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The idea that each of us owns our physical selves is one that has largely failed to achieve prominence in contemporary political theory, despite its sound philosophical basis, largely due to its association with a strong formulation of right-wing libertarianism best expressed in the work of Robert Nozick. In this thesis I argue that the idea as expressed in Nozick's most infamous work, Anarchy, State and Utopia, is not taken to its full conclusion and that there is in fact a way of unpacking self-ownership, necessary under proper consideration of its underlying premises, that would imply far less of a connection with right-libertarianism. Fundamentally, Nozick considered self-ownership as a base value in itself, informing all of his subsequent political and ethical values. Through analysis of various important contemporary attempts to improve on and undermine self-ownership, points made respectively by libertarians who wish to modify it and non-libertarians who wish to do away with it, I argue that self-ownership must in fact be a structure which is itself derivative of a more basic and fundamental value. Conceding the argument held in common by all of the major theorists proposing modifications to self-ownership, that self-ownership is a self-defeating theory when we consider the operability and usefulness of the rights it bestows upon those who have no original resources to trade, I seek to enquire exactly what it is about rights-holders that self-ownership rights were designed to protect and promote, using evidence gleaned from the work of Nozick. I conclude from this that the basic value of agency must underlie the Nozickian supposition of self-ownership. Making agency the primary value subsequently means that self-ownership needs a further derivative principle, something approximating a redistributive system which enables all agents to have self-ownership rights which are of comparably equal usefulness to them.

This thesis is an attempt to reveal John F. Kennedy, the politician, as a political theorist. Kennedy's philosophy was the underlying current for all his political action, and in the test of time and history, the measurement of his success is more likely to be weighted in favor of his political theory than in favor of his political accomplishments.

Thesis advisor: Jean Luc Solère / In my dissertation, I aim (1) to render, from Spinoza’s philosophical system, a critique of the State form or, more broadly, of political coercion and (2) to supply, on the basis of the same, a positive account of the alternative. It is, in essence, my goal to derive anarchism out of the sources of Spinozism. My claim is that, in Spinoza’s work, there obtains a tension between force and freedom as models for political organization. While other interpreters have tended to synthesize these opposing tendencies in one manner or another, I endeavor to highlight their incompatibility and to show that, for Spinoza, they produce two distinct forms of political life. One, the passive foundation of political union, which grounds the State. Two, the active foundation of political union, which grounds the rational community. Having identified this theoretical breach, I proceed to examine the affective structure of each foundation as conceived by Spinoza. I find an inescapable contradiction in the first, which — contrary to the best intentions of the founders of State — tends not only to maintain citizens in a condition of perpetual minority, but progressively erodes their capacity for autonomy, thus inviting a parallel and equally progressive enhancement of coercive intervention. This result implies the moral necessity of revolution, the spinozian contours of which I examine in detail. In the second, which I consider in both affective and ontological terms, I discover the opposite movement. That is, a progressive escalation of reason together with its affective modalities that enhances the human capacity for political and social harmony, rendering political coercion obsolete.

Cosmopolitanism has become highly influential in political theory, philosophy, sociology and other disciplines over the past several decades. In political theory, cosmopolitans have given strong emphasis to universal moral principles and relatively strong duties which cross national boundaries. Thus, many cosmopolitan prescriptions would require some significant changes in attitude and actions from the status quo. Because of this, one of the persistent challenges to the practical application of cosmopolitan principles has been in identifying ways to motivate support for them. This thesis develops a possible answer to the problem of cosmopolitan motivation, in the form of a rooted cosmopolitanism which gives emphasis to the roles that ‘cosmopolitan ambassadors’ could play. The Ambassadorial Cosmopolitan approach presented here emphasizes ways in which support for domestic policy consistent with cosmopolitanism could be generated through (a) highlighting and reinforcing the cosmopolitan strains within existing national traditions and (b) by demonstrating how the ideas of revered national figures connect in significant ways with cosmopolitan principles. The theory is applied in the context of policy action to combat harmful climate change. The exemplar state is India, and the exemplar ambassador is Mahatma Gandhi. The thesis establishes important connections between cosmopolitan theory and Gandhi’s highly influential thought on social change and ethical life practices. It shows how such connections could be used in the Indian context. The final chapter indicates some other contexts where Ambassadorial Cosmopolitanism could also be applied.

This dissertation demonstrates that Leo Strauss, in The City and Man, continues his response to Carl Schmitt�s arguments concerning the affirmation of the political, as outlined by Strauss in his 1932 article on Schmitt�s The Concept of the Political. In affirming the political, Strauss spoke of the 'theologico-political problem', or the question regarding who, or what, should rule society. Strauss outlines six criteria in his 1932 'Comments', which he argues can be found in Schmitt�s The Concept of the Political, as essential for the recovery of the political. In raising the question of the political, both Schmitt and Strauss return to the fundamental question regarding how one should live. In so doing, Strauss rejects Schmitt�s reliance on conflicting faiths and returns to the Socratic description of the best regime (politeia), understood as the best way of life, that is devoted to contemplation, peace and justice. In his argument in The City and Man, Strauss satisfies the six criteria outlined in his 'Comments': (1) the acceptance of moral evil within human nature; (2) the problem of opposition among groups; (3) the possibility of a non-neutral, transprivate obligation; (4) the need for a content that determines the distinction between friend and enemy; (5) a content that leads to a quarrel over the question of 'what is Right?' and (6) that the political must address 'the order of human things from a pure and whole knowledge'. This thesis demonstrates that Strauss�s 1964 book, The City and Man, indirectly addresses Schmitt�s general criteria, using an interpretation of Thucydides�s, Aristotle�s and Plato�s best regime � which is linked to the pursuit of wisdom, or the philosophic life � to provide a transpolitical standard that opposes Schmitt�s insistence on 'concrete' experience, that relies on historical destiny, and faith, as the guide to political life.

This thesis reconstructs and interprets the life and writings of the relatively unknown nineteenth century philosopher John Grote (1813-1866). It places his work in the intellectual contexts of the University of Cambridge of his day and discusses his place in the development of Victorian Thought. The thesis argues that John Grote, (brother of the historian George Grote) is a most original thinker in his own right and that historically he holds a crucial place in the debates that make up Victorian thought. Cambridge University between 1830 and 1870 is seen to have nurtured a dualistic intellectual movement called the Cambridge Network which rivalled intellectually, the centres of Edinburgh and London and the movements of Positivism utilitarianism -and common sense philosophy. In developing the Cambridge philosophy of his day in response to developments elsewhere in British philosophy, John Grote (like James Frederick Ferrier in Scotland) is shown to have elaborated a nascent form of indigenous philosophical idealism in England prior to the 1870's and the emergence of oxford Idealism. The introduction argues that a modern understanding and appreciation of John Grote's philosophy is unlikely without the reconstruction of the cultural, intellectual and institutional world which he inhabited. The loss of detail about this world in the twentieth century, explains why past attempts to popularize Grote's work have failed. Conventional accounts of the history of Victorian philosophy are elaborated and attacked in the introduction, as are the methodological assumptions upon which they were written. Chapter one provides details of Grote's life and writings but gives special prominence to his novel, and in retrospect revolutionary, work on language. Chapters two and three provide a historical reconstruction of the intellectual context that attended the production of Grote's corpus. The middle chapters from four to nine reconstruct Grote's analytic philosophical work in the areas of metaphysics, epistemology, ontology, ethics, and politics, revealing Grote's commitment to epistemological and ethical idealism and the production of a 'relational theory of obligation' and a 'jural theory of politics'. My arguments are synthesised in chapter ten and the conclusions and some indications as to John Grote's influence are appended.

This dissertation demonstrates that Leo Strauss, in The City and Man, continues his response to Carl Schmitt�s arguments concerning the affirmation of the political, as outlined by Strauss in his 1932 article on Schmitt�s The Concept of the Political. In affirming the political, Strauss spoke of the 'theologico-political problem', or the question regarding who, or what, should rule society. Strauss outlines six criteria in his 1932 'Comments', which he argues can be found in Schmitt�s The Concept of the Political, as essential for the recovery of the political. In raising the question of the political, both Schmitt and Strauss return to the fundamental question regarding how one should live. In so doing, Strauss rejects Schmitt�s reliance on conflicting faiths and returns to the Socratic description of the best regime (politeia), understood as the best way of life, that is devoted to contemplation, peace and justice. In his argument in The City and Man, Strauss satisfies the six criteria outlined in his 'Comments': (1) the acceptance of moral evil within human nature; (2) the problem of opposition among groups; (3) the possibility of a non-neutral, transprivate obligation; (4) the need for a content that determines the distinction between friend and enemy; (5) a content that leads to a quarrel over the question of 'what is Right?' and (6) that the political must address 'the order of human things from a pure and whole knowledge'. This thesis demonstrates that Strauss�s 1964 book, The City and Man, indirectly addresses Schmitt�s general criteria, using an interpretation of Thucydides�s, Aristotle�s and Plato�s best regime � which is linked to the pursuit of wisdom, or the philosophic life � to provide a transpolitical standard that opposes Schmitt�s insistence on 'concrete' experience, that relies on historical destiny, and faith, as the guide to political life.

The US is currently experiencing a confusing and problematic shift in politics under Donald Trump, who continues to disrupt the status quo of American democracy. Such a reality begs us to ask the question of what politics means, and what it should mean for the future. Throughout history, many philosophers and theorists, such as Thomas Hobbes and Max Weber, have identified the meaning of politics as obedience and domination over others. However, such an interpretation is incredibly dangerous, closely aligning with the historical values of authoritarian and totalitarian governments. Political theorist Hannah Arendt provides a solution to this dilemma, exposing the much more productive explanation that politics can only be achieved through the realization of equality. Additionally, she demonstrates that the key to this political utopia lies within the personal, as her humanistic concept of ‘plurality’ sheds light on how true politics can be achieved within society. Further, through such recognition, we can illuminate the dangers that the world faces when authority figures do not possess such a quality.

Regardless of one's position on what has come to be called postmodern theory, there is no denying that this theoretical perspective is challenging the legitimacy of many of the traditional concepts of political and social theory. Foremost among these challenges is the opposition that postmodern theory pose to any attempt to provide foundational certainty on which subjectivity, our sense of who we are and our place in the world, can be established. This thesis explores this postmodern "decentering" of subjectivity and argues that is a useful insight for contemporary political theory. Using the work of Judith Butler and William Connolly, I argue that a perspective that refuses to assume any foundational premises on which essential subjectivity can be established leads to a more ethical negotiation of difference and, ultimately, to a re-invigorated democratic ethos that allows for multifarious ways of being to be politically recognized. / Master of Arts