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Includes bibliographical references: leaves 201-224 / South African authorities formalised their goal to pursue a developmental state with the adoption of the National Development Plan (NDP) in 2012. It is clear from the reading of the NDP that the authorities are convinced that the developmental state approach is a cause for development. The declaration to construct a developmental state is interesting at best or bizarre at worst in that developmental states are often identified by assessing their (economic) performance over a period. They hardly sought out to intentionally build developmental states. The South African governance system has implications for a quest to construct a developmental state. Whereas the literature on East Asian countries tends to focus on the role of central governments in economic development, the South African governance places a huge emphasis on cooperative governance between the three spheres of government. To this end, the constitution spells out the specific developmental objectives that must be pursued by municipalities. This essentially means that the system of cooperative governance, and the extent of effectiveness of local government, will either catalyse or impede the realisation of South African developmental state. Developmental states are often distinguished from others by their structures, roles and outcomes. Their structures and roles are developmental and are a cause for soaring outcomes. This logic was employed to analyse the nature of structures and roles in eight (8) selected municipalities over a 15-year period and how these influenced the actual policy performance. Findings that emerged from over 30 interviews with high ranking officials in various institutions and the thorough analysis of a number of documents confirm that structures and roles in municipalities are far from being developmental. The study also found that informal factors have effectively ‘juniorised’ local government as a sphere of government despite the constitution emphasising the equality of all three spheres. In the final analysis, local government is incapacitated to carry out its developmental mandate. It is against this reality of incapacitation of local government that the study argues that the performance of local government, measured against its constitutional objectives, effectively impedes the realisation of a developmental state in South Africa. / Development Studies / D. Litt. et Phil. (Development Studies)

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This dissertation provides an in-depth study of police transformation in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan and Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union. It draws upon interviews with police, NGO workers, politicians and international practitioners, and employs a comparative-historical approach. Contra to democratic policing approaches, advocating the diffusion of police power and implementation of police reform concurrently with wider democratisation, reform was relatively successful in Georgia after the 2003 Rose Revolution because of state-building. The new government monopolised executive power, fired many police, recruited new personnel, raised police salaries and clamped down on organised crime and corruption. Success also depended on the elite's political will and their appeal to Georgian nationalism. Prioritisation of state-building over democratisation limited the reform's success, however. The new police are politicised and have served elites' private interests. Reform has failed in Kyrgyzstan because of a lack of state-building. Regional, clan and other identities are stronger than Kyrgyz nationalism. This has hindered the formation of an elite with capacity to implement reform. The state has limited control over the police, who remain corrupt and involved in organised crime. State-building has not precipitated police reform in Russia because of the absence of political will. The ruling cohort lacks a vision of reform and relies on corruption to balance the interests of political factions. The contrasting patterns of police reform have a number of implications for democratic police reform in transitioning countries: First, reform depends on political will. Second, institutionalising the police before democratising them may be a more effective means of acquiring the capacity to implement reform. Third, such an approach is likely to require some sort of common bond such as nationalism to legitimate it. Fourth, ignoring democratisation after institutionalisation is risky as reformers can misuse their power for private interests.