Cette étude consiste à démontrer que les procédures administratives d’urgence ont entraîné une modification de la conception du rôle du juge administratif : d’une part, par rapport aux libertés fondamentales dont le juge administratif a dû déterminer et encadrer la notion ; d’autre part, par rapport à l’autorité administrative vis-à-vis de laquelle le juge administratif a retiré un pouvoir accru qui lui donne la vigueur d’un juge administrateur. Cette étude est présenté en deux parties on s’attacher, dans une première partie, à montrer comment les procédures d’urgence, mises à sa disposition par la loi du 30 juin 2000, permettent au juge administratif de faire cesser les atteintes aux libertés fondamentales. Dans une deuxième partie, on tentera de mettre en lumière l’évolution du rôle du juge administratif dans ses relations avec l’administration. Les procédures d’urgence ont conduit à l’élargissement de ses pouvoirs, ce qui a entraîné un renforcement de l’autorité du juge administratif par rapport l’administration. / This study is aims to demonstrate that the administrative procedures of urgency has led to a redefinition of the role of administrative judge: first, in relation to the fundamental libertie whose the administrative judge had a duty to determine this concept. Secondly, in relation to administrative authority vis-à-vis which the administrative judge withdrew an increased power that gives it the force of a administration judge. This study is presented in two parts: in the first part, we show how the urgency procedures provided by the law N° 2000-597 of 30 June 2000, allows the administrative judge to stop violations of fundamental liberties. In The second part we attempt to highlight the changing role of the administrative judge in its relations with the administration. The urgency procedures have led to the expansion of its powers, which led to a strengthening of the authority of the administrative judge against the administration

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:23:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Daniel Brajal Veiga.pdf: 1262151 bytes, checksum: fa521ba55f68d3e2856dcf09ded02d2a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2014-10-14 / The aim of this research is to analyze the legal institute called poder geral de cautela or, in an attempt to translate the term, the general power of injunction , which is provided in the article 798 of Brazilian Code of Civil Procedure. The reason for this research is due to the fact that, not very often, the general power of injunction is not fully understood according to all its constitutional aspects. The hypotheses analyzed refer to the use of the general power of injunction by the judges, as well as its enforcement over plausible and urgent legal interests. The method chosen to the present study consist of analysis and research of the legislation, the legal doctrine (national and international) and the Court s decisions. The conclusions obtained show that the general power of injunction does the function of a filling rule of the legal system, besides being an instrument inherent of the jurisdiction s use. Keywords: general power of injunction, writ of prevention; court action; precautionary action provisional remedy, preliminary injunction, filling rule of the legal system, jurisdiction / Este trabalho tem por objetivo a análise do instituto do chamado poder geral de cautela, previsto no artigo 798 do Código de Processo Civil. A justificativa deste estudo deve-se ao fato de que, nem sempre, o dever-poder geral de cautela é plenamente compreendido de acordo com todos os seus aspectos constitucionais. As hipóteses analisadas referem-se à utilização do dever-poder geral de cautela pelos juízes e à sua aplicação envolvendo interesses plausíveis e urgentes. O método utilizado para este estudo consistiu na análise e pesquisa da legislação, da doutrina (nacional e estrangeira) e da jurisprudência. As conclusões obtidas demonstram que o dever-poder geral de cautela desempenha a função de uma norma de fechamento do sistema, além de ser um instrumento ínsito ao exercício da jurisdição