Este estudo volta-se a averiguar a possibilidade de aplicação dos princípios constitucionais e gerais do processo ao controle abstrato de constitucionalidade (aqui abrangidas tanto as ações direta de inconstitucionalidade, como a declaratória de constitucionalidade e, ainda, a arguição de descumprimento de preceito fundamental), bem como a verificar em que medida a especialidade do processo objetivo de controle de constitucionalidade permite, ou não, a aplicação dos princípios gerais do processo e, ainda, a expor que, algumas vezes, as particularidades do processo do controle abstrato resultam na conformação de princípios próprios, diversos daqueles que informam os processos de índole subjetiva. Após uma introdução que busca trazer a lume as origens históricas do controle de constitucionalidade, apresentando o surgimento dos dois modelos de controle repressivo existentes (quais sejam, o norteamericano e o austríaco), bem como a conformação histórica e atual do sistema brasileiro, passa-se à análise dos princípios processuais à luz dos princípios constitucionais fixados na Constituição Federal de 1988. A abordagem é feita mediante o estudo de cada um dos princípios processuais aplicáveis, quais sejam: os princípios da especialidade; do juiz natural e da reserva de plenário; da ação ou demanda; da congruência; da especificação das normas; da causa de pedir aberta; da subsidiariedade; da livre investigação das provas; da indisponibilidade; do contraditório; da publicidade; da motivação e fundamentação das decisões; da irrecorribilidade; e da irrescindibilidade. O estudo é realizado mediante a análise tanto dos posicionamentos da doutrina como das decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal que exploram mais diretamente o tema da aplicação dos princípios processuais em questão. Ao final, conclui-se que as normas processuais de índole constitucional têm, ao menos em princípio, aplicação no processo de controle de constitucionalidade, bem como que, em decorrência da natureza jurisdicional do processo de controle abstrato, a aplicação de determinados princípios gerais do processo traria inegáveis benefícios, maior segurança e clareza ao processo do controle de constitucionalidade. / This study aims at checking the possibility of applying the constitutional and general principles of judicial proceedings to the abstract constitutionality control (i.e., judicial reviews covering direct unconstitutionality actions, as well as declaratory proceedings of constitutionality, and fundamental precept violation actions), as well as to check to what extent the specialty of the objective control of constitutionality actions permit, or do not permit, the application of general principles of the judicial proceedings and still, to expose that, sometimes, the peculiarities of the abstract control result in conformation of peculiar principles, different from those that inform legal actions of subjective character. After an introduction that aims at enlightening the historical origins of constitutionality control (judicial review), presenting the creation of two existing repressive control models (i.e., North-American and Austrian models), as well as the historical and present configuration of the Brazilian system, an analysis of the procedural principles is made facing the constitutional principles established in the Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988. The approach is made by studying each one of the applicable procedural principles, such as: specialty principle, natural judge principle and full bench principle; as well as principles of legal actions or claims; congruence; specification or norms; open cause of action; subsidiary rights; free investigation of evidence or proof; inalienability; contradictory; publicity; motivation and recital of decisions, refuse to appeal; and irrevocability. This study is carried out by analysing both the doctrines opinion as well as the decisions of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court that exploit more directly the theme of procedural principles application being studied. Finally, it is concluded that the procedural norms of constitutional character at least have as a principle their application in the constitutionality control action, as well as that as a result of the jurisdictional nature of the concentrated control action, the application of certain general principles of the proceedings would bring undeniable benefits, greater safety and clearness to the constitutional control actions.

Este estudo volta-se a averiguar a possibilidade de aplicação dos princípios constitucionais e gerais do processo ao controle abstrato de constitucionalidade (aqui abrangidas tanto as ações direta de inconstitucionalidade, como a declaratória de constitucionalidade e, ainda, a arguição de descumprimento de preceito fundamental), bem como a verificar em que medida a especialidade do processo objetivo de controle de constitucionalidade permite, ou não, a aplicação dos princípios gerais do processo e, ainda, a expor que, algumas vezes, as particularidades do processo do controle abstrato resultam na conformação de princípios próprios, diversos daqueles que informam os processos de índole subjetiva. Após uma introdução que busca trazer a lume as origens históricas do controle de constitucionalidade, apresentando o surgimento dos dois modelos de controle repressivo existentes (quais sejam, o norteamericano e o austríaco), bem como a conformação histórica e atual do sistema brasileiro, passa-se à análise dos princípios processuais à luz dos princípios constitucionais fixados na Constituição Federal de 1988. A abordagem é feita mediante o estudo de cada um dos princípios processuais aplicáveis, quais sejam: os princípios da especialidade; do juiz natural e da reserva de plenário; da ação ou demanda; da congruência; da especificação das normas; da causa de pedir aberta; da subsidiariedade; da livre investigação das provas; da indisponibilidade; do contraditório; da publicidade; da motivação e fundamentação das decisões; da irrecorribilidade; e da irrescindibilidade. O estudo é realizado mediante a análise tanto dos posicionamentos da doutrina como das decisões do Supremo Tribunal Federal que exploram mais diretamente o tema da aplicação dos princípios processuais em questão. Ao final, conclui-se que as normas processuais de índole constitucional têm, ao menos em princípio, aplicação no processo de controle de constitucionalidade, bem como que, em decorrência da natureza jurisdicional do processo de controle abstrato, a aplicação de determinados princípios gerais do processo traria inegáveis benefícios, maior segurança e clareza ao processo do controle de constitucionalidade. / This study aims at checking the possibility of applying the constitutional and general principles of judicial proceedings to the abstract constitutionality control (i.e., judicial reviews covering direct unconstitutionality actions, as well as declaratory proceedings of constitutionality, and fundamental precept violation actions), as well as to check to what extent the specialty of the objective control of constitutionality actions permit, or do not permit, the application of general principles of the judicial proceedings and still, to expose that, sometimes, the peculiarities of the abstract control result in conformation of peculiar principles, different from those that inform legal actions of subjective character. After an introduction that aims at enlightening the historical origins of constitutionality control (judicial review), presenting the creation of two existing repressive control models (i.e., North-American and Austrian models), as well as the historical and present configuration of the Brazilian system, an analysis of the procedural principles is made facing the constitutional principles established in the Brazilian Federal Constitution of 1988. The approach is made by studying each one of the applicable procedural principles, such as: specialty principle, natural judge principle and full bench principle; as well as principles of legal actions or claims; congruence; specification or norms; open cause of action; subsidiary rights; free investigation of evidence or proof; inalienability; contradictory; publicity; motivation and recital of decisions, refuse to appeal; and irrevocability. This study is carried out by analysing both the doctrines opinion as well as the decisions of the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court that exploit more directly the theme of procedural principles application being studied. Finally, it is concluded that the procedural norms of constitutional character at least have as a principle their application in the constitutionality control action, as well as that as a result of the jurisdictional nature of the concentrated control action, the application of certain general principles of the proceedings would bring undeniable benefits, greater safety and clearness to the constitutional control actions.

<p>Učenje o načelima postupka je jedno od karakteristika germanske procesualistike, pod čijim uticajem postaje i neodvojivi deo domaće doktrine. U teoriji se veoma rano se za oblast prikupljanja procesnog materijala formiraju dva antipodna načela &ndash; raspravno i istražno. Prvo podrazumeva da su samo stranke ovla&scaron;ćene da unose procesni materijal, odnosno da su samo one odgovorne za to. Drugo stavlja u dužnost sudu pribavljanje procesnog materijala i prebacuje odgovornost sa stranaka na njega.</p><p>Od promena u srpskom parničnom postupku koje su usledile 2004. g. tvrdi se da je raspravno načelo afirmisano, a dono&scaron;enjem Zakona o parničnom postupku iz 2011. g. i da je promenjen koncept parničenja u smislu uloge suda. On je sada pasivan, i gotovo neodgovoran na planu prikupljanja procesnog materijala. Predmet istraživanja u disertaciji je postojanje raspravnog načela u sada&scaron;njem srpskom parničnom postupku.</p><p>Rezultati istraživanja pokazuju da se ne može govoriti o raspravnom načelu kao važećem u srpskom parničnom postupku. Takav zaključak je, pre svega, uslovljen teoretskim određenjem pojma raspravnog načela i njegovog odnosa prema sudijskoj dužnosti pitanja. Raspravno načelo zaista podrazumeva da samo stranke unose procesni materijal u postupak i da u tom pogledu imaju slobodu, odnosno odgovornost. U tom smislu njegova nužna posledica su tri instituta: teret tvrdnje, priznanje tvrdnji koje vezuje sud i subjektivni teret dokazivanja. Međutim, ukoliko uz ova tri instituta postoji i sudijska dužnost pitanja, onda se odgovornost delom prebacuje i na sud, &scaron;to dovodi do postojanja sasvim drugog načela &ndash; ublaženog raspravnog načela.</p><p>Na osnovu rečenog, promene koje su se desile napu&scaron;tanjem načela materijalne istine, i to pre svega ukidanjem ovla&scaron;ćenja suda da izvodi dokaze po službenoj dužnosti, nisu dovele do uspostave raspravnog načela. Sud i dalje ima dužnost da postavljanjem pitanja ukazuje strankama na deficite procesnog materijala; presuda na osnovu tereta tvrdnje, kao i presuđenje uprkos nepredlaganju dokaza može da usledi samo ako sud prethodno ispuni svoju dužnost. Sud je i u srpskom postupku saodgovorni subjekat postupka, i to ne proizilazi samo iz redakcije ZPP, već je takav smisao u skladu sa vrednovanjima slobode i odgovornosti stranaka, sa ciljem postupka, i na kraju sa osnovnim ljudskim procesnim pravima zagarantovanim Ustavom.</p><p>Određenje da raspravno načelo nije važeće, već da je to ublaženo raspravno, utiče na shvatanje niza instituta koji se tiču procesa formiranja činjeničnog stanja,<br />a spram toga se i svi drugi instituti koji se tiču procesa formiranja činjeničnog stanja moraju prosuđivati.</p><p>Veoma važan deo istraživanja, koji je i prethodio zauzimanju stavova, je uporednopravno istraživanje fokusirano na germanski pravni krug &ndash; Nemačku i Austriju. S obzirom da su srpsko procesno pravo i dogmatika gotovo pod isključivim germanskim uticajem, bilo je potrebno da se temeljno istraži pitanje raspravnog načela u ovim sistemima. Rezultati ovog dela su pokazali da je ideja o raspravnom načelu koje podrazumeva pasivan i neodgovoran sud davno prevladana; upravo obratno, moderan germanski model postupka podrazumeva saodgovornost suda i stranaka.</p> / <p>The doctrine of civil litigation principles is one of the key characteristics of the Germanic procedural theory. Under its influence the doctrine of the principles grew into the essential part of the Serbian theory as well. The theory has rather early developed two conflicting principles with regard to responsibility for collecting the facts and and evidence &ndash; the principle of party control of facts and means of proof (Verhandlungsmaxime) and principle of investigation by the court (Untersuchungsmaxime). First one entails that the parties only can provide facts and means of proof in litigation; court can not render its judgment upon facts or proof which are not introduced by the parties. Second one implies a duty of the court to ascertain and clarify the facts; by the same token, court has responsibility to do so.<br />It is the common opinion that principle of party control over facts and means of proof is effectuated in Serbian civil litigation since legislative changes in 2004. Moreover, after the introduction of the new Civil Procedure Act in 2011it is widely accepted that the paradigm of litigation is radically changed so the court is now rather passive and almost without any responsibility for gathering facts and means of proof. The subject matter of this doctoral thesis is the existence of principle of party control of facts and means of proof in current Serbian civil litigation.<br />The results of analysis show that the principle of party control of facts and means of proof does not exists in Serbian civil litigation. This conclusion is first of all determined by dogmatic examination of the principle&rsquo;s notion. Indeed it signifies that only parties produce facts and means of proof, and in that sense that they have disposition and, accordingly, responsibility for that. By the same token, its necessary consequence are three institutes: burden of facts, binding effect of non disputed facts and burden of production of proof. However, if these three institutes exist with the court&rsquo;s parallel duty to provide hints and feedback, then the responsibility is shifted partly to the court, which results in existence of a new principle &ndash; principle of soften party control of facts and means of proof.<br />Regarding to what is said earlier, the changes which resulted in abandoning the principle of seeking of material truth, basically abrogating the court&rsquo;s obligation to take the proofs ex offo, did not lead to the creation of principle of party control of facts and means of proof. The court still has a duty to give hints and feebacks, i. e. to suggest to the parties that they clarify or supplement their pleadings; dismissing the claim or striking defense as insufficient due to the lack of factual pleadings or production of means of proof can take place only if the court previously fulfills its duty. The court is also in Serbian civil litigation jointly responsible procedural subject. That conclusion is not warranted only by interpretation of wording of the Civil Procedure Code&rsquo;s provision, but rather and predominantly by evaluation of party autonomy and responsibility in Serbian civil procedure, purpose of a civil procedure, and last but not least, by basic procedural constitutional rights.<br />The conclusion that the principle of party control of facts and means of proof does not exist and that its place is taken by the principle of softened party control has fundamental consequences on set of institutes which refer to the process of determination of facts. In that sense all these institutes are analyzed by the virtue of existing principle of Serbian civil procedure.<br />Particularly important part of the thesis, which indeed precedes the main part, is a comparative study of the Germanic legal systems &ndash; Germany and Austria. Regarding the fact that Serbian procedural law and doctrine was and still is under almost entirely Germanic influence, it was necessary to conduct a thorough analysis of these systems. Results show that the idea of principle of party control of facts and means of proof, i. e. idea of passive and unliable court is abendoned. Directly opposite, modern Germanic procedural model is distinguished by joint responsibility of court and parties.</p>

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-26T20:23:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Carlos Augusto Marcondes de Oliveira Monteiro.pdf: 1850422 bytes, checksum: 0aa420a4caf4e09cb3c47d14b2cab9e3 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-10-29 / This works derives from the certainty that judicial reviews are the main cause for the delays in lawsuits, specially at the Labor Courts, in which the plaintiff or the defendant are sometimes forced to waive their rights due to such lawsuits delays. It shall discuss alternatives, in the Extraodinary Review Procedure to adjust it to the constitutional procedural principles, since in practical terms one can verify 3 judicials instances, while we maintain that the Superior Labor Court should be restricted to its role as an extraordinary instance. This is not possible when one can not distinguish the effects of an Ordinary Review from that of the Extraordinary Review. The Extraordinary Review is subject to the competence of the panels of the Superior Labor Court and applicable to review the rulings of the Regional Labor Courts on Ondinary Reviews of individual claims whenever the requirements of CLT's article 896 are present. The limitation of the applicability of the Extraordinary Review is not enough to grant TST the status of a true Extraordinary Review Court. The scope of this work is to establish the exact function of the Superior Labor Court and its efectiveness, based upon the constitutional procedural principles, specially the due process of the law and the reasonable procedural length, which comprises the effectiveness and fast-track of the procedure by analysing the effects of both Ordinary and Extraordinary Reviews / Este trabalho tem origem na crença de que os recursos são os principais responsáveis pela morosidade dos processos, mormente na justiça do trabalho, onde a parte se vê obrigada, muitas vezes, a abrir mão de seus direitos em razão da demora judicial na solução do processo. Discutiremos alternativas, no âmbito do recurso de revista, a fim de adequá-lo aos princípios constitucionais do processo, pois o que se verifica na prática é a existência de três instâncias judiciais, enquanto que defendemos que o TST deve se limitar à sua natureza de instância extraordinária. E isso não é possível quando os efeitos dos recursos de natureza extraordinária não se distinguem dos efeitos dos recursos de natureza ordinária. O recurso de revista é cabível para turmas do TST, contra as decisões proferidas em grau de recurso ordinário, em dissídio individual, pelos Tribunais Regionais do Trabalho, quando presentes as hipóteses do artigo 896 da CLT. A limitação ao cabimento do Recurso de Revista é insuficiente para transformar o TST em verdadeiro órgão de natureza extraordinária. O propósito deste trabalho é estabelecer a exata função do Tribunal Superior do Trabalho e sua eficácia, com base nos princípios constitucionais do processo, em especial o devido processo legal e o princípio da duração razoável, que engloba a efetividade e a celeridade processual, analisando os efeitos dos recursos de natureza ordinária e extraordinária

O presente trabalho examina a amplitude do fenômeno do Processo Judicial Eletrônico e as perspectivas de resposta à sociedade com relação à razoável duração do processo e sua celeridade pela utilização dos meios eletrônicos. Com este objetivo, analisa as possibilidades de acesso à justiça e os desafios do desenvolvimento de um novo método que permita aperfeiçoar a participação dos sujeitos processuais para que os escopos jurisdicionais sejam plenamente atingidos. Neste sentido, observa as reconfigurações que as opções políticas realizadas a partir do início deste século engendram, tanto nos princípios processuais em face às garantias constitucionais, quanto na jurisdição e suas interdependências com outros aspectos do direito processual civil. Subsidiariamente, contextualiza o desenvolvimento da atuação estatal no ciberespaço, as estratégias formuladas e a inserção do Poder Judiciário nesta seara. Ao concluir, verificar-se-á que o Processo Judicial Eletrônico é um método em construção que, já dentro do caráter atual de forma autorizada pela Lei nº 11.419/06, quando complementada pela legislação e regulamentação correlata, possibilita maior transparência e participação, tendente a prover efetividade à prestação jurisdicional na sociedade pós-moderna. / This paper investigates the extent of the digital process phenomenon and the perspectives of its impact on the society concerning the examination of the case in a reasonable period of time and its celerity upon the employment of electronic means. In view of this, this study aims to analyze the possibilities of access to justice and the challenges imposed by the development of a new method which enables the improvement in the participation of all related parties in the judicial proceedings so as to fully accomplish the scope of the jurisdictional function. As follows, it examines the reconfiguration engendered by the political options which have been taking place since the beginning of this century both in the procedural principles in light of constitutional guarantees and in the jurisdiction and on its correlation with other aspects of civil procedure. Alternatively, this dissertation contextualizes the progression of the governmental interaction on the cyberspace, the conceived strategies and the insertion of the Judiciary in this field. In conclusion, it will be possible to establish that the digital process is still under development, but even under its current status, as authorized by Law 11,419/06 and complemented by other corresponding regulations, is nonetheless able to ensure more transparency and a higher level of participation, tending to provide effectiveness to the jurisdictional function in the postmodern society.

O presente trabalho examina a amplitude do fenômeno do Processo Judicial Eletrônico e as perspectivas de resposta à sociedade com relação à razoável duração do processo e sua celeridade pela utilização dos meios eletrônicos. Com este objetivo, analisa as possibilidades de acesso à justiça e os desafios do desenvolvimento de um novo método que permita aperfeiçoar a participação dos sujeitos processuais para que os escopos jurisdicionais sejam plenamente atingidos. Neste sentido, observa as reconfigurações que as opções políticas realizadas a partir do início deste século engendram, tanto nos princípios processuais em face às garantias constitucionais, quanto na jurisdição e suas interdependências com outros aspectos do direito processual civil. Subsidiariamente, contextualiza o desenvolvimento da atuação estatal no ciberespaço, as estratégias formuladas e a inserção do Poder Judiciário nesta seara. Ao concluir, verificar-se-á que o Processo Judicial Eletrônico é um método em construção que, já dentro do caráter atual de forma autorizada pela Lei nº 11.419/06, quando complementada pela legislação e regulamentação correlata, possibilita maior transparência e participação, tendente a prover efetividade à prestação jurisdicional na sociedade pós-moderna. / This paper investigates the extent of the digital process phenomenon and the perspectives of its impact on the society concerning the examination of the case in a reasonable period of time and its celerity upon the employment of electronic means. In view of this, this study aims to analyze the possibilities of access to justice and the challenges imposed by the development of a new method which enables the improvement in the participation of all related parties in the judicial proceedings so as to fully accomplish the scope of the jurisdictional function. As follows, it examines the reconfiguration engendered by the political options which have been taking place since the beginning of this century both in the procedural principles in light of constitutional guarantees and in the jurisdiction and on its correlation with other aspects of civil procedure. Alternatively, this dissertation contextualizes the progression of the governmental interaction on the cyberspace, the conceived strategies and the insertion of the Judiciary in this field. In conclusion, it will be possible to establish that the digital process is still under development, but even under its current status, as authorized by Law 11,419/06 and complemented by other corresponding regulations, is nonetheless able to ensure more transparency and a higher level of participation, tending to provide effectiveness to the jurisdictional function in the postmodern society.

Les juges non professionnels ne se résument pas à un concept dont l’unité est relative, ils forment également une catégorie de fait. Ils sont des tiers non-magistrats, rattachés directement ou indirectement à une juridiction, dotés d’une mission juridictionnelle non professionnelle parce qu’inhabituelle et dépourvue d’un objectif de rémunération. Cette définition préalablement posée ne permet cependant pas de postuler l’existence d’une catégorie juridique. La catégorisation suppose en effet de rechercher la commune nature des objets d’étude. La réussite de l’entreprise dépend par conséquent de la découverte d’une unité certaine entre les juges non professionnels et d’une opposition marquée vis-à-vis des juges de carrière. C’est précisément le propre d’une théorie générale du procès dédiée aux juges non professionnels que de répondre à ces questions. Quelles sont les particularités institutionnelles et procédurales des juges non professionnels ? Suffisent-elles pour conclure à l’existence d’une catégorie juridique ? Les juges non professionnels ne s’inscrivent-ils pas dans la lignée des juges professionnels formant ainsi une simple variante au sein d’une catégorie juridique plus large, celle des juges ? La recherche est scindée en deux temps, ordonnée autour d’une distinction fondamentale. Le premier volet d’ordre institutionnel est l’occasion d’étudier les rapports entre le droit au procès et les juges non professionnels, le second volet d’ordre procédural permet d’analyser les relations des juges non professionnels avec le droit du procès / Lay judges cannot be reduced to a single concept as the unity of this concept is relative. The definition of lay judges gather different features. They are non-magistrates third party directly or indirectly attached to a court with a jurisdictional function. Their task is unusual and they lack of compensation goals. This definition previously stated does not yet allow to postulate a legal category. The categorisation itself would imply the search of common grounds between the objects of study. The success of the project depends on the findings of unity between the lay judges themselves and on significant difference compared to the professional judges. The main function of a general theory of the trial dedicated to lay judges is to answer these following questions. What are the institutional and procedural features of lay judges? Are they sufficient to conclude that there is a legal category? Would the lay judges fit in the line of professional judges forming a simple variant in a broader legal category? The research will be divided into two stages, both organised around a fundamental distinction. The first part, of institutional order, will be an opportunity to study the relationship between the right to trial and the lay judges. The second part, of procedural order, will analyse the relationship of lay judges with a right for trial