Thesis (M.A.)--Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 1991. / Abstract. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 118-127).

Thesis (M. Sc.)--Acadia University, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 64-71). Also available on the Internet via the World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Stanford University. / Includes abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Florida State University, 2005. / Advisor: Ithel Jones, Florida State University, College of Education, Dept. of Childhood Education, Reading and Disbility Services. Title and description from dissertation home page (viewed Jan. 25, 2006). Document formatted into pages; contains ix, 107 pages. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2006. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 253-265).

Thesis (DPhil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2006. / Bibliography. Also available via the Internet.

Middlemarch is the novel at the centre of this thesis. George Eliot's writing, and Middlemarch in particular, is the paradigm of what has come to be known as Classic Realist fiction. In reading Middlemarch, it seems, one is introduced to a fictional world. The characters are psychologically complex, and they are presented with moral and social problems which are created and discussed with subtlety and intelligence. Until recently, critical assessment of Middlemarch has focussed on evaluation of Eliot's achievement in just these terms. The thesis begins with a question, how, and indeed is it possible for a novel to depict a fiction in this way? The introductory chapter proposes an answer to this question which opens the way to a radical critical appraisal of the status of Middlemarch as a psychologically realistic novel. The scope of the thesis is in one sense very narrow: it is on the ways in which George Eliot creates the moral psychology of her characters, and the ways in which she develops and sustains our interest in their motives, their emotions and in general their mental states and processes. My suggestion is that the language Eliot uses is deeply coloured by her commitments in the Philosophy of Mind. The argument will be that in order to take Eliot's fiction to be psychologically realistic, we are committed to sharing her unacceptable philosophical presuppositions. The second chapter of the thesis is a discussion of Eliot's novella The Lifted Veil. This is an odd piece of fiction, both technically and in subject matter. It does not fit easily into the Eliot canon, and until recently it has received little attention. The purpose of Chapter Two is partly to redress that balance but more to diagnose Eliot's philosophical commitments. The eerie fantasy of unnatural mind-reading reveals Eliot's ideas in a very explicit way. My suggestion is that in the struggle to make this fantasy coherent, a picture of the mind emerges which is both seductive and ultimately nonsensical. Narrow as the focus is, the arguments to establish my point take us deep into Wittgenstein's later Philosophy. The fundamental insight of Wittgenstein's work on the philosophy of mind was that in order to understand how it is possible to talk meaningfully about mental states and processes, we must resist the seductive, ultimately nonsensical picture seemingly imposed upon us by the grammar of ordinary psychological remarks. And if those arguments are thought to be convincing, the thesis has important negative implications for at least one important perennial question in the philosophy of aesthetics. The starting point of this thesis takes seriously the idea that novelists can, and ought to, examine themes of deep human significance. The larger goal of this piece of work has been to open up a line of enquiry which might examine, from within the Analytic tradition in philosophy, the extent to which that task is feasible. I have sought to establish an important connection between the creation of the moral psychology of fictional characters, and Wittgenstein's later work in the philosophy of mind. I believe that the examination I have conducted of the way issues in the philosophy of mind, especially those treated in the Philosophical Investigations, bear on the way Eliot writes places much of the psychological language of Middlemarch in a new light, and discloses certain quite general limits on what is possible in creating fictional minds.

This thesis concerns two main questions: What is intuition? And can it be a source of knowledge or justification? In addressing these questions, it advances several ongoing philosophical debates, and does so in two main ways: firstly, by formulating a general account of the nature of intuitive judgement that establishes common ground amongst the often disparate views of scholars working on intuition (or intuitions) in psychology, linguistics, philosophy and various other disciplines; and, secondly, by developing a new epistemological position that combines scepticism about the evidential value of intuition with a new account of philosophical skill. The general account of the nature of intuitive judgement mainly consists in drawing a distinction between intuitive judgement and intuitive appearance which is analogous to a distinction that can be drawn between perceptual judgement and perceptual appearance. It is argued that a common type of paradox entails the distinction for the non-perceptual case; it is then demonstrated how various related notions, such as intuitive belief, intuitive thinking and intuition as a cognitive faculty, can be derived from the notion of intuitive judgement. The epistemological account receives additional support from a new theory regarding the objects of intuition, according to which the analogy between intuition and perception holds specifically for what is sometimes called 'aspect perception': it is argued that some intuitive appearances are partially constituted by an appearance of meaning and that, consequently, the analysis of intuitive judgement must distinguish between two types of object, an intentional object (typically, a thought) and a causal one (typically, an expression of thought). It is further argued that the focus on evidential value that has been prevalent in the philosophical literature is too restrictive. By contrast with the prevalent view, it is demonstrated that intuition plays a significant role in human thinking, including in philosophical and scientific enquiry, independently of whether intuition is of great or only of minimal evidential value.

FÉLIX, Francisco Hélio Cavalcante. O estado atual do legado de Benjamin Libet, sua coerência e seu impacto na filosofia da mente e no estudo do livre arbítrio. 2014. 116f. – Dissertação (Mestrado) – Universidade Federal do Ceará, Programa de Pós-graduação em Filosofia, Fortaleza (CE), 2014. / Submitted by Márcia Araújo (marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2015-03-12T14:12:25Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_dis_fhcfelix.pdf: 646316 bytes, checksum: 1e7496a8ad9966924cff8a1359d6e39a (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Márcia Araújo(marcia_m_bezerra@yahoo.com.br) on 2015-03-13T17:10:52Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_dis_fhcfelix.pdf: 646316 bytes, checksum: 1e7496a8ad9966924cff8a1359d6e39a (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2015-03-13T17:10:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_dis_fhcfelix.pdf: 646316 bytes, checksum: 1e7496a8ad9966924cff8a1359d6e39a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014 / Benjamin Libet’s legacy and the current status of his findings were analysed. Libets’ works on neurophisiology of voluntary act prompted a huge discussion on philosophy of mind in general and specifically on free will. The evidence from his main studies shows that the brain process that is responsible for the so called voluntary act begins preconsciously. The beginning of this neural process would be defined as the appearance of a readiness potential in eletroencephalographics recordings. This defies the common notion that a person can counsciously and freely choose how and when to act. The scientist holds the idea of consciously vetoing the act that has unconsciously begun and thus enable the exercise of free will. One would have about 200 milliseconds to use this veto power before the concrete onset of the respective action. Libet has tried to figure out a philosophic mind-brain interaction theory to compound with his empiric findings and so to shape what he understood as a human action and free will characterization. The reactions to these works were substantial. It seems to be a noticeable example of close interaction between philosophic and scientific knowledge, with a prospect of both enrichment and misunderstandings. A comprehensive review of Libet’s work and the main thinkers who commented on it shows that the discussion was quite rich and still has a great ammount at the present days. New methods of assessing brain activities and the recent replications of Libet’s experimental model emphasize the importance of his work. Some of his conclusions are now strengthened, in spite of the weakening of other points in his argumentations. His legacy can be ultimately regarded as an unavoidable reference to every person who investigates the free will issue. / Analisou-se o legado de Benjamin Libet e o estado atual de seus achados. Os trabalhos de Libet sobre neurofisiologia do ato voluntário provocaram uma intensa discussão no campo da filosofia da mente em geral e do livre arbítrio em particular. As evidências de seus principais estudos são de que o processo cerebral responsável pelo ato tido como voluntário inicia-se de modo pré-consciente. O início desse processo neural seria definido pelo aparecimento do potencial de prontidão em registros eletroencefalográficos. Isso desafia a noção comum de que o sujeito pode escolher, de modo consciente e livre, sobre o como e quando agir. O cientista defende a ideia de que a possibilidade de se vetar conscientemente o ato que se iniciou inconscientemente pode garantir o exercício do livre arbítrio. O indivíduo teria cerca de 200 milissegundos para usar esse poder de veto antes da concretização da respectiva ação enquanto tal. Libet procurou elaborar uma teoria filosófica de interação mente-corpo para compor com seus achados empíricos o que entendia ser a configuração do agir humano e do livre arbítrio. As reações a esses trabalhos foram consideráveis. Trata-se de exemplo significativo de interseção estreita entre o conhecimento filosófico e o conhecimento científico, onde há tanto a possibilidade de enriquecimento quanto de mal entendidos. Um levantamento do trabalho de Libet e um apanhado dos principais comentadores de suas reflexões mostram que a discussão foi muito rica e que ainda continua bastante intensa em nossos dias. Os novos métodos de registro de atividade cerebral e as recentes replicações do modelo experimental libetiano enfatizam a importância de sua obra. O exame conceitual mais rigoroso e sofisticado de seus achados e de suas análises se mostrou enriquecedor. Algumas de suas conclusões estão fortalecidas com o tempo, apesar de certos pontos de suas ilações se mostrarem mais frágeis. Pode-se considerar seu legado como referencial inescapável para qualquer um que se debruce sobre a questão do livre arbítrio.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:12:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 TeseNM.pdf: 708573 bytes, checksum: 2b2f806733a067725d2fde4ee77b9450 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-09-13 / The present study aims to show the Algorithms of Compression as adequate criterion for the demarcation of the ambit of the mental starting from a Philosophy of Mind reflection. The Algorithms of Compression, understood from a Dennett´s soft materialism perspective - where they acquire an character in its formal sense meaning composed of successive stages of prescriptions that look for a certain result whenever they are initiate, but they also possess its heuristic character, that is to say, they are also good as economic strategy to prescribe instances not passible to reduction in random series that are, for its time, characteristic expressions of mental vocabulary (faiths, desires, longing...). / RESUMO: O presente estudo tem por objetivo principal apresentar os Algoritmos de Compressão como critérios suficientes para a demarcação do âmbito do mental a partir de uma reflexão da Filosofia da Mente. Os Algoritmos de Compressão entendidos num viés proposto pelo materialismo brando dennettiano - onde adquirem um caráter de açambarcar em seu significado um sentido formal composto de sucessivas etapas de prescrições que buscam levar a um determinado resultado sempre que forem iniciados, mas também possuem seu caráter heurístico, ou seja, servem também como estratégia econômica para prescrever instâncias não passíveis de redução à série randômica que são, por sua vez, termos próprios do vocabulário mentalista (crenças, desejos, saudade...).