert, I intend to show that the Meno returns to the issues raised and left unresolved in the Protagoras, but now with the idea of recollection. My intention is to look at how the idea of recollection, developed and associated with eros in the intervening dialogues, can help explain the nature of virtue and its teachability. I believe that we can come to answer both questions, “What is virtue?” and “Is virtue teachable?” posed in the Protagoras and the Meno by drawing on the ideas of anamnesis and eros as they appear in the Meno, Phaedrus, and Symposium.

My goal in the present work is to add to our understanding of Socratic protreptic. I do so by focussing on psychological traits and qualities of character in Socrates’ young associates. There are a number of candidates throughout the dialogues whose colourful depiction and careful psychological rendering offer us ample material for study. In this study, I focus on two characters in particular. First, I look at the presentation of Alcibiades in the final scene of Symposium. Here I explore how Plato uses hubris and shame to explain the failure of protreptic in this gifted Socratic associate. Next, I look at Theaetetus as presented in the eponymously named dialogue. His characterization as an able, intelligent and model candidate for philosophy gives us a penetrating insight into the Socratic ideal. Finally, I offer a reading of Eros in Phaedrus that examines the psychological dynamic between the lover and his beloved. While a number of types of lovers are envisioned in this dialogue, I argue that if a beloved is to succeed in turning toward philosophy his lover must be a philosophical lover motivated by other-regarding care for his beloved’s soul. / Thesis (Ph.D, Philosophy) -- Queen's University, 2012-04-02 11:04:07.292

The goal of this thesis is ultimately to answer the two questions raised and left unresolved in Plato’s Protagoras: What is virtue? Is virtue teachable? Following the dramatic order of Plato’s dialogues as outlined by Catherine Zuckert, I intend to show that the Meno returns to the issues raised and left unresolved in the Protagoras, but now with the idea of recollection. My intention is to look at how the idea of recollection, developed and associated with eros in the intervening dialogues, can help explain the nature of virtue and its teachability. I believe that we can come to answer both questions, “What is virtue?” and “Is virtue teachable?” posed in the Protagoras and the Meno by drawing on the ideas of anamnesis and eros as they appear in the Meno, Phaedrus, and Symposium.

The goal of this thesis is ultimately to answer the two questions raised and left unresolved in Plato’s Protagoras: What is virtue? Is virtue teachable? Following the dramatic order of Plato’s dialogues as outlined by Catherine Zuckert, I intend to show that the Meno returns to the issues raised and left unresolved in the Protagoras, but now with the idea of recollection. My intention is to look at how the idea of recollection, developed and associated with eros in the intervening dialogues, can help explain the nature of virtue and its teachability. I believe that we can come to answer both questions, “What is virtue?” and “Is virtue teachable?” posed in the Protagoras and the Meno by drawing on the ideas of anamnesis and eros as they appear in the Meno, Phaedrus, and Symposium.

In a short dialogue, philosopher Paul Feyerabend made some remarks regarding the interpretation of Plato’s theory of writing in the Phaedrus, which boil down to the suggestion that written works are didactically valuable when having the right kind of resemblance to “live exchanges”, adding that Plato in this respect resembles modern philosophies of science. In the present thesis, I flesh out and vindicate Feyerabend’s suggestions by a thematic reading of Phaedrus 274c–278b and a subsequent comparison of the interpreted theory with a few relevant modern philosophies of science.  My reading focuses on Plato’s philosophical use of the words ζῆν ‘live’, εἴδωλον ‘idol/image/representation/eidōlon’ and παιδιά ‘play’. Through them I show how Plato constructs a three-tiered value ranking of didactic processes, with live exchanges as the best, traditional monographs in the style of Lysias’ written speech as the worst, and Plato’s own original conception of “playful” writing in the middle: “a kind of eidōlon” of a live exchange that nevertheless does not pretend to be the real thing. Plato’s three tiers correspond well to the modern distinction between everyday scientific work, scientific papers and the different suggestions for in-betweens, such as the one made by Peter Medawar or the one contained in the so-called strong programme of David Bloor. I also identify four characteristics of Plato’s theory, including its emphasis on imitative learning, the necessity of the prescribed didactics, non-propositionality and reflexivity, which are found in the modern philosophies of the just-mentioned authors, as well as in that of Ludwik Fleck.