No description available.

No description available.

The overall ambition of this thesis is to investigate the approaches taken to environmental and sustainability education in outdoor education and ecocriticism in a Swedish and in an international context, to investigate environmental meaning making and to conduce to the development of analytical methods for empirical investigations of environmental meaning making. Four objectives are formulated.   The first objective of the thesis is to analyse constitutive discursive rules and traits regarding environmental and sustainability education and environmental meaning making in outdoor education in a Swedish context and in ecocriticism. This is achieved through discourse analyses of central textbooks in outdoor education and of research and textbooks in ecocriticism. The second objective is to investigate how different situated circumstances such as, text, place, mobility, social situations and previous experiences interplay in environmental meaning making. This is achieved through analyses of classroom communication, through analysis of nature writing and through an analysis of painted landscapes. The third objective is to compare and critically discuss the constitutive discursive rules and traits within the two investigated educational practices ­– out door education and ecocriticism ­– in the light of the results from the investigations of environmental meaning making carried out. The fourth objective is to develop analytical methods based on John Dewey and Louise Rosenblatt’s theories of transaction and meaning making for conducting empirical investigations of environmental meaning making in which different interplaying situational circumstances are taken into account. The results of the thesis show that taking a transactional starting point to investigate environmental meaning making adds further understanding of the situational circumstances influencing environmental meaning making in specific situations which sheds new light to the identified approaches to environmental and sustainability education in outdoor education and ecocriticism. These results suggest that a transactional approach to environmental and sustainability education can help to clarify taken for granted assumptions regarding the nature of situational circumstances such as text, place and mobility in environmental meaning making.

This dissertation examines Richard Rorty's liberalism, especially as articulated in Contingency, irony, and solidarity, from a perspective which is sympathetic to the broad features of his pragmatism. I argue that Rorty's liberalism is, in the first instance a moral, rather than a political project and I begin this dissertation by examining in Chapter One, the basis of this moral project in his rejection of any notion of human nature in favour of a focus on the individual as a contingent, self-creating vocabulary. The moral core of Rorty's work is found in the vision of the liberal self who abhors cruelty. His politics extends outward from one variant of this type, the liberal ironist, who tries to balance her liberal commitments with a disposition to radical doubt. In his attempt to secure society for, and from, the liberal ironist, Rorty constructs a vision of society based in a strong division between public and private. In Chapter Two I argue that we should reject this move, and I argue instead for a vision of society based in conversation. In Chapter Three, I argue that this conversational understanding offers us an increased chance to attain the sort of cosmopolitan community to which Rorty aspires. In particular, I argue that we should see conversation, rather than imagination and reading, as the best means to develop and extend our sense of solidarity. One of the biggest obstacles to our increasing solidarity through conversation is the way in which power operates to sustain existing social and political arrangements by setting the conversational agenda. Rorty, unfortunately, says little about the workings of power and so, in Chapter Four, I propose the use of Iris Marion Young's thought on oppression and domination as a means to illuminate the issue of power at work, and to help us in finding ways to deal with it. In the final chapter I look to the particular role of the intellectual in the conversation. I examine Rorty's rejection of philosophy-as-epistemology in favour of what he calls pragmatism, and how this move combines with a variety of other strategies to apparently silence intellectuals. I argue that in spite of these moves, Rorty's philosophy and his own example actually extend the space from which and through which intellectuals can participate in the conversation and its transformation. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2010.

In this thesis I claim that dominant realist, interpretive and postmodern research methodologies, taken together, provide necessary but not sufficient tools for use within educational research. Understandings of material, social and linguistic worlds do not, in themselves, cater for teachers' pragmatic needs to consider (a) the social consequences of educational practices, both their own and those of the institutions within which they work, and (b) the complexity of teaching in a postmodern world. I draw on ideas from pragmatism, post-structuralism, critical pedagogy, complexity theory, reflective practice, and personal experience in order to invite the emergence (or social construction) of new phenomena: these I hope, may enable teachers and other educationalists to take a vibrant part in ongoing debates and actions concerning educational policy and practice. I argue that the assumption that educational theory can be applied in practice is flawed and needs to be replaced by theory which recognises the dynamic nature of theory-in-practice: all theory is data within practice. This is a late-career thesis written by a practitioner with an unusually broad experience of the New Zealand educational system. I argue that the purpose of theory is to guide practice, that practice must drive theory, and that theory and practice need to join together to focus on the consequences of planned actions. This is neo-pragmatism, but, as stated thus far, it is not enough for my purposes because it does not include a commitment to social justice. Praxis is a term which ties emancipatory political goals to theory-and-practice. I invite the construction of the understandings of praxitioner activities where collective praxis and individual praxis might co-emerge in the interests of social justice. I promote the expansion of fresh discourses through research into collective praxis within teaching and teacher education.

The overall aim of this thesis is to theoretically explore and empirically analyse practical embodied knowledge in educational settings. In accordance to this aim an approach of body pedagogics is used in combination with classical pragmatism, using foremost William James’ and John Dewey’s concepts of experience, meaning, inquiry and habit. In addition, these concepts are combined with an idea of reflexive body techniques. A main focus lies on investigating the learning of body techniques in dinghy sailing by studying the process and the product of teaching and learning, the role of the instructor for sailors’ learning and the interplay between teaching and learning. The thesis entails three case studies consisting of video recordings of dinghy sailing, all using a combination of theoretical explorations and practical epistemology analysis (PEA). Empirical focus lies on how sailors grow into purposeful body techniques by taking the measure of their ongoing, continuous experience while coordinating their movements with the environment. The analyses show how understandings and bodily skills are simultaneously used in the educational situations where the dinghy sailors have to handle both the environment and various instructions given by the trainer. The result is presented through a descriptive model, comprising theoretical explorations and empirical analysis, through which it is possible to emphasise both the process and the content of the learning of body techniques. The methodological contribution of the thesis thus also consists of developed tools for analysing processes of body pedagogics at a micro level.

The general view of pragmatism holds that universal moral norms cannot be justified within a pragmatic perspective. Pragmatism, thus, is associated with relativism. C.I. Lewis says that pragmatism without universal norms is a self-contradiction. I defend the view that there are two dimensions to pragmatism. I claim that Lewis' philosophy encompasses both. I argue that there are two different pragmatic justifications implicit in his philosophy; while one is associated with relativism, the other is not. I call them: "the pragmatic choice of the best" and "the pragmatic justification of the non-repudiable," respectively. What is justified by the first is a choice from alternatives; what is justified by the second is the Categorical Imperative--the imperative to be practically consistent. I argue that the imperative governing ethics is secured as one aspect of, or derivation from, the imperative of practical consistency. I argue that there are ethical alternatives but that this flexibility occurs within the discipline; I propose that pragmatic choice of the best be the determining methodology for selection of an alternative. While the first justification belongs to the dimension of pragmatism as understood by the conventional wisdom, the second belongs to the dimension I call "foundational pragmatism." / From the Introduction to Chapter 2, I present my position. From Chapter 3 to 7, I explain the structure which underlies and makes possible the two different justifications: this requires a careful, and at times helpful, approach to the way Lewis structures a complex and unified system of norms, knowledge, decisions and choices. In Chapters 8 and 9, I explain how Lewis justifies the Categorical Imperative as pragmatically a priori: I also provide a definition of practical consistency, which is lacking. In Chapters 10 through 12, I develop some ideas connecting the later Wittgenstein, Apel and Winch in order to argue for a convergence between Wittgenstein and Lewis. In the concluding chapter, I argue that Richard Rorty's claim that pragmatism and foundationalism are incompatible is incorrect--indeed, it is not upheld by his own version of pragmatism. By these arguments, I bring Lewis' pragmatism into the contemporary arena of the struggle to ground ethics.

Questions of uncertainty and value conflict are increasingly pervasive challenges confronting policy makers seeking to address the range of environmental problems generated by contemporary technological systems. Yet these questions are ultimately political and moral in nature, and require a framework of strategic environmental assessment (SEA) that is marked by informed and democratic civic governance. Reflecting this, the original, civic purposes of environmental assessment (EA) embraced science and public participation as interdependent elements in the creation of more sustaining forms of human-nature interaction. However, formal models of EA have forsaken meaningful democratic engagement to technique. Based on the instrumentalist assumption that better science automatically leads to better policy, EA has externalised the civic source of political energy that underpins its environmental expertise. Moreover, debates become polarised when science is uncritically imported into the adversarial forums of interest-based politics,so that environmental science is increasingly unable to support political action. I shall argue that the revolutionary potential of SEA to transform the policy process rests upon a recovery of its original, civic purposes. My thesis is that a deeper understanding of the relationship between scientific knowledge and political action is required if SEA is to be rigorous, and also relevant to public concerns. Philosophical pragmatism contributes epistemological resources vital to this task. By situating knowledge in the context of practice, and by recognising the dialogical, judgmental nature of rationality, the practical philosophy of pragmatism reclaims the contextually embedded nature of inquiry. When science is embedded in a wider ethical context, the meaning and purposes of environmental knowledge become central questions of policy. The procedural ethics of both liberal and Habermasian politics cannot address these questions, however, because they relegate questions of the public good to the realm of individual choice. Instead, I argue that public dialogue, guided by a praxisoriented virtue ethics, is required to recover objective environmental goods in the policy process. I also argue that Aristotlean rhetoric, with its focus on the credibility of expertise, is the mode of persuasive argument most appropriate for dialogical public forums. The public philosophy of civic environmental pragmatism is therefore presented as a richer theoretical framework for understanding the contribution of both experts and citizens in the development of environmental knowledge for policy. As a dialogical framework for SEA, civic environmental pragmatism constructively combines the critical/normative and instrumental/descriptive aspects of policy inquiry, both of which are required in the development of socially robust knowledge and politically feasible policy decisions.

Thesis (M.A.)--Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, South Hamilton, Mass., 2000. / Abstract and vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 94-97).

Diss. Stockholm : Tekniska högskolan, 2005.