Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Cesar Gomes Bonfim Dias.pdf: 1124341 bytes, checksum: 0597660771a7d49eec9ad282d8b45412 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-11-20 / This work aims to understand how to configure the theme of indivision on the thought of Maurice Merleau-ponty (1908 - 1961). The term indivision appears in philosophical sense, between 1958 and 1960, taught courses at the Collège of France, such as joint ownership body and worldly, that is, from my body with me, of my body with the world and of the bodies among themselves. Merleau-Ponty asserts that we are indivisibility . As the term body refers to the perceptual experience body that the subject has of himself, of the things, of the world and of the other, this indivision and it, too, an experience, an experience of indivision, such as express our title. The indivision descends from the husserlian intentionality, it refers to the mode of being of consciousness as consciousness of something. Merleau-ponty combines this theme to the Lebenswelt (world of life) husserlian and establishes their reflections on the horizon of an intentionality operant, a way to be original that works from the inside, which allows for the existence of intercorporeality and interworld. This way of being original identifies himself to what we call from experience of indivision. It is this over the course of three reflections developed by the philosopher, namely the perceptual experience body, the expression and the reflection on the flesh. In the first, the body phenomenal provides at the philosopher thinking a kind of unity that exists for himself to himself (the subject as the body) and in communion with the world, with things and with the other - a way of indivision founded on corporeality. In the second reflection, thinking about the meaning of the expression, from the perspective of the experience of the speaking subject makes it possible to understand the operation of expression the operationality a point or moment of indivision. The spousal of the language by speaking subject indicates a layer of indivision woven of yarns diacritics and a crossroads between the elements that make up this layer. In the third reflection, the flesh shows the same nature of the experience of indivision as indivisibility. There are carnal indivisibility between the "I" and the "world" (I and things, between myself and the other). The flesh, as a element and dimensionality that make up the indivision, it is a way of being that is being carried out by the agency of its own operation, enabling the identity, the difference and as well as the links between all the fleshs / Este trabalho pretende compreender como se configura o tema da indivisão no pensamento de Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908 1961). O termo indivisão aparece em sentido filosófico, entre 1958 e 1960, nos cursos ministrados no Collège de France, como indivisão corporal e mundana, isto é, do meu corpo comigo, do meu corpo com o mundo e dos corpos entre si. Merleau-Ponty afirma que nós somos uma indivisibilidade. Como o termo corpo refere-se à experiência perceptiva corporal que o sujeito tem de si mesmo, das coisas, do mundo e do outro, essa indivisão é ela, também, uma experiência, uma experiência da indivisão, como expressão nosso título. A indivisão descende da intencionalidade husserliana, aquela referente ao modo de ser da consciência como consciência de algo. Merleau-Ponty alia essa temática à Lebenswelt (mundo da vida) husserliana e estabelece suas reflexões no horizonte de uma intencionalidade operante, um modo de ser original que trabalha desde o interior, a qual viabiliza a existência da intercorporeidade e do intermundo. Esse modo de ser original identifica-se ao que chamamos de experiência da indivisão. Ela está presente ao longo de três reflexões desenvolvidas pelo filósofo, a saber, a experiência perceptiva corporal, a expressão e a reflexão acerca da carne. Na primeira, o corpo fenomenal propicia ao filósofo pensar um tipo de unidade existente de si a si (o sujeito como corpo) e de comunhão com o mundo, com as coisas e com os outros um modo de indivisão fundado na corporeidade. Na terceira reflexão, pensar o sentido da expressão, sob a ótica da experiência do sujeito falante torna possível entender a operação de expressão a operacionalidade como ponto ou momento da indivisão. O esposamento da língua pelo sujeito falante indica uma camada de indivisão tecida de fios diacríticos e de um entrecruzamento entre os elementos que compõem essa camada. Na terceira reflexão, a carne mostra a natureza mesma da experiência de indivisão como indivisibilidade. Há indivisibilidade carnal entre o eu e o mundo (eu e as coisas, entre eu e os outros). A carne, como elemento e dimensionalidade que compõem a indivisão, é um modo de ser que se realiza pelo agenciamento de sua própria operação, possibilitando a identidade, a diferença e bem como os laços entre todas as carnes

Cette thèse s'interroge sur la connaissance de soi émotionnelle, sur sa place ainsi que sa participation à la connaissance de soi, sur la valeur qu'elle a pour les individus ordinaires et sur la manière dont les individus ordinaires peuvent l'obtenir. L'examen de la nature des émotions et de la valeur que les individus accordent à la connaissance de leurs émotions, qui est effectué dans cette thèse, met en avant l'importance de l'acquisition de la connaissance de soi émotionnelle, ainsi que le lien que cette dernière est communément entendue entretenir avec le bonheur. Si l'acquisition de cette connaissance apparaît comme primordiale, elle n'en est pas pour autant facile. Elle requiert le déploiement d'un certain nombre de capacités cognitives, ainsi qu'un effort cognitif important, notamment au cours de l'utilisation de l'introspection. En effet, cette thèse discute exclusivement de l'accès introspectif à la connaissance de soi émotionnelle, et laisse de côté les autres formes d'accès à la connaissance de soi. Je m'interroge donc dans ce travail, sur la portée pratique mais aussi morale de l'utilisation de l'introspection au regard des émotions, en proposant une défense du processus introspectif comme d'un processus capable de permettre à un individu ordinaire de détecter, d'identifier et d'interpréter ses propres émotions. Cette thèse est donc axée autour de deux arguments principaux. Le premier de ces aruments octroie à la connaissance de soi émotionnelle, une place fondamentale au sein de la forme de connaissance de soi qui importe aux individus ordinaires. Le second défend l'idée selon laquelle l'introspection offre un accès à cette connaissance émotionnelle, notamment par le biais de l'appréhension qu'elle permet de la phénoménologie des émotions, et que cet accès a une fiabilité minimale et donc une valeur épistémique, même faible, ainsi qu'une valeur morale et intrinsèque. / This thesis examines emotional self-knowledge, its place as well as its participation in self-knowledge, the value it has for ordinary individuals and how ordinary individuals can obtain it. The examination of the nature of the emotions and the value that individuals place on the knowledge of their emotions, which is carried out in this thesis, highlights the importance of the acquisition of emotional-selfknowledge, as well as the link thet the latter is commonly heard to maintain with happiness. If the acquisition of this knowledge appears to be essential, it is not easy. It requires the unfurling of a number of cognitive abilities, as well as a significant cognitive effort, especially during the use of introspection. Indeed, this thesis exclusively discusses introspective access to emotional self-knowledge, and set aside other forms of access to self-knowledge. In this woek, I therefore question the practical but also moral scope of the use of introspection with regard to emotions, proposing a defense of the introspective process as a process capable of allowing an ordinary individual to detect, to identify and interpret one's own emotions. This thesis is therefore organized around two main arguments. The first of these arguments gives emotional self-knowledge a fundamental place in the form of self-knowledge that matters to ordinary people. The second defends the idea that introspection offers access ti this emotional knowledge, notably through the apprehension that its allows of the phenomenology of emotions, and that this access has a minimum reliability and therefore an epistemic value - even a weak one - as well as a moral and intrinsic value.

Submitted by Fabio Sobreira Campos da Costa (fabio.sobreira@ufpe.br) on 2016-08-26T15:37:10Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) Tese NormandoJQViana_Biblioteca Central_UFPE (0).pdf certa.pdf: 2847669 bytes, checksum: 035b1ec1bda1217eaae08822bf17ca9e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-26T15:37:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) Tese NormandoJQViana_Biblioteca Central_UFPE (0).pdf certa.pdf: 2847669 bytes, checksum: 035b1ec1bda1217eaae08822bf17ca9e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-02-29 / CNPq / Vem de longa data o interesse da ciência psicológica pela busca do autoconhecimento (James, 1890/1983). Neste contexto, os estudos oriundos do campo da autoconsciência, em especial com o advento da Teoria OSA (Duval & Wicklund, 1972), uma das primeiras teorias a considerar as discrepâncias entre o self e os padrões (Duval & Silva, 2001), têm reunido esforços no intuito de superar tamanha lacuna. Neste contexto, entusiasmado pela compreensão do self, em especial em sua vertente simbólica, bem como no instanciamento dos processos autoavaliativos por este operados, tramados à identificação da natureza dos padrões de atratividade e a forma como estes têm sido fenomenologicamente consciencizados no fluxo da experiência interna dos sujeitos, o presente estudo de tese objetiva identificar o que são os padrões de autoatratividade, qual sua dinâmica representacional no seio da experiência interna e o enlaçamento no processo autoavaliativo dos processos de atratividade autopercebida, autofocalização (autoconsciência situacional e disposicional), autoestima, bem estar (satisfação com a vida e felicidade), humor depressivo e religiosidade. Para o estudo em questão, foi recrutada uma amostra mista composta por 657 participantes (563 brasileiros e 94 portugueses), adolescentes, jovens, adultos e idosos, de ambos os sexos e orientações sexuais homossexual e heterossexual, residentes na Região Metropolitana do Recife e na cidade de Lisboa, Portugal. Os procedimentos relativos à coleta ocorreram em três etapas: a primeira com objetivo de levantar emicamente, por intermédio de procedimentos multimétodos, o campo semântico de autoatratividade (Estudo 1 – Qualitativo); a segunda, com base nos achados da etapa anterior, corresponde ao processo de elaboração e validação da Escala de Autoatratividade - EAA junto à pesquisa desta com o conjunto de instrumentos utilizados (Escala de Apreciação Corporal (EAC); Escala de Autoconsciência Situacional (EAS); Escala de Autoconsciência Disposicional (EAD); Escala de Autoestima de Rosenberg; Escala de Satisfação com a Vida; Escala de Felicidade Subjetiva; Escala CES-D (Rastreamento de depressão); Escala de Religiosidade Global (ERG) e Escala de religiosidade de item único, bem como o roteiro de entrevista Fenomenológico-Cognitiva dos Estados Autoconscientes – EFEA), a fim de permitir a identificação da multidimensionalidade da maquinaria psíquica atrelada ao construto atratividade dentre a amostra recrutada (Estudo 2 – Ex-post-facto) e a terceira etapa refere-se ao aprofundamento dos achados da etapa que a antecede, por intermédio da apresentação do gradiente fenomenal dos padrões de atratividade com base na identificação dos modos como estes são representados no fluxo da experiência dos participantes durante estado autoconsciente relacionado a autoatratividade (Estudo 3 – Fenomenal). A hipótese geral que dá sustentação ao estudo em questão considera que quanto mais autoconscientes e de modo reflexivo as pessoas são maior seria a capacidade que estas têm de minorar as influências que os padrões de atratividade exercem sobre os processos autoavaliativos, ocasionando prejuízos ao funcionamento psicológico saudável, além de que, os padrões, caso emerjam à consciência, no seio da experiência interna, se realizarão cognitivamente em elementos variados de natureza representacional, em especial na forma da fala interna e visualização interna. De modo específico, dentre o conjunto de hipóteses que dá sustenção ao referido estudo, destaca-se aquela que chama atenção ao papel moderador da religiosidade no possível impacto deletério que os padrões de atratividade ocasionam à vida das pessoas, haja vista, a importância e centralidade de tal dimensão para subjetividade humana. O modelo de análise de dados adotado no presente estudo de tese prezou, no tocante ao material quantitativo, pela investigação da dimensionalidade das escalas por via da metodologia das facetas (Guttman, 1968), com base nas Análises Multidimensionais não-métricas do tipo SSA (Similarity Structure Analysis, ver Guttman, 1968; Roazzi, 1995). Por sua vez, o material qualitativo foi submetido à análise de conteúdo (Estudo 1, Bardin, 1970) e a metodologia fenomenológica padrão (Estudo 2, Cott & Rock, 2008). Os principais achados do presente estudo de tese apontam que os padrões de autoatratividade e sua fenomenologia são representados cognitivamente na consciência por intermédio dos elementos da fala interna e das visualizações internas, associadas aos elementos do sentimento, bem como a consciência sensória. Não se encontrou, todavia, ocorrência de pensamento não simbolizado na análise fenomenal operada. A estrutura de tal padrão se organiza a partir de duas dimensões, uma física e outra não física, representadas pelos fatores: sensualidade, moralidade, apresentação pessoal, afetividade, inteligência, bom humor e asseio. Tais fatores quando correlacionados entre si, e junto as demais medidas utilizadas, apontam a presença de correlações estatisticamente significantes, em especial, no tocante às variáveis: Orientação sexual, no âmbito geral, os heterossexuais encontram-se mais próximos de um campo de afeto positivo, e os homossexuais nas cercanias do afeto negativo; Idade, os mais jovens, também situados num campo do afeto negativo, passando por um campo intermediário, onde há a presença de jovens adultos, findando com os participantes com idades entre 36 e 76 anos, cravados num campo de afeto positivo; Religiosidade, igualmente caracterizada por uma disposição polar, nas cercanias desta variável, os que se dizem religiosos, os heterossexuais e os adultos e idosos, e distanciando-se da religiosidade, localizados em plano antagônico, os que relatam não professar nenhuma fé, os adolescentes de 14 a 20 anos e os jovens homossexuais; e Nacionalidade, os portugueses mais próximos de um padrão de atratividade com base em princípios morais e os brasileiros simpáticos às variáveis sociodemográficas de natureza religiosa, inferindo que estas exercem influência sobre o instanciamento dos processos autofocalizadores, correlações estas cujos significados são corroborados pelos achados oriundos do estudo fenomenal. Tal estudo representa um esforço em dar visibilidade a uma temática pouco investigada na ciência psicológica, a natureza dos padrões de correção e o impacto destes nos processos autofocalizadores, em diálogo com uma perspectiva de mente dual, que contempla aspectos psicológicos e fenomenais da subjetividade e cognição humanas, a fim de contribuir com uma compreensão mais profunda sobre os aspectos cognitivos cruciais relacionados ao instanciamento de modos mais adaptados e, consequentemente, menos comprometedores da existência significativa e feliz. / The interest of the psychological science in the search for self-knowledge has come a long way (James, 1890/1983). In this context, studies from the self-awareness field, especially with the advent of the OSA Theory (Duval & Wicklund, 1972), one of the first to consider the discrepancies between the self and the patterns (Duval & Silva, 2001), have gathered efforts in order to overcome such gap. Within this framework, keen on understanding the self, especially in its symbolic aspect as well as in the instantiation of the self-assessment processes it operates, hatched in the identification of the nature of attractiveness patterns and how they have phenomenologically been made aware in the flow of the subjects‟ inner experience, this study aims to identify self-attractiveness patterns, their representational dynamics within the inner experience and the intertwining of the self-perceived attractiveness processes, of self-focusing (situational and dispositional self-awareness), self-esteem and well-being (life satisfaction and happiness), depressive mood and religiosity in the self-assessment process. For this study, a mixed sample of 657 participants (563 Brazilian and 94 Portuguese) was recruited, among whom were teenagers, adults and elderly people of both sexes, as well as homo and heterosexual orientations, living in the metropolitan area of Recife and in Lisbon, Portugal. The collecting-related procedures were carried out in three steps: the first one, to emically raise, through multimethod procedures, the semantic field of self-attractiveness (Study 1 - Qualitative); the second, based on the findings from the previous step, corresponds to the process of development and validation of the Self-attractiveness Scale – SAS, along with its survey with the set of instruments used (Body Assessment Scale - BAS); Situational Self-Awareness Scale (SSAE); Dispositional Self-Awareness Scale (DSAS); Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; Life Satisfaction Scale; Subjective Happiness Scale; CES-D Scale (Depression Tracking); Global Religiosity Scale (GRS) and Single-item Religiosity Scale, as well as the Self-Aware States Phenomenological-Cognitive interview script – SASPG), to enable the identification of the multidimensionality of the psychic machinery linked to the attractiveness construct within the recruited sample (Study 2 - Ex-post-facto). The third stage refers to deepening the findings of the previous one through the presentation of the phenomenal gradient of attractiveness patterns based on the identification of the ways they are represented in the flow of the participants‟ experience during the self-aware state related to self-attractiveness (Study 3 - Phenomenal). The general hypothesis that supports the present study considers that the more self-aware and reflective people are, the greater the capacity they have to reduce the influence attractiveness patterns have on self-assessment processes, which bring harm to healthy psychological functioning. Moreover, those patterns, should they emerge to awareness within the inner experience, will cognitively take place in a range of elements of representational nature, especially in the form of inner speech and inner visualization. In particular, among the set of assumptions that support this study, there is one that draws attention to the moderating role of religiosity in the possible deleterious impact attractiveness patterns cause to people's lives, given the importance and centrality of such dimension to human subjectivity. With regard to the quantitative material, the data analysis model adopted in this thesis study valued the investigation of the scale dimensionality by means of the facet methodology (Guttman, 1968), based on the non-metric SSA (Similarity Structure Analysis, see Guttman, 1968; Roazzi, 1995) type Multidimensional Analysis. In turn, the qualitative material was submitted to content analysis (Study 1, Bardin, 1970) and to the pattern phenomenological methodology (Study 2, Cott & Rock, 2008). The main findings of the present study indicate the self-attractiveness patterns and their phenomenology to be represented cognitively in the awareness by means of the inner speech and inner visualization elements, associated with both feelings and sensory awareness. There was no occurrence of non-symbolized thought in the carried out phenomenal analysis, though. The structure of such a pattern is set considering two dimensions, physical and non-physical, represented by the following factors: sensuality, morality, personal presentation, affection, intelligence, good humor and neatness. Such factors, when correlated and with the use of other measures, suggest the presence of statistically significant correlations, especially regarding the variables: Sexual orientation, in general, heterosexuals are closer to a positive affection ground, while homosexuals, around negative affection; Age, the youngest also being in a negative affection ground, passing to a middle ground where young adults are present, ending with between 36 and 76 year-old participants, nailed to a positive affection ground; Religiosity, also characterized by a polar layout around this variable, those who claim to be religious, the heterosexual, the adults and the elderly, as opposed to those distant from religiosity, located in an antagonistic plan, who report not to profess any faith, 14 to 20 year-old adolescents and young homosexuals; and Nationality, with the Portuguese closer to an attractiveness pattern based on moral principles, whilst the Brazilians sympathize with the sociodemographic variables of a religious nature, inferring that they influence the instancing of self-focusing processes, correlations whose meanings are corroborated by findings of the phenomenal study. This study represents an effort to give visibility to a little investigated topic in the psychological science, the nature of correction patterns and their impact on the self-focusing processes, dialoguing with a dual mind perspective, which includes psychological and phenomenal aspects of human subjectivity and cognition in order to contribute to a deeper understanding of the crucial cognitive aspects related to the instancing of more adapted and consequently less compromising forms of a meaningful and happy existence.

Two influential theories of consciousness disagree about if consciousness initially arises along the occipitotemporal cortex to later engage frontoparietal regions and attentional mechanisms, or if it necessarily requires the latter. Consequently, different predictions are made about the temporal emergence of consciousness. The event-related potential (ERP) technique can be used to resolve the issue. It can temporally track neural activity of consciously perceived stimuli relative to stimuli bypassing consciousness. This essay describes the two theories and reviews ERP studies on visual consciousness and its relationship to attention. Three ERP correlates of consciousness have been proposed. The question is if they should be interpreted as supporting the one or the other theory. Most plausibly, visual consciousness arises along occipitotemporal regions and later incorporates frontal areas engaging higher cognitive functions. Importantly it seems that consciousness cannot arise without spatial attention/parietal regions.

Depersonalization-Derealization Disorder (DDD) is a dissociative syndrome characterized by a sense of disconnectedness from one’s own self and the world around. People suffering from the condition report feeling like external observers, cut off from their own bodies, emotions and thoughts; their surroundings are perceived as unreal. The present thesis analyses DDD by sustaining the view that its phenomenology can be understood through Metzinger’s notion of phenomenal transparency. This idea is not entirely new: recent contributions (Ciaunica et al., 2020; Ciaunica et al., 2021; Seth et al., 2012) have framed the dramatic experiences of depersonalization and derealization as instances of highly opaque mental states. However, more detailed discussions of phenomenal transparency are sparse. My contribution wishes to partially fill in this gap. To elucidate the concept of transparency, I will first highlight the distinction between the classical representationalist notion of transparency and the metzingerian, phenomenal account of it. I will then argue that phenomenal transparency adequately describes the associated depersonalized phenomenology. Finally, I will attempt to present and dissipate ambiguities contained in the concept and address potential criticism regarding the redundancy of transparency as an explanatory tool for dissociative phenomena. / Depersonalisations- och Derealisationssyndrom (DDD) är ett dissociativt syndrom som kännetecknas av en känsla av att vara frånkopplad från ens eget jag och omvärlden. Människor som lider av tillståndet rapporterar att de känner sig som externa observatörer, avskurna från sina egna kroppar, känslor och tankar; deras omgivning upplevs som overklig. Denna avhandling analyserar DDD genom att stödja uppfattningen att dess fenomenologi kan förstås genom Metzingers föreställning om fenomenal transparens. Denna idé är inte helt ny: senaste bidrag (Ciaunica et al., 2020; Ciaunica et al., 2021; Seth et al., 2012) har ramat in de dramatiska upplevelserna av depersonalisering och derealisering som förekomster av mycket ogenomskinliga mentala tillstånd. Mer detaljerade diskussioner om fenomenal transparens är dock sparsamma. Mitt bidrag vill delvis fylla denna lucka. För att belysa begreppet transparens kommer jag först att lyfta fram distinktionen mellan den klassiska representationalistiska föreställningen om transparens och den metzingerska, fenomenala redogörelsen för den. Jag kommer då att hävda att fenomenal transparens på ett adekvat sätt beskriver den associerade depersonaliserade fenomenologin. Slutligen kommer jag att försöka presentera och skingra oklarheter som finns i konceptet och ta upp potentiell kritik angående transparensens redundans som ett förklarande verktyg för dissociativa fenomen.

Jan Wallentin. Vägar till samadhi : en granskning av Robert K. C. Formans begrepp ”Pure Consciousness Event” (Roads to Samadhi : An Examination of Robert K. C. Forman’s Concept of ”Pure Consciousness Event”). Umeå University: Department of Historical, Philosophical and Religious studies. Bachelor thesis. June 2021.Is Robert K. C. Forman’s concept of ”pure consciousness event” an example of a universal,mystical core experience? Is it possible to establish the neural correlates of this proposedexperience, and to induce it experimentally? These are the main questions of this study,which is a literature review drawing on recent scientific research from three fields: religious studies, philosophy of consciousness and neuroscience.The major findings are:The concept of ”pure consciousness event” (PCE) does seem like a tenable way ofgetting around the constructivist critique regarding universal, mystical core experiences.However, Forman’s original definition of PCE seems too strict. Forman defines PCE as ”a wakeful though contentless (non-intentional) consciousness”, but in the conventional wisdom of contemporary philosophy it is deemed impossible to be conscious without beingconscious about something. A conceivable solution would be to replace the term ”PCE” withThomas Metzinger’s less strict term ”Minimal Phenomenal Experience” (MPE), whichallows for some, though minimal, mental content during these kind of experiences.Regarding neural correlates, several recent studies suggest that a high level of activityin the brain’s default mode network (DMN) is correlated with a heightened sense of self-awareness. A low level of activity in the DMN is, vice versa, correlated with a sense of self-forgetting, as in the flow-experience. However, the activity-level of the DMN does not seem to fully explain the proposed existence of pure consciousness events, even in a less strict definition of this term.Methods used to induce experiences reminiscent of PCE include the white dreams ofTibetan dream yoga (yoga nidrā), states of deep meditation, and the intake of psychoactive substances, like psilocybin, DMT and LSD.Keyterms: Robert K. C. Forman, pure consciousness event, mysticism, samadhi, philosophy of consciousness,Thomas Metzinger, minimal phenomenal experience, drug induced ego dissolution.

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The thesis deals with the problem of the existence of consciousness in the physical world. It denies the approach that is prevailing in the contemporary philosophy of mind that treats the phenomenal consciousness and intentionality separately. The position held in this thesis is to claim that the phenomenal character of consciousness and intentionality are inseparable and that it is impossible to understand the former without understanding the latter, and vice versa. The problem of the existence of consciousness in the physical world is viewed as the problem of the existence of (conscious) intentionality in the physical world. With the aim to achieve an analysis of intentionality that would keep its phenomenal character and the first person point of view, and, at the same time, shed light on its realization in the physical world, thoughts of Peter Strawson, G. E. M. Anscombe, Tim Crane, Colin McGinn and John Searle are discussed. The result is an outline of intentionality that allows to explain the fundamental level of intentionality as a physical process and the higher levels of intentionality as a development of the fundamental level. Two principles are crucial for this approach: the development of intentionality from the fundamental level to the higher level is comprehensible only if we keep the...

En 1995, le philosophe Ned Block a proposé de distinguer deux notions de conscience : une notion purement expérientielle, la « conscience phénoménale », qui désigne l’effet que cela fait d’être dans tel ou tel état mental, et une notion purement fonctionnelle, la « conscience d’accès », ou « accès cognitif » (Block, 2007), entendue comme la capacité du sujet à utiliser ses représentations pour le contrôle de ses opérations cognitives, et, via ces opérations, pour le contrôle de la parole et de l’action. Block défend depuis l’hypothèse très discutée selon laquelle l’expérience consciente, ou « conscience phénoménale », déborde l’accès cognitif du sujet. L’objet central de ce travail est de mettre cette hypothèse à l’épreuve de la recherche sur le rêve. Nous y soutenons principalement les trois arguments suivants : 1. Sous hypothèse d’une continuité entre les propriétés de la mémoire onirique et vigile, on peut objectiver la réalité d’expériences conscientes pendant le sommeil en s’appuyant sur le critère canonique de rapportabilité. De fait, de nombreuses études convergent pour montrer que les sujets peuvent rapporter un contenu onirique qui reflète de manière non équivoque un stimulus présenté plus d’une minute avant l’éveil – ce qui, au regard de l’extrême évanescence de la perception subliminale, ne pourrait pas être le cas si le rêve était un processus inconscient. Sachant que le sommeil s’accompagne d’une sévère désactivation des aires frontales, et en particulier du cortex dorsolatéral préfontal (DlPFC), un tel résultat tend à questionner le modèle neuropsychologique de « l’espace neuronal global de travail » (Dehaeneet Naccache, 2001 ; Dehaene et al, 2006) qui fait dépendre la perception consciente de l’activation de ces aires.2. Le fait même d’objectiver la réalité d’expériences conscientes pendant le sommeil à travers des récits de rêves recueillis à l’éveil implique cependant de reconnaître que ces mêmes expériences ont été remarquées par le dormeur et qu’elles relèvent en ce sens minimum de la conscience d’accès. Pour autant, certains désordres cognitifs de la conscience rêvante, tels notamment que la cécité au changement, suggèrent qu’il ne suffit pas qu’une expérience soit remarquée par le dormeur pour qu’elle relève de plein droit de la conscience d’accès : il fautencore qu’elle puisse être maintenue activement dans la mémoire de travail. Le phénomène bien connu des « dissociations identité-apparence » (Schwartz, 1999) suggère pareillement que la rapportabilité d’une expérience onirique n’assure pas qu’elle soit posée pour le contrôle des opérations cognitives dans le rêve.3. Dès l’instant où l’on a pu objectiver la réalité des expériences oniriques à travers le critère canonique de rapportabilité, il devient possible – là encore, sous hypothèse de continuité –d’inférer de façon empiriquement contraignante l’existence d’une vie consciente non rapportable du dormeur. Se pose alors la question de savoir si un tel vécu, dont on peut soutenir qu’il constitue une forme d’inconscient psychique, relève de plein droit de la conscience d’accès.Enfin, à travers ces trois arguments portant spécifiquement sur la conscience onirique, nous montrons que la recherche sur le rêve permet de questionner de façon privilégiée la notion d’une nécessaire rapportabilité de l’expérience consciente et de faire valoir le concept de modularité de la conscience qui sous-tend l’hypothèse blockéenne du débordement expérientiel (Block, 1995, 1997). / In 1995, the American philosopher Ned Block proposed to distinguish between two notions of consciousness: “Access-consciousness” and “Phenomenal-consciousness”. “P-consciousness” is experience: it refers to what it is like to be in a certain mental state. “Aconsciousness” is a purely functional notion. A mental state is A-conscious when it allows the subject to cognitively control its reasoning, speech and action. Since 1995, Block supports the controversial hypothesis according to which conscious experience overflows our cognitive access to it. The main goal of this work is to assess this hypothesis from the point of view of scientific research on dreaming. This PhD dissertation makes the three following points : 1. Assuming there is a continuity between waking and dreaming memory, one can objectively verify that dreams are conscious experiences that occur during sleep relying on the canonical criterion of reportability. Indeed, many studies show that subjects can report on a dream content that unequivocally reflects a stimulus that has occurred more than one minute before awakening – which couldn’t be had this dream content been unconsciously processed. Considering that sleeping involves a severe deactivation of the frontal areas of the brain, especially of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DlPFC), this result seems to call into question the global neuronal workspace theory of consciousness. Indeed, according to this theory the activation of these very areas is a necessary condition for a conscious perception to occur(Dehaene & Naccache, 2001; Dehaene et al, 2006). 2. There is no way though to demonstrate scientifically that dreams are conscious experiences of the sleeper without implying they were noticed during sleep, which, in turn, implies an elementary level of access. Still, certain cognitive disorders of our dreaming consciousness, such as change blindness, suggest that, due to a severe weakness of working memory, noticing an experience during sleep might not suffice to constitute a genuine cognitive access to it. The well-known phenomenon called “identity-appearance dissociation” (Schwartz, 1999) also suggests that dreaming experiences that are reportable on awakening might not always be poised for cognitive control in the dream. 3. Once the reality of conscious experiences during sleep is objectively established relying on the criterion of reportability, it becomes possible – again under the assumption of continuity - to empirically infer the existence of dreaming experiences that the subject cannot report. The following question then arises: are these experiences, which can be seen as a form of unconscious mental life, access-conscious? Finally, and more generally, we show that the results of dreaming research offer a vantage point both to call into question the notion that conscious experience is necessarily reportable and to support the concept of modularity of our conscious selves (Nagel, 1971; Gazzaniga,1985) that underlies Block’s overflow hypothesis (Block, 1995, 1997)

La notion d’espace prend un sens très fort et comme actif dans le travail artistique de Robert Irwin. Celui-ci instaure un nouveau mode d’être pour l’espace par son installation dite « site-conditioned/determined » tout en la nouant pourtant avec celui du site préexistant, qu’il soit intérieur ou extérieur. Le statut ontologique de son installation est celui d’un « non-objet », d’une extrême simplicité de forme et d’un minimum de matérialité : une bande noire ou une surface de voile semi-transparent, à la fois objet montré et sujet montrant, mettent en jeu lumière et ombre, attirant notre attention non seulement sur lui mais tout autour, intégrant l’espace où il s’intègre. L’installation est mise en œuvre de son environnement architectural ou naturel. L’installation est ainsi installa(tten)tion, c’est-à-dire installation qui installe l’attention. Ce que procure l’artiste au spectateur par son installation est la sensation pure de l’apparaître dynamique et changeant de l’espace du monde réel. Sensible d’abord à la dimension réelle de l’espace physique, nous découvrons peu à peu sa dimension virtuelle, puis transcendantale, au fur et à mesure que ce processus de sensation pure déclenché par l’aspect inhabituel de cet espace pourtant réel se déploie. Grâce au toucher direct et vivant d’un sentir aiguisé, et visuel et kinesthésique, éveillé par l’installation de Robert Irwin, devient quasi palpable notre conscience d’exister. Elle résonne alors à la réalité directe et immédiate du monde mais aussi aux virtualités de son apparaître et à ce qui les rend possibles : sa forme en soi, révélée et actualisée comme la véritable nature de l’espace réel. / The notion of space has a strong and active meaning in Robert Irwin’s art work. He establishes a new way of appearance of space through his so-called “Site-conditioned/determined” installation by uniting the installation with the space of the existing site, whether indoors or out. The ontological status of his installation is that of a “none-object”: extremely simple in form and with a minimum of materials. He uses a black tape or a surface of semitransparent scrim. These objects are both “object shown” and “subject showing”. They play with light and shadow, catching our attention not only on themselves but also on their surroundings, including the space into which they fit. So the art piece is not only the installation itself but its circumstance with its whole architectural or natural environment. So the installation is installa(tten)tion, that is to say an installation that installs attention. Through the installation, the artist provides for the viewer a chance to have a pure sensation of the dynamic and changing appearance of space in the real world. At first sensitive to the real dimension of physical space, we discover little by little its virtual and then transcendental dimensions, as this process of pure sensation unfolds, triggered by the unusual aspect of the real space caused by the installation. A direct and living contact through a sharpened feeling, both visual and kinesthetic, with the space, awakened by the installation of Robert Irwin, makes our awareness of existing almost palpable. This awareness of existing resonates with the direct and immediate reality of the world as well as potentialities of the world’s appearance and what makes these potentialities possible: form in itself, revealed and actualized as the true nature of real space.