Existing empirical literature on political business cycles focused primarily on developed economies before it began considering a basket of both developed and developing economies. This study seeks to expand the existing literature by pursuing two objectives using Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) as locations of the study. The first objective is to examine the presence (lack thereof) of political business cycles in the BRICS trading block for the period 1994 to 2014. The second objective of this study is to examine the effect that political business cycles (if present) have on the sovereign credit ratings that the BRICS countries receive from credit rating agencies. Credit rating agencies make use of a combination of political, social and economic factors to determine the ratings assigned to various countries. The credit ratings assigned to countries by these agencies play an important role to international lenders as they use these ratings to make decisions on the interest rates they charge to different sovereigns. Based on the first objective, the findings from this study show that there is weak evidence of electorally timed interventions in BRICS economies over the period of 1994 to 2014. These findings are inconsistent with the predictions of political business cycle theory which suggests that incumbent politicians take advantage of the information gap between them and voters by implementing economic changes closer to an election year in order to exude competence and to increase their chances of reelection. However, further analysis based on the second objective shows that elections in BRICS countries are not viewed negatively by credit rating agencies. Hence, unlike in other developing countries, the BRICS countries are not likely to be downgraded during or after election years. Consequent to these findings, this study supports the notion that the government’s influence on the fiscal and monetary policy variables across BRICS is not concentrated nor overly exerted around election periods and that the BRICS countries’ institutions are regarded by rating agencies as independent and up to relevant international standards.

The purpose of this diploma thesis is complex analysis of labour market in the Czech Republic since the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, with the emphasis on the critical years 2008-2012. The object of the analysis is the investigation of labour market indicators by trend analysis and standard errors, assessment of the hypothesis about volatility of labour market, determination of strong and weak labour market indicators, further the comparison with countries, which succeeded during the economic crisis, and some possible steps, which would lead to stabilization of the Czech labour market. Finally I investigate if the ruling political parties affect the economy (unemployment rate and inflation) in order to increase their chances of being re-elected by using the linear regression. In conclusion the labour market indicators are very volatile, although the Czech labour market is in good condition in comparison with other countries in the European Union. The political business cycle research shows that it does not occur in the Czech Republic, but this can be caused by the transformation period and the short time series.

Submitted by Fabio Alvim Klein (faklein@yahoo.com) on 2012-03-29T21:24:39Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Elections and Fiscal Policy at the Municipal Level in Brazil_final text.pdf: 670509 bytes, checksum: 8698b7d50dff5d0e05111b0acbeabbf7 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Gisele Isaura Hannickel (gisele.hannickel@fgv.br) on 2012-03-30T13:27:28Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 Elections and Fiscal Policy at the Municipal Level in Brazil_final text.pdf: 670509 bytes, checksum: 8698b7d50dff5d0e05111b0acbeabbf7 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-03-30T13:28:49Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Elections and Fiscal Policy at the Municipal Level in Brazil_final text.pdf: 670509 bytes, checksum: 8698b7d50dff5d0e05111b0acbeabbf7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-02-24 / This thesis adds to the political business cycles (PBC) literature by studying the relationships between elections, term limits, political parties and fiscal policies in 3,393 Brazilian municipalities between 2001 and 2008. The results show that first term mayors increase total revenues and keep reasonable levels of spending during elections, thus preserving or either increasing budget balances. They also change their budget composition from current expenditures (e.g. personnel) towards capital related ones (e.g. investments) as elections approach. In fact, only first term mayors seem to benefit from opportunistic increases in fiscal variables, especially in current and personnel expenditures. Yet, first term mayors are not necessarily less fiscally responsible than second term mayors along their term in office (non-electoral years) or during elections. In this sense, elections with first term and second term mayors seem to promote a competitive feature which appears to enhance electoral and fiscal accountability. This thesis also points at a significant association between opportunistic and partisan fiscal cycles at the local level in Brazil. During elections, rightwing parties increase the budget balance, while left-wing parties increase capital related expenditures and reduce current and personnel expenditures, but in this last case not as much as other parties. By doing so, these parties partially meet voters’ fiscal preferences. During the term (non-electoral years), however, right-wing parties present a slightly looser budget balance, while left-wing parties invest less than other parties, and these policies are not favoured by voters. Overall, this study shows that voters in Brazil recognize a sustainable fiscal management, enjoying both higher government revenues and spending, especially rewarding higher capital expenditures and investments throughout the incumbent’s term and increases in current and personnel expenditures in the electoral year. In any case, voters’ fiscal preferences are mostly independent of ideological preferences. / Esta tese contribui para a literatura sobre ciclos políticos de negócios ao estudar as relações entre eleições, limites à reeleição, partidos e política fiscal em 3.393 municípios brasileiros entre 2001 e 2008. Os resultados mostram que prefeitos de primeiro mandato aumentam receitas totais e mantém níveis razoáveis de gastos durante as eleições, preservando ou até aumentando o balanço orçamentário. Eles também alteram sua alocação orçamentária reduzindo despesas correntes (e.g. pessoal) e aumentando despesas de capital (e.g. investimentos) à medida que as eleições se aproximam. Em realidade, apenas prefeitos de primeiro mandato parecem se beneficiar de aumentos oportunistas nas variáveis fiscais, especialmente em despesas correntes e de pessoal. No entanto, prefeitos de primeiro mandato não são necessariamente menos responsáveis fiscalmente do que prefeitos de segundo mandato ao longo da gestão (anos não eleitorais) ou durante as eleições. Nesse sentido, eleições com prefeitos de primeiro e segundo mandatos parecem promover condições competitivas que potencialmente aumentam a responsabilização eleitoral e fiscal. Essa tese também aponta para uma significativa associação entre ciclos fiscais oportunistas e partidários no nível local no Brasil. Durante as eleições, partidos de direita aumentam o balanço orçamentário, enquanto partidos de esquerda aumentam despesas de capital e reduzem despesas correntes, mas nesse último caso não tanto quanto os demais partidos. Ao fazerem isso, esses partidos atendem parcialmente às preferências dos eleitores. Durante o mandato (anos não eleitorais), entretanto, partidos de direita apresentam um balanço orçamentário levemente mais baixo, enquanto partidos de esquerda investem menos do que os demais partidos, e essas políticas não são favorecidas pelos eleitores. De forma geral, esse estudo mostra que os eleitores no Brasil reconhecem uma administração fiscalmente responsável, e têm uma preferência por mais receitas e gastos públicos, especialmente premiando maiores despesas de capital e investimentos ao longo do mandato político e aumentos em receitas e despesas correntes no ano eleitoral. De qualquer modo, as preferências fiscais dos eleitores são independentes das preferências ideológicas.

為瞭解地方縣市長選舉期間，候選人所爭相開立之競選支票對於地方經濟的影響，本研究將過去僅以中央政府為研究對象的政治景氣循環理論延伸至地方層級，期能藉此彌補相關文獻僅考量政治層面的不足。而關於政治景氣循環理論自Nordhaus(1970)正式提出至今，較具爭議之實證結果分歧的部分，本研究試圖以「執政者操控經濟之能力」的差異予以解釋。 另一方面，基於地方政府彼此間的競爭性，地方層級之政治景氣循環現象對於地方經濟的影響，應有別於中央層級。本研究遂以此現象對房地產價格之影響為焦點，藉以瞭解當政治景氣循環現象可能因執政者操控能力之有無而不必然出現時，各地方之經濟狀況是否將因此而有所差異。 經由理論模型之探討，以及蒐集台灣地區民國74年至87年各縣市之相關年資料以進行實證分析之後，本研究得到下列結論： 1. 就本研究的實證資料而言，我國地方層級存在政治景氣循環現象；而執政者為達成其連任目的而於選前採取擴張政策時，將同時考量其財政自主程度，顯示執政者之操控能力對於政治景氣循環現象的發生有相當的影響。 2. 地方層級之政治景氣循環現象，將伴隨房地產價格的過度資本化，而使房地產價格有相對上較高的傾向；由台灣地區相關資料所得之實證結果亦是如此。由此，可推論此一現象對於地方經濟發展有相當影響。 3. 由於政治景氣循環現象的存在，使得都市發展程度較高、財政自主程度較高的縣市，其房地產價格偏高的現象，似乎是現今民主政治制度下一種難以避免的趨勢。 4. 地方政府贏得選舉的動機，應是中央政府制訂相關政策目標或策略時所不容忽略的，特別是那些須經由地方政府所執行者，如促進區域均衡、促進城鄉發展之策略等。 此外，基於研究結果與限制，關於如何改善在總體經濟變數、政府支出等方面因政治景氣循環現象所引發之人為波動，乃是未來值得進一步探究之課題。或是突破資料之限制，改以季資料或月資料進行實證分析，應能使研究成果更為清晰。再者，關於中央政府對於地方政府行為的影響，亦可為後續研究方向。 第一章 緒論 1 第一節 研究動機與目的 1 第二節 研究方法 4 第三節 研究範圍 5 第四節 研究限制 5 第五節 研究流程 8 第二章 文獻回顧 9 第三章 理論模型 15 第一節 政治景氣循環理論之討論 15 第二節 結合政治景氣循環理論之資本化模型 17 第四章 地方層級政治景氣循環現象探討與實證分析 22 第一節 地方政府操控經濟之誘因與工具 22 第二節 地方政府執政者操控能力之差異 30 第三節 實證分析 36 第四節 小結 49 第五章 地方層級政治景氣循環現象對房地產價格之影響實證分析 51 第一節 各縣市房地產價格概況分析 51 第二節 實證分析 62 第三章 小結 70 第六章 綜合分析與檢討 72 第一節 中央補助款角色之探討 72 第二節 地方層級之政治景氣循環現象與區域均衡發展 74 第三節 實證資料之限制 76 第七章 結論 78 第一節 結論 78 第二節 後續研究方向 80 參考文獻 82 附錄 92 表目錄 表4-1：選民的政黨偏好與改變，1983-1992 23 表4-2：第十屆至第十三屆縣市長選舉當選人名單與得票率 25 表4-3：第十二屆至第十四屆縣市議會之多數黨及該黨籍議員比例 31 表4-4：各縣市之自有財源比例 33 表4-5：各縣市自有財源比例之ANOVA分析結果 35 表4-6：實證資料來源 39 表4-7：選舉循環之虛擬變數設計 40 表4-8：平均每人歲出之選舉循環估計結果 43 表4-9：每年新闢與維護之道路面積之選舉循環估計結果 45 表4-10：地價稅收之選舉循環估計結果 47 表5-1：各縣市房地產報酬率之ANOVA分析結果 57 表5-2：變數定義與資料來源說明 65 表5-3：OLS估計結果 68 表5-4：Parks法估計之結果 69 表a-1：「平均每人歲出」迴歸分析之基本統計量 92 表a-2：「每年新闢與維護之道路面積」迴歸分析之基本統計量 93 表a-3：「地價稅收」迴歸分析之基本統計量 94 表a-4：「房地產報酬率」迴歸分析之基本統計量 95 圖目錄 圖1-1：研究流程圖 8 圖5-1：北部區域縣市之歷年平均區段地價 52 圖5-2：中部區域縣市之歷年平均區段地價 53 圖5-3：南部區域縣市之歷年平均區段地價 54 圖5-4：東部區域縣市之歷年平均區段地價 55 圖5-5：北部區域縣市歷年之房地產報酬率 58 圖5-6：中部區域縣市歷年之房地產報酬率 59 圖5-7：南部區域縣市歷年之房地產報酬率 60 圖5-8：東部區域縣市歷年之房地產報酬率 61