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More now than ever, the status of war refugees and the standard of how certain global actors are obligated to treat them is of the utmost importance. Often, within a conventional sense of justice it is difficult to determine blame for the suffering of refugees because multiple actors play significant roles in the events leading up to displacement. This paper is an analysis of five prominent arguments regarding justice in migration for war refugees. I also present my own formulation of a principle that dictates how we should treat refugees. In conceiving this principle, I concentrated specifically on people displaced from Iraq and Syria. This focus came directly in response to the recent Executive Order 13769, titled “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States.” I examine the philosophical conceptions of moral repair, moral blame, and humanitarian obligation within the context of the executive order and the sociological factors and implications in its institution.

This thesis studies the relationship between the particular interests of individuals and the common good, as it is conceived by various moral and political philosophers in earlymodern England (c.1640-c.1740). Interests are spoken of in English translations of Italian and French texts in the early seventeenth century, and are often used to describe goods or desires that are morally ambiguous. The vocabulary becomes commonly used in political tracts during the English Civil Wars, and this is where the thesis begins. We then move on to an analysis of the place of interests in Hobbes’s changing civil science. Hobbes continues to see interests as being morally ambiguous and dangerous to the common good. The third chapter deals with the republican tradition (epitomized by James Harrington), in which thinkers begin to conceive how interests might be manipulated to serve the common good. Chapter 4 deals with the men of latitude of the Restoration, who first conceive that interests are in fact identical with our moral virtues. We thereby come to see that the important questions regarding interests in the restoration revolved around religion and morality, rather than (as is commonly assumed) around trade. The fifth chapter deals with the commonwealth theorists, who became increasingly concerned that Charles II’s court, and subsequently the court whigs, were beginning to constitute an interest separate from that of the people. We then come to a discussion of Bernard Mandeville, who is generally thought to be a critic of the commonwealthmen, but (in his use of the vocabulary of interests) actually bears quite a close intellectual resemblance to them. The thesis ends with an account of a number of reactions to Mandeville, chief among them, Joseph Butler, who argues that not only are our interests identical with virtue, but they also naturally serve the common good.

“An American Philosophy of Punishment: Moral Permissibility, the Inferiorities of Punishment, and a Case for Pure Restitution” is an examination of the paradigm of criminal punishment currently implemented in the United States and the inherent flaws of ‘punishment’ as a system of justice. The characteristics of punishment are evaluated from a perspective, “punishment by necessity,” which attempts to justify criminal punishment for a lack of viable alternatives. David Boonin, in his book, The Problem of Punishment, offers a robust alternative paradigm of criminal justice- ‘pure restitution’. Boonin advances two arguments: (1) ‘pure restitution’ is capable of replacing punishment as a paradigm of criminal justice and (2) restitution should replace punishment because punishment is morally impermissible. This paper considers two of the most notorious objections to Barnett’s pure restitution, the “irreparable harms” and “third party victims” objections, as well as the moral status of punishment. The “irreparable harms” objection claims that the inability of restitution to entirely repair victims in crimes against the person indicates that restitution cannot offer any remedy, and that this inability is unacceptable. This objection fails to recognize the possibility for partial reparations, nor that punishment is equally incapable of wholly repairing the victims of these crimes. The “third party victims” objection claims that by compelling the offender to make restitution to the victim, the state is harming individuals in proximity to the offender, but the state is prohibited from harming individuals. This objection fails to consider the critical distinction of intent and culpability; the state does not intend to harm third parties by exacting restitution, but does so as a foreseeable consequence, whereas the offender caused an intentional harm, and thus carries a higher degree of blameworthiness. Additionally, the present implementation of restitution is considered by considering the relevant legal precedent, the Constitutional situation of restitution, and a hypothetical implementation scenario, which highlights the potential for “crime insurance/ tax”, and the other practical implications of implementing restitution.

Philosophers usually seek for and justify moral and political orders by two methodologies. Rationalism claims that social organization of human beings should fit with human nature, and believes that a predefined conception of human nature, defined in terms of human capacities for the exercise of reason, can be established as the independent criterion for choosing and justifying the proper moral and political order. Institutionalism, on the other hand, believes that human nature is at least significantly shaped by the actual construction of moral and political orders by human beings, and by internalizing the social institutions in which they live, they create themselves. In this essay, I argue that rationalism is not a good methodology because it does not reflect the correct relationship between human beings and their institutional life. I will develop a philosophical theory of institutionalism, and argue that an institutionalist justification of the ideal of liberal democracy will encourage a political development towards liberalization and democratization. I will also argue that Rawls‘s justification of liberal democracy is such an institutionalist justification, and although it might seem to suggest otherwise, it not only speaks to citizens of western democracies, but also speaks to all moral persons from all other societies. The political development towards liberalization and democratization is a normative demand for any human society, if such a society strives to be a well-ordered society with long term legitimacy and stability. The exact degree of liberalization and democratization for any particular society will depend on the available means of communication and organization, but the normative demand for such a political development is present in every human society. Institutionalism represents human freedom in human beings‘ creation and justification of social institutions, which are man-made rules and norms aimed at guaranteeing social order among interacting human agents. As a ―liberalism of freedom,‖ institutionalism is therefore committed to a highest ideal of human institution building: institutions of a society should be justified to, and be obeyed by, all the members of this society, so that such a society is a political autonomy. In these terms, Rawls‘s justification of liberal democracy, although dependent on a public political culture of modern western democracies, is nevertheless not limited to this context. As an instantiation of institutionalism, Rawls‘s theory has a dimension of universalism. Ultimately, Rawls‘s justification of liberal democracy encourages every other human society on this earth to develop towards the ideal of liberal democracy.

Rhetoric as a discipline is still touched by the shadow of ancient Greece. Rhetoric was defined famously by Aristotle as the "available means of persuasion," codified into five canons in classical Rome, and has since been a central part of Western education to train speakers and writers to effectively move their audiences. However, particularly beginning in the mid-20th Century, the discipline's understanding of rhetoric as a means of persuasion (or even manipulation) passed down from our ancient roots began to shift to a sense of rhetoric as matters of ethics and a concern for the other. It begs the question: As a discipline, how did we get to a point where ethical concerns have increasingly entered the rhetorical conversation? With a theoretical focus, this study traces and examines how rhetoric's relation to ethics has transformed over the past 60 years from our discipline's Aristotelian/Platonic/Socratic inheritance to the introduction of multiple new perspectives and voices. In suggesting that the goal of rhetoric is more than persuasion--a major focus of the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition dominant in the field of rhetoric and composition in the early 20th Century--this study traces a "turn" within our discipline from "confrontational" rhetoric to "invitational" rhetoric. It suggests that invitational rhetoric challenges a strict definition of rhetoric as persuasion seeks instead to understand rather than convert, support camaraderie and mutuality (if not unity) instead of reinforcing dominant power relationships, challenge the speaker as much as the audience, and privilege listening and invitation over persuasion when appropriate. Rhetorical ethics is defined as the ethical decisions made in the everyday interactions that constantly invite us to make rhetorical choices that inevitably have consequences in the world. The study examines kairos/sophistic rhetoric, identification, and responsibility to establish a potential framework for rhetorical ethics, as well as listening and acknowledgement as methods for enacting this model. The ambition is a rhetoric of ethics that attends to everyday situations; accommodates different, often "silenced," voices; and offers the possibility of an ethical encounter with others. The study offers several possible conclusions about the nature of rhetorical ethics. Significant areas of continued study include issues of voice, agency, and marginalization--even invitational rhetoric does not guarantee that quieter or disadvantaged voices will be heard. In all, an(other) rhetoric is both a ripe topic for continued disciplinary attention, as well as a necessary component of everyday interactions with others that long to display love over hate, listening over silencing, inclusion over exclusion, and acceptance over rejection.

This thesis explores Hegel's reading of Kant's critical philosophy and demonstrates the way in which the philosophies of Kant and Hegel have been traditionally misread. The thesis focuses in particular on Kant's political thought and aims to show how any political philosophy founded on essentially Kantian presuppositions, presents a dangerous dead end unless and until it is speculatively re-read in the way that Hegel re-reads Kant's politics in the Philosophy of Right. In the first two chapters, the nature of Hegel's re-thinking of Kant's critiques of theoretical and practical reason in the Science of Logic is expounded, and the nature of the logic of critique and the logic of speculation is established. In Chapters Three and Four, the self-defeating pattern of Kant's political philosophy, unrecognised by contemporary commentators on Kant, is shown to be speculatively read and re-presented in Hegel's Phllosophy of Right, something that goes unappreciated in Marx's critique of Hegel. In the final chapter, the impossibility of a successful political philosophy written in terms of critique, and the related impossibility of a Hegelian political philosophy read in terms of critique, is made clear through an examination of the work of Weber, Rawls, Arendt, Habermas and Benhablb. In the Conclusion, the need for a new, speculative political philosophy is argued for. A political philosophy premised on a thinking through of the self-defeat of critical thought, and a recognition of the identity of the rational and the actual in ethical life.

This paper considers Cicero’s dialogues concerning Epicurean and Stoic philosophy in De Finibus. In it, I consider Cicero’s portrayal both of the deep appeal of the promise of perfect wisdom and invulnerability to chance offered by both philosophical schools as well as the confusions that necessarily lie at the heart of philosophies that seek these ends. / text