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An Anglo-Japanese cross-cultural study of children's theory of mind and executive function and caregiver characteristicsFujita, Nao January 2014 (has links)
No description available.
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The metaphysics of agencySchlosser, Markus E. January 2007 (has links)
Mainstream philosophy of action and mind construes intentional behaviour in terms of causal processes that lead from agent-involving mental states to action. Actions are construed as events, which are actions in virtue of being caused by the right mental antecedents in the right way. Opponents of this standard event-causal approach have criticised the view on various grounds; they argue that it does not account for free will and moral responsibility, that it does not account for action done in the light of reasons, or, even, that it cannot capture the very phenomenon of agency. The thesis defends the standard event-causal approach against challenges of that kind. In the first chapter I consider theories that stipulate an irreducible metaphysical relation between the agent (or the self) and the action. I argue that such theories do not add anything to our understanding of human agency, and that we have, therefore, no reason to share the metaphysically problematic assumptions on which those alternative models are based. In the second chapter I argue for the claim that reason-explanations of actions are causal explanations, and I argue against non-causal alternatives. My main point is that the causal approach is to be preferred, because it provides an integrated account of agency by providing an account of the relation between the causes of movements and reasons for actions. In the third chapter I defend non-reductive physicalism as the most plausible version of the standard event-causal theory. In the fourth and last chapter I argue against the charge that the standard approach cannot account for the agent’s role in the performance of action. Further, I propose the following stance with respect to the problem of free will: we do not have free will, but we have the related ability to govern ourselves—and the best account of self-determination presupposes causation, but not causal determinism.
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Owning Our Implicit Attitudes: Responsibility, Resentment, and the Whole SelfWhitaker, Wesley 01 January 2018 (has links)
Are implicit biases something we can rightly be held responsible for, and if so, how? A variety of social and cognitive psychological studies have documented the existence of wide-ranging implicit biases for over 30 years. These implicit biases can best be described as negative mental attitudes that operate immediately and unconsciously in response to specific stimuli. The first chapter of this thesis surveys the psychological literature, as well as presents findings of real-world experiments into racial biases. I then present the dominant model of implicit attitudes as mere associations, followed by evidence that at least some implicit attitudes take on a propositional form and involve making inferences based on evidence. I then reject adopting either of these two rigid models in favor of a dispositional approach that treats implicit biases as on the same spectrum of, but adjacent to, beliefs.
I then evaluate the moral wrongdoing associated with holding explicitly prejudicial beliefs, appealing first to Kantian notions of respecting individuals as agents, then appealing to Strawson’s argument that we are responsible for expressions of our will. Our status as human agents involves participating in complex and sustained interactions with others, which necessarily implies that we take part in the social practice of holding each other responsible for the quality of their will. The reactive attitudes we display in our everyday interactions indicate which features and circumstances are most important when investigating this practice. After applying this approach to implicit attitudes, I then pose the objection that their unconscious and unendorsed nature disqualifies implicit attitudes as proper expressions of our will. I develop this objection using Scanlon’s account of moral responsibility, which requires the capacity to self-govern in light of principles that are generally agreed upon as good reasons for guiding interactions with one another. Finally, I critique Real Self theories that seek to arbitrarily privilege one part of ourselves in favor of the Whole Self, which privileges those features that are most integrated into our overall character.
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"Do you know what I think?": a cross-linguistic investigation of children's understanding of mental state wordsSouza, Debora Hollanda 28 August 2008 (has links)
Not available / text
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Is physicalism "really" true?: an empirical argument against the universal construal of physicalismSmith, Paul H., 1952- 27 August 2010 (has links)
Physicalism as universally construed is the thesis that everything in the world is either physical or a consequence of physical facts. Certain consequences of physicalism for free will, religion, and so on make it unpalatable to some. Physicalism should not be dismissed merely on its unpalatability. Nonetheless, we should be very sure it is true before accepting it uncritically (as much of science and philosophy now do). Physicalism is a contingent thesis, taken as true on the basis of strong inductive evidence and an inference-to-the-best-explanation that specifies it as the best theory over any of its competitors to provide an ontological account of the universe. So long as there is no contrary evidence to the claims of physicalism, then it stands relatively uncontested.
I argue that there is a body of well-attested empirical evidence that falsifies universally-construed physicalism by violating an essential assumption of the theory – causal closure of the physical domain. I present a detailed account of this closure-violating evidence. So that those who are unfamiliar with the body of evidence on offer may judge its validity, I include brief summations of experimental designs, findings, and analyses, plus some controversies pertaining to the data and their resolutions. I then argue why this body of empirical evidence should count against universal physicalism, argue for the evidence’s scientific legitimacy, and discuss criticisms which have been lodged against it, then explain why these criticisms lack force.
I conclude that the evidence I present is sufficient to falsify the universal construal of physicalism as supported by today’s and by foreseeable future understandings of the physical world. I acknowledge, though, that nothing can be guaranteed against an indefinite “wait-and-see” argument for some implausible “fully-realized” physics that may be able to reconcile the evidence I propose with such a fully-completed formulation of physicalism. I suggest that if this is the best physicalists can come up with, then their position is weak and the inference-to-the-best-explanation that until now supported universal physicalism should be turned around to tell against the theory. / text
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Synaesthesia : an essay in philosophical psychologyGray, Richard January 2001 (has links)
We are sometimes led to a different picture of things when something unexpected occurs which needs explaining. The aim of this thesis is to examine a series of related issues in the philosophy of mind in the light of the unusual condition known to psychologists as ‘synaesthesia’. Although the emphasis will be on the philosophical issues a view of synaesthesia itself will also emerge. Synaesthesia is a distinct type of cross-modal association: stimulation of one sensory modality automatically triggers an additional phenomenal character of experience associated with a second sensory modality in the absence of any direct stimulation of the second modality. Chapter 1 introduces synaesthesia to a philosophical audience by outlining the early history of synaesthesia studies, by summarising contemporary research and by indicating areas of philosophical interest to be considered in the rest of the thesis. Chapter 2 uses synaesthesia to examine one important philosophical model of the mind, Fodor’s modularity hypothesis, and, in turn, investigates the nature of synaesthesia in the light of that model. Fodor claims that cognitive modules can be thought of as belonging to a psychological natural kind in virtue of their possession of most or all of nine specified properties. The most common form of synaesthesia possesses Fodor’s nine specified properties of modularity, and hence it should be understood in terms of an extra cognitive module, and thus as belonging to the abovementioned psychological natural kind. Many psychologists believe that synaesthesia involves a breakdown in modularity. A breakdown in modularity would also explain the apparent presence of the nine specified properties in synaesthesia. I discuss the two concepts of function which underlie the respective theories, defending the breakdown thesis, arguing, in any case, that properties deriving from evolutionary history should also be used to decide between the two theses and thus ultimately membership of a psychological natural kind such as Fodor suggests. The argument is then used to respond to two challenges to the notion of a psychological natural kind. Chapter 3 focuses on the phenomenal character of synaesthetic experience. Externalists about the phenomenal character of experience tend to argue that the character of perceptual experience is to be explained either by the properties objects present to percipients, or by the properties objects are represented by percipients as having. Some internalists argue that there is a need to postulate hrther properties of the individual - in other words, qualia - to account for the individuation of the character of perceptual experience. The existence of additional phenomenal characters of experience in synaesthesia, which cannot directly be explained by reference to features of objects, suggests the existence of extra qualia and thus the presence of qualia in normal perception. The aim of this chapter is to meet the challenge presented by synaesthesia and the extra quaZia argument, and contrariwise, use synaesthesia as a way of fbrther clarifjmg the merits of the respective externalist positions. In the previous chapters the locution of ‘coloured hearing’ will have been adopted. Occasionally the process underlying synaesthesia is described as one of ‘hearing colours’. Chapter 4 rejects the latter usage. In so doing it focuses on the place of synaesthesia vis-a-vis normal perceptual processes. Considerations from previous chapters are further developed in order to shed light both on the metaphysical individuation of perceptual modalities and on how we know the distinctive perceptual modalities. Given the actual content of our concepts of perceptual modalities, it is argued that the actual world is one in which even synaesthetes are unable to hear colours. Consideration is given as to whether there is a possible world in which people could hear colours. The justification of the usage of ‘coloured-hearing’ then leads to a discussion of the relative importance of the individuating conditions of modes of perception. The thesis focuses largely on coloured hearing. What merits the preceding considerations have might be supported if they can be generalised. Chapter 5 goes a small way in that direction.
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First principles in Aristotle's psychology : the science of soul in De Anima 1Carter, Jason W. January 2015 (has links)
This thesis analyses the method, purpose, and results of Aristotle's treatment of a select number of Presocratic and Platonic theses about the soul within the context of De Anima 1. Contrary to a prevalent interpretation of De Anima 1 which sees Aristotle's treatment of his predecessors' psychological views as dialectical, I argue that Aristotle treats his predecessors as having offered potentially viable hypotheses about the nature of the soul, and that these hypotheses are treated as attempts to explain the soul's basic powers. I further show that, in order to test the explanatory limits of these theories, Aristotle uses a version of the scientific method of inquiry advertised in the Prior and Posterior Analytics, which consists in setting out the basic psychological phenomena which psychology should explain, and then testing the extent to which his predecessors' definitions of the soul are able to accomplish this task. This thesis argues that, by demonstrating where his predecessors' first principles fall short, Aristotle is able to make theoretical progress towards establishing his own 'hylomorphic' first principle of soul, that soul is the 'first fulfilment of a natural instrumental body', and towards the idea that soul operates in the body of living beings as a formal, final, and efficient cause.
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Real Intentions and Virtual WrongsSohng, Elaine 01 January 2017 (has links)
In this thesis, I answer the gamer's dilemma or the inability to find a moral distinction between virtual pedophilia and virtual murder. I expand virtual pedophilia to virtual rape to address increasing rates of sexual harassment and assault in virtual reality. In this thesis, I 1) explain what occurs when one engages in virtual rape; 2) identify relevant moral differences between physical rape and virtual rape; 3) challenge the existing relationship between committing harm and wrong in the case of rape; and 4) argue that virtual rape is morally reprehensible due to the agent’s intention to utilize a person as a mere tool for pleasure.
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Wittgenstein and Sellars on intentionalityBrandt, Stefan Geoffrey Heinrich January 2011 (has links)
The aim of the thesis is to explore Ludwig Wittgenstein’s and Wilfrid Sellars’s views on intentionality. In the first chapter I discuss the account of intentionality and meaning the early Wittgenstein developed in his Tractatus logico-philosophicus. I present his idea that sentences are pictures of states of affairs with which they share a ‘logical form’ and to which they stand in an internal ‘pictorial relationship’. I argue that Wittgenstein thought of this relationship as established by acts of thought consisting in the operation of mental signs corresponding to the signs of public languages. In the second and third chapters I discuss the later Wittgenstein’s criticism of ideas at the heart of the Tractarian account of intentionality, as well as his explanations of the phenomena that motivated it. In the second chapter I examine his rejection of the idea that thinking consists in the operation of mental signs and his criticism of the idea that meaning and understanding are mental processes accompanying the use of language. In the third chapter I turn to Wittgenstein’s criticism of the idea that representations stand in an internal ‘pictorial relation’ to objects in the natural order that are their meaning. I illuminate his later views by discussing Sellars’s non-relational account of meaning, in particular his claim that specifications of meaning do not relate expressions to items that are their meaning, but rather specify their rule-governed role in language. I conclude with a discussion of the later Wittgenstein’s account of the relationship between intentional phenomena and the objects at which they are directed. In the final fourth chapter I provide a detailed discussion of Sellars’s account of thinking. I conclude with some criticisms of Sellars’s views.
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A pure world : moral cognition and spiritual experiences in Chinese World of WarcraftHornbeck, Ryan January 2012 (has links)
This dissertation is about moral cognition and the production of spiritual experiences in the Chinese version of the massively multiplayer online game, World of Warcraft (CWoW). Chapter 1 introduces the game, field sites, data collection methods, and the questions and paradigms that structure the dissertation's narrative. This chapter explains that during fieldwork CWoW players frequently described gameplay as yielding positive moral and spiritual experiences. Chapter 2 outlines the cognitive mechanisms – Haidt and Joseph's 'moral foundations' (2004; 2007) – that are hypothesised to inform the in-game experiences to which players attributed moral significance. Chapter 3 argues that some aspects of the WoW gameworld are high in cognitive 'relevance' (following Sperber & Wilson, 1986) for Haidt and Joseph's moral foundations. This relevance yields the game a capacity for cross-cultural appeal. Chapter 4 argues that social agencies operant in the lives of CWoW players motivated players to utilise these morally relevant aspects of gameplay as a 'religion-like tool for group cohesion' (following Sosis & Alcorta, 2008). These extra-game agencies help explain why these aspects of gameplay were cultivated in lieu of, or as superordinate to, aspects that may be 'relevant' to other cognitive mechanisms. Chapter 5 argues that reports of soul merger experiences obtained in CWoW resemble Durkheim’s 'collective effervescence' (Durkheim, 1995 [1912]) and may be understood at the cognitive level as 'flow' (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990) experiences conjoined with affective outputs from Haidt and Joseph's moral foundations. Chapter 6 summarises the key points made in the preceding chapters and concludes that in the contexts sampled here, high-contingency aspects of CWoW gameplay may be viewed as Durkheimian religious rituals.
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