The aim of this thesis is to examine critically the concept of the everyday and everydayness in the light of modem phenomenologically-influenced philosophy. Although a lot of work has been done concerning this topic by the sociology of everyday life, our aim is to thematize the everyday in order to understand its underlying philosophical themes and questions. We examine textually some key works by Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger which will provide us with an access to the thematics of the everyday. Following this, we discuss the most important themes underlying the question of the everyday, namely, time, language and the self, always in reference to the writings of Husserl, Heidegger and Jacques Derrida. We examine critically the claim that the everyday is fundamentally defmed as a mode of temporality - the present in its repetition - and as a state of discourse - everyday language or common sense; we also examine the self and its relations to the Other as the basis of the intersubjective nature of everydayness. In the last chapter we try to present a coherent picture of what a thematization of the concept of the everyday might involve. The everyday can be described - but never absolutely defmed - as obvious, pre-given, unthematic, average etc. and is determined by a cluster of metaphysical themes (time, language, the self etc.) as the most basic state of existence. Our fundamental claim is that a certain reading of the concept of the everyday can question these transcendental, philosophical categories and that the everyday has to be thought, following Derrida, as a non-identical repetition of the same, that is, as a trace

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The dark matter (DM) blind spots in the Minimal Supersymmetric Standard Model (MSSM) refer to the parameter regions where the couplings of the DM particles to the Z-boson or the Higgs boson are almost zero, leading to vanishingly small signals for the DM direct detections. In this paper, we carry out comprehensive analyses for the DM searches under the blind-spot scenarios in MSSM. Guided by the requirement of acceptable DM relic abundance, we explore the complementary coverage for the theory parameters at the LHC, the projection for the future underground DM direct searches, and the indirect searches from the relic DM annihilation into photons and neutrinos. We find that (i) the spin-independent (SI) blind spots may be rescued by the spin-dependent (SD) direct detection in the future underground experiments, and possibly by the indirect DM detections from IceCube and SuperK neutrino experiments; (H) the detection of gamma rays from Fermi-LAT may not reach the desirable sensitivity for searching for the DM blind spot regions; (Hi) the SUSY searches at the LHC will substantially extend the discovery region for the blind-spot parameters. The dark matter blind spots thus may be unblinded with the collective efforts in future DM searches.

Using an approach based on Soft Collinear Effective Theory (SCET) and Heavy Quark Effective Theory (HQET) we determine the b-quark fragmentation function from electron-positron annihilation data at the Z-boson peak at next-to-next-to leading order with next-to-next-to leading log resummation of DGLAP logarithms, and next-to-next-to next -to leading log resummation of endpoint logarithms. This analysis improves, by one order, the previous extraction of the b-quark fragmentation function. We find that while the addition of the next order in the calculation does not much shift the extracted form of the fragmentation function, it does reduce theoretical errors indicating that the expansion is converging. Using an approach based on effective field theory allows us to systematically control theoretical errors. While the fits of theory to data are generally good, the fits seem to be hinting that higher order correction from HQET may be needed to explain the b-quark fragmentation function at smaller values of momentum fraction.

Liu, Pengbo. / "September 2010." / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2010. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 94-96). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter Chapter 1 --- Physicalism and its Discontents --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Physicalism --- p.2 / Chapter 1.1.1 --- "Two Problems in Characterizing ""Physicalism""" --- p.2 / Chapter 1.2 --- The Explanatory Gap --- p.6 / Chapter 1.2.1 --- The First Manifestation of the Explanatory Gap: Mary's New Knowledge --- p.7 / Chapter 1.2.3 --- The Epistemic (Explanatory) Gap and the Ontological Gap --- p.10 / Chapter 1.2.4 --- Levine on the Explanatory Gap --- p.11 / Chapter 1.3 --- The Phenomenal Concept Strategy (PCS): The Basics --- p.16 / Chapter Chapter 2 --- Two Accounts of Phenomenal Concepts --- p.18 / Chapter 2.1 --- The Quotational Account of Phenomenal Concepts --- p.18 / Chapter 2.1.1 --- The Quotation Analogy --- p.18 / Chapter 2.1.2 --- The Fundamental Use and Derived Use --- p.20 / Chapter 2.1.3 --- Why Mental Quotation? --- p.22 / Chapter 2.1.4 --- Problems of the Quotational Account --- p.25 / Chapter 2.2 --- The Recognitional/Demonstrative Account of Phenomenal Concepts --- p.30 / Chapter 2.2.1 --- Type Demonstratives and Token Demonstratives --- p.31 / Chapter 2.2.3 --- "Recognition, Memory, and Imagination" --- p.37 / Chapter 2.2.4 --- The Possession Condition of Recognitional Concepts --- p.40 / Chapter 2.2.5 --- PRC and PC --- p.41 / Chapter 2.2.6 --- Compare the Quotational Account and the Loarian Recognitional Account --- p.45 / Chapter 2.2.7 --- Reply to Balog's Complaint --- p.47 / Chapter 2.3 --- Objections and Replies --- p.49 / Chapter 2.3.1 --- Chalmers' Objection --- p.49 / Chapter 2.3.2 --- Raffman's Objection: --- p.52 / Chapter Chapter 3 --- The Phenomenal Concept Strategy Examined --- p.55 / Chapter 3.1 --- The Phenomenal Concept Strategy: A Brief Review --- p.55 / Chapter 3.2 --- Stoljar's Objections --- p.57 / Chapter 3.2.1 --- Experience Thesis and the A priori/ A priori Synthesizable --- p.58 / Chapter 3.2.3 --- The Immediacy Thesis and Phenomenal Acquaintance --- p.60 / Chapter 3.2.4 --- Conceptual Difference and Conceptual Gap --- p.66 / Chapter 3.2.5 --- Conclusion --- p.72 / Chapter 3.3 --- Chalmers' Objection to PCS --- p.72 / Chapter 3.3.1 --- Chalmers' Master Argument --- p.73 / Chapter 3.3.2 --- Balog's Reply --- p.78 / Chapter 3.3.3 --- A Worry about Balog's Reply --- p.82 / Chapter 3.3.4 --- Epistemic Situation and the Explanatory Gap --- p.84 / Chapter 3.3.5 --- An Alternative Reply: Some Speculations --- p.87 / Chapter 3.3.6 --- Conclusion --- p.92 / Bibliography --- p.94

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Rutgers University, 2009. / "Graduate Program in Philosophy." Includes bibliographical references (p. 133-135).

Thèse--Paris. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Oregon, 2003. / Typescript. Includes vita and abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 327-353). Also available for download via the World Wide Web; free to University of Oregon users.