After 12 years of isolation, the relations between Brussels and Minsk have been thawing starting in the last year. One of the components of the policy of re-engagement is the new initiative adopted by the EU called Eastern Partnership (EaP). This thesis sought to answer following question: what were the main reasons for the change in the EU policy towards Belarus after 2008? In order to answer the research question I formulated two hypotheses. The first hypothesis argues that while the EU has acted according to the normative power expectations up until 2008, after that date a more pragmatic approach in the foreign policy has been at work. The second hypothesis explains this change by the increasing influence of Eastern European countries in realm of decision-making processes within the EU, which resulted in a reformed EU foreign policy towards Belarus.These hypotheses are tested in a qualitative case study of the launching of the Eastern Partnership initiative, seen as the most important instrument that defines the new policy of EU. I will focus on the process of decision–making in regards to the adoption of the new initiative towards the Eastern European countries, using the rational actor model and the theory of formal leadership. The results of the paper point out that the main reason for changing the EU foreign policy towards Belarus were connected to pragmatic interests in the economic and energy areas, which weakened the EU normative claims. However, EU values are still counted as political conditionality has recently re-entered the agenda. Thus, the current foreign policy is two-fold: based on rational model of acting and normative power. Moreover, the EaP is the result of the strengthened position of Eastern European countries in terms of the power hierarchy among EU members, with Poland, and the Baltic States playing an increasingly larger role.

In the last few decades the European Union (EU) and its members have emphasized the importance of human rights and the need to improve human rights conditions in Third World countries. In this research project, I attempted to find out whether the European Union and its members practice what they preach by giving precedence to countries that respect human rights through their Official Development Assistance (ODA) program. Furthermore, I tried to analyze whether European integration occurs at the foreign policy level through aid allocation. Based on the literatures on political conditionality and on the relationship between human rights and foreign aid allocation, I expected that all EU members promote principles of good governance by rewarding countries that protect the human rights of their citizens. I conducted a cross-sectional time-series selection model over all recipients of ODA for each of the twelve members for which I have data, the European Commission, and the aggregate EU disbursements from 1979 to 1998.

Tenu dans un contexte international de démocratisation et d’aspiration à la liberté de peuples africains subsahariens, la décision phare du sommet de La Baule de juin 1990 fut la résolution de la France de conditionner son APD aux efforts démocratiques des pays d’Afrique subsaharienne. Avec cette décision, Paris entend: 1. Encourager l’ouverture démocratique des Etats africains, condition sine qua non à l’instauration de la paix et à la réalisation du développement économique ; 2. Défendre et promouvoir des valeurs de la démocratie libérale qu’il estime universelles. Par contre, la flagrance de la relation démocratie-développement est relative. Le relativisme culturel pose souvent problème au principe de l’universalité des valeurs démocratiques et des droits humains. Des potentats africains invoquent d’ailleurs le relativisme culturel pour innocenter leur mauvaise foi démocratique. Il reste encore beaucoup d’efforts à réaliser pour l’implantation d’un véritable Etat de droit en Afrique subsaharienne, en dépit d’une tendance de normalisation des processus électoraux sur le continent. La stratégie de conditionnalité politique de la France poursuivant cet objectif en Afrique subsaharienne n’est pas toujours fidèle à l’esprit de La Baule dans sa mise en œuvre. La personnalisation des relations étatiques, la primauté des intérêts géostratégiques de la France, etc. prennent souvent le dessus sur l’idéal démocratique de La Baule. La France demeure très présente en Afrique subsaharienne où ses multinationales ont une très forte implantation. Les leviers de commande de l’économie sont contrôlés par la France à travers ses multinationales comme Bolloré, Orange et Areva. Cependant, au-delà de cette apparence, il est constaté une régression de l’influence française sur le continent. Ce recul est lié à des dynamiques endogènes telles que des opinions publiques nationales et d’un leadership politique apparemment conscients des enjeux géostratégiques que représente dorénavant l’Afrique subsaharienne sur la scène internationale. A cela s’ajoutent des dynamiques exogènes relatives notamment à la percée de la Chine dont l’orientation stratégique de sa politique internationale africaine porte atteinte à l’efficacité de la conditionnalité politique de la France. / Made in against the international backdrop of democratization and aspiration for the freedom of sub-Saharan African peoples, the landmark decision of the La Baule summit of June 1990 was France's commitment to conditioning its ODA to the democratic efforts of sub-Saharan African countries. Paris took this decision with a view to: 1. Encouraging the democratic opening of African States as a prerequisite for peace and economic development.2. Defending and promoting values of liberal democracy that she considers universal. On the other hand, the flagrance of the relationship between democracy and development is relative. Cultural relativism often poses a problem to the principle of the universality of democratic values and human rights. Moreover, African potentates invoke cultural relativism to exonerate their bad democratic faith. Despite a trend towards the normalization of electoral processes on the continent, a lot of work is yet to be done to establish genuine Rule of Law in sub-Saharan Africa. As regards its implementation, France’s poltitical conditionnality strategy pursuing this objective in sub-Saharan Africa is not always true to the spirit of La Baule. The personalized state relations, the primacy of the geostrategic interests of France, etc., often get the upper hand over the democratic ideal of La Baule. France remains very present in sub-Saharan Africa where its multinationals are very strongly settled. France has a hold over the control levers of the economy through its multinationals like Bolloré, Orange and Areva. However, beyond this appearance, there is a regression of French influence on the continent. This decline is linked to endogenous dynamics such as national opinions and political leadership seemingly aware of the geostrategic stakes that now represent sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, there are exogenous dynamics, particularly related to the breakthrough of China, whose strategic orientation in its African policy undermines the effectiveness of France's political conditionality

Avec le lancement du Partenariat Euro-Méditerranéen (PEM) en 1995, les relations entre l’Union européenne et les Pays tiers méditerranéens (PTM) connaissent une évolution notable. Du fait de la mise en place d’un cadre multilatéral complété par la conclusion des accords d’association, ce Partenariat représente une rupture avec les politiques méditerranéennes antérieures. Dans le contexte du cinquième élargissement de l'Union européenne du 1er mai 2004, la Politique Européenne de Voisinage (PEV) transforme le PEM en préconisant la création d’un cercle d'amis avec les voisins méditerranéens du Sud et les nouveaux voisins de l’Est. Ce métissage est le résultat de la rencontre entre deux cadres à objectifs différents et contextes géostratégiques différents : le PEM comme cadre de coopération régionale établi dans les années quatre-vingt-dix et une PEV en tant que politique de l’UE employant les méthodologies issues du processus de préadhésion. Les transformations des relations euro-méditerranéennes après la PEV ont permis l'émergence progressive d'une nouvelle forme relationnelle avec un impact contrasté sur les dimensions bilatérale et multilatérale du PEM. Cette étude définit le résultat de cette nouvelle dynamique interactive des politiques de l’UE sous le nom de cadres de voisinage euro-méditerranéens. La délimitation des cadres de voisinage euro-méditerranéens passe par l’analyse des transformations des relations après le cinquième élargissement en distinguant la dimension multilatérale de la dimension bilatérale. Si la dimension régionale euro-méditerranéenne post-élargissement n’est que partiellement affectée par la PEV, la dimension bilatérale est, quant à elle, profondément modifiée par l’instauration progressive d’un cadre relationnel à mi-chemin entre l’association et l’adhésion. / With the launch of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) in 1995, the relation between the relationship between the EU and Mediterranean countries witnessed a significant evolution. With the establishment of a multilateral framework supplemented by the conclusion of association agreements, this Partnership represents a break with past Mediterranean policies. In the context of the fifth enlargement of the European Union on May 1st, 2004, the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) transforms the PEM; advocating for the creation of a circle of friends with Mediterranean neighbors in the South and the new neighbors in the East. This mix is the result of the encounter between two frameworks with different objectives in different geo-strategic contexts: the EMP as a regional cooperation framework established in the nineties on one hand and the ENP, i.e. an EU policy using the pre-accession process methodologies on the other hand. The transformation of Euro-Mediterranean relations after the ENP allowed for the gradual emergence of a novel relational framework with a mixed impact on the bilateral and multilateral dimensions of the EMP. This study defines the result of this new interactive dynamic of the EU policies falling under the Euro-Mediterranean neighbourhood framework. The delimitation of the Euro-Mediterranean neighbourhood frameworks involves the study of the transformations in the relations following the fifth enlargement, distinguishing between multilateral and bilateral dimensions. While the Euro-Mediterranean regional dimension post-enlargement is only partially affected by the ENP, the bilateral dimension is, in turn, profoundly changed by the progressive introduction of a relational framework halfway between the association and the membership.