CoordenaÃÃo de AperfeÃoamento de Pessoal de NÃvel Superior / Este estudo, como o prÃprio tÃtulo indica, pretende apresentar uma leitura sistemÃtica das figuras de consciÃncia e autoconsciÃncia na obra Fenomenologia do EspÃrito, de Hegel. Esta leitura sustenta-se no pensamento de que nÃo podemos abandonar a anÃlise das experiÃncias em que o espÃrito se manifesta, pois apenas atravÃs delas podemos compreender como a consciÃncia se torna capaz de conquistar o saber de si mesma e satisfazer a si mesma em uma forma de autoentendimento unificado consigo mesmo: o espÃrito. / This inquiry, as the title indicates, intends to present a systematic reading of the consciouness and self-consciouness figures in Hegelâs Phenomenology of Spirit. I argue that we can not renounce experiences analysis in which the spirit manifests, because only through them we can realize how consciouness becomes able to acquire the knowledge of itself and content itself in a mode of self-understanding unified with itself: the spirit.

Relying mainly on R. B. Pippin’s and D. Moggach’s interpretative works on Kant and Hegel, the thesis tackles the problem of the reception of Kant by Hegel. It does so by looking into the impact of Kant’s first critique on the Preface, the Introduction and the first part of the section Self-consciousness of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Three Kantian conditions for there to be freedom are identified and shown to be reinterpreted by Hegel in a continuist perspective. These three conditions are spontaneity, reflectivity and negativity which propels and retains the free Kantian subject in the Hegelian becoming of reality.

Los estudios de esta tesis doctoral muestran la relación estrecha que existe en la Fenomenología del Espíritu entre el concepto hegeliano de experiencia, su concepción del absoluto y el impacto que tiene en ambos el desafío del escepticismo. La tesis general sostenida es que la confrontación de Hegel con el escepticismo es la clave de lectura más importante para la comprensión de la Introducción a la Fenomenología y por lo tanto del programa original de la obra. Más específicamente, se sostiene que la Introducción a la <i>Fenomenología del Espíritu</i> se encuentra filosóficamente constituida en atenta referencia a las objeciones que Gottlob Schulze había dirigido al incipiente idealismo de Jena en sus escritos de 1803 (<i>Aforismos sobre lo Absoluto</i>) y de 1805 (<i>Los momentos principales del modo escéptico de pensar acerca del conocimiento humano</i>). Se afirma aquí que Hegel revalorizó el escepticismo de Schulze, a tal punto que: a) los desafíos de Schulze son la principal provocación para un cambio de rumbo en los planes filosóficos de Hegel, esto es, el de comenzar por el problema del conocimiento antes de presentar su <i>Lógica</i>; b) las objeciones de Schulze constituyen los motivos decisivos que generan la ruptura entre Schelling y Hegel; c) a raíz de tales objeciones, Hegel relativiza en la Fenomenología la distinción tajante que había establecido entre antiguo y nuevo escepticismo en su escrito de 1802 (<i>Relación del escepticismo con la filosofía</i>); d) Hegel no sólo considera las objeciones del escéptico sino que se apropia y reformula algunas de sus ideas.En síntesis: los estudios que se exponen en esta tesis reconstruyen una polémica entre Hegel y Schulze. Esta reconstrucción puede aclarar la teoría de la experiencia que se encuentra en el texto de la Introducción a la <i>Fenomenología</i>. En cuanto al orden de la exposición, este trabajo doctoral comienza con una presentación de la concepción de Kant acerca de la experiencia, del límite del conocimiento humano y del absoluto, tal como aparecen en la <i>Crítica de la Razón Pura</i>, mostrando cómo ya en aquella obra el escepticismo juega un rol determinante (capítulo 1). A continuación, se exponen las ideas y los argumentos fundamentales del escrito hegeliano de 1802 sobre el escepticismo (capítulo 2). En el tercer capítulo se muestra la incertidumbre que tuvieron los lectores académicos, entre ellos Schulze, acerca de la autoría de la <i>Revista Crítica de Filosofía</i>, la cual era editada por Schelling y Hegel sin especificar la autoría de cada artículo, y en la que había sido publicado el escrito de Hegel. A esta situación se debe -según la presente tesis- que Schulze haya dirigido sus críticas a Schelling y no a Hegel. En los capítulos cuarto y quinto se exponen las tesis fundamentales que Schulze sostiene en los escritos mencionados de 1803 y 1805. El capítulo central, el sexto, consiste en un comentario de toda la Introducción a la <i>Fenomenología</i> a la luz del debate velado con Schulze y en atención particular al concepto hegeliano de experiencia. El último capítulo examina a grandes rasgos, a partir de lo demostrado, la concepción de Hegel sobre el escepticismo y sobre el concepto de experiencia en el resto de la <i>Fenomenología del Espíritu</i>. Se distingue un escepticismo estructural, que forma parte de la dinámica de la experiencia, de un escepticismo histórico que constituye una figura puntual del itinerario de la experiencia que hace la conciencia. En el mismo capítulo se considera el destino que tuvo el concepto de experiencia en el resto de la obra de Hegel y se concluye que sigue de cerca el destino de la Fenomenología y se indagan los motivos. También se examina sucintamente el papel del escepticismo en la <i>Ciencia de la Lógica</i> y en las <i>Lecciones de Historia de la Filosofía</i>. En las Conclusiones Finales de este trabajo doctoral se retoman en forma comparada y sintética las concepciones de Kant, de Schulze y de Hegel acerca de la experiencia, el límite, el absoluto y la libertad. / This doctoral work shows the strained relationship existing in Phenomenology of Spirit between the Hegelian concept of experience, his conception of the Absolute and the impact on both of the challenge of Scepticism. The thesis broadly maintains that Hegel's confrontation with Scepticism is the major key to understanding the Introduction to Phenomenology and, for that matter, the original scheme of the work. More specifically, it maintains that the Introduction to Phenomenology of Spirit finds itself philosophically based on specific references to the objections that Gottlob Schulze had directed toward the early idealism of Jena in his work of 1803 (Aphorisms about the Absolute) and of 1805 (The principal moments of the sceptic mode of thinking about human knowledge). This thesis strongly suggests that Hegel, revalued the scepticism of Schulze, to such a point that: a) the challenges of Schulze are the principal motivation for a change of direction in the philosophical stages of Hegel, suggesting that he began with the problem of knowledge before presenting his Logic; b) the objections of Schulze constitute the main reasons generating the rupture between Schelling and Hegel; c) at the root of such objections, Hegel revises in Phenomenology the clear cut distinction that he had established between ancient and new scepticism in his work of 1802 (On the relationship of scepticism to philosophy) ; d) Hegel not only considers the objections to scepticism but also he appropriates and reformulates some of Schulze's ideas. In synthesis: this thesis attempts to reconstruct a polemic between Hegel and Schulze. This reconstruction may clarify the theory of experience found in the Introduction to Phenomenology. This doctoral work is presented in the following order: it begins with an overview of Kant's notion of experience, from the limit of human knowledge and the absolute, which appears in the Critique of Pure Reason, showing how, already present in that work, Scepticism plays a determining role (Chapter One). Following this, the next chapter demonstrates the ideas and fundamental arguments of Hegelian writing from 1802 about Scepticism (Chapter Two). The third chapter discusses the uncertainty that scholars had, among them Schulze, about the authorship of the Critical Journal of Philosophy, which, even though edited by Schelling and Hegel, and containing the latter's writings, had no specific authorship ascribed to its contents. It was owing to this situation - argues this thesis - that Schulze would have directed his criticisms to Schelling and not to Hegel. Chapters Four and Five demonstrate the fundamental theses that Schulze sustained in his aforementioned work of 1803 and 1805. The central Chapter Six consists of a commentary on the Introduction to Phenomenology in the light of this veiled debate with Schulze, paying special attention to the Hegelian concept of experience. The last chapter outlines, from what has been shown, Hegel's ideas about Scepticism and the notion of experience in the rest of Phenomenology of Spirit. A structural scepticism, that forms part of the dynamic of experience, is here distinguished, from an historical scepticism that constitutes an identifiable component of the experience that makes the conscience. The same chapter considers the aim of the concept of experience in the rest of Hegel's works, and concludes that it closely follows the aim in Phenomenology, citing the reasons for this. Also explored, succinctly, is the role of Scepticism in Science of Logic, and Lectures on the History of Philosophy. The Final Conclusions of this doctoral work synthesise and compare the views of Kant, Schulze, and Hegel, on experience, the limit, the Absolute, and freedom.

Submitted by Maike Costa (maiksebas@gmail.com) on 2016-07-01T14:08:17Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 1401604 bytes, checksum: f0cd4d45f87ff7f17a46f9c37caf5ef3 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-01T14:08:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 1401604 bytes, checksum: f0cd4d45f87ff7f17a46f9c37caf5ef3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-08-26 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / Le débat philosophique contemporain sur la “altérité” a donné lieu à des recherches diversifiées. Les “déconstructions” entreprises par la “postmodernité” n’ont pas encore de réussite définitive. La “critique faible” des “fondements metaphysiques” peut être résumée dans la métaphore suivante: “premièrement ils nous donnent des ailes ensuite ils nous ôtent le ciel”. Devient pertinente la critique de G.W. Hegel (1770-18310) au modèle solipsiste de fundamentation de la moderne philosophie de la subjectivité; une fois qu'il comprend la genèse des subjectivités comme essentiellement la genèse de leur sociabilité, enracinée dans une liberté solidaire et reconnue simultanément; le “problème de l’identité e da difference” sur le thème de “l'unité différenciée”. La large production intellectuelle de ce philosophe, et la “structure” de corrélation dialectique de sa pensée et de ses écrits nous renvoie toujours à la perspective de la totalité. De cette façon, notre recherche ont comme objectif genérál l’aprehénsion et l’exposition critique, à partir de la possibilité d'une approche ontologique-existentielle du Moi hégélienne, des concepts de la Conscience-de-Soi et la Reconnaissance, dans leur mouvements propre constitutive, développement et devenir en tant que “l'Esprit”, placé dans la “Dialectique de la Reconnaissance”, comme ils apparaissent dans la Phénoménologie de l'Esprit (1807), de Hegel, notamment dans le chapitre IV. Ainsi, nous supposons qu'une investigation d'intérêt académique sur ces questions est justifiée et coïncide avec les exigences de la société actuelle, à contribuer au développement des “lectures” plus compréhensive des préoccupations de l'homme et de la femme contemporains et les relations sociales complexes qui impliquent la constant “décision de reconnaissance” dans les modes d'efficacité de Si au monde ; dans l'émergence de la figure des “affinités sélectives”. / The hodiernal philosophical debate about the “alterity” raises disparate investigations. “Deconstructions” operated by the “post-modernity” have not obtained and do not intend a success definitive. And the “weak criticism” of the metaphysical foundations could be summarized by the following metaphor: “first they gave us wings and then they steal the sky”. It is pertinent the criticism of G. W. F. Hegel (1770-1831) to the model solipsistic of substantiation of modern philosophy of subjectivity. He understands the genesis of subjectivity as essentially the genesis of their sociability, rooted in a freedom supportive and simultaneously recognized; the identity and the difference as “differentiated unity”. The extensive intellectual production of this philosopher, as well as the "structure" of dialectical interrelationship of his thought always refers to the perspective of the whole. Accordingly, our research had as general objective the apprehension and critical exposition, since the possibility of an ontological-existential approach to I Hegelian, of the concepts of Self-Consciousness and Recognition, in their own constituent movements, development and “come-to-be” as “Spirit”, placed on Dialectic of Recognition. These concepts appear in Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit (1807) (notably in Chapter IV). Therefore, we understand that an investigation of academic interest on such issues is justified and coincides with the current demands of society, contributing to the development of “readings” with more understanding of the contemporary concerns and the complex of social relations that imply a constant “decision by recognition” in the ways of effectiveness of Self in the world; the emergence of the figure of “selective affinities”. / O debate filosófico hodierno sobre “alteridade” suscita investigações díspares. As “desconstruções” operadas pela chamada “pós-modernidade” não obtiveram nem pretendem um êxito definitivo. E a “crítica fraca” dos fundamentos metafísicos poderia ser resumida na seguinte metáfora: “primeiro nos deram asas para depois nos roubar o céu”. A crítica de G. W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) ao modelo solipsista de fundamentação da filosofia moderna da subjetividade entende a gênese das subjetividades como essencialmente gênese de suas sociabilidades, radicada numa liberdade solidária e reconhecida simultaneamente; identidade e diferença enquanto “unidade diferenciada”. Assim sendo, considerando a extensa produção intelectual do nosso filósofo, bem como a “estrutura” de inter-relação dialética de seu pensamento e de seus escritos, que nos remete sempre a perspectiva do todo, nossa pesquisa teve como objetivo geral a apreensão e exposição crítica, desde a possibilidade de uma abordagem ontológico-existencial do Eu hegeliano, dos conceitos de Consciência-de-Si e de Reconhecimento, em seus movimentos próprios constitutivos, desenvolvimento e vir-a-ser enquanto “Espírito”, postos na Dialética do Reconhecimento, tal como aparecem no corpo da Fenomenologia do Espírito (1807), notadamente no capítulo IV, de Hegel. Neste sentido, entendemos que uma investigação de interesse acadêmico sobre tais questões justifica-se e coincide com demandas da sociedade atual, contribuindo para o desenvolvimento de “leituras” mais compreensivas das inquietações do homem e da mulher contemporâneos e do complexo de relações sociais que implicam numa constante “decisão pelo reconhecimento” nos modos de efetividade do Si no mundo; na emergência da figura das “afinidades seletivas”.

Orientador: Marcos Lutz Müller / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-26T02:32:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Gorges_MariaClaudia_M.pdf: 1174283 bytes, checksum: 5718cca7454f0285757a364d33b5dc29 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / Resumo: Este trabalho tem por objetivo compreender o conceito de experiência e percorrer as experiências da certeza sensível e percepção, primeira e segunda figuras do movimento fenomenológico da consciência. Ao longo desse caminho procuraremos compreender como se articulam os momentos da experiência, tendo em vista que Hegel a apresenta, na Introdução, como um movimento dialético que a consciência exerce nela mesma, de forma dupla; como um caminho realizado tanto do ponto de vista da consciência natural, como também, do ponto de vista da consciência filosófica, do nós, cujo resultado corresponde ao aparecimento de uma nova figura da consciência / Abstract: Ce travail a pour objectif de comprendre le concept d'expérience et d'explorer les expériences de certitude sensible et de perception, première et seconde figures du mouvement phénoménologique de la conscience. Au fil de cette exploration nous chercherons à comprendre comment s'articulent les moments de l'expérience, en considérant que Hegel la présente, dans l'Introduction, comme un mouvement dialectique que la conscience exerce en elle-même, de façon double; comme un chemin réalisé, tout autant, du point de vue de la conscience naturelle que du point de vue de la conscience philosophique, du nous, dont le résultat correspond à l'apparition d'une nouvelle figure de la conscience / Mestrado / Filosofia / Mestra em Filosofia