In recent years there has been increasing interest in philosophical theories which downplay the importance of the idea that our words and thoughts represent aspects of the world. The best-known example of these non-representational theories is metaethical expressivism, the view that ethical language and thought is best understood not as representing or describing ethical features of the world, but as expressing our attitudes towards it. Other theories apply similar ideas to other kinds of language and thought, and global versions apply it to all kinds. Non-representationalism has undergone a major shift in the last few decades, and lack of clarity about what it now involves has led some to worry that it is either unintelligible, or else indistinguishable from its representationalist rivals. In the first part of my thesis, I offer a novel reading of the new kind of non-representationalism. I argue that this reading, for the first time, makes the view both intelligible and distinct from representationalism. However I also show that this reading collapses one of the major debates in the recent literature – the debate between global and local non-representationalists. This debate turns out to be empty: properly understood, the disputants already agree with each other. Many writers think that non-representationalism threatens metaphysics, particularly theories which purport to say what makes statements of given kinds true, and to what various kinds of terms refer. Some take this to be an advantage of the view, others a disadvantage. In the second part of my thesis I argue that this common view is deeply mistaken – nonrepresentationalism does not undermine metaphysics. I respond to a number of recent arguments, showing that neither global nor local forms of non-representationalism undermine metaphysics. I argue that non-representationalism is compatible with metaphysics, and that this is not a problem for the view.

Western democracies are characterised by a significant level of distrust and widespread feelings of disenfranchisement amongst ordinary citizens. The rise of populist political parties, figures and movements reflects the gradual development of a strong and increasingly vocal anti-establishment sentiment amongst millions of people who feel that the ideas and actions of political elites and experts are at odds with and do not represent their own lives. As sites where political elites are educated and socialised, universities (and the knowledge they produce) have a role in both causing and potentially solving this democratic deficit. There is a role for universities to alter their epistemological practices in ways that respect and give voice to the multiplicity of experiences, beliefs and issues in the world. There is also scope for universities to engage in civic education both on and off campus. This thesis reflects on an experiment that attempted to do this, applying the principles of philosophical pragmatism and the democratic vision of John Dewey in a participatory research project in east London to convene publics of citizens around pressing social issues and develop their power to effect change. This experiment highlighted the importance of having an underlying, place-based, civic infrastructure comprising relationships and sociality to do this work. There were further challenges in adequately respecting pluralism in a diverse world, and building citizen power in a context where experts are deemed to know best. The thesis ends by examining the wider lessons of this experiment. It looks at the potential of community-university partnerships to act as vehicles for democratic renewal, arguing that universities have the potential to re-cast themselves as mediating institutions to facilitate democracy in their local communities.

L'objet de cette thèse est de proposer une position originale dans le débat sur le réalisme scientifique, l'empirisme modal, et d'en démontrer la fructuosité quand il s'agit de tirer des enseignements du contenu cognitif des théories scientifiques. L'empirisme modal est une position empiriste, suivant laquelle le but de la science n'est pas de produire des théories vraies, mais des théories empiriquement adéquate. Cependant, il propose d'adopter un cadre plus large que les versions traditionnelles d'empirisme pour penser l'expérience, en incorporant un engagement envers les modalités naturelles, ou l'idée qu'il y a du possible dans la nature, et des contraintes sur les possibles. Nos théories sont empiriquement adéquates si elles délimitent correctement l'étendue des expériences possibles. Cette position s'appuie sur une conception située et pragmatique des modalités naturelles et de la confrontation empirique. Nous prétendons qu'elle est à même de rendre justice au succès empirique des sciences, sans pour autant faire face au problème du changement théorique qui mine le réalisme scientifique. Nous expliquons comment les contraintes de nécessité sur les phénomènes peuvent être connues à l'issue d'une induction, et en quoi cette façon de voir s'accorde avec la pratique scientifique. Enfin, nous affirmons qu'un engagement envers les modalités naturelles offre une richesse interprétative à même de renouveler, dans un cadre pragmatiste, plus ouvert que le réalisme, certaines questions métaphysiques tout en les ramenant à l'expérience. / The aim of this thesis dissertation is to propose a novel position in the debate on scientific realism, modal empiricism, and to show its fruitfulness when it comes to interpreting the cognitive content of scientific theories. Modal empiricism is an empiricist position, according to which the aim of science is to produce empirically adequate theories rather than true theories. However, it suggests adopting a broader comprehension of experience than traditional versions of empiricism, through a commitment to natural modalities. Following modal empiricism, there are possibilities in nature, and constraints on what is possible, and a theory is empirically adequate if it correctly delimits the range of possible experiences. The position rests on a situated and pragmatic conception of natural modalities and of empirical confrontation. We claim that it can do justice to the empirical success of science, while not falling prey to the problem of theory change that undermines scientific realism. We explain how constraints of necessity on phenomena can be known by induction, and how this modal epistemology fits with scientific practice. Finally, we claim that a commitment to natural modalities allows for a rich interpretation of the cognitive content of theories. Modal empiricism could renew some metaphysical debates within a pragmatist framework, by tying them to experience and not being constrained by realist prejudices.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-03-16T12:14:52Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Flávio Augusto Queiroz e Silva.pdf: 2433287 bytes, checksum: 5490f79c9ab1da67e63570796db0f518 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-03-16T12:14:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Flávio Augusto Queiroz e Silva.pdf: 2433287 bytes, checksum: 5490f79c9ab1da67e63570796db0f518 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-02-22 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This investigation inquires into the concept of “the growth of concrete reasonableness” in the philosophy of the pragmaticist Charles S. Peirce (1839 – 1914), addressing it as a fundamental idea in his work. As we have understood, the concept is not only important to comprehend Peirce’s philosophy, but it also structures his thought. In other words, we can understand this great, complex and vivid philosophy, as well as the classification of its branches, based on the “growth of concrete reasonableness”. Therefore, we have looked for the bedrocks of this idea in Peircean Phenomenology, Normative Sciences and Metaphysics. We will see that the idea of an incarnated reasonableness in the Universe, active and always growing, leads us directly to the heart of Peirce’s philosophy: pragmaticism, realism and the strong negation of any nominalist, individualistic and dogmatic ideals whatsoever / A pesquisa investiga o conceito de "crescimento da razoabilidade concreta" na filosofia do pragmaticista norte-americano Charles S. Peirce (1839 – 1914), tratando-o como ideia fundamental de sua obra. Entendemos ser um conceito importante para entender a filosofia do autor porque é estruturante de seu pensamento. Em outras palavras, podemos entender a grande, complexa e viva filosofia de Peirce, assim como a estruturação e classificação de seus ramos, a partir do “crescimento da razoabilidade”. Para isso, buscamos os alicerces desta ideia na Fenomenologia, nas Ciências Normativas e na Metafísica do autor. Veremos, com este percurso, que a ideia de uma razoabilidade encarnada no Universo, atuante e sempre em crescimento, permite-nos aceder diretamente ao coração da filosofia peirciana: o pragmaticismo, o realismo e a negação ferrenha de qualquer postura nominalista, individualista e dogmática

This thesis explores how rally drivers in Scotland perceive environmental issues and the environments through which they drive. The overarching aim behind this is to think about a group of people who may be more hostile towards questions of environmental responsibility, and look at how such stakeholders reason round their behaviours and perceive environmental issues. I argue that due to the potentially farreaching impacts of contemporary environmental challenges, it is crucial to take seriously the viewpoints and values of those who are perhaps not so willing to engage with environmental issues. The work draws on several bodies of literature. First is work in environmental philosophy on the practical contribution of this sub-discipline, in particular environmental pragmatism. Second is thinking in sociology and human geography on responsibility, especially the interface between responsibility and care. Third is recent material in geography on the body and movement, in particular the burgeoning field of automobility. These issues are addressed through a three-fold research design. Ethnographic and participatory techniques are used to foster an understanding of what exactly ‘the environment’ might mean to rally drivers (and indeed other users of the forest with whom rallying may come into conflict) and how it is experienced. In-depth interviews and subsequent narrative analysis seek to delve further into participants’ narratives and life histories in order to get a handle on how rally driving sits in relation to broader life contexts. Finally, two small-scale participatory projects with rally organisers relating to environmentally-responsible practice look at how this all comes together when participants make practical responses to environmental challenges. The key conclusions arising from the empirical data are that environmental problems are experienced through a range of senses, with different groups using different sensory ‘evidence’ to make claims about environmental damage; that in some cases stakeholders’ views of environmental issues are based on perceived conflict with others as opposed to actual conflict; and that the values activities such as motor sport may represent are just as significant as their physical environmental impacts. In terms of the broader applicability of this research, I suggest two things. Firstly, that one of the key challenges in responding to contemporary environmental issues lies in thinking through how publics link up their everyday practices with much bigger discourses on global environmental change. Secondly, that careful and critical reflection on the rich narratives of place and people, and on the range of emotions shaped by embodied experience, can go some way to explaining why people may persist with more environmentally damaging practices in spite of ethical and environmental criticisms.

John Dewey é um dos fundadores da corrente filosófica denominada Pragmatismo, nome inspirado na palavra grega pragma que significa, entre outros, agir, praticar, ter habilidade em negociar de maneira inteligente; como por exemplo na resolução inteligente e eficiente de problemas. Ao lado de William James e C. S. Pierce, outros pioneiros na criação de tal corrente, o filósofo se detém sobre as mais importantes questões políticas e sociais de seu tempo, especialmente sobre a origem do conhecimento, questão tradicional nas ciências filosóficas ocidentais. O Pragmatismo está ligado à corrente empírica inglesa e à crítica ao tradicional dualismo filosófico que opõe razão e experiência, espírito-matéria, mente-corpo, indivíduo-sociedade, entre outros. Para Dewey o conhecimento origina-se da interação entre indivíduos e meio, necessária à sobrevivência dos primeiros, e da profunda capacidade de adaptação e modificação do ambiente efetivada pelos seres humanos através do pensamento reflexivo, do método inteligente. O método inteligente, capacidade exclusivamente humana de se adaptar e transformar a natureza, é entendido no Pragmatismo como instrumental, como advindo da prática e da sua reflexão. A união da prática e da reflexão situa-se na experiência. Nesse trabalho nos dedicamos a compreender o significado da concepção de experiência na obra de John Dewey através da pesquisa dos seus princípios constituidores e das suas características fundamentais. Nesse processo definimos semelhanças e diferenças entre experiências estéticas, educativas, reflexivas e democráticas, concluindo que a prática do pensamento reflexivo e da democracia das interações entre indivíduos e meio, que o desenvolvimento e a prática do método inteligente e a liberdade do compartilhamento das relações entre os seres humanos e o ambiente fundamentam todas as experiências efetivamente democráticas e reflexivas. Em Dewey, uma sociedade democrática se estabelece em experiências democráticas e inteligentes e, portanto, são essas últimas alguns dos objetivos e meios pelos quais a democracia deve se realizar na escola com vistas à construção de uma sociedade democrática, já que a instituição escolar foi criada para conservar e transformar o mundo natural e social do qual participa e constitui o ser humano. / John Dewey was one of the founders of the American school of thought known as Pragmatism, word derived from the Greek (pragma), and which has, among its meanings, to act, to practice, to have the ability to negotiate intelligently, e.g. as in the instrumental and efficient problem solving process. Seen as a pioneer (together with William James and CS Pierce), the philosopher reflects on the most pressing political and social issues of his time, especially in regards to the origin of knowledge, a topic which is recurrent in the Western philosophical sciences. The Pragmatism is connected to the English empirical philosophical system and to the rejection of the classic philosophical dualism that opposes reason to experience, spirit and matter, mind and body, individual and society, among others. According to Dewey, knowledge results from the interaction of the individuals with their environment, necessary to their survival, and from the deep human capacity to adapt and to modify the environment through thought, through the intelligent method. The intelligent method, the uniquely human capacity to adapt itself and to transform nature, is understood as instrumental, arising from practice and reflection. Practice and reflection forgather in experience. Through our work, we have sought to understand the meaning of the concept of experience in John Dewey, through the research of its fundamental principles and aspects. In this process, we have identified similarities and differences in aesthetic, education, reflective and democratic experiences, concluding that the practice of reflective thinking, the practice of the democracy of the interactions of individuals with their environment, that the development and practice of the intelligent method and the human capability to share relations are the ground for effective democratic and reflective experiences. A democratic society is based on democratic and intelligent experiences, and, therefore, these are some of the objectives and means through which democracy takes place in school, an institution designed to preserve and transform the natural and social world that constitutes the human being and in which the human being participates.

This dissertation will compare the concept of nature as it appears in the philosophies of the American pragmatist John Dewey and the Chinese daoist Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) and will defend two central claims. The first of these is that Dewey and Zhuangzi share a view of nature that is non-reductive, philosophically liberal, and more comprehensive than the accounts recurrent in much of the Western tradition. This alternate conception of nature is non-reductive in the way that it avoids the physically mechanistic outlook underwriting much of contemporary Anglo-American thought. It is philosophically liberal in that it accepts a more generous and progressive position than predominant Western orthodoxies. And, it is more comprehensive in scope insofar as it draws as much from the social sciences as it does from the natural sciences. The second claim defended will be that the synoptic vision gained from such a comparison offers a new heuristic program for research into the philosophical position known as naturalism, a program that can, at once, avoid the scientistic tendencies of the current, mainstream treatment of nature and reconnect with earlier, more inclusive models. Where Dewey's and Zhuangzi's ideas converge, one finds similarities in the prescriptions each made for human action, and where they differ, one finds mutually complementary insights. Finally, this heuristic will be used to refute various interpretations of Dewey and Zhuangzi that tend to understate or ignore the importance of nature within their schemes.

This paper will focus on two elements, viz. experience and inquiry, which are central to John Deweys philosophy and their relation to the movement known as pragmatism. Although each of these concepts has received extensive treatment by other schools of thought, the pragmatists, and particularly Dewey, did much to redefine each in hopes of alleviating the tension between conflicting philosophical viewpoints. An explication of Deweys view on experience is the first step in understanding his application of the pragmatic method towards reconstructing philosophical thinking. Therefore, this paper will explore the meaning that Dewey gave to each and how that meaning is helpful to the overall pragmatist project of reuniting philosophical speculation with practical consequences.

Through the observation of conversations on Internet Relay Chat and the quantitative analysis of “chat-logs”, I investigate the characteristics of this form of communication unique to the digital realm. My research rests on a theoretical framework integrating the semiotic and pragmatism of Charles S. Peirce (as primary groundwork) with the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and the sociology of Erving Goffman, to grasp shared significations in cyberspace simultaneously as logical process and as social practice. This exploratory case study yields evidence supporting the potential fruitfulness of Peircean philosophy as the foundation for a new paradigm in empirical communication research, and successfully puts to the test a particular type of method (computational and diagrammatic) suggested to accomplish such research.

<p>Syftet med denna studie är att skapa en definition av begreppet praktisk kunskap. För att uppnå detta har en litteraturstudie genomförts, i vilken elva relevanta filosofer och deras teorier har belysts. I analysen utkristalliserades åtta olika komponenter i praktisk kunskap. Det råder konsensus dessa filosofer emellan om att denna är kopplad till handling och/eller är grundad på erfarenhet. Den praktiska kunskapen är kontextualiserad och i vissa avseenden råder det ett dialektiskt förhållande mellan teori och praktik. Reflektionen är av betydelse och kunskapen har en etisk dimension. Praktisk kunskap är personlig och sitter i kroppen.</p>