This diploma thesis focuses on the topic of the principles applied during proceedings regarding offences, mainly the principle of non bis in idem, which this thesis focuses on. The non bis in idem principle means that a matter cannot be judged twice, because it is generally accepted that two punishments for the same crime are unfair. This principle is applied in proceedings on criminal charges and because the concept of criminal charges is autonomous according to the European Court for Human rights, i.e. it has specific objective content, I chiefly discussed interpretation of this concept. According to the European Court for Human Rights, in order for the issue to be criminal charges within the meaning of Article 4(1) of the Protocol to the European Convention on Human Rights, the charges must fulfil the so-called Engel criteria, which I have endeavoured to explain to the reader. These criteria were created by the European Court for Human Rights in the case of Engel and Others v. the Netherlands (1976), whereas these criteria were developed before the same court in the case of Bendenoun v. France (1994). These criteria are decisive in regard to whether the issue is criminal charges and whether the guarantees offered by the European Convention on Human Rights must be applied during the proceedings,...

Engaging in Cree ceremonies, in one manner, is a legal act. It is also a gendered act as well. Thus, ceremony is one avenue to seek both legal and gendered transformations. The transformational processes this thesis contemplates are the protocols (or rules of procedure) involved in Cree sweat lodge (matotisân) and pipe (ospwakân) ceremonies. Some of these protocols are gendered in nature, in that they set out different actions based upon sex or gender. Looking at gender is a necessary part of our continuing work with Indigenous legal orders. Further, engaging in ceremony as legal practice offers one avenue in addressing the potentials for inequality that gendered protocols bring about. While this research does not seek a definitive resolution to some critical discourses about gendered protocols, it focuses on their legal nature to explore processes of change that reaffirm the sanctity of Cree ceremonial spaces while opening up these spaces for radical dissent. This research asks: (1) What are the processes for changing the gendered nature of protocols in Cree ceremonies, and as result changing Cree law? (2) What are the barriers within Cree social practices that prevent ceremonial change? (3) What are the potential dangers Cree spiritual and legal practices changing? In order to maintain the integrity of the knowledge systems resident in Cree ceremonies, to uphold our obligations to the relations involved in the ceremonies, and to avoid potentials for violence in our deconstructions or transformation, an ethos of deep relationality should inform our processes of change. This means seeking out methods of change that are already resident within ceremonial structures, and ensuring reciprocity when we actively seek transformations by upholding obligations resident in nehiyaw piimatisiwin (Cree way of life/being). / Graduate

En droit algérien, comme en droit français, la Production de la norme juridique passe par plusieurs étapes, depuis la phase de préparation jusqu’a l’ application, elle subit l’intervention de plusieurs acteurs législatifs qui créent un déséquilibre des pouvoirs en matière d’initiative entre les deux chambres du parlement , que vient atténuer la révision constitutionnelle algérienne de 2016, ensuite entre le parlement et le pouvoir exécutif, ce dernier a la maitrise sur toute la procédure législative en matière de débat législatif jusqu’a son adoption, le texte reste toujours au stade de projet tant que le veto du président de la république par la demande d’une seconde lecture ou pour retard de promulgation n’est pas levé. Ce n’est pas pour autant que le texte devient applicable, car en dernière étape le texte demeure tributaire du conseil constitutionnel qui, une fois saisi, peut modifier, ou tout simplement rejeter tout le texte pour une inconstitutionnalité. Est-il pour autant vrai qu’en Algérie, le parlement est dépossédé de sa fonction initiale, qui est la production de la norme juridique. Quid du parlement français? / In Algerian law, as in French law, the production of the legal standard goes through several stages, from the preparation phase to the implementation, it undergoes the intervention of several legislative actors that create an imbalance of powers within the lawabout the legislative initiative between the two chambers of parliament that enhances the Algerian Constitutional Review of 2016 and then between the Parliament and the Executive, the latter has control over the entire legislative procedure in terms of legislative debate until its adoption, the text is still in the draft stage as long as the veto of the President of the Republic,by the request for a second reading or for the delay of promulgation, is not lifted. This does not mean that the text becomes applicable because in the last step, the text depends on the constitutional council which, once entered, can correct, remove, reshape, a part or reject all the text for an unconstitutionality. Is it nevertheless true that in Algeria, the parliament is dispossessed of its original function, which is the production of the legal norm. Quid of the French parliament?

My dissertation starts with the overview of the history of financial control in the Czech lands. In the overview, I compare various controls having the power of the financial control with special attention paid to their mutual interference and overlapping. Performance of one type of control influenced implementation of other types of control. For many reasons, I decided to focus on the period starting in 1989. The years following the change of the regime in 1989 were very turbulent and rich in legislative initiatives. Some were successful, some less productive and I point out selected steps made in the area of control of financial activities, which lacked proper background and reasoning. On the other hand, many constructive proposals had been abolished for political reasons rather for their imperfectness. In other words - much alike the old totalitarian regime, the new authorities did not hesitate to make political decisions at the cost of the public interest. In the text of my dissertation, I examine the current financial control activities from the de lege lata point of view. Looking at the main body of relevant legislation - leaving aside the selected special laws which guide control by ways of special provisions - there are currently three acts, which guide the performance of "financial control"...

Das Verfahren der internationalen ad hoc Strafgerichtshöfe für das ehemalige Jugoslawien und für Ruanda kann als die erste völkerstrafverfahrensrechtliche Ordnung betrachtet werden. Von den Richtern selbst ausgearbeitet und entwickelt, orientierte sich dieses Verfahren ursprünglich sehr an dem angloamerikanischen Strafprozessmodell. Mangels geeigneter Präzedenzfälle und angesichts der vielen Analogiefaktoren zwischen dem innerstaatlichen Strafverfahrensrecht und dem Völkerstrafverfahrensrecht haben sich die Richter -insbesondere während der ersten Tätigkeitsjahre ihrer Gerichtshöfe- öfter auf innerstaatliche Rechtspraxen bei der Anwendung ihrer Verfahrens- und Beweisordnungen bezogen. Die vorliegende Arbeit untersucht diese Bezugnahme auf innerstaatliches Recht anhand der Rechtsprechung beider ad hoc Strafgerichtshöfe im Bereich des Beweisrechts. Die Gründe und Formen der Bezugnahme auf innerstaatliches Recht werden zuerst dargestellt und anschließend analysiert. Aus der Untersuchung der Rechtsprechung ergibt sich eine insgesamt unsystematische und pragmatische Nutzung des innerstaatlichen Rechts, welches meistens dazu dient, die für den Einzelfall geeignetste Lösung zu liefern und/ oder die von den Richtern getroffene Entscheidung zu legitimieren. Solch eine Vorgehensweise birgt zweierlei Probleme: Ein Legitimitätsproblem angesichts der Internationalität des Verfahrens der ad hoc Strafgerichtshöfe und ein Problem hinsichtlich der Vorhersehbarkeit der Anwendung ihrer Verfahrens- und Beweisordnungen. Abschließend widmet sich diese Arbeit dementsprechend der Frage nach einer methodischen Herangehensweise, welche zu mehr Legitimität und Vorhersehbarkeit bei der Anwendung der Verfahrensregeln internationaler Strafgerichtshöfe beitragen könnte, und dies abgesehen davon, ob sich die Richter dabei auf externe normative Räume, wie diejenigen innerstaatlicher Rechtsordnungen, beziehen oder nicht. / The procedure of the ad hoc international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda can be regarded as the first set of rules of international criminal procedure. This procedural law, constructed and developed by the judges themselves was primary inspired by the common law approach to criminal proceedings. In the absence of precedents, and given the numerous potential analogies between domestic criminal procedure and international criminal procedure, the judges often referred to domestic legal practices - particularly during the ad hoc tribunals’ first years of activity - when applying rules of procedure and evidence. The present work investigates this reference to domestic law by examining the ad hoc tribunals’ jurisprudence regarding the law of evidence. The reasons for and forms of the reference to domestic law are first presented and then analysed. This study concludes that, on the whole, domestic law is referred to in an unsystematic and pragmatic manner: It is mostly used by the judges in order to provide the most suitable solution for the particular case before them and/ or to legitimate a decision they have already made on the basis of their own procedural rules. Such an approach raises two problems: a legitimacy deficit in regard to the internationality of the ad hoc tribunals’ procedure and a lack of predictability in the application of the rules of procedure and evidence. This study deals therefore finally with the possibility of a methodical approach, which could contribute to more predictability and legitimacy in the application of the procedural rules of international criminal tribunals, regardless of whether or not the judges refer to external normative systems, such as domestic legal orders.

Alors que la scène du droit semble célébrer le triomphe de l’écriture juridique, on est obligé de se poser la question de l’impact du « tout écrit » sur l’oralité juridique et de rechercher, si besoin était, la place actuelle de cette dernière en droit privé. Il est vrai que l’oralité est source d’insécurité de par ses deux caractéristiques principales : la volatilité et la versatilité. Pour autant, des vecteurs sécurisés de l’oralité existent. On est aujourd’hui en capacité d’assurer une sécurité quant à la parole et de lui conférer un caractère fiable ou pérenne ou de lui assigner un cadre, une structure permettant de développer un habitus institutionnel. L’oralité juridique demeure une notion importante en droit français mais mal définie et à caractère évolutif. Il pour autant est permis de douter que l’écriture constitue, partout et toujours, un progrès. Si l’écriture insiste surtout sur le message qu’elle véhicule et tend à l’anonymat des relations sociales, l’oralité valorise l’individualisation des rapports sociaux. L’oralité présente des caractéristiques principales essentielles telles que la rapidité, la facilité et la simplicité. L’oralité est également nécessaire au soutien des principes généraux d’organisation du procès. Elle présente des qualités indéniables rendant son utilisation indispensable, mais surtout l’oralité a vocation à replacer au centre du rapport d’obligation ou au centre du procès l’individu, source de cette oralité. L’oralité est loin du "déclinisme" qu’on lui prédit et ses apports sont essentiels. C’est la faveur traditionnelle pour l’oralité qui se trouvera ici rappelée / Nowadays the increasing number and complexity of new additional texts congest the Law. As a consequence, we can ask the question of the impact of writing on legal orality. Thus, it is required to look for the current place of orality in private law. It is true that orality is a source of insecurity because of two main features : volatility and versatility. However, there are some secured flows when using orality. Nowadays, we are able to ensure security of speech and to award it a lasting character. Also here, the possibility exists to assign to it a framework, a structure allowing to develop institutional customs. Legal orality remains an important concept in French Law, despite the current lack of structure. Whether in contractual or irrefutable proof or in procedural law, orality does not hold same guarantees as written words and without the transfer into writings, orality remains a source of concern. But we can be skeptical about the writing as a progress. If writing pays particular attention on the message and moves towards the anonymous of social relationships, orality highlights individualization of social relationships. Orality has key characteristics such as speed, ease and simplicity. Orality is also required to support of the general principles of the organization of the trial. It shows undeniable qualities making its use indispensable, but above all, orality has the vocation to put the person in the center of the contract or in the center of the trial. Today, orality is still far from the predicted decline as its contribution remains essential. It is the traditional favor for orality which will be recalled here

Les juges non professionnels ne se résument pas à un concept dont l’unité est relative, ils forment également une catégorie de fait. Ils sont des tiers non-magistrats, rattachés directement ou indirectement à une juridiction, dotés d’une mission juridictionnelle non professionnelle parce qu’inhabituelle et dépourvue d’un objectif de rémunération. Cette définition préalablement posée ne permet cependant pas de postuler l’existence d’une catégorie juridique. La catégorisation suppose en effet de rechercher la commune nature des objets d’étude. La réussite de l’entreprise dépend par conséquent de la découverte d’une unité certaine entre les juges non professionnels et d’une opposition marquée vis-à-vis des juges de carrière. C’est précisément le propre d’une théorie générale du procès dédiée aux juges non professionnels que de répondre à ces questions. Quelles sont les particularités institutionnelles et procédurales des juges non professionnels ? Suffisent-elles pour conclure à l’existence d’une catégorie juridique ? Les juges non professionnels ne s’inscrivent-ils pas dans la lignée des juges professionnels formant ainsi une simple variante au sein d’une catégorie juridique plus large, celle des juges ? La recherche est scindée en deux temps, ordonnée autour d’une distinction fondamentale. Le premier volet d’ordre institutionnel est l’occasion d’étudier les rapports entre le droit au procès et les juges non professionnels, le second volet d’ordre procédural permet d’analyser les relations des juges non professionnels avec le droit du procès / Lay judges cannot be reduced to a single concept as the unity of this concept is relative. The definition of lay judges gather different features. They are non-magistrates third party directly or indirectly attached to a court with a jurisdictional function. Their task is unusual and they lack of compensation goals. This definition previously stated does not yet allow to postulate a legal category. The categorisation itself would imply the search of common grounds between the objects of study. The success of the project depends on the findings of unity between the lay judges themselves and on significant difference compared to the professional judges. The main function of a general theory of the trial dedicated to lay judges is to answer these following questions. What are the institutional and procedural features of lay judges? Are they sufficient to conclude that there is a legal category? Would the lay judges fit in the line of professional judges forming a simple variant in a broader legal category? The research will be divided into two stages, both organised around a fundamental distinction. The first part, of institutional order, will be an opportunity to study the relationship between the right to trial and the lay judges. The second part, of procedural order, will analyse the relationship of lay judges with a right for trial