This thesis examines the attitude of Malaysia’s Islamist movements – (1) The Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS); (2) The National Trust Party (AMANAH); (3) The Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM) and (4) the Malaysian Muslim Solidarity Front (ISMA) towards the 2011 Arab Uprisings events or popularly known as the ‘Arab Spring’ in the Middle East and North Africa. In particular, it explores the knowledge and perceptions of selected Islamist movement activists, politicians and members in Malaysia towards the Arab Uprisings as well as considering how the events impact their activism, political approach and attitudes towards the issues of regime change, civil disobedience, political revolution, democracy, Islamism and political stability. This thesis also identifies a number lessons learnt by the Malaysian Islamists from the development of post-Arab Uprisings in the MENA region. The tendency of Malaysian Islamists to be influenced by the development in the Middle East and global political Islam are not seen as something new as evidently shown in the case of the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution. This popular event was known for its indirect impact on the political activism and approaches of PAS and ABIM in Malaysia back in the 1980-1990s, as well as inspiring many Malaysian Islamists to uphold the struggle of establishing an Islamic state in the country. Following the recent uprisings in several Arab states, which also witnesses the rise of Arab Islamist parties in securing a ruling power, these events have also been widely followed by the Malaysians in general and the Islamists in particular with great interest. Furthermore, the major involvement of Malaysian Islamists in a series of mass protests, popularly known in Malaysia as the “Bersih movement” (circa 2011-2016), against the ruling government, were perceived by numerous local and foreign journalists as an attempt to create a “Malaysian Spring” which inspired by the ‘Arab Spring’ phenomenon for the sake of toppling the current regime. However, there have been strong opinions voiced by the Malaysian authorities and various local scholars suggesting that there was no basis for presuming an Arab Uprisings impact in the context of the Malaysian experience. This raises the question of the relationship between the Arab Uprisings and Malaysian Islamists. Nevertheless, no matter how relevant the questions raised between Malaysia’s Islamist movements and the ‘Arab Spring’, the central concern that needs to be highlighted is the extent to which Malaysian Islamists grasp the fundamental issues of the 2011 Arab Uprisings before jumping to any conclusion about the polemics of the “Malaysian Spring”. In so doing, both quantitative and qualitative methods were applied through a questionnaire based-survey which was conducted in Malaysia involving 530 respondents, primarily among the registered and active representative of Malaysian Islamist between the ages of 18 and 45, as well as 15 in-depth interviews with selected Malaysian Islamist activists and leaders ranging from those in opposition political parties (PAS and AMANAH) to those in non-government Islamist organisations (ABIM and ISMA). The survey of Malaysian Islamists’ attitudes towards the Arab Uprisings development covered a variety of dimensions, namely understanding the general issues about the Arab Uprisings’ phenomenon, factors that lead to the Uprisings, the role of Islamist movements, the influences of the Uprisings on Malaysia’s Islamist movements activism and finally lessons learnt from the Arab Uprisings. The data is statistically analysed with the assistance of the SPSS computer package, and by using a number of statistical procedures, such as frequencies and cross-tabulations. The outcome of this research shows that the majority of respondents have an outstanding knowledge on the Arab Uprisings which was mostly obtained via new social media such as Facebook and Twitter, along with mixed perceptions toward the events. Furthermore, they also reached an understanding that the uncertainties in the Arab world would eventually lead to another wave of uprisings in the long term. Speaking of the global impact of the Arab Uprisings events, some elements of political repression, coupled with corruption and power abuses (which some claimed to be practised by the Malaysian regime), led to a number of Malaysian Islamists believing that they were inspired by the acts of mass street protests during the Arab Uprisings. This inspiration came when they witnessed the ousting of several long-serving autocratic Arab rulers in their respective states by the Arab protesters. However, the fear of insecurity and political instability which is currently evident in the post-Arab Uprisings in Egypt, Libya, Syria and the Yemen led to many respondents favouring political stability rather than regime change. Most of the respondents were quite sceptical about the polemics of the “Malaysian Spring” as most of them neither disagreed nor agreed that the series of political rallies by the Bersih movement were an indirect effort to topple the ruling government which was ‘accused’ by several pro-government media, politicians and authorities in Malaysia. Overall, this empirical research found that the majority of Malaysian Islamists from PAS, ABIM, ISMA and AMANAH are supportive of a free and democratic elections as a relevant medium for political change, rather than overthrowing the current regime via civil disobedience, street demonstration, or ‘revolution’.

This thesis aims to analyze Islamic rhetoric of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its underlying objectives and reasons by examining policies, speeches and declarations of the PLO, Fateh and Yasser Arafat. It is widely accepted that the PLO functiones according to secular rules / perceives Israel, Palestine and the Israeli-Palestinian question on Palestinian nationalist and Third worldist grounds. However in spite of its secular functioning and goals, the PLO since its inception has referred to Islamic rhetoric on natinal struggle of Palestine&rsquo / s liberation. Henceforth it is argued that the PLO has chosen a pragmatist and instrumentalist language in referring to Islamic symbols and discourses. Islamic rhetoric of the PLO has aimed primarily to mobilize the Palestinians for national goals and to legitimize the PLO against rising power of political Islam headed by Hamas. Furthermore the thesis also demonstrates that the PLO&rsquo / s Islamic rhetoric was affected by Palestinian society&rsquo / s shift along Islamic lines and Islamic component of Palestinian nationalism and culture. The PLO seemed to intensify its resort to Islamic rhetoric with every crisis that decreased the PLO&rsquo / s authority and power. It is concluded that content of the PLO&rsquo / s pragmatic Islamic rhetoric was never related with making Islam as normative and legal basis of Palestinian society, rather it was related with mobilization and legitimating.

Today, most Muslim-majority countries must contend with two realities: Islamists’ increasing access to political participation on the one hand and domestic and international pressures for women’s rights on the other. This dissertation seeks to identify the conditions necessary for resolving tensions between Islamist demands for political inclusion and secular feminists’ demands for the institutionalization of women’s rights in Muslim-majority countries. Attempts at gender reform have not only been rare, but have also usually excluded either secular feminists or Islamists due to state actors’ inability or unwillingness to resolve conflict between them. In some contexts, however, power holders have initiated inclusive consultative arrangements, mechanisms (commissions, committees, and mediation) that enable both secular feminists and Islamists to participate in gender policy-making processes, in spite of divergent ideological preferences, and thereby generated more broadly supported reforms. This dissertation argues that attempts at conflict resolution between secular feminists and Islamists are more likely to arise in the context of an autonomous state where the power holder needs the support of both groups. Such a state has both the flexibility and willingness to include both Islamists and secular feminists in the policy-making process. In states that do not enjoy autonomy from non-state actors, the state is less likely to have the flexibility to adopt policy-making processes that do not serve the politicized interests of dominant actors. I build this argument by conducting a comparative historical analysis of state development and relations among power holders, secular feminists, and Islamists, as well as drawing on interviews with politicians, bureaucrats, scholars, and activists in Morocco and Bangladesh. In both of these countries, secular feminists and Islamists have had antagonistic relations and ideological differences, but both groups participated in gender policy reform in Morocco, whereas in Bangladesh, multiple attempts at gender policy-making have excluded one group or the other. I then assess the extent to which an argument based on state autonomy and political alliances explains variation in the inclusiveness of gender policy-making processes in four other Muslim-majority countries (Jordan, Malaysia, Turkey, and Pakistan). / Government

This dissertation investigates the extent to which between Islam and democracy are compatible in the Muslim world. While some scholars have argued that Islam is inherently incompatible with democracy many have found, in contrast, that Islam has many resources to accommodate a successful democratic state. If Islam is compatible with democratic governance at a doctrinal level, why then are the majority of Muslim countries largely authoritarian? To address this question, I introduce a refinement on this discrepancy by focusing on the coexistence of emerging Islamic institutions with democratic transitions in 49 Muslim-majority states. Traditionally, Islam has been operationalized as a "dichotomous" variable based on demographics or an "attitudinal" measure based on survey responses. Both measures have failed to account for an inherent variation of Islam's role across the Muslim world. I developed a new index to assess the variation in Islam factor across Muslim countries: <italic>Islamic Institutionalization Index</italic> (III). This new index avoids the shortcomings of the current approaches to quantifying "Islam" and captures the range of variation in Islamic Institutions across 49 countries by allowing scholars to gauge the density and level of Islam in each country. With the index I designed, I rely on three different levels of analysis to examine under which circumstances Islam and democracy can coexist. More precisely, by looking into three categories of Islamic institutions (educational, political, and financial), I raise the following question: "To what extent and in what levels do Islamic Institutions support the coexistence between Islam and Democracy?"Analyzing 49 Muslim-majority states, I utilize mixed methodology by using <italic>Configurational Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis</italic> (FS/QCA) and focused case study analysis. FS-QCA offers an innovative and robust approach to identify configurationally complex factors while discerning the emerging patterns displayed by medium size (N=49) cases. To further explain the complex interplay of conditions, I focus on two case studies in greater detail: Kazakhstan and Turkey. I find a strong empirical association between the density and scope of Islamic political, educational and financial institutions and the existence of democratic norms (civil and political liberties and democratic institutions). Findings further suggest that Islamic institutions can coexist with civil and political liberties when governments allow Islamic institutionalization to function in society with no stern political restrictions. Among the three categories of III, Islamic states with higher levels of <italic>Islamic political institutions</italic> manifest <italic>particularly</italic> higher levels of democracy. Conversely, states that ban the emergence of a range of Islamic institutions in politics, education, and interest-free banking exhibit low levels of freedom and stunted democratic institutions.

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This thesis explores the intersection of politics, religious ideology, and gender norms in the context of the Turkish labor market. I aim to shed light on the increasing interplay of these forces under AKP governance and, by extension, provide a rationale for Turkish women’s consistently low labor force participation. Further, I intend to expose that, despite introducing several legal reforms geared towards promoting gender equality, the party continues to frame the traditional family unit as the main pillar of social stability, thereby forcing women into a domestic box from which they have not been able to escape. I hypothesize that several of the AKP’s reforms, which involve various domains of Turkish society—the social security system, the institution of marriage, the family unit (specifically public childcare), and, more indirectly, the education system—have deterred Turkish women from entering and/or remaining in the labor force, as they are predicated on the party’s idealization of domesticity. Ultimately, I grapple with the ways in which the AKP’s policies and ideology have led to Turkish women’s low labor force participation rate—reported by the International Labour Organization (ILO) to be 32.37 percent in March 2017.[1] [1] “Labor Force Participation Rate, Female (% of Female Population Ages 15+) (Modeled ILO Estimate): Turkey,” The World Bank, November 2017, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.TLF.CACT.FE.ZS?locations=TR.

Por meio de dois artigos, um de revisão bibliográfica e outro de pesquisa empírica, este trabalho busca examinar os impactos para o Egito, e as repercussões para o Oriente Médio, da ascensão da Irmandade Muçulmana ao poder após a deposição de Hosni Mubarak, ditador egípcio durante três décadas. O caso do Egito é o objeto da pesquisa pois exemplifica de forma cristalina como as aberturas democráticas nos países árabe-muçulmanos representam um enorme desafio para essas sociedades. A atuação da Irmandade Muçulmana em um ambiente de liberdade era aguardada por observadores dentro e fora do Oriente Médio pois, como principal movimento adepto do chamado islã político, seu sucesso ou fracasso poderiam indicar a possibilidade de êxito na construção das democracias locais, uma vez que parece inevitável o islamismo, como sinônimo de islã político, ser o primordial beneficiário da ruína dos regimes despóticos que grassam na região. Como base para esta análise, o primeiro artigo busca, por meio de uma revisão bibliográfica da história e da ideologia da Irmandade Muçulmana, desde sua fundação, em 1928, as explicações para o comportamento do grupo após a queda de Mubarak. O segundo artigo, por sua vez, estuda a conduta da política externa do Egito e reconstrói a forma como a ditadura de Mubarak desempenhava suas relações exteriores, comparando esta com a política externa do Egito durante o governo de Mohamed Morsi, irmão muçulmano eleito presidente do país em junho de 2012. Por fim, o segundo artigo busca entender os impactos provocados pelo período de governo da Irmandade Muçulmana na política externa do Egito na fase seguinte, após a deposição de Morsi (julho de 2013), em que o país passou a ser liderado pelo marechal Abdel Fattah al-Sissi, cujas ações na seara internacional são manifestamente tomadas em oposição não apenas à Irmandade Muçulmana, mas a qualquer elemento que possa ser identificado com o islã político. / Through two articles, a literature review and an empirical analysis, this paper seeks to examine the impacts to Egypt, and the implications for the Middle East, of the rise to power of the Muslim Brotherhood after the overthrow of Hosni Mubarak, Egyptian dictator for three decades. The case of Egypt is the object of research because it exemplifies in a crystalline way how the democratic openings in the Arab-Muslim countries represent a huge challenge for these societies. The performance of the Muslim Brotherhood in a freer environment was expected by observers inside and outside the Middle East because, as the main supporter of the movement called political Islam, its success or failure could indicate the possibility of success in the construction of local democracies, since it seems inevitable that Islamism, as synonymous with political Islam, be the primary beneficiary of the ruin of the despotic regimes that are rife in the region. As a basis for this analysis, the first article seeks, through a literature review of the history and ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, since its founding in 1928, the explanations for the behavior of the group after the fall of Mubarak. The second article, in turn, studies the conduct of foreign policy of Egypt and reconstructs how the dictatorship of Mubarak played its foreign relations, comparing this with the foreign policy of Egypt during the reign of Mohamed Morsi, muslim brother elected president of the country in June 2012. Finally, the second article seeks to understand the impacts caused by the period of government of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt\'s foreign policy in the next stage, after the deposition of Morsi (July 2013), in which the country was led by Marshal Abdel Fattah al-Sissi, whose actions in the international arena are clearly taken in opposition not only to the Muslim Brotherhood, but the elements which can be identified with political Islam.

This study delves into the post-Arab Spring period when political Islam was at the forefront of the drive for democratisation in the MENA region. The theories of political Islam and liberal democracy are used as the theoretical framework for the study. A qualitative approach was undertaken with a focused textual analysis of a variety of academic papers and opinion pieces on the theory of political Islam in order to discuss the compatibility of political Islam and democracy. The study makes use of Tunisia and the Ennahdha Movement as a case study to assess the practical application of political Islam. The research is limited to the 2011-2015 period in Tunisia in order to specifically make use of the electoral periods to determine the political Islam credentials of the Ennahdha Movement. What the study has determined is that there is sufficient evidence of the symbiotic relationship between political Islam and liberal democracy, making political Islam a viable approach for political movements in Muslim majority countries. This study contributes to the literature on political Islam as well as analysis of the post-Arab Spring developments in Tunisia. It provides a more in-depth focus on what makes Ennahdha a political Islam movement and uncovers its liberal democratic character. / Political Sciences / M.A. (International Politics)

The study deals with roots of (a) rise of political tensions and (b) roots of rise of political Islam (from Muslim Brotherhood and Turkish AKP up to militant Islamic organizations) in the Middle East in the second half of the 20th century. So it deals with conflict between corrupt and highly unpopular political and economical elite and its challengers recruiting from Islamic movements. The basic roots of this conflict and rise of political Islam are seen in highly uneven modernization process: (1) very rapid social and demographic change (urbanization, media expansion, demographic transition, and educational system expansion), (2) slow going and unstable economic development and (3) unchanging political subsystem. This uneven and deformed Middle Eastern modernization pattern is in detail documented by empirical macro-indicators. It is systematically compared with the modernization process in other post-colonial world macro-regions as well as with early European modernization which was accompanied by sharp social conflict, however dominated by rival secular ideologies. The Middle Eastern highly uneven pattern of modernization is under way in the context of discredited secular ideologies and in the context of Islamic religion with its political relevant imaginary, concepts and symbolism as well as...

This thesis is preoccupied with the development of Iraqi political Shi'a after the fall of Ṣaddām Ḥusayn. Its main area of interest is the comparison of three Shi'i political movements - Dac wa Party, the Supreme Council for the Islamic revolution in Iraq and the movement of Muqtadā aṣ-Ṣadr on the background of broader historical development of Shi'i community in Iraq. Although this thesis is written in English, it uses both English and Arabic sources and literature with occasional excursions into French and Persian sources. The thesis deals with the ideological transformation of the parties, formation of alliances, utilization of militias for political goals and the relations with the USA and Iran. The conclusion of the thesis is that the Iraqi Shi'i political scene is deeply fragmented, strongly influenced by Iran and its parties are often vehicles for personal political ambitions of its leaders which effectively prevents any unification of Shi'i political position and creation of strong central Iraqi government.