För att eleverna ska nå de kunskapsmål som Skolverket suttit upp inom matematik, behöver de utveckla och behärska flera matematiska förmågor. För att kunna lösa uppgifter utifrån de fyra grundläggande räknesätten underlättar det om elever har utvecklat utantillkunskaper för b.la. multiplikationstabellerna. Syftet med denna studie är att jämföra två olika undervisningsaktiviteter, grundade i behaviorismen respektive pragmatismen, för att se vilken som är mest framgångsrik för automatisering av multiplikationstabeller. Studien har genomförts i årskurs 3 i två parallellklasser inriktat på sjuans, åttans och nians multiplikationstabell. Varje klass fick ta del av varsin undervisningsaktivitet och det genomfördes flera skriftliga tester för att jämföra resultaten. Resultaten visade en marginell skillnad mellan de två grupperna som båda hade förbättrat sina kunskaper av multiplikationstabellerna. Slutsatsen blev därför att båda aktiviteterna var lika framgångsrika för studiens syfte.

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My dissertation brings together representatives from two otherwise antagonistic traditions: Charles Peirce of the pragmatists and Herbert Marcuse of the critical theorists. I demonstrate the affinities between the two philosophers with a focus on their contributions to socio-political thought in advanced industrial societies. After addressing the antagonisms between the two traditions I offer a reading that allows for a Peircean complement to Marcuse's One-Dimensional Man and a Marcusean complement to Peirce's critique of the “method of authority” in his seminal essay, "The Fixation of Belief." / McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts; / Philosophy / PhD; / Dissertation;

Orientador: Lauro Frederico Barbosa da Silveira / Banca: Ivo Assad Ibri / Banca: Jorge Luis Vargas Prudêncio de Barros Pires / Resumo: Propomos no presente trabalho uma abordagem pragmaticista do conceito de Significado com base nos escritos deixados por Charles Sanders Peirce em seus Collected Papers. Tal abordagem tem como fundamento analisar o conceito de Significado através de uma perspectiva triádica, onde Significado (meaning) é entendido como o hábito no qual inserimos um signo para compreendê-lo, sua Significação (signification) como o conjunto de todas as qualidades apresentadas pelo signo e o Sentido (sense) como o vetor de interpretação do signo responsável pela razoabilidade em relacionar, diante do estado de coisas, os hábitos do intérprete às qualidades do signo afim de interpretá-lo de maneira satisfatória. Para defendermos nossa proposta, abordamos, no primeiro capítulo, uma caracterização das categorias peircianas e o conceito de tríade no intuito de elucidar a arquitetura ontológica com a qual Peirce fundamenta seu pensamento. No segundo capítulo, esboçamos o conceito de signo e sua natureza triádica. Tal conceito é entendido por Peirce como o elemento mediador da ação diante do estado de coisas. No terceiro capítulo, apresentamos a formação triádica do conceito de significado que propomos nesta pesquisa, assim como a relação de sua construção com as categorias e o estímulo para a Abdução na ausência de Sentido. Por fim, no quarto capítulo, inserimos a tríade do significado em uma perspectiva exclusivamente linguística na qual relacionamos os conceitos de meaning e signification aos de deno... (Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo) / Mestre

Much of contemporary mainstream political philosophy operates under the assumption that if reasonable people deliberate about matters of basic justice in the right conditions, agreement will emerge. This assumption implies that although reasonable people will likely disagree about private matters concerning the nature of the good life, they will nonetheless agree about public matters of justice. I reject this assumption, and in this dissertation I argue that reasonable people are likely to experience deep and persistent disagreements about matters of basic justice. I concede that there are some domains of justice where broad agreement has been achieved in modern democratic societies, namely those concerning the scope and content of civil and political liberties. However, when it comes to the scope and content of economic liberties, there is little agreement to be had. This is because reasonable people can be committed to radically different premises about matters of basic justice as well as the fact that basic agreed-upon concepts can be interpreted and interconnected in significantly different ways. Even in ideal theory, then, where we restrict ourselves to idealized reasonable people, rational consensus is not a feasible goal on certain core matters of justice. From here, I turn to the realm of non-ideal deliberation about justice and explore the difficult problem of rational political ignorance. I further discuss the effects of the Internet on non-ideal political deliberation, and I look at the ways in which online deliberation can fuel normal cognitive biases and deepen political polarization. I argue that matters of economic justice are characterized by both moral pluralism and epistemic complexity, both of which tend to be downplayed within the deliberative enclaves that proliferate on the Internet. How are we to deal with these problems of political disagreement and polarization? To help answer this question, I turn to the tradition of American pragmatism, and especially the writings of William James, to suggest a re-orientation of political philosophy away from the assumption of rational consensus and toward a more humble, but more constructive, vision in which the philosopher attempts to fashion new ideals that might help overcome currently entrenched disagreements.

This thesis seeks to address two distinct sets of criticisms that have been offered at medical practice. The first criticism suggests that medicine today is too exclusive in its application of the term 'disease.' As a consequence, important biological phenomena are marginalized by physicians and scientists. The second criticism suggests that medicine has been too inclusive in its understanding of disease. As a result, many biological phenomena that were once considered 'natural' or 'normal' aspects of human life are now given a medical dimension that they previously did not have. The goal of this thesis is to understand why two seemingly contradictory criticisms have been applied to the same practice. To answer this question, I invoke Edmund Husserl's important analysis of modern science to argue that medicine suffers from a problem of 'naive objectivism.' This problem is present under the dominant paradigm of medical diagnosis, the biomedical model. Having identified the source of these two criticisms, my goal is to then develop new models of medical practice that can address these criticisms. First, I turn to John Dewey's philosophical naturalism to develop a medical model that can address the problem of exclusion in biomedicine. Then, I turn to Martin Heidegger?s existential analytic to develop a medical model that can address the problem of inclusion in biomedicine. I supplement both of these analyses with research generated in the medical humanities fields, attempting to show how the biomedical model of medicine fails to meet the goals of medical care. The end result of such analysis is the development of two new medical models that can serve to replace the biomedical model. I offer no attempt to adjudicate between these two models, instead leaving such issues to be handled by the patient and the physician throughout the course of his or her treatment.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--McMaster University, 2006. / Supervisor: Barry Allen. Includes bibliographical references (p. 259-277).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Nevada, Reno, 2008. / "May, 2008." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 202--233). Online version available on the World Wide Web.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Dept. of Political Science, March 1999. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thesis (M.A.)--California Polytechnic State University, 2008. / "Spring 2008." "In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree [of] Master of Arts in History." "Presented to the faculty of California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo." Major professor: George Cotkin, Ph.D. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 103-111). Also available online and on microfiche (2 sheets).