The integration of the University of Pretoria into its context has become a critical consideration, if the City of Tshwane Development framework 2010 endeavor to further develop the Hatfield district area as one of the cities nodal activity hubs is to be achieved. How can this are achieved without compromising the universities security when breaking the barriers between. / Dissertation (MArch(Prof))--University of Pretoria, 2009. / Architecture / unrestricted

Foundationalism about justification has historically enjoyed widespread acceptance among philosophers despite equally widespread disagreement about how foundational justification is possible. It is widely agreed that all knowledge must by justified by a foundation that does not stand in need of justification, but philosophers disagree on what could provide that foundation. Internalists, who look for justification in factors internal to rational agents, tend to agree that foundational justification is provided by seemings, or the way things seem to one to be. This view has most commonly gone by the name 'Phenomenal Dogmatism' although variations of it have been defended. Phenomenal dogmatism has been criticized for being too permissive with regard to the states it counts as able to confer foundational justification. In this paper I will consider one attempt, offered by Berit Brogaard, to revise phenomenal dogmatism in response to these criticisms. I will argue that Brogaard's revised view has significant problems of its own. Specifically, it does not account for problems arising from the possibility of cognitively penetrated perceptions. / Master of Arts

Philosophers commonly distinguish between an experience’s intentional content—what the experience represents—and its phenomenal character—what the experience is like for the subject. Separatism—the view that the intentional content and phenomenal character of an experience are independent of one another in the sense that neither determines the other—was once widely held. In recent years, however, separatism has become increasingly marginalized; at present, most philosophers who work on the issue agree that there must be some kind of necessary connection between an experience’s intentional content and phenomenal character. In contrast with the current consensus, I believe that a particular form of separatism remains the most plausible view of the relationship between an experience’s intentional content and phenomenal character. Accordingly, in this thesis I explain and defend a view that I call “moderate separatism.” The view is “moderate” in that the separatist claim is restricted to a particular class of phenomenal properties: I do not maintain that all the phenomenal properties instantiated by an experience are independent of that experience’s intentional content but only that this is true of the sensory qualities instantiated by that experience. I argue for moderate separatism by appealing to examples of ordinary experiences where sensory qualities and intentional content come apart. First I argue that an experience’s intentional content does not determine the sensory qualities it instantiates by appealing to cases where two experiences share the same intentional content but instantiate different sensory qualities. Then I argue that the sensory qualities instantiated by an experience do not determine its intentional content by appealing to cases where two experiences that instantiate the same sensory qualities differ with regard to intentional content. I consider a number of alternatives to my account of the intentional content and phenomenal character of the experiences at issue and argue that none is plausible. If so, it follows that the intentional content and sensory qualities instantiated by an experience are independent of one another.

Philosophers commonly distinguish between an experience’s intentional content—what the experience represents—and its phenomenal character—what the experience is like for the subject. Separatism—the view that the intentional content and phenomenal character of an experience are independent of one another in the sense that neither determines the other—was once widely held. In recent years, however, separatism has become increasingly marginalized; at present, most philosophers who work on the issue agree that there must be some kind of necessary connection between an experience’s intentional content and phenomenal character. In contrast with the current consensus, I believe that a particular form of separatism remains the most plausible view of the relationship between an experience’s intentional content and phenomenal character. Accordingly, in this thesis I explain and defend a view that I call “moderate separatism.” The view is “moderate” in that the separatist claim is restricted to a particular class of phenomenal properties: I do not maintain that all the phenomenal properties instantiated by an experience are independent of that experience’s intentional content but only that this is true of the sensory qualities instantiated by that experience. I argue for moderate separatism by appealing to examples of ordinary experiences where sensory qualities and intentional content come apart. First I argue that an experience’s intentional content does not determine the sensory qualities it instantiates by appealing to cases where two experiences share the same intentional content but instantiate different sensory qualities. Then I argue that the sensory qualities instantiated by an experience do not determine its intentional content by appealing to cases where two experiences that instantiate the same sensory qualities differ with regard to intentional content. I consider a number of alternatives to my account of the intentional content and phenomenal character of the experiences at issue and argue that none is plausible. If so, it follows that the intentional content and sensory qualities instantiated by an experience are independent of one another.

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Phenomenal consciousness presents a recalcitrant problem for the scientific conception of the world and the physicalist thesis that claims that everything that exists (including whatever is involved in any mental phenomena) is physical and physically explainable. Thus, on this view, every truth is a physical truth. By Putnam-Kripkean considerations and for several other reasons, I defend the claim that any version of such a physicalist thesis must be a necessary thesis, which ultimately means that contingent physicalism is not tenable. Against this thesis, philosophers have put forward several anti-physicalist arguments including the knowledge argument, the conceivability/modal argument, the explanatory gap argument, and the property dualism argument. All these arguments rest on the assumption of an epistemic/explanatory gap, which I call the &ldquo / phenomenal-physical gap,&rdquo / between the phenomenal and the physical. I claim that the phenomenal-physical gap (the PP-gap) is unbridgeable, from which it can be concluded that a priori physicalism is not tenable. The phenomenal concept strategy (PCS), which is a specific strategy within a posteriori necessary physicalism, aims at offering an explanation in physical terms of why we have such an unbridgeable gap by differentiating between phenomenal and physical concepts in a fundamental way. Nevertheless, proponents of PCS&mdash / the most promising version of a posteriori necessary physicalism&mdash / face a severe problem that I call &ldquo / the problem of phenomenal subjecthood&rdquo / in explaining in physical terms why we have the PP-gap. The phenomenon of &ldquo / experiencing&rdquo / consists of three substantially existing elements: the phenomenal subject (the experiencer), the experiential item (what is experienced by the subject), and the phenomenal s-v-o relation (the experiential relation) between the first two. I argue for the substantial existence of phenomenal subjects based on an argument I provide, the reality of some mental phenomena such as phenomenal unity and continuity, and the mental facts concerning phenomenal peculiarity, phenomenal agency, and the sense of phenomenal I-ness, the reality of all of which one cannot deny. Since PCS accounts are mostly qualia-centered accounts that ignore the reality of phenomenal subjects and the phenomenal s-v-o relation, they cannot account for the PP-gap in physical terms without first offering substantial theories of phenomenal subjecthood. But once they grant the substantiality of phenomenal subjects, they face severe difficulties in establishing their accounts of the nature of phenomenal concept, and thus the PP-gap in physical terms.

The aim of this thesis is to critique two approaches to explaining the relation between representational and phenomenal content. The first approach, representationism, holds that phenomenal content is entirely constituted by intentional or representational content. The second approach, phenomenism, holds that phenomenal content is not entirely constituted by intentional or representational content. There is something ’more’ to phenomenal content than just intentional content. Two types of consideration are considered in order to evaluate these two approaches as follows: The first, considers two ’metaphysical speculations’, inverted spectra and inverted earth: The second, considers causal and explanatory implications of adopting either of these two approaches. Inverted spectrums and inverted earth provide prima facie grounds for rejecting representationism(Block, 1990, 1996; Shoemaker; 199 1); however, it will be demonstrated that both ‘speculations’ do not demonstrate representationism to fail. This thesis will argue that existing responses to inverted earth, for example, Lalor (1999), Lycan (1996), and Tye (1994, 1995b, 1998b) are inadequate. However, it provides a new response to inverted earth on behalf of the wide representationist. Narrow content representationism, which holds that phenomenal contents are functions that map contexts onto contents, will be demonstrated to fail. Doubt is also cast upon teleological approaches to phenomenal content. Causal and explanatory constraints present a problem to both wide representationism and phenomenism. Wide representationalist theories have traditionally faced a challenge from attempting to explain how relational properties can be casually relevant (Fodor, 1987). These problems apply also to representationist theories of phenomenal content. Two current proponents of wide causation are considered, Wilson (1997) and Yablo (1997); their accounts are found to be problematic. Phenomenism either faces a troublesome ‘explanatory gap’ or a problematic commitment to type-type physicalist identity theories. Finally a proposed future direction for these two theories is suggested.

Although having conscious experiences is a fundamental feature of our everyday life, our understanding of what consciousness is is very limited. According to one of the main conclusions of contemporary philosophy of mind, the qualitative aspect of consciousness seems to resist functionalisation, i.e. it cannot be adequately defined solely in terms of functional or causal roles, which leads to an epistemic gap between phenomenal and scientific knowledge. Phenomenal qualities, then, seem to be, in principle, unexplainable in scientific terms. As a reaction to this pessimistic conclusion it is a major trend in contemporary science of consciousness to turn away from subjective experiences and re-define the subject of investigations in neurological and behavioural terms. This move, however, creates a gap between scientific theories of consciousness, and the original phenomenon, which we are so intimately connected with. The thesis focuses on this gap. It is argued that it is possible to explain features of consciousness in scientific terms. The thesis argues for this claim from two directions. On the one hand, a specific identity theory is formulated connecting phenomenal qualities to certain intermediate level perceptual representations which are unstructured for central processes of the embedding cognitive system. This identity theory is hypothesised on the basis of certain similarities recognised between the phenomenal and the cognitive-representational domains, and then utilised in order to uncover further similarities between these two domains. The identity theory and the further similarities uncovered are then deployed in formulating explanations of the philosophically most important characteristics of the phenomenal domain—i.e. why phenomenal qualities resist functionalisation, and why the epistemic gap occurs. On the other hand, the thesis investigates and criticises existing models of reductive explanation. On the basis of a detailed analysis of how successful scientific explanations proceed a novel account of reductive explanation is proposed, which utilises so-called prior identities. Prior identities are prerequisites rather than outcomes of reductive explanations. They themselves are unexplained but are nevertheless necessary for mapping the features to be explained onto the features the explanation relies on. Prior identities are hypothesised in order to foster the formulation of explanatory claims accounting for target level phenomena in terms of base level processes—and they are justified if they help projecting base level explanations to new territories of the target level. The thesis concludes that the identity theory proposed is a prior identity, and the explanations of features of the phenomenal domain formulated with the aid of this identity are reductive explanations proper. In this sense, the thesis introduces the problem of phenomenal consciousness into scientific discourse, and therefore offers a bridge between the philosophy and the science of consciousness: it offers an approach to conscious experience which, on the one hand, tries to account for the philosophically most important features of consciousness, whereas, on the other hand, does it in a way which smoothly fits into the everyday practice of scientific research.

Orientador: Alfredo Pereira Júnior / Banca: Mariana Claudia Broens / Banca: João de Fernandes Teixeira / Resumo: A consciência é um conceito extremamente polêmico, gerando uma série de modelos e teorias na filosofia e na ciência. Um dos maiores problemas é a questão do aspecto qualitativo da consciência. Alguns teóricos preferem negar tal aspecto, tanto por sua dificuldade ontológica, como por sua dificuldade em termos metodológicos. Outros assumem a consciência como fenomênica, entretanto a qualificam como epifenomênica em relação ao mundo físico. Uma outra possibilidade é que a consciência seja fenomênica em sua definição e que tenha sido selecionada no processo evolutivo por apresentar vantagens adaptativas. O presente trabalho tem por objetivo estudar se a consciência pode ser uma estratégia adaptativa, considerando-a como sendo qualitativa, por definição. A idéia defendida, por nós, é que a consciência foi selecionada no percurso evolutivo, inicialmente, por ajudar o organismo a se afastar de situações perigosas e aproximar-se de situações benéficas, sendo que provavelmente, mais tarde, a consciência tenha se sofisticado, tornando-se uma via de contato social, propiciando a compreensão do contexto e a conseqüente resposta adequada a este. / Abstract: Click electronic access below. / Mestre

This paper argues that Gertler’s (2012) account of acquaintance is inadequate because it cannot perform the explanatory role that it’s supposed to perform. My argument builds from two central claims. First, I argue that our judgments about phenomenal absences have the special features that acquaintance is supposed to explain. Second, I argue that Gertler’s take on acquaintance does not allow us to be acquainted with phenomenal absences. This suggests a general methodological lesson: when developing an account of the epistemology of acquaintance, we should make sure that we are capturing all of the relevant sorts of cases. / Master of Arts