According to Kierkegaard, the knowledge of God begins with the recognition of various truths about oneself. Every individual, just by virtue of being human, has the capacity to develop an intuitive awareness of God. In this thesis, I explore the nature of this knowledge. In chapter one, I introduce a number of ideas important for understanding Kierkegaard's phenomenology of religious belief, including his distinction between objective and subjective reflection, his method (indirect communication), and his psychology. The first chapter concludes with a description of the range or domain of "natural religion." In the next chapter, I analyze the structural or formative elements of natural religion, the awakening of a God -relationship in the extremity of selfknowledge (an individual's awareness of the eternal, infinite, and possible aspects of the human "self"). In the final chapter, I explore two related peculiarities in Kierkegaard's treatment of religious knowledge: his contempt for inductive or probabilistic arguments, and his suggestion that the existence of God can become clear to a person with a different kind of certainty. I argue that although he overstates his polemic against theistic arguments, Kierkegaard is nonetheless correct in his account of the proper ground of belief in God. I conclude by juxtaposing Kierkegaard's views on belief in God with those of twentieth century probabilistic theologians and atheologians, as well as the "Reformed Epistemology" of Alvin Plantinga.

Drawing on the ritual theory of “rebounding violence” as developed by Maurice Bloch, the contemporary anthropologist, the thesis examined some kingship rituals periodically observed in Nepal and highlighted their political implications. The study also made an assessment of the concept of “divine kingship” in orthodox “Hindu” tradition and traced connections between religion and politics. In Nepal, kingship is taken as a symbol of sovereign power and national unity, and the king is often revered in public festivals as an incarnation of Lord Vishnu, or as a representative of some other divinities such as Indra, Bhairava and the Buddha. The thesis explored such rituals, demystified the concept of “divine kingship,” and displayed through historical evidences how Nepali rulers have appropriated religious occasions for their own legitimacy.

No description available.

Habilitationsschrift--Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Erlangen, 1974. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [417]-427) and index.

Thesis (Th. M.)--St. Vladimir's Orthodox Theological Seminary, 2008. / Abstract. Description based on microfiche version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 144-145).

This study explores how racial and religious identities are impacted and subsequently reconciled among Black women who join the historically White Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS) in Southwest Atlanta, Georgia. This study was based upon the premise that the African-American religious aesthetic and the Black Church shape racial and religious identities. Therefore, identity reconciliation among Black LDS women who previously attended the Black church is jeopardized. A mixed-methods research approach was used to measure Black women’s ability to reconcile their racial and religious identities. The data gathered enabled the researcher to broadly determine the degree to which reconciliation is achieved among Black LI)S women. The researcher found that the diminutive presence of the African-American religious aesthetic in the LDS Church did not considerably influence identity reconciliation among Black LDS women . This finding is significant as it will help to inform future studies about identity reconciliation among Black people who join historically White religious institutions as well as the viability of the Black Church as a resource for spiritual and racial identity cultivation among Black people.

The current study examines several recent comparisons made between the writings of Nagarjuna and Derrida. The main question under examination is why in particular should such a comparison of two widely different thinkers hold obvious appeal for contemporary scholars? In an attempt to answer this question the comparisons of Robert Magliola, David Loy, Harold Coward and others are analysed as are critiques of this type of comparison presented by Richard Hayes, A. Bharati and others. It is concluded that the basis for these comparisons is a strong concern for a "middle way" perspective between forms of absolutism and nihilism in contemporary Western culture.

Note: / This thesis explores the ways that Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno's Critical Theory and the ethics of Christian liberation theology mutually inform each other. Horkheimer and Adorno' s theories of the "dialectic of enlightenment" and “negative dialectics" provide a self-critical social analysis that interconnects the domination of humanity by humanity and the domination of nature in a way that strengthens the critique of Christian ethics. Further, Horkheimer and Adorno's "longing for the wholly other" resonates profoundly with Christians who believe in a God of Justice. By the same token, Christian reflection on critical Theory leads to a critique ofHorkheimer and Adorno's excessive distance from political practice and their narrow understanding of radical praxis. In this “new dialogue" the project of Christian ethics develops a more substantial critique of domination, while the Critical Theory of Horkheimer and Adorno is critiqued and renewed. / Cette thèse examine les différentes manieres avec lesquelles la Théorie Critique et l'éthique de la théologie de la libération chrétienne s'entrecroisent et s'informent mutuellement. Les théories d'Horkheimer et d'Adorno sur la "dialectique de la raison" et "dialectique négative" apportent une analyse altocritique de la société et associent la domination de l'humanité par l'humanité et la domination de la nature de manière à renforcer la critique de l'éthique chrétienne. De plus, le concept du "désir pour le tout Autre" qui ont Horkeimer et Adorno résonne profondément chez les chrétiens qui fondent leurs foi dans un Dieu de Justice. Dans ce sens, la réflection chrétienne sur la Théorie Critique amène une critique d'Horkheimer et Adorno qui veut noter leur distance excessive envers les pratiques poli tiques et leurs mécompréhension du praxis radical. Dans ce "nouveau dialogue ll le projet chrétien de l'éthique, amène une critique plus substantiel de ce qui est la domination et de ce fait renouvelle et illumine la Théorie Critique d'Horkheimer et D'Adorno.

Describing Bernard Lonergan's relation to philosophy of religion is tricky business, with complications arising on different levels. To begin with, he does not use the term as it is usually understood in the field of the same name. Moreover, he addresses the same issues as philosophers of religion, but under the guise of philosophy of God or natural theology. Finally, he understands idiosyncratically the issue of religious experience, which is now a specialized category in philosophy of religion called upon to support formally rational statements for or against theistic belief. This central issue in Lonergan is further complicated by the fact that his idiosyncratic understanding of (religious) experience plays different roles in his thinking about God and religion. In this study I flesh out the dynamics of these various components, their interrelationships, and their function from early to late development. / My point of departure is a period in Lonergan's thought where he attributes more to the influence of religious experience in our thinking than at any time prior in his career. In chapter 1 I pursue some reasons that have been given for the tardiness of his response, intimating its nature and what it meant for his controversial "proof" for God's existence. Something of a detour is taken in chapter 2 since discussion of the concept of religious experience in Lonergan must grapple with what he means by experience in general. I decipher three senses to the term integral to his concept of consciousness that I distinguish from a contemporary model, that of David Chalmers. Since Lonergan is emphatic about distinguishing consciousness from its concept I trace this aspect of his philosophical claim against the background of Kant and Hegel, his main dialogue partners on the question. In chapter 3 I return to the specifically religious dimension of the notion of experience in the early Lonergan. Here I track the development of his category of religious experience as it moves from the periphery to the explanatory basis of his thought. In chapter 4 the relevant later literature in Lonergan is examined in which is seen the emergence of what is technically philosophy of religion to him. Among the distinctions I introduce is the difference between his model of religion and what he calls his philosophy of religion. Conceiving it historically, I see the former, his model of religion, as the departure point for what in his philosophy of religion he sets out to accomplish. They are related, of course, but not one and the same thing. To avoid confusion with the field of the same name, I recommend that we refer to his philosophy of religion as it is literally, as a philosophy of religious studies, distinguishing it firstly from his philosophy of God and secondly from his model of religious experience. / Besides providing an unprecedented comprehensive understanding of Lonergan's philosophy of religion, outlining the matter this way also aids in identifying precisely what are the points of contact between Lonergan's thoughts on God and religion and the issues presently discussed by philosophers of religion. The conclusion offers an example of this at the level of "philosophy of," the formal component of Lonergan's philosophy of religion in the generic sense in which I understand it. It represents steps toward a larger project, which I adumbrate in the appendix.

Mysticism can be examined from various viewpoints: historical, theological, sociological, and psychological. This study primarily examines the philosophical status and implications of mysticism, an issue investigated many times, particularly over the last four decades. Walter T. Stace's work in the early sixties is regarded as a hallmark in the field. The topics covered in this thesis are epistemological, metaphysical and religio-ethical and deal with mystical knowledge, its object, and its method. The characteristics of mystical knowledge, its objectivity or subjectivity, its object/s, its logical status, the way/s it is presented in the language, and its method/s of acquisition are investigated. This study is primarily epistemological, since the central issue is the status of mystical awareness in human knowledge. / Since this is a philosophical reflection on mystical experience, the primary sources are mystical writings, mainly from Christian classical mystics, and philosophical writings about mysticism, mainly from twentieth-century Western philosophers. Again since it is a 'philosophical reflection' on 'mystical experience,' this study employs two methods: a historical survey of mystics' ideas, and philosophical reflection on mystics' reports or analysis of contents of mystical text. Since the focus of the study is Stace's account of mysticism, his ideas will be examined in detail. Reference to other mystics and philosophers will be primarily for elaboration, comparison and criticism of Stace's analysis. Instead of merely criticizing Stace's arguments and convictions, this study also offers an alternative account and presents a consistent philosophical analysis of mysticism.