This project is a critique of the connection between lethal violence and justice within Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Our critique focuses on three specific moments—moments that Derrida touches upon in Glas, but does not address in detail—namely, heroic vengeance, execution and warfare. By subjecting each of these moments to a close reading we will be calling into question the very possibility of an act of violence that can lay claim to being absolutely ‘necessary’ or ‘just’ either within its specific historical moment or from beyond it. The theoretical basis of the project closely parallels Jacques Derrida’s work on Hegel, in that it stems from a deconstruction of the connection between epistemology and ontology. This also has serious implications for the question of ethics. By tracing the play of différance through the semeiological structure of both theoretical and practical cognition Derrida’s work makes it possible to address the ethical implications of speculative dialectics from a non-dialectical angle. Figuratively speaking, the relationship between theoretical and practical cognition can be thought of as the relationship between reading and writing. As such, the title of the project is to be taken as a figurative reference to the connection between theoretical (i.e. reading) and practical (i.e. writing) cognition and by extension to the connection between epistemology, ontology and ethics. Addressed in this manner our project begins by tracing the silence (i.e. the ‘a’ of différance) that is, at one and the same time, a condition of the possibility and impossibility of meaning. This silence has serious ramifications for Hegel’s political philosophy. Hegel’s system sets out to ground the law within the ‘positive’ infinity of the Concept [Begriff] and thus, close the circle of philosophy. This project will attempt to expose the ethical stakes—and the ultimate impossibility—of Hegel’s ‘positive’ infinity by taking up the thread of lethal violence in the Philosophy of Right.

This project is a critique of the connection between lethal violence and justice within Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Our critique focuses on three specific moments—moments that Derrida touches upon in Glas, but does not address in detail—namely, heroic vengeance, execution and warfare. By subjecting each of these moments to a close reading we will be calling into question the very possibility of an act of violence that can lay claim to being absolutely ‘necessary’ or ‘just’ either within its specific historical moment or from beyond it. The theoretical basis of the project closely parallels Jacques Derrida’s work on Hegel, in that it stems from a deconstruction of the connection between epistemology and ontology. This also has serious implications for the question of ethics. By tracing the play of différance through the semeiological structure of both theoretical and practical cognition Derrida’s work makes it possible to address the ethical implications of speculative dialectics from a non-dialectical angle. Figuratively speaking, the relationship between theoretical and practical cognition can be thought of as the relationship between reading and writing. As such, the title of the project is to be taken as a figurative reference to the connection between theoretical (i.e. reading) and practical (i.e. writing) cognition and by extension to the connection between epistemology, ontology and ethics. Addressed in this manner our project begins by tracing the silence (i.e. the ‘a’ of différance) that is, at one and the same time, a condition of the possibility and impossibility of meaning. This silence has serious ramifications for Hegel’s political philosophy. Hegel’s system sets out to ground the law within the ‘positive’ infinity of the Concept [Begriff] and thus, close the circle of philosophy. This project will attempt to expose the ethical stakes—and the ultimate impossibility—of Hegel’s ‘positive’ infinity by taking up the thread of lethal violence in the Philosophy of Right.

In this paper I attempt to address an interpretive difficulty that surrounds Hegel's position in the history of jurisprudence. After a brief overview of Hegel's project, I outline the first two sections of the Outlines of the Philosophy of Right in order to support my argument that Hegel advocates a natural law theory of legal validity. I then show that confusions regarding Hegel's place in the history of jurisprudence arise from his view that the ethical evaluation of laws is limited (with some exceptions) to procedural laws that govern the enactment and recognition of laws in the administration of justice. I end by providing Hegel's distinctive argument for legal publicity, which he takes to be essential for the enactment and recognition of valid law.

When an act is right or wrong, there may be an explanation why. Different moral theories recognize different moral facts and offer different explanations of them, but they offer no account of moral explanation itself. What, then, is its nature? This thesis seeks a systematic account of moral explanation within a framework of moral realism. In Chapter 1, I develop a pluralist theory of explanation. I argue that there is a prima facie distinctive normative mode of explanation that is essential to moral theory. In Chapter 2, I characterize normative explanation through its formal properties. I then draw on John Mackie’s claim that moral explanations are queer to develop a powerful form of moral scepticism. In Chapters 3–4, I reject attempts to reduce normative explanation to logical necessity, metaphysical necessity, or conceptual (analytic) necessity. The failure of these accounts is taken to reinforce Mackie’s scepticism. In Chapter 5, I defend a partial analysis of normative explanation in terms of irreducible normative laws. I argue that irreducible normative laws offer a realist, though non-naturalist, answer to Mackie’s scepticism. The existence of irreducible normative laws then is defended as offering the best realist explanation of why rightness and wrongness supervene on descriptive properties. In Appendix A, I discuss the claim the normative explanation has an essential connection to the motivation of virtuous agents. I defend this claim from certain difficulties posed by Jonathan Dancy’s recent work.

Esta dissertação consiste de um estudo da Filosofia do Direito de Hegel tomando como fio condutor o modo como se apresenta, no interior dessa obra, as relações de reconhecimento recíproco travadas sob o signo da exclusão e/ou limitação recíprocas, ou seja, sob o signo da intersubjetividade negativa. Procurou-se explorar os nichos onde tais formas de intersubjetividade aparecem, sucessiva e respectivamente, no Contrato (Vertrag) entre pessoas jurídicas, na Ação (Handlung) encetada a partir do ponto de vista moral e, por fim, no caso da Sociedade Civil (bürgerliche Gesellschaft), no sentido de mostrar como esses nichos de intersubjetividade negativa se reportam, cada um por sua vez, a um modelo de relações de reconhecimento recíproco positivo ou inclusivo capaz de fazer frente às forças disruptivas liberadas por aquele. O caso da sociedade civil se torna exemplar na exploração dessa contraposição entre dois modelos de intersubjetividade ao se apresentar como um conceito que procura não reduzir todo o âmbito da sociedade à esfera do sistema de carecimentos (System der Bedürfnie), por conseguinte, à uma intersubjetividade negativa/excludente, mas contrapor a esta, no interior mesmo da sociedade civil, uma esfera de intersubjetividade positiva conceituada por Hegel sob a rubrica das corporações (Korporationen) capaz de recompor as relações éticas e fazer a passagem para a esfera do Estado. / This work consists of a study in Hegel\'s Philosophy of Right taking as guide line the concept of \"negative intersubjectivity\", that is, the relations of recognition based on mutual limitation or reciprocal exclusion. We sought to explore that concept, respectively, in the shape of the Contract (Vertrag), of the Action (Handlung) based on the \"moral point of view\", and in the philosophical arrangement imposed by Hegel to his concept of Civil Society (bürgerlich Gesellschaft). The aim was to show that \"negative intersubjectivity\" is always reporting itself towards a \"positive\" one, which in turn can counter the disruptive energies liberated by the first one. In this regard, Hegel\'s concept of civil society (bürgerlich Gesellschaft) is strategic: rather than reduces it to the \"system of needs\" (System der Bedürfnie), that is, reduces it exclusively to negative relations of recognition, Hegel ascribed to the corporations (Korporationen) the role of containg the disruptive forces which the market spreads, and to recompose the ethical relations wich enables the transition to Estate.

CoordenaÃÃo de AperfeÃoamento de Pessoal de NÃvel Superior / Na tradiÃÃo filosÃfica, a filosofia do direito à a disciplina que tematiza o direito enquanto tal, nÃo este ou aquele direito especÃfico de um ou outro Estado, nÃo se interessa detalhadamente pela realidade do direito, mas pelo conceito do direito. Para Hegel o direito à a realizaÃÃo objetiva da liberdade, porÃm nem toda lei ou instituiÃÃo positiva à de fato uma lei da liberdade, sÃo necessÃrios critÃrios para determinar quando uma lei ou instituiÃÃo positiva à ou nÃo justificÃvel, isto Ã, satisfaz as exigÃncias da razÃo pela liberdade. Essa dissertaÃÃo tem como objetivo determinar quais os critÃrios de avaliaÃÃo e correÃÃo do direito positivo em Hegel e a relaÃÃo entre o conceito do direito e a efetividade do direito. A presente dissertaÃÃo terà como principal referÃncia bibliogrÃfica a obra de G.W.F. Hegel, Linhas Fundamentais da Filosofia do Direito, assim como obras complementares do prÃprio autor (Fenomenologia do EspÃrito, Filosofia da HistÃria etc) e de demais autores e comentadores que contribuam com o nosso objetivo. Concluiremos que Hegel concilia em sua Filosofia do Direito a historicidade e normatividade da liberdade, isto Ã, para Hegel a liberdade pressuporia normas e seria historicamente efetivada e que os critÃrios para avaliar e corrigir o direito positivo seriam histÃricos e normativos. / In the philosophical tradition, the philosophy of right is the discipline that thematizes the right as such, not this or that specific right of one or other State, not interested in detail by the rightâs reality, but of the rightâs concept. For Hegel the right is the objective realization of freedom, but not every law or positive institution is indeed a law of freedom, criteria is necessary to determine when a law or positive institution is justifiable or not, that is, satisfies the demands of reason for freedom. This dissertation aims to determine the criteria for the evaluation and correction of positive law in Hegel and the relation between the concept of right and the actuality of right. The present dissertation will have as main bibliographical reference the work of G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, as well as complementary works by the author himself (Phenomenology of Mind, Philosophy of History, etc.) and other authors and commentators who contribute to our objective. We will conclude that Hegel conciliates in his Philosophy right the historicity and normativity of freedom, that is, for Hegel, freedom would presuppose norms and would be historically effective, and that the criteria for evaluating and correcting positive law would be historical and normative.

Embora Hans Kelsen tenha desenvolvido suas ideias sobre a justiça em diversos artigos e capítulos de livros, o jusfilósofo nunca edificou uma obra mais profunda, monográfica ou sistemática sobre a questão do justo. Suas considerações, o mais das vezes proferidas incidentalmente quando da análise e crítica das teorias do direito natural, se encontram, a bem dizer, dispersas por diversas produções. A leitura integral e conjunta de seus estudos, entretanto, permite a identificação da mesma e coerente concepção de filosofia moral que perpassa todos os seus escritos, concepção esta que sugere a relatividade, subjetividade e irracionalidade da questão do justo. Sem o propósito de ser uma biografia intelectual ou uma psicanálise do conhecimento das conclusões kelsenianas sobre o problema da justiça, o objetivo da presente dissertação, além da tentativa de realizar uma exposição sistemática da própria teoria da justiça de Kelsen  dispersa por uma multiplicidade de trabalhos, nem todos disponíveis ou publicados em língua portuguesa , consiste na análise dos pressupostos e justificativas teórico-filosóficos que, utilizados pelo jusfilósofo como embasamento de suas inferências sobre o tema, o conduzem a afirmar a incognoscibilidade de qualquer conceito absoluto, objetivo e universal de justiça, ou a viabilidade de uma razão prática. A meta maior desta dissertação, portanto, é o estabelecimento e elucidação das premissas extraídas por Kelsen do pensamento teórico-filosófico de Max Weber, Immanuel Kant (além dos neokantismos de Marburgo e Baden), Wittgenstein, e dos neopositivistas do Círculo de Viena, para rejeitar lógico-gnosiologicamente as concepções absolutistas do justo, bem como a possibilidade de discutir ou definir racionalmente a justiça e as normas morais dela decorrentes. A partir de elementos colhidos dessas diferentes correntes intelectuais, Kelsen desacredita, com base na distinção entre enunciados sobre fatos (racionais e verificáveis) e proposições relativas a valores (irracionais e não verificáveis), a capacidade humana de cognição dos valores em geral e, mais ainda, a existência e cognoscibilidade de valores absolutos  em sua ótica, requisitos imprescindíveis para a exequibilidade de qualquer sistema objetivo de moralidade ou para especulações racionais sobre a justiça. / Although Hans Kelsen has developed his ideas about justice in many articles and books chapters, this legal philosopher never produced a deep, monographic or systematic work over the issue of virtue. His considerations, most frequently stated incidentally on analysis and critics of the natural rights theories, are, actually, disperse by several titles. A general and concerted reading of his works, however, provides the identification of a unique and coherent conception of moral philosophy that encompass all of his writings, conception that suggests a relativistic, subjectivist and irrational approach of the question of virtue. Without the intent of being an intellectual biography or a psychoanalysis of knowledge of Kelsens conclusions over the problem of justice, the objective of the present dissertation, therefore, besides the attempt to achieve a systematic exposition of Kelsens theory of justice diffused in many works, some of them not available and published in Portuguese -, is to analyze the theoretical and philosophical foundations and justifications that conduct the legal philosopher to assert the impossibility of cognition of an absolute, objective and universal concept of justice or the viability of a practical reasoning. Thus, the main goal of this dissertation is to determine and elucidate the premises that Kelsen took from the theoretical and philosophical thinking of Max Weber, Immanuel Kant and the neo-kantianisms of Marburg and Baden, Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, to logically and gnosiologically reject absolute conceptions of justice and the possibility of rationally discuss and define justice and its moral norms. With elements incorporated from these different intellectual traditions, Kelsen impeaches, based on the distinction of factual enunciations (rational and verifiable) and propositions about values (irrational and non-verifiable), the human capacity to apprehend values and, furthermore, the existence and capacity of comprehension of absolute values, in his view, indispensable presuppositions to any objective system of morality or theorizations about justice.

Submitted by SILVANA COLOMBO DE ALMEIDA null (sil_colal@hotmail.com) on 2016-10-10T01:50:42Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Texto Dissertação.pdf: 634445 bytes, checksum: 7bcf6851346fb596f0c58ff201c6e6f4 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Paula Grisoto (grisotoana@reitoria.unesp.br) on 2016-10-11T17:00:17Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 almeida_sc_me_mar.pdf: 634445 bytes, checksum: 7bcf6851346fb596f0c58ff201c6e6f4 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-10-11T17:00:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 almeida_sc_me_mar.pdf: 634445 bytes, checksum: 7bcf6851346fb596f0c58ff201c6e6f4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-09-16 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / O intuito do presente trabalho é analisar possíveis contribuições que o desenvolvimento dialético especulativo da Filosofia hegeliana, sobremaneira a Filosofia do Espírito Objetivo, traz à compreensão acerca dos direitos humanos e seu desenvolvimento da modernidade à contemporaneidade. Defende-se que as ideias contidas na filosofia hegeliana sejam uma possibilidade de se ultrapassar alguns limites existentes nas discussões tradicionais a respeito do tema, embasadas principalmente nas filosofias modernas do direito natural. Para tanto, optou-se por analisar a relação dos direitos humanos com a filosofia do direito natural, seguindo-se para a crítica hegeliana ao jusnaturalismo e, consequentemente, encerrando-se com sua compreensão de reconhecimento e sua influência na Filosofia do Direito e no estabelecimento das relações éticas na Sittlichkeit. / The purpose of this academic writting is to analyse the possible contributions that the dialectical speculative development of Hegel’s Philosophy, moreover the Philosophy of Objective Spirit, brings to light regarding human rights and its development from modernity to the present day. It is argued that the ideas contained in Hegel’s Philosophy are a possibility of overcoming some existing limits in traditional discussions in regard with this topic, mainly based on modern philosophies of the Natural Rights. In order to do so, it has been opted to analyse the relation of human rights with the philosophy of natural rights, followed by Hegel’s critic to Natural Rights, and as a result, closing with its understanding of the recognition and its influence in the Philosophy of Right and on the establishment in ethic relation in Sittlichkeit.

Embora Hans Kelsen tenha desenvolvido suas ideias sobre a justiça em diversos artigos e capítulos de livros, o jusfilósofo nunca edificou uma obra mais profunda, monográfica ou sistemática sobre a questão do justo. Suas considerações, o mais das vezes proferidas incidentalmente quando da análise e crítica das teorias do direito natural, se encontram, a bem dizer, dispersas por diversas produções. A leitura integral e conjunta de seus estudos, entretanto, permite a identificação da mesma e coerente concepção de filosofia moral que perpassa todos os seus escritos, concepção esta que sugere a relatividade, subjetividade e irracionalidade da questão do justo. Sem o propósito de ser uma biografia intelectual ou uma psicanálise do conhecimento das conclusões kelsenianas sobre o problema da justiça, o objetivo da presente dissertação, além da tentativa de realizar uma exposição sistemática da própria teoria da justiça de Kelsen  dispersa por uma multiplicidade de trabalhos, nem todos disponíveis ou publicados em língua portuguesa , consiste na análise dos pressupostos e justificativas teórico-filosóficos que, utilizados pelo jusfilósofo como embasamento de suas inferências sobre o tema, o conduzem a afirmar a incognoscibilidade de qualquer conceito absoluto, objetivo e universal de justiça, ou a viabilidade de uma razão prática. A meta maior desta dissertação, portanto, é o estabelecimento e elucidação das premissas extraídas por Kelsen do pensamento teórico-filosófico de Max Weber, Immanuel Kant (além dos neokantismos de Marburgo e Baden), Wittgenstein, e dos neopositivistas do Círculo de Viena, para rejeitar lógico-gnosiologicamente as concepções absolutistas do justo, bem como a possibilidade de discutir ou definir racionalmente a justiça e as normas morais dela decorrentes. A partir de elementos colhidos dessas diferentes correntes intelectuais, Kelsen desacredita, com base na distinção entre enunciados sobre fatos (racionais e verificáveis) e proposições relativas a valores (irracionais e não verificáveis), a capacidade humana de cognição dos valores em geral e, mais ainda, a existência e cognoscibilidade de valores absolutos  em sua ótica, requisitos imprescindíveis para a exequibilidade de qualquer sistema objetivo de moralidade ou para especulações racionais sobre a justiça. / Although Hans Kelsen has developed his ideas about justice in many articles and books chapters, this legal philosopher never produced a deep, monographic or systematic work over the issue of virtue. His considerations, most frequently stated incidentally on analysis and critics of the natural rights theories, are, actually, disperse by several titles. A general and concerted reading of his works, however, provides the identification of a unique and coherent conception of moral philosophy that encompass all of his writings, conception that suggests a relativistic, subjectivist and irrational approach of the question of virtue. Without the intent of being an intellectual biography or a psychoanalysis of knowledge of Kelsens conclusions over the problem of justice, the objective of the present dissertation, therefore, besides the attempt to achieve a systematic exposition of Kelsens theory of justice diffused in many works, some of them not available and published in Portuguese -, is to analyze the theoretical and philosophical foundations and justifications that conduct the legal philosopher to assert the impossibility of cognition of an absolute, objective and universal concept of justice or the viability of a practical reasoning. Thus, the main goal of this dissertation is to determine and elucidate the premises that Kelsen took from the theoretical and philosophical thinking of Max Weber, Immanuel Kant and the neo-kantianisms of Marburg and Baden, Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, to logically and gnosiologically reject absolute conceptions of justice and the possibility of rationally discuss and define justice and its moral norms. With elements incorporated from these different intellectual traditions, Kelsen impeaches, based on the distinction of factual enunciations (rational and verifiable) and propositions about values (irrational and non-verifiable), the human capacity to apprehend values and, furthermore, the existence and capacity of comprehension of absolute values, in his view, indispensable presuppositions to any objective system of morality or theorizations about justice.

Esta dissertação consiste de um estudo da Filosofia do Direito de Hegel tomando como fio condutor o modo como se apresenta, no interior dessa obra, as relações de reconhecimento recíproco travadas sob o signo da exclusão e/ou limitação recíprocas, ou seja, sob o signo da intersubjetividade negativa. Procurou-se explorar os nichos onde tais formas de intersubjetividade aparecem, sucessiva e respectivamente, no Contrato (Vertrag) entre pessoas jurídicas, na Ação (Handlung) encetada a partir do ponto de vista moral e, por fim, no caso da Sociedade Civil (bürgerliche Gesellschaft), no sentido de mostrar como esses nichos de intersubjetividade negativa se reportam, cada um por sua vez, a um modelo de relações de reconhecimento recíproco positivo ou inclusivo capaz de fazer frente às forças disruptivas liberadas por aquele. O caso da sociedade civil se torna exemplar na exploração dessa contraposição entre dois modelos de intersubjetividade ao se apresentar como um conceito que procura não reduzir todo o âmbito da sociedade à esfera do sistema de carecimentos (System der Bedürfnie), por conseguinte, à uma intersubjetividade negativa/excludente, mas contrapor a esta, no interior mesmo da sociedade civil, uma esfera de intersubjetividade positiva conceituada por Hegel sob a rubrica das corporações (Korporationen) capaz de recompor as relações éticas e fazer a passagem para a esfera do Estado. / This work consists of a study in Hegel\'s Philosophy of Right taking as guide line the concept of \"negative intersubjectivity\", that is, the relations of recognition based on mutual limitation or reciprocal exclusion. We sought to explore that concept, respectively, in the shape of the Contract (Vertrag), of the Action (Handlung) based on the \"moral point of view\", and in the philosophical arrangement imposed by Hegel to his concept of Civil Society (bürgerlich Gesellschaft). The aim was to show that \"negative intersubjectivity\" is always reporting itself towards a \"positive\" one, which in turn can counter the disruptive energies liberated by the first one. In this regard, Hegel\'s concept of civil society (bürgerlich Gesellschaft) is strategic: rather than reduces it to the \"system of needs\" (System der Bedürfnie), that is, reduces it exclusively to negative relations of recognition, Hegel ascribed to the corporations (Korporationen) the role of containg the disruptive forces which the market spreads, and to recompose the ethical relations wich enables the transition to Estate.