The intent of this study is to investigate the effects of political polarization on the categorization and cognition of neutral stimuli. Polarization in politics is increasing and affecting the general electorate. This study was a within-subjects design with two stimuli conditions (slogans and personas). Both stimuli conditions had liberal, neutral, and conservative levels. The data was recorded using the Qualtrics survey software. The results of the classification and rating were compared across political party affiliation and political activity level. Analysis showed that there was a significant difference in the classification of neutral stimuli.

21st century political science has seen a growing field of research focused around the idea of political polarization. While authors like Fiorina and Abramowitz have been debating the existence of such polarization, the literature has come to understand that perhaps the root of the issue lies in differing definitions. The never-ending quest for clarity has produced a variety of measures of polarization and, subsequently, theories on why 21st century Americans may be experiencing such polarization. Unsurprisingly, as political science questions what may be causing various trends in 21st century voter behaviors and attitudes, the Internet is often mentioned. With the Internet being a clearly powerful tool for political mobilization, whether or not it is divisive among the public could have politically consequential implications. Because of its interactive nature, it is difficult to evaluate a person's social media use. This study uses a unique survey to evaluate a respondent's general social media and internet use, as well as measures of political polarization. Using this information, along with analysis of the 2016 ANES, I am able to make associations of various levels of social media activity and political polarization. Using means comparison and multivariate regression, I am able to evaluate social media use controlling for effects of age and other confounding variables and how it relates to measures of political polarization. The survey results ultimately provide some evidence for the claim that increasing social media use is associated with higher levels of political polarization. Additionally, in an OLS regression model testing the effects of different sources of political news, increases in internet use are highly correlated with an increase in political polarization. / Master of Arts / Since the 2016 US Presidential election, there have been increasing concerns over how divided the country is getting. Part of the reason why people feel so polarized is likely being exaggerated by social media and breaking news headlines. While Americans may be closer on the issues than they care to believe, the perception of a divided country may be just as consequential. It is difficult to say to what degree our country is truly polarized, if at all. What we can be sure of is that political activists are able to be heard much louder given the platform of the internet. What motivates people to spend hours of their day scrolling through platforms like Facebook is an individual preference, but it is clear that these companies can directly profit from click-bait news headlines. In order to explore the degree to which different groups are polarized in America, I used an online survey asking respondents about their internet use and political leanings. Using this information, I am able to see what associations might exist between things such as amount of time spent on social media per day and how committed one is to their ideology. These measures themselves are widely debated in political science, so the study also aims to examine in what ways different measures of polarization may be used effectively. The results of the study do find some evidence that increased social media use is correlated with an increase in political polarization. However, other measures of political activity on the internet are seen to be highly correlated with an increase in political polarization.

Does the usage of social media make individuals more polarized? Previous studies have shown that political use of the internet does make individuals more likely to politically participate, but little academic work has looked at the dynamic of ideology and the social media usage, despite the increase of social media usage in everyday life. This study uses Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Reddit, YouTube, Snapchat, and TikTok to see if social media users are more polarized, and which ideological groups are more polarized on social media. Moderates are included to differentiate if there is a difference. This study analyzed data from the American National Election Survey (ANES) of 2020 to analyze regression models between the social media platforms, and the different groups of polarization. Evidence was found that liberal polarization was correlated with Twitter, Instagram, and Reddit usage. Counterevidence was found of conservative polarization and Reddit and Snapchat usage. When moderates are included, polarization was found in Twitter, Reddit, and YouTube usage.

Ideological partisans in the United States are increasingly “sorting” themselves along cultural lines, from the cable news stations they watch to the chain restaurants they prefer. How do partisans seem to “know” how to sort themselves along ideological lines in cultural realms that offer no obvious political cues? To investigate this question, I look to the realm of narrative television, where conservatives and liberals have certain unique favorite programs despite the programs lacking any overt political content. I employ a quantitative content analysis to demonstrate that the substance of these polarizing shows relate to the social traits of curiosity, conformity, relativism, dogmatism, tribalism, vigilance, and chastity, which have previously been demonstrated to correspond to political ideology.

Thesis advisor: Hideo Konishi / Thesis advisor: Alberto Alesina / This dissertation studies the interaction of politicians’ and voters’ incentives and its effect on redistributive and immigration policies. The first chapter ``Redistribution, Polarization, and Ideology'' focuses on the effect of income inequality and party polarization on redistributive policy, both theoretically and empirically. I demonstrate that income inequality and party polarization on social issues push redistributive policy in opposite directions. In particular, when the importance of ideology for the voters rises with their income, polarization discourages redistribution. Using data from the American National Election Study and the Census, I verify that it is indeed the case that the importance attached to ideological issues is increasing in the voters' income. Effects of ``income elastic'' ideology can account for the observed stability of redistribution policy in the U.S. The second chapter, ``Foreign Born U.S. Citizens and Immigration Policy'', studies the impact of immigration on immigration reforms, and decomposes the effects of naturalized and non-naturalized immigrants. Using Census data and roll call votes for the House on 2005 and 2006 immigration bills, we find that immigration affects Democratic and Republican parties differently. While the effect of non-naturalized immigrants can be explained by congressional district's socio-economic characteristics, naturalized immigrants exert an additional effect linked to their ability to vote in congressional elections. Higher naturalized immigrant population increases the probability that Democrats vote in favor of immigration, and decreases it for Republicans, suggesting opposite electoral incentives for the two parties, that can be interpreted in a framework of rational office-motivated incumbents seeking reelection. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2016. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics.

Using data from the American National Election Studies from 1968 to 2016, I explore the historical relationship between voter income, other demographic factors, and political polarization. I find that while having a higher income and a better education generally correlates with increased Republican political preference, though the relationship between higher income and increased Republican preference does not hold in lower income groups. Race is by far the most significant indicator of political preference, with whites and blacks on opposite ends of the political spectrum, and Hispanics as well as other races somewhere in between the two. In addition, I analyze the data from 20th century elections separately from 21st century elections and discover key differences in how each factor influences political preference.

This dissertation investigates how presidents build successful legislative coalitions and enact their agenda into law in the United States Congress. It argues that constituencies and electoral incentives cause members of Congress to respond to the president’s agenda in a systematic manner. The president’s strength in members’ constituencies interacts with members’ electoral incentives to determine whether members will vote for or against the president. The theoretical claims presented in this dissertation are supported by a combination of case studies and quantitative analysis. The empirical analysis utilizes a dataset with observations for every member of Congress from 1957 to the present. I find that constituency-level presidential strength causes systematic variance in members’ response to the president’s agenda. Vulnerable members of Congress are particularly sensitive to the president’s strength in their constituencies, while safe members of Congress are a bit less attentive to their constituencies. These findings contribute to our understanding of American politics by showing that the president’s ability to enact agenda items into law is affected by much more than mere party politics. This conclusion is especially relevant in the modern, polarized era in American politics. / text

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While numerous studies have examined the role of group identity, particularly partisan identity, in influencing individuals’ socio-political attitudes and policy preferences, the impact of relational identity — individuals’ self-concept rooted in interpersonal relationships, roles, and responsibilities — is rarely examined. This dissertation outlines the different effects of group identity and relational identity on message processing and attitude change in socio-political contexts. This dissertation first draws on the social identity approach and motivated reasoning to understand how categorizing oneself in terms of group membership contributes to group polarization. Next, building on Brewer and Gardner’s (1996) notion of a relational self and interpersonal relationship literature, this dissertation examines the influence of relational identity on attitudes toward socio-political issues. Additionally, this dissertation offers a relational identity-based strategic communication solution that could potentially mitigate polarization resulting from group identity. Three online survey experiments were conducted in three different contexts, including immigration, climate change, and the COVID-19 pandemic. These three studies primed different group identities (e.g., partisan identity and national identity) and relational identities (e.g., being a friend and being a parent) and then presented issue-specific factual information. Results suggest that individuals’ partisan identities bias a broad range of judgments and lead to polarization over politicized issues, even when presented with factual information. However, linking a controversial socio-political issue and an issue-relevant relational identity has the potential to mitigate polarization resulting from group identity such as partisanship. / Media & Communication

This is a collection of papers on three Southeast Asian countries, Cambodia, Lao PDR and Thailand. All four studies rely on household survey data for analyzing topics related to poverty and conflicts. Trust and Conflict in Southern ThailandThe insurgency in Thailand’s southern border provinces has caused thousands of casualties since 2004. This paper investigates the impact of mistrust of the government on the violent conflict. I analyze how failure to address local grievances has led to a breakdown of trust and created conditions for an insurgency. Empirical tests are carried out using a survey of individual trust in government institutions conducted at the beginning of violent conflict. It is shown that sub-districts where the population displayed lower levels of pre-conflict trust experienced higher levels of lethal violence during the conflict. Factors influencing trust in government institutions are analyzed using ordinal logistic analysis. Economic and ethno-linguistic factors are identified as the main determinants of trust towards the government. Political polarization in ThailandThe article traces recent political polarization to earlier institutional reforms opening up the political system to increased electoral competition. The increased influence of the rural majority led new political entrepreneurs to introduce welfare policies. The new polices were opposed by urban tax payers, setting off a process of policy driven polarization that drew on underlying cleavages in Thai society. Empirical tests based on voting patterns in the most recent general election using a seemingly unrelated regression model provide support for the hypothesis of policy driven political polarization. The analysis highlights the vulnerability to increased polarization after introduction of institutional reforms that alter the balance of power between different parts of the electorate. Ethnic Minority Poverty in Lao PDREthnic minorities have a significantly higher poverty incidence than the majority in Lao PDR. Based on survey data the determinants of minority poverty are analyzed, the sources of inequality decomposed, and the expected impact of polices to address minority poverty estimated. When economic factors are controlled for, ethnicity does not have any significant effect on poverty. Decomposition shows that unequal access to resources and demographic variables largely explain the majority-minority poverty gap. Rural Poverty in CambodiaCambodia has been growing rapidly over the past few years, but remains one of the poorest countries in East Asia. This paper analyzes rural poverty in Cambodia to identify the factors that explain its occurrence and persistence. The reduction of rural poverty in Cambodia requires (1) improvements in agricultural productivity and (2) the establishment of other income earning opportunities for the rural population. An econometric analysis of the Cambodian Socio-Economic Survey shows that the main causes of poverty differ between landowners and the landless, and between different regions.