The dominant trend in international security over the past decade has been a move towards ‘remote control’: the increasing use of special forces, private military and security companies and remote systems at the expense of the engagement of large forces. Paul Rogers analyses how this trend has developed, and asks whether it can really provide an appropriate response to the likely threats against global security in the coming years.

There is general consensus that mercenarism is and should remain prohibited. The difficulty that has arisen is firstly one of defining the exact nature of mercenarism, and more specifically what actions constitute mercenary actions. A further difficulty arises in that much of the legislation intended to outlaw mercenarism is impacting on the legal activity of private military and security contractors, who fall short of the definitional requirements of mercenarism. The two groups being so closely linked that they are often mistakenly conflated . There is currently a need to develop a response to the private military security industry, which is better suited to effectively regulate their activities, whilst also effectively criminalising the activities of those who actions amount to mercenarism. The dissertation therefore sets about analysing how these two distinct sectors: mercenaries and private military security companies, are regulated at an international and domestic level. It then uses the lessons learnt from these regulator attempts, and the various policy considerations which countries have to make, to propose a way forward in creating an effective regulatory system for mercenaries and private military companies at an international and domestic level. / Thesis (LL.M.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2013.

The commercialisation of military services has increased in importance since the end of the Cold War. Commercial Military Service Providers (CMSPs) have found increased respectability and worked in states on every continent. Writing on CMSPs has similarly increased. Several high profile incidents have come under intense scrutiny, and has led to some portions of the literature demonising their use. However, there are still conceptual and theoretical issues which have been under explored. This thesis contributes to the literature which has sought to address this theoretical lacuna. Historical Sociology and comparative analysis are employed to analyse the implications of CMSP use on the state. A modified version of the Ideological, Economic, Military and Political (IEMP) model developed by Michael Mann, is used to theorise the impact of commercial security providers on existing sources of power within the state, and the relationship between them. The thesis uses two case studies which are representative of the use of CMSPs during this time period. The Sierra Leone Civil War and the invasion and reconstruction of Iraq since 2003. It will be argued that CMSPs alter the balance between power structures within the state, positively and negatively affecting the power of the state. The short term use of CMSPs has proven to be useful and of increasing importance; especially when military weakness is an urgent problem. However, although there has been no example of CMSPs intentionally threatening state stability, they can also subvert the power of the state. CMSPs, particularly when used for an extended period, have undermined the relationship between the sources of power, undermining political stability. Most significantly they weakened the state by undermining the strength it gains from its embeddedness in society.

Since the early 1990s the use of private military companies (PMCs) has proliferated. Especially the United States are increasingly turning to private contractors to perform military tasks. Privatization advocates claim that PMCs work cheaper than the military. In addition to that, PMCs give the cover of plausible deniability that regular troops lack. But the fact that legislative control or public debate are missing raises the question of accountability and underlines the need for legal means to control and regulate PMCs and their operations.

The rise of the Private Military Industry has been cemented in modern global political reality, but where next will this multi-billion dollar industry go and what form will it take after the market boom of Iraq? Post-Colonial Africa is considered the birthplace of the modern mercenary and historically features prominently as a testament to the potential for immoral privately sponsored military activities within unstable states. Moreover, it is a rich market that the Private Military Industry is increasingly turning its attention to, albeit focussing on support functions for now, but a massive industry with a competitive and poorly regulated market environment will invariably begin to explore different avenues as competition grows. With market diversification grows the ethical risk of abuse. At the same time, peacekeeping efforts across the continent are hampered by numerous factors, not least of all a chronic lack of trained personnel. Could the legal and political legitimacy, not to mention the sustainable market environment sought by the PMI potentially exist in multilaterally sanctioned, privatised peacekeeping and peace support operations in Africa? Can the ethical challenges of mercenarism be suspended or even bypassed for the sake of expedient intervention in potential genocides, or be perhaps pragmatically accepted as an inevitable development that should be embraced rather than condemned, for strategic security reasons? Can the ethical condemnation of the proposed means of peace support be overridden by the potential ends generated by such a move? Is the world ready for privatised peacekeepers? This dissertation explores the ethical background to the privatisation of military operations and how these foreign policy trends and social perceptions of control of force impact on the notion of privatised peacekeeping, particularly in the context of operations in Africa. It investigates the philosophical implications of privatised peacekeeping by way of a constrained pragmatic form of consequentialist evaluation that warns against reckless expediency. Ultimately, this dissertation offers a more philosophically suitable argument to justify and control this seemingly inevitable next step in the trend of privatisation of force. / Thesis (M.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2008.

This master thesis analyses impact of private military companies on the monopoly on legitimate violence. It examines the influence of private military companies on this monopoly in case of the United States and Iraq during the war in Iraq. The united States are in a position of a sending state that has had a long tradition of using these companies. On the other hand Iraq can be seen as a weak state and one could presume that the use of private military companies has a negative impact on its monopoly on violence. Just to validate the negative or positive impact of these companies a state and size of the militaries as main means of violence, and a capability to enforce law on a state's territory is analyzed.

Thesis (MA (Political Science. International Studies))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / Bibliography / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) are fast becoming a permanent structure in international security. PMSCs are made up of two groups, namely Private Military Companies (PMCs) and Private Security Companies (PSCs). Antagonism towards their existence and involvement in African civil wars is the result of some damaging effects of PMSCs- more specifically PMCs- including misconceptions. Both PMCs and PSCs are compared to mercenaries and definitional issues plague the private security industry. Private Military and Security Companies however are legal entities, different to mercenaries. This is why PMCs are sometimes referred to as "corporate warriors". As private companies PMCs often fill the security gaps left by international responses to African civil wars. Their contracts with legitimate governments offer a cheap and effective end to the violence of civil war. In recent years the use of PMSCs has increased among both weak and strong states. Antipathy however remains the prominent attitude in the international community, thus challenging the use of PMSCs. From this point of view, they are a ¡°scourge¡± because PMCs are not only likened to mercenaries of old who fight for private gain, but the arguments are also that they undermine the sovereignty of weak states, that they are unaccountable to the citizens of these states, that they violate human rights, that they don't solve root causes and that they contribute to militarization. The increase of civil conflicts in Africa and the surplus of military professionals after the Second World War meant that mercenaries became involved in African liberation struggles. By the end of the Cold War however- in an era that favours liberal economic practices and privatisation- professional legal Private Military and Security Companies were established to supplement the security gap left at the end of the Cold War. As mentioned, these are legal companies that don.t breach international conventions; are accountable to some home state legislation's and brought peace to Angola and Sierra Leone. International responses to security concerns- especially those in Africa- are burdened by the plethora of complex civil conflicts that simultaneously demand attention from the United Nations. PMCs may be equipped to execute Chapter VII mandates of the UN Charter, as these deal with robust enforcement functions at a time when the West is reluctant to intervene. What is perhaps required is more accountability (also to host state legislation) and oversight. The services of PMCs are beneficial to a number of stakeholders. These include the states in which they are registered, the states in which they operate, the citizenry that they protect, and they are profitable to the shareholders of the PMCs and diamond and oil companies they are contracted to. It is thus the conclusion of this thesis that Private Military Companies provide a faster and more cost- effective option for peacemaking in Africa. As private companies they are not bound by protocols and conventions but they must satisfy the company and its shareholders. And although the use of Private Military Companies is not dependent on the regulation of the industry, the PMSC industry would benefit from more self- regulation in the market place. Thus with relevant and more effective regulation, PMCs could become Africa's solution to her civil conflicts. Unlike in the Ballesteros report, the UN has to recognise this role. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Private Militere- en Sekuriteitsmaatskappye (PMSMe) is vinnig besig om 'n permanente struktuur in privaatsekuriteit te word. Skadelike uitwerkings van hierdie PMSMe, wanpersepsies ingesluit, is 'n gevolg van die antagonisme teenoor die maatskappye en hul betrokkenheid in burgeroorloë. PMSMe word met huursoldate vergelyk en gevolglik word die privaatsekuriteitsindustrie met kwessies rondom definiering gekwel. PMSMe, anders as huursoldate, is egter wettige entiteite. Om hierdie rede word PMSMe dikwels as "korporatiewe krygsmanne" (corporate warriors) beskryf. PMSMe, as private maatksappye, vul dikwels die sekuriteitsgapings wat deur die internasionale reaksies tot burgeroorloë in Afrika gelaat is. Hul kontrakte met legitieme regerings bied 'n goedkoop en effektiewe middel om die geweld van burgeroorloë te beëindig. Die gebruik van PMSMe het, gedurende die afgelope jare, in beide swak- en sterk state toegeneem. Antipatie dien steeds as in vername afkeur in die internasionale gemeenskap. Dit daag dus die gebruik van PMSMe uit. Hulle word steeds met huursoldate in die internasionale gemeenskap verwar. Terselfdertyd word geargumenteer dat PMSMe die soewereiniteit van swak regerings ondermyn, dat hulle nie verantwoordbaar aan die burgers van hierdie state is nie, dat hulle inbreuk maak op menseregte, dat hulle nie die kernoorsake van konflik oplos nie, en dat hulle tot militarisering bydra. Die toename in burgerlike konflikte in Afrika, tesame met die oorskot militêre vakkundiges na die Tweede Wereldoorlog, het gemaak dat huursoldate in Afrika se vryheidstryde betrokke geraak het. Teen die einde van die Koue Oorlog - gedurende 'n tydperk waar liberale ekonomiese praktyke en privatisering voorrang geniet het - was professionele wettige PMSMe byderhand om die sekuriteitsgaping aan te vul. Hierdie is dus wettige maatskappye wat nie internasionale konvensies skend nie, wat verantwoordbaar is aan sekere tuisstaatwetgewing, en wat vrede in Angola en Sierra Leone meegebring het. Internasionale reaksies tot sekuriteitskwessies - veral die sigbaar in Afrika - word deur 'n oormaat van komplekse burgerlike konflikte, wat gelyktydig aandag van die Verenigde Nasies (VN) verg, belas. Hiervolgens is dit moontlik dat PMSMe wel toegerus mag wees om Hoofstuk II-mandate van die VN Handves uit te voer. Die rede hiervoor is dat die PMSMe wel toegerus is om robuuste toepassings funksies te verrig. Dit het veral vorendag gekom gedurende 'n tydperk toe die Weste huiwerig was om by sekuriteitskwessies in te meng. Hoer vlakke van verantwoordbaarheid en oorsig word moontlik meer vereis. Die dienste van PMSMe is voordelig vir vele belanghebbendes. Hierdie sluit die state in waar hul gekontrakteer het, die state waarin hulle optree, die burgers wat hulle beskerm, die winsgewendherd vir aandeelhouers van die PMSMe en die diamant- en oliemaatskappye deur wie hul gekontrakteer mag wees om installasies te beskerm. Die gevolgtrekking van hierdie tesis is dus dat PMSMe 'n vinniger en meer koste-effektiewe opsie vir vredemaking in Afrika bied. Al is die gebruik van PMSMe nie afhanklik van die regulering van die industrie nie, sal die PMSMe-industrie by 'n verhoging in self-regulering in daardie sektore baat vind. Met relevante en meer effektiewe markregulering, kan PMSMe dus as 'n oplossing in Afrika se burgerlike konflik dien. Anders as in die Ballesteros verslag, sal die VN dit moet erken.

Peut-on confier au secteur privé des activités relevant du coeur del’Etat, autrement dit « régaliennes » ? Le ministère de la défense,ainsi que ceux de la justice et de l’intérieur, pratiquent déjàl’externalisation de certaines fonctions auparavant dévolues à desfonctionnaires ou des militaires. Or, la défense nationale est un« service public constitutionnel », et de ce fait ne peut être déléguée àune personne privée. Toutefois, le Conseil Constitutionnel a autoriséd’en concéder, par contrat, des fonctions « détachables ». Cecontexte implique de déterminer le périmètre externalisable, end’autres termes le « coeur de métier régalien », qui n’est définidans aucun texte législatif ou réglementaire. En dehors de certainscas particuliers jugés, la décision reste à l’appréciation du ministre,dans le cadre de l’objectif recherché : économies budgétaires,meilleure efficacité de l’outil. Ce processus d’externalisationprocède d’une vision nouvelle de l’action de l’Etat, qui conserve lacapacité de décision dans ses domaines régaliens mais peut enconfier la mise en oeuvre à des opérateurs privés, procédant d’unevision libérale de l’action de l’Etat.Après avoir étudié les fondements de la politique d’externalisation(Partie I), en abordant en premier lieu le besoin et le contexte(Titre I), puis la détermination du périmètre externalisable (TitreII) et ses possibilités d’extension (Titre III), nous aborderons lapréparation et la conduite de l’externalisation (Partie II), quiconcerne avant tout la préparation matérielle de l’externalisation(Titre I), puis la conduite du projet d’externalisation (Titre II), enabordant le volet social de la démarche (Titre III). / How can private sector manage activitiesusually recognized as part of the State’s heart, in other words3“kingly”? The Ministry of defense, as well as the Ministries forJustice and of Interior, already outsources several functions,previously dedicated to Civil servants or militaries. Nevertheless,national defense is a constitutional public service, which shouldnot be delegated to any private person. However, theConstitutional Supreme Court admitted to delegate, by contract,“detachable” functions. Thus, the “outsourcable” perimeter, the“kingly core business” should be determined, as no legaldocument defines it. Except some already judged specific cases,the minister is liable to decide alone, thanks to his objectives:budget sparing, better efficiency. The outsourcing process showsout a new vision of State’s action, which keeps decision capacitybut may delegate action to private operators, in a liberal point ofview of the State’s public activities.After having studied the outsourcing policy’s foundation (part I),we’ll first examine the requirement and the context (title I), thenthe outsourcable perimeter’s determination (title II) and itsextension possibilities (title III), we’ll then take care ofoutsourcing’s preparation and conduct (part II), which firstconcerns physical preparation (title I), then outsourcing project’sconduct (title II), approaching the process’ social part (title III).

La participation de personnes privées à des opérations militaires n’est pas récente et s’est longtemps illustrée par le phénomène des mercenaires, mais elle a pris beaucoup d’ampleur depuis les années 1990 et le recours à des sociétés militaires privées. Ces sociétés se voient confier des tâches qui ne sont pas directement liées au cœur de métier des armées étatiques, mais certaines d’entre elles peuvent concerner des prestations armées. Le recours à des personnes privées dans le cadre d’opérations militaires soulève de nombreuses difficultés juridiques. Il est en effet essentiel de déterminer le droit qui est applicable à ces personnes, qu’elles soient qualifiées de mercenaires ou qu’il s’agisse d’employés de sociétés militaires privées. La définition de leur statut est quant à elle fondamentale afin d’examiner la possibilité de retenir leur responsabilité en cas de nécessité. La question de la responsabilité des sociétés militaires privées elles-mêmes est également posée, tout comme celle, primordiale, de la responsabilité des États qui emploient de telles sociétés. / Private persons whether individuals or legal entities have always taken part in military operations and the best and most famous example was the one of mercenaries. But, since the 1990’s, this participation has been renewed by the increasing activity of the private military companies. These companies have contracts for various tasks and some of them are directly linked to armed missions. The participation of private entities in military operations raises a lot of legal questions. It is necessary to as certain the law which will apply to them, whether they are mercenaries or employees of private military companies. The definition of their status is also crucial in order to determine the liability for their acts. Several fundamental questions arise not only as far the liability of these companies is concerned but also, and perhaps even more, as far as the liability of States employing these companies is concerned.

Sedan kalla krigets slut har en ny typ av aktör dykt upp i internationella konflikter och krig världen över. Denna aktör är privata företag som i dagsläget erbjuder allt från supplementär logistik till att helt ersätta nationella arméer. Utgångspunkten i denna uppsats är att ta reda på vilka faktorer som har skapat en marknad för dessa företag generellt, samt vilka av dessa faktorer som kan förklara framväxten i Sverige specifikt. I uppsatsen undersöks befintlig forskning kring vad som drivit utvecklingen. Därefter kommer befintlig teori att prövas som förklaringsmodell för expansionen i Sverige. Den befintliga teorin som prövats på Sverige består av sju faktorer beskrivandes politiska och samhälleliga förutsättningar vilka förklarar expansionen. Av dessa återfinns samtliga i Sverige, men genom en analys av deras respektive giltighet i svensk kontext uppstår en mer nyanserad bild, där endast fyra av faktorerna är relevanta som förklaringar. Dessa är en transformation av försvarets fokus och organisation, en politisk trend av privatisering samt ett överflöd av militärt utbildad personal utan sysselsättning. Av dessa är den förstnämnda den starkaste katalysatorn medan den sistnämnda endast i viss mån påverkar den redan pågående expansionen. / Since the end of the Cold War a new phenomenon has shown in international conflict and war, worldwide. This phenomenon is the private companies nowadays offering supplementary logistics, armed troops to the front and everything in between. This essay aims to identify which factors that have contributed to the creating of a market for these companies in general, and which of these that can explain the growth of Swedish companies in particular. In the essay previous research on the topic of privatization of security are examined and thereafter applied onSwedenin order to examine to what extent it can be used to explain the changes inSweden. The existent theory applied onSwedenconsists of seven factors, describing political and social basis, which explain the expansion. All of these are found in Sweden, however, through a further analysis of their individual relevance, a more nuanced result can be seen, whereas only four out of seven are relevant as explanations. These are a transformation in defence focus and organization, a political trend of privatization and a flood of trained unemployed military personnel. The first one of these is the strongest catalyst for expansion while the latter only to a certain degree reinforces the already ongoing process.