Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:00Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Cesar Gomes Bonfim Dias.pdf: 1124341 bytes, checksum: 0597660771a7d49eec9ad282d8b45412 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-11-20 / This work aims to understand how to configure the theme of indivision on the thought of Maurice Merleau-ponty (1908 - 1961). The term indivision appears in philosophical sense, between 1958 and 1960, taught courses at the Collège of France, such as joint ownership body and worldly, that is, from my body with me, of my body with the world and of the bodies among themselves. Merleau-Ponty asserts that we are indivisibility . As the term body refers to the perceptual experience body that the subject has of himself, of the things, of the world and of the other, this indivision and it, too, an experience, an experience of indivision, such as express our title. The indivision descends from the husserlian intentionality, it refers to the mode of being of consciousness as consciousness of something. Merleau-ponty combines this theme to the Lebenswelt (world of life) husserlian and establishes their reflections on the horizon of an intentionality operant, a way to be original that works from the inside, which allows for the existence of intercorporeality and interworld. This way of being original identifies himself to what we call from experience of indivision. It is this over the course of three reflections developed by the philosopher, namely the perceptual experience body, the expression and the reflection on the flesh. In the first, the body phenomenal provides at the philosopher thinking a kind of unity that exists for himself to himself (the subject as the body) and in communion with the world, with things and with the other - a way of indivision founded on corporeality. In the second reflection, thinking about the meaning of the expression, from the perspective of the experience of the speaking subject makes it possible to understand the operation of expression the operationality a point or moment of indivision. The spousal of the language by speaking subject indicates a layer of indivision woven of yarns diacritics and a crossroads between the elements that make up this layer. In the third reflection, the flesh shows the same nature of the experience of indivision as indivisibility. There are carnal indivisibility between the "I" and the "world" (I and things, between myself and the other). The flesh, as a element and dimensionality that make up the indivision, it is a way of being that is being carried out by the agency of its own operation, enabling the identity, the difference and as well as the links between all the fleshs / Este trabalho pretende compreender como se configura o tema da indivisão no pensamento de Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908 1961). O termo indivisão aparece em sentido filosófico, entre 1958 e 1960, nos cursos ministrados no Collège de France, como indivisão corporal e mundana, isto é, do meu corpo comigo, do meu corpo com o mundo e dos corpos entre si. Merleau-Ponty afirma que nós somos uma indivisibilidade. Como o termo corpo refere-se à experiência perceptiva corporal que o sujeito tem de si mesmo, das coisas, do mundo e do outro, essa indivisão é ela, também, uma experiência, uma experiência da indivisão, como expressão nosso título. A indivisão descende da intencionalidade husserliana, aquela referente ao modo de ser da consciência como consciência de algo. Merleau-Ponty alia essa temática à Lebenswelt (mundo da vida) husserliana e estabelece suas reflexões no horizonte de uma intencionalidade operante, um modo de ser original que trabalha desde o interior, a qual viabiliza a existência da intercorporeidade e do intermundo. Esse modo de ser original identifica-se ao que chamamos de experiência da indivisão. Ela está presente ao longo de três reflexões desenvolvidas pelo filósofo, a saber, a experiência perceptiva corporal, a expressão e a reflexão acerca da carne. Na primeira, o corpo fenomenal propicia ao filósofo pensar um tipo de unidade existente de si a si (o sujeito como corpo) e de comunhão com o mundo, com as coisas e com os outros um modo de indivisão fundado na corporeidade. Na terceira reflexão, pensar o sentido da expressão, sob a ótica da experiência do sujeito falante torna possível entender a operação de expressão a operacionalidade como ponto ou momento da indivisão. O esposamento da língua pelo sujeito falante indica uma camada de indivisão tecida de fios diacríticos e de um entrecruzamento entre os elementos que compõem essa camada. Na terceira reflexão, a carne mostra a natureza mesma da experiência de indivisão como indivisibilidade. Há indivisibilidade carnal entre o eu e o mundo (eu e as coisas, entre eu e os outros). A carne, como elemento e dimensionalidade que compõem a indivisão, é um modo de ser que se realiza pelo agenciamento de sua própria operação, possibilitando a identidade, a diferença e bem como os laços entre todas as carnes

Le but de cet essai est d’interroger la questionne de la langue, en tant qu’outil privilégié dans la communication humaine, dans son rapport avec l’existence de l’être humain et de faire le point sur le débat, plutôt littéraire, se rapportant sur les aspects convergents et divergents entre les moyens d’expressions chez l’être humain et l’animal. La langue est l’un des éléments le plus manifeste dans la vie de l’être humain mais elle est tellement évidente qu’on a souvent tendance à l’écarter dans les débats concernant les phénomènes humains. De même, mis à part certains auteurs qui se sont penchés sur la question de la langue, ce sujet fait rarement objet de choix de ceux qui se donnent pour tâche d’approfondir les œuvres des hommes et femmes littéraires et les œuvres philosophiques françaises. En fait, on a beaucoup parlé de Montaigne, Pascal, Descartes, et Rousseau ; mais l’aspect de la langue dans les œuvres de ces auteurs est sous exploré. Néanmoins, c’est un sujet qui est encore à examiner et qui, en fait, joue un rôle prépondérant dans les œuvres de Montaigne, Pascal, Descartes et Rousseau. En entamant ce débat on n’est pas sans savoir que les archives littéraires et philosophiques françaises sont multiples et divers. Il serait donc utopique de vouloir entreprendre une revue exhaustive de la question de la langue dans les œuvres des auteurs français. Les discussions dans cet essai sont basées notamment sur une partie des œuvres de Montaigne, Descartes, Pascal et Rousseau. En particulier, ce dossier esquisse une revue critique des points de vue de Montaigne et Descartes sur l’animal et l’être humain par rapport à la communication, le duel entre Pascal et Montaigne et les points de vue exprimés par Rousseau concernant la langue. Ce dossier conclut avec un penchant sur Descartes qui établit une relation étroite entre la pensée, la langue et l’existence de l’être humain. Abstract (English Version) The purpose of this study is to interrogate the question of language as related to human existence and to delve into the literary debate with regard to the relationship between the ways human beings communicate among themselves and the way animals express themselves to each other. Language is one of the most important aspects in the life of human beings. It is so evident in our daily activities that one often has the tendency to neglect it in debates that surround the many phenomena that are influential in the existence of human beings. Likewise, scholars interested in the works of the French thinkers rarely examine the role that debates on language play in their writing. In fact, the works of the French authors Montaigne, Pascal, Descartes, and Rousseau are broadly known both in the milieu of French and Francophone Studies and other branches of knowledge such as the Humanities, the Social Sciences, and even the Mathematics. However, debates related to language in the work of these authors have not been explored sufficiently. Given what language represents for human beings, it is a subject that should continue to occupy an important place in the reflections of the academic community. The works of these authors i.e. Montaigne, Pascal, Descartes, and Rousseau offer grounds on which one can raise important debates related to language. This study draws on the works of Montaigne, Pascal, Descartes, and Rousseau to interrogate the issue of language as related to human existence and to discuss whether language is a phenomenon exclusive to human beings or if it is a shared attribution between human beings and animals. In particular, this study makes a critical review of the viewpoints expressed by Montaigne and Descartes on the relationship between human beings and animals with regard to communication, the conflicts between Pascal and Montaigne, and the viewpoints expressed by Rousseau with regard to language.

En quoi peut consister l’énonciation dans le sens d’un énoncé ? Telle est l’interrogation à laquelle nous tentons de répondre dans cette thèse. Défendant une approche discursive du sens (Carel 2011, Ducrot 1984), nous nous fixons l’objectif de mettre en lumière une conception de l’énonciation dans cette perspective. Notre défi majeur est ainsi de démontrer, de manière concrète, une énonciation qui n’est pas conçue comme une sorte d’événement du monde relatif à la production d’un énoncé. Il s’agit en effet de cette conception de l’énonciation, d’ailleurs prise pour aller de soi, lorsque la plupart des auteurs (Kleiber 2008, Recanati 2008) interprètent un énoncé contenant une expression déictique tel que « Je suis Français » ou « Il fait chaud ici ». Défendant une approche référentielle du sens, ces auteurs sont amenés à repérer le référent correspondant à l’occurrence du mot « je » ou celle du mot « ici », avec la signification de l’un et l’autre mot prise respectivement comme « celui qui produit l’occurrence de je » et « le lieu où l’occurrence d’ici est produite ». Étant donné qu’un tel repérage du référent implique, de manière inévitable, de chercher dans la production de l’énoncé concerné, l’énonciation se présente ainsi comme extralinguistique et comme l’événement constitué par la production de l’énoncé. En nous appuyant, non sans une certaine liberté, sur les travaux respectifs de Benveniste (1966) et de Ducrot (1984), nous nous proposons de dresser le portrait d’une autre conception de l’énonciation qui relève plutôt du système linguistique lui-même, à la différence de celle dépendant ainsi de l’univers extralinguistique. À partir d’un fondement sémantique dégagé des travaux de ces deux auteurs, ainsi que des éléments que nous développons sur cette base, nous faisons des analyses portant essentiellement sur les marques de pronoms, afin d’illustrer la conception de l’énonciation que nous défendons. Qu’il s’agisse de l’analyse comparative entre « Je sais que p » « Tu sais que p » « Elle sait que p », ou celle entre « Je suis beau » « Tu es beau » « Il est beau », nos analyses impliquent donc certaines conséquences. D’une part, elles démontrent que les marques de pronoms peuvent comporter une valeur sémantique qui n’est pas relative à la référence ni à l’énonciation entendue comme un événement extralinguistique. D’autre part, elles permettent de voir que l’on peut rendre compte de ces éléments de sens non référentiels avec le cadre, inspiré de ces deux auteurs, que nous nous efforçons d’établir. / How to understand “enunciation” in the meaning of an utterance? This is the question we are trying to answer in this thesis. Defending a discursive approach to meaning (Carel 2011, Ducrot 1984), we set ourselves the objective of bringing light to a conception of enunciation in this perspective. Our major challenge, as a result, is to demonstrate with tangible illustrations an enunciation that is not conceived as a kind of “world event” relating to the production of an utterance. As we know, it’s about this conception of enunciation, taken for granted, when most authors (Kleiber 2008, Recanati 2008) interpret an utterance containing a deictic expression such as "I am French" or "It's hot here". Mostly defenders of the referential approach to meaning, these authors pick up the referent corresponding to the occurrence of the word "I" and that of the word "here", with the meaning of these two words taken respectively as "the one that produces the occurrence of I" and "the place where the occurrence of here is produced". Given that such an identification of the referent involves, inevitably, a look at the production of the utterance concerned, the enunciation thus appears extralinguistic and as the event constituted by the production of the utterance. Based on Benveniste (1966) and Ducrot (1984) respectively, though not without certain inspiration of our own, we try to sketch the outline of another conception of enunciation, which is the one that comes rather from the linguistic system itself, unlike the one that is dependent on the extralinguistic context. In order to illustrate this conception of enunciation, we conduct analyses mostly on pronouns, and the semantic foundation is drawn from the works of these two authors, as well as from the elements that we develop on this basis. In fact, whether it’s the comparative analysis between "I know that p" "You know that p" "She knows that p" or the one between "I'm beautiful" "You're beautiful" "He's (It’s) beautiful", our descriptions do entail consequences. On the one hand, they show that pronouns can have a semantic value that is neither relative to the reference nor to the enunciation taken as an extralinguistic event. On the other hand, our analyses show that we can account for the non-referential elements of meaning with the frame, inspired by these two authors, that we strive to develop.