A number of recent objections to physicalism are based on the apparent gap between physical knowledge and phenomenal knowledge. In response, some physicalists accept the epistemic gap, but deny the inference from the epistemic gap to a metaphysical gap. One popular strategy is to argue that there is something unique about our phenomenal concepts, the concepts that we use to think about our phenomenal states in terms of their subjective character, that explains the apparent gap. I develop a version of this strategy.Specifically, I argue that phenomenal-physical identities are necessarily true. These identities only seem contingent due to peculiarities of our phenomenal concepts. Phenomenal concepts have a unique connection to their referents; they are "self-presenting" concepts, which include their referents as components of the concepts themselves. Regardless of how we conceptualize the world, a phenomenal concept will always refer to the phenomenal state. But this is not true of non-phenomenal concepts, even concepts like `H2O' that seem to get at the essence of their referents. There is always an element of contingency in the connection between a non-phenomenal concept and its referent.When we consider an identity between a phenomenal concept and a non-phenomenal concept, like `pain = the firing of p-neurons', the more intimate connection between the phenomenal concept and its referent generates the intuition that the two concepts could come apart. This is true in a sense. If we were to adopt conceptualize things differently, the physical concept might not refer to the same state. For example, if we were to adopt a different theory of neuroscience, we might not conceptualize the firing of p-neurons as `the firing of p-neurons'. Phenomenal concepts, on the other hand, will always pick out the same referents, regardless of how we represent the world. For this reason, the concepts `pain' and `the firing of p-neurons' do come apart, but not in a sense that makes trouble for physicalism. What is possible is not a world in which pain isn't identical to the firing of p-neurons, but only a world in which pain isn't conceptualized as the firing of p-neurons.

We are sometimes led to a different picture of things when something unexpected occurs which needs explaining. The aim of this thesis is to examine a series of related issues in the philosophy of mind in the light of the unusual condition known to psychologists as ‘synaesthesia’. Although the emphasis will be on the philosophical issues a view of synaesthesia itself will also emerge. Synaesthesia is a distinct type of cross-modal association: stimulation of one sensory modality automatically triggers an additional phenomenal character of experience associated with a second sensory modality in the absence of any direct stimulation of the second modality. Chapter 1 introduces synaesthesia to a philosophical audience by outlining the early history of synaesthesia studies, by summarising contemporary research and by indicating areas of philosophical interest to be considered in the rest of the thesis. Chapter 2 uses synaesthesia to examine one important philosophical model of the mind, Fodor’s modularity hypothesis, and, in turn, investigates the nature of synaesthesia in the light of that model. Fodor claims that cognitive modules can be thought of as belonging to a psychological natural kind in virtue of their possession of most or all of nine specified properties. The most common form of synaesthesia possesses Fodor’s nine specified properties of modularity, and hence it should be understood in terms of an extra cognitive module, and thus as belonging to the abovementioned psychological natural kind. Many psychologists believe that synaesthesia involves a breakdown in modularity. A breakdown in modularity would also explain the apparent presence of the nine specified properties in synaesthesia. I discuss the two concepts of function which underlie the respective theories, defending the breakdown thesis, arguing, in any case, that properties deriving from evolutionary history should also be used to decide between the two theses and thus ultimately membership of a psychological natural kind such as Fodor suggests. The argument is then used to respond to two challenges to the notion of a psychological natural kind. Chapter 3 focuses on the phenomenal character of synaesthetic experience. Externalists about the phenomenal character of experience tend to argue that the character of perceptual experience is to be explained either by the properties objects present to percipients, or by the properties objects are represented by percipients as having. Some internalists argue that there is a need to postulate hrther properties of the individual - in other words, qualia - to account for the individuation of the character of perceptual experience. The existence of additional phenomenal characters of experience in synaesthesia, which cannot directly be explained by reference to features of objects, suggests the existence of extra qualia and thus the presence of qualia in normal perception. The aim of this chapter is to meet the challenge presented by synaesthesia and the extra quaZia argument, and contrariwise, use synaesthesia as a way of fbrther clarifjmg the merits of the respective externalist positions. In the previous chapters the locution of ‘coloured hearing’ will have been adopted. Occasionally the process underlying synaesthesia is described as one of ‘hearing colours’. Chapter 4 rejects the latter usage. In so doing it focuses on the place of synaesthesia vis-a-vis normal perceptual processes. Considerations from previous chapters are further developed in order to shed light both on the metaphysical individuation of perceptual modalities and on how we know the distinctive perceptual modalities. Given the actual content of our concepts of perceptual modalities, it is argued that the actual world is one in which even synaesthetes are unable to hear colours. Consideration is given as to whether there is a possible world in which people could hear colours. The justification of the usage of ‘coloured-hearing’ then leads to a discussion of the relative importance of the individuating conditions of modes of perception. The thesis focuses largely on coloured hearing. What merits the preceding considerations have might be supported if they can be generalised. Chapter 5 goes a small way in that direction.

Cognitive scientists seeking a computational account of consciousness almost universally opt for a process theory of some kind: a theory that explains phenomenal experience in terms of the computational processes defined over the brain's representational vehicles. But until recently cognitive science has been dominated by the classical computational theory of mind. Today there is a new player on the scene, connectionism, which takes its inspiration from a computational framework known as parallel distributed processing (PDP). It is therefore appropriate to ask whether connectionism has anything distinctive to say about consciousness, and in particular, whether it might challenge the dominance of process theories. I argue that connectionism has the resources to hazard a vehicle theory of consciousness. A vehicle theory places consciousness right at the focus of cognition by identifying it with the explicit representation of information in the brain. Classicism can't support such a theory because it is committed to the existence of explicit representations whose contents are not phenomenally conscious. The connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness aligns phenomenal experience with stable patterns of activation in neurally realised PDP networks. It suggests that consciousness is an amalgam of phenomenal elements, both sensory and non-sensory, and the product of a multitude of consciousness-making mechanisms scattered throughout the brain. This somewhat unorthodox picture is supported, I claim, by careful analysis of experience, and by the evidence of the neurosciences. One obstacle facing this account is the apparent evidence, both direct and indirect, for the activity of unconscious explicit representations in human cognition. I establish that much of the direct evidence for this thesis is open to doubt on methodological grounds. And studies that support the dissociation thesis indirectly, by way of an inference to the best explanation, are vulnerable to alternative connectionist explanations of the relevant phenomena. What is most significant about the connectionist vehicle theory of consciousness is not the fact that it's a connectionist theory of consciousness, but that it's a vehicle theory - an account which takes cognitive science into largely unexplored territory, but in so doing brings into clearer focus the issues with which any theory of consciousness must contend. / Thesis (Ph.D.)--Department of Philosophy, 1998.

Este trabalho tem como objetivo a análise da obra São Bernardo, de Graciliano Ramos. Qualificaríamos nosso projeto analítico, de antemão designado como uma leitura interpretativa, como pertencente ao âmbito de uma transdiciplinaridade, notadamente aos campos disciplinares da teoria da literatura e da filosofia. Divide-se em duas partes marcadamente distintas: a primeira, denominada de “Teoria (Idéias)”, tem como visada um continente te órico cujas idéias servirão de base para o conteúdo disposto na segunda parte. Podemos, assim, afirmar que a Parte I atuará como norte epistemológico, justificando o propugnado na parte II; esta última denominada de “Leitura (imagens)”. Neste sentido, a proposta teórico-filosófica do trabalho tem três eixos centrais. O primeiro, discorrido no Capítulo 1 da primeira parte, centra-se numa fenomenologia da percepção , tendo como principal suporte bibliográfico o livro do filósofo Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Fenomenologia da Percepção ; neste, postulamos a percepção como um primeiro fundamento de uma estética receptiva , No segundo eixo estabelece-se a memória como o outro central fundamento que posicionará o sujeito – intérprete no processo, postulado por nós como “fenomênico”, de uma leitura. Estes dois fundamentos irão compor com um terceiro, a saber, a concepção hermenêutica de uma estética receptiva tal como pensada pelo teórico literário Wofgang Iser. O terceiro capítulo da parte I vai, deste modo, estruturar-se como hipótese interpretativa que irá amparar a leitura-escritura de toda segunda parte. E ́, portanto, nesta última, que realizamos a análise do romance São Bernardo . Devemos então afirmar que a investigação do livro, enquanto projeto e ambição metodológica, assume um paradigma estético-fenomenológico que se justifica nos fundamentos teóricos suprareferidos. O livro é, assim, perspectivado capítulo a capítulo, formando um percurso no qual o leitor-intérprete focará “compreensivamente” as idéias e imagens que tomam, e tomaram, relevo durante a leitura. Atribuindo-se e descobrindo-se significado àquelas passagens que, imantadas por um sentido de valor, sobressaíram, predominantes, à consciência-espírito. A análise do romance in(surge)-se, pois, como troca estética: o leitor-intérprete ao tempo em que se ilumina por ela, clareia e motiva o texto lido._________________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT: The aim of this work is to analyze t he book ‘São Bernardo’, which was written by Graciliano Ramos. We intend actually to give an analysis to the works based on the Philosophy and the Theory of Literature. The work is divided into the following subjects: Theoretical consider ations (part 1), which are the ‘ideas’; this first part is the ‘epistemological basis’ of the interpretation (part 2). The three chapters of the first part of this work have the following is sues: Chapter I: The ‘perception’ as the first condition in order to have an “aest hetic experience”. An important author mentioned in this chapter is Maurice Merleau-Ponty, specia lly one of his works named Phénoménologie de la Perception . Chapter II: The ‘memory ‘, which leads the subject in the reading process cons idered as ‘phenomenical’. Chapter III: An interpretative conception mainly based on Wofgang Iser’s vi ew about the literary hermeneutics. We have then, in the third ch apter, an interpretative hypothesis as the basis of the second part. The second part of this work is an interpretation of the book ‘São Bernardo’ as we said above. In this sense, the reader will be able to understand the meaning of the book by understandi ng the images. Finally, the main point of this work is that the reader can ‘translate’ the book and, at the same time, be receptive to the book itself._________________________________________________________________________________________ RESUMEN: Este trabajo tiene como objetivo el análisis de la obra São Bernardo, de Graciliano Ramos. Calificaríamos nuestro proyecto analítico, de antemano designado como una lectura interpretativa, como perteneciente al ámbito de una transdisciplinariedad, sobre todo a los campos disciplinares de la teoría de la literatura y de la filosofía. Se divide en dos partes notablemente distintas: la primera, denominada “Teoría (Ideas)”, presenta un contenido teórico cuyas ideas servirán de base para lo dispuesto en la segunda parte. Podemos, así, afirmar que la Parte I actuará como guía epistemológica, justificando lo defendido en la parte II; esta última denominada de “Lectura (Imágenes)”. En este sentido, la propuesta teórico-filosófica del trabajo tiene tres ejes centrales. El primero, desarrollado en el Capítulo 1 de la primera parte, se centra en una fenomenología de la percepción teniendo como apoyo bibliográfico principal el libro del filósofo Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Fenomenología de la Percepción ; en este, postulamos la percepción como un primer fundamento de una estética receptiva . En el segundo eje se establece la memoria como el otro fundamento central que posicionará el sujeto-intérprete en el proceso, por nosotros postulado como “fenoménico”, de una lectura. Estos dos fundamentos compondrán con un tercero, la concepción hermenéutica de una estética receptiva así como pensada por el teórico literario Wolfgang Iser. El tercer capítulo de la parte I va, de esta manera, a estructurarse como hipótesis interpretativa que irá a apoyar la lectura-escritura de toda la segunda parte. Es, entonces, en esta última, que analizamos el romance São Bernardo. Debemos afirmar pues que la investigación del libro, como proyecto y ambición metodológica, asume un paradigma estético-fenomenológico que se justifica en los fundamentos teóricos referidos. El libro es, así, perspectivado capítulo a capítulo, formando un percurso en el cual el lector-intérprete visualizará “comprensivamente” las ideas e imágenes que ganan, y ganaron, énfasis durante la lectura. Atribuyéndose y descubriéndose significado a los pasajes que, unidos por un sentido de valor, se destacaron, predominantes, a la conciencia-espíritu. El análisis de la novel se in(surge) , pues, como cambio estético: el lector-intérprete al mismo tiempo en que se ilumina por ella, aclara y motiva el texto leído.

This thesis evaluates the integrated information theory (IIT) by looking at how it may answer some central problems of consciousness that the author thinks any theory of consciousness should be able to explain. The problems concerned are the mind-body problem, the hard problem, the explanatory gap, the binding problem, and the problem of objectively detecting consciousness. The IIT is a computational theory of consciousness thought to explain the rise of consciousness. First the mongrel term consciousness is defined to give a clear idea of what is meant by consciousness in this thesis; followed by a presentation of the IIT, its origin, main ideas, and some implications of the theory. Thereafter the problems of consciousness will be presented, and the explanation the IIT gives will be investigated. In the discussion, some not perviously—in the thesis—discussed issues regarding the theory will be lifted. The author finds the IIT to hold explanations to each of the problems discussed. Whether the explanations are satisfying is questionable.

Bence Nanay holds, that attention which is focused on one object, and distributed acrossits properties, gives rise to disinterestedness in phenomenal experience, and it therefore is involved in the occurence of the most paradigmatic kind of aesthetic experience.It is for this reason, that Nanay defines this sort of attention as "aesthetic attention". In this thesis, I point out, that Nanay's doctrine does justice to facts and phenomena,and that it succeeds in specifiying one of the necessary conditions, of what he takes as the "paradigmatic kind" of aesthetic experience. Nevertheless, as I go on to argue, Nanay fails to account for dissinterestedness' being insufficient for aesthetic experience, and avoids to ask the question we have been longing to ask, namely whether there is such a thing, as attention which is both necessary and sufficient for aesthetic experience. I, thereafter, provide an answer to this question, according to which aesthetic attention is, essencially, attention which is focused on non-derivative value, in an aesthetic context. In the remaining of the text, I make use of Gestalt theory, and thus explore the relationship between the kind of attention Nanay conceived of as "aesthetic attention", and the kind I define as such.

I argue in this thesis that Aristotle’s hylomorphic metaphysics, supported by his theory of causality and his theory of the soul (De Anima), holds the key to solving the problem of mental causation in contemporary philosophy of mind. A core aspect of the contemporary mind-body problem is the problem of mental causation (how does the mind interact with the body to cause actions in humans). Without mental causation, in the realist sense of the word, it is difficult to see how humans are held responsible for their actions. There have been different approaches to solving the mind-body problem, but each has met with its own set of problems, except, I argue, Aristotle’s hylomorphism. Jaegwon Kim argues that Davidson’s anomalous monism cum supervenience renders mental causation epiphenomenal, and that a mental state is causally efficacious only when reduced to the physical properties. I argue that it is the phenomenal consciousness that accounts for our actions, and while neither Davidson’s nor Kim’s accounts of action can adequately deal with phenomenal consciousness, Aristotle’s metaphysics can. I argue that the ancient and neo-Aristotelian notion of self-knowledge is akin to our contemporary notion of phenomenal consciousness and that Aristotle saves the notion of autonomous mental causation through his theory of hylomorphism that holds every substance is a composite of matter (body) and form (soul). My thesis is thus a novel invitation to rethink Aristotle’s psychology and philosophy of mind in the context of contemporary philosophy of mind. / Thesis (DPhil)--University of Pretoria 2020. / University of Pretoria(Postgraduate Bursary (2017-2018) / Philosophy / DPhil / Unrestricted

In previous work, we presented evidence suggesting that ordinary people do not conceive of subjective experiences as having phenomenal qualities. We then argued that these findings undermine a common justification given for the reality of the hard problem of consciousness. In a thought-provoking article, Talbot has challenged our argument. In this article, we respond to his criticism.

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This is a study of how literal and phenomenal transparency inform the development and understanding of a design ordered by two overlapping reference systems. A mixed-use building serves as the project to resolve the complexities of overlap that result from rotation, and to explore ideas of transparency. / Master of Architecture