Property around the world is regarded as a pillar of wealth creation. South Africa is no exception, being a capitalist society with residential property by large forming a base of individual wealth, as an investment class. A new set of legislation which was promulgated in June 2007 and which promotes and advances the social and economic welfare of South Africans, by advocating a fair, transparent, competitive, sustainable, responsible, efficient, effective and accessible credit market industry thereby ultimately protecting the consumer. This new legislation, the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 replaced the Usury Act 73 of 1968 and the Credit Agreements Act 75 of 1980. The effects of this legislation ricocheted into the South African economy generating conflicting outcomes. The purpose of this research investigated the paradoxical effect of the National Credit Act on the South Africa Residential Property Market. The dissertation first carried out a thorough review of the literature of the South African Legislation pertaining to the property market post and prior to the promulgation of the National Credit Act, South African Residential Property Market, South African Residential Rental Market and South African Building and Construction Industry. The study sought to validate the paradoxical effect of the legislation by analysing secondary data to investigate the contribution and correlation of mortgage loan advances, residential rental market growth and residential construction activity. The analyses revealed a strong direct correlation between the implementation of the National Credit Act and mortgage loan advances; residential rental growth and the performance of the residential construction industry, respectively. The data analysis from the questionnaires carried out on six residential property developers further reiterated the strong correlation as illustrated by the secondary data analyses. The main findings of this study revealed that the implementation of this legislation resulted in a paradoxical effect on the South African property market. Home ownership decreased, while rentals sky-rocketed, forcing households to accede to higher rentals which are not governed by the Act. Furthermore, confidence as well as job creation in the residential construction industry slumped to an all time low, resulting in job losses and fewer homes being built. The research therefore concluded that the decline in the home ownership market and the consequential growth in the residential rental market is a result of the implementation of the National Credit Act and substantiates the paradoxical effect of the Act. / Thesis (M.B.A.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Westville, 2009.

No description available.

The recognition in law of pension benefits and expectancies, as a matrimonial asset which may be subject to certain claims (and counterclaims), occured in South Africa in 1989. The starting point of this development was an investigation in 1984, on: "the possibility of making provisions for a divorced woman to share in the pension benefits of her former husband ". This investigation came about, in South Africa, after the matter had already been accepted, in many foreign legals systems, as a well-established, and most important concept of family law. The obvious question for the South African legislature was which of the pension-sharing schemes throughout the world would best serve as a model. Since the South African accrual system was largely based on the German Zugewinngemeinschaft, it seemed only natural that a close comparative study should be made of Germany's Versorgungsausgleich scheme. It is one of the aims of this thesis to point out whether and to what extent South Africa followed the German example. To do so, it will be necessary to examine first the different legal situations which were prevalent before and after the legal changes in the two countries and to elaborate on the reasons which led to these changes. The discussion in chapter three of how the German system of equalisation of pension expectancies, the so-called Versorgungsausgleich, is applied, will facilitate a comprehensive comparison with the South African scheme. The questions to be answered in the fifth chapter are whether it is appropriate to examine the equalisation of pension expectancies under South African law, which was only recently introduced, in a comparison with the German system and whether it is possible to speak of a Versorgungsausgleich when referring to the South African situation. Whenever possible, I have attempted to suggest solutions that may appear acceptable. To conclude the thesis, certain pension sharing problems arising under South African private international law will be briefly commented upon. / Private Law / LLM

Abstract not available

No description available.

The recognition in law of pension benefits and expectancies, as a matrimonial asset which may be subject to certain claims (and counterclaims), occured in South Africa in 1989. The starting point of this development was an investigation in 1984, on: "the possibility of making provisions for a divorced woman to share in the pension benefits of her former husband ". This investigation came about, in South Africa, after the matter had already been accepted, in many foreign legals systems, as a well-established, and most important concept of family law. The obvious question for the South African legislature was which of the pension-sharing schemes throughout the world would best serve as a model. Since the South African accrual system was largely based on the German Zugewinngemeinschaft, it seemed only natural that a close comparative study should be made of Germany's Versorgungsausgleich scheme. It is one of the aims of this thesis to point out whether and to what extent South Africa followed the German example. To do so, it will be necessary to examine first the different legal situations which were prevalent before and after the legal changes in the two countries and to elaborate on the reasons which led to these changes. The discussion in chapter three of how the German system of equalisation of pension expectancies, the so-called Versorgungsausgleich, is applied, will facilitate a comprehensive comparison with the South African scheme. The questions to be answered in the fifth chapter are whether it is appropriate to examine the equalisation of pension expectancies under South African law, which was only recently introduced, in a comparison with the German system and whether it is possible to speak of a Versorgungsausgleich when referring to the South African situation. Whenever possible, I have attempted to suggest solutions that may appear acceptable. To conclude the thesis, certain pension sharing problems arising under South African private international law will be briefly commented upon. / Private Law / LLM

Thesis (LLD)--Stellenbosch University, 2000. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: This dissertation is an attempt at reconciling the existing (and until recently predominant) private law concept of ownership and the property rights espoused by the new constitutional order. The attempts at land reform in South Africa and Germany are used as specifie examples of the manner in which the whole property law order in both these legal systems is developed through legislative and judicial initiative, on the basis of the constitutional provisions concerning property protection and regulation. The purpose of the investigation is to determine to what extent constitutional development of the private law of property will result in a property law order serving the socio-economic and political goals of economic growth and self-fulfilment and empowerment of the individual. Focus is placed on the influence of the constitutional protection and regulation of property as a mechanism for developing the private law of ownership in Germany and South Africa. In the first part of the exposition, the choice of legal comparison as course of inquiry is substantiated, and the terminological difficulties connected with an investigation into the development of the private law of property by the constitutional protection and regulation of property are discussed. Attention is given to the use of the terms "ownership" and "property" in the private law and in the constitutional context. The term "tenure" is also discussed in the context of land reform in South Africa. Further, the usc of terms such as "public interest", "common weal" and "public purposes" is discussed. The use of these terms are particularly complicated by the fact that each of them are often used in more than one sense, and that the use of these di fferent terms overlap to varying extents. The second part of the exposition contains information on the background of the constitutional property orders as they arc found in Germany and South Africa. The drafting histories of the South African and German constitutional property clauses indicate that in both these legal systems, the constitutional property clauses have hybrid ideological foundations. Both contain a compromise between, on the one hand, classical liberalism (which affords the holders of rights a high degree of individual freedom and autonomy) and, on the other hand, social democracy (which allow stronger regulatory measures, also upon private properly). Further, some of the structural aspects connected to constitutional protection and regulation of property in Germany and South Africa are discussed. The positively phrased property guarantee in art 14 GG is compared with the negatively phrased "guarantee" of s 25 Fe, whereby the transitional property guarantee in s 28 JC is also considered. Further, the basic structure and stages of an inquiry into the constitutional property clause are discussed, with reference to differences between the German and South African methods. These differences are not of such a nature that it excludes further comparison. Ilowever, it is necessary to keep the differences in the judicial system in mind when conducting a comparison of the present nature. Therefore, a brief overview of the judicial systems of Germany and South Africa is provided, with specific reference to the manner in which the courts resolved certain property questions. The principles underlying the constitutional orders of Germany and South Africa are also discussed with specific reference to their significance for the treatment of property issues. In particular, the meaning of the constitutional state (Rechtsstaat) and the social wei fare state (Sozialstaat) for the solution of problems connected to property is discussed. It is indicated that the legitimacy of the legal order in general and property law in particular, depends on the degree of success in the implementation of these values. Further, it is indicated that the implementation of these values also determines the importance of private property and/or regulation thereof in a specific legal system. In the third part of the exposition, the relevance of the constitutional protection and regulation for the private law of ownership is discussed. The expansion of the concept of property by the application of a "purely" constitutional definition thereof raises the question as to the continued relevance of the private law concept of ownership. This issue is discussed with reference to the protection of property in terms of the constitution in comparison with the scope of property in private law. It is indicated that the "exclusively constitutional" concept of property is by no means based only on Constitutional law. The role of the private law concept of ownership in a constitutional order is then elucidated. The discussion then turns to an analysis of the limitations on property endorsed by the constitutional order. Two main kinds of limitation are possible: (i) limitation of property through vertical operation of the constitution (ie a broad category of legislative and administrative deprivation (regulation), and a more specialised category, namely expropriations), and (ii) limitation through horizontal operation of the constitution (ie through the inroads allowed on property rights by the protection of other rights in the Bill of Rights). It is indicated that the application of the public interest / public purposes requirements are sometimes intended to protect individual interest above those of society in general. In other cases, the public interest / public purposes requirement is aimed at securing the interests of the society at large. Further, it is indicated that the purpose of constitutional "interference" in the area of private property law is to correct imbalances in the relations among private persons which are regarded by the law as "equals," even if they are not equal for all practical purposes. The fourth part of the exposition concentrates on the land reform programmes in Germany (after the reunification of 1990) and South Africa (since 1991) in order to analyse the attempts by the legislature and judiciary to give effect to the improved property order as anticipated by constitutional development of property. In both Germany and South Africa political changes made land reform programmes essential: In South Africa the land reform programme was introduced to reverse the injustices created by colonialism and apartheid. A tripartite programme is employed for this purpose. The new kinds of land rights created through this system of land reform are indicated. The manner in which this body of law is treated by the courts is also analysed with reference to its relevance for the development of Property Law in general. In Germany a property and land reform programme became necessary with the reunification. On the one hand, the socialist property order in the former GDR had to be replaced by the property order already existing in the FGR, and on the other hand the individual claims for restitution of the land and enterprises taken by the GDR state or its Soviet predecessor had to be balanced against the claims that present occupiers of such land have to it. The influence of legislation and litigation connected to these issues on the development of Property Law is discussed. The final part of the exposition is a summary of the conclusions drawn during the course of the analysis. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In 'n poging om in hierdie uiteensetting die bestaande (en tot onlangs nog oorheersende) privaatregtelike begrip "eiendom" te versoen met die breër eiendomsbegrip wat deur die nuwe grondwetlike bestel gepropageer word, word die grondhervormingsprogramme in Suid Afrika en Duitsland gebruik as voorbeelde van die wyse waarop die bestaande Eiendomsreg in beide regsisteme deur die wetgewer en die howe ontwikkel word. Die doel van die ondersoek is om vas te stel tot watter mate die grondwetlike ontwikkeling van privaatregtelike Eiendomsreg sal bydra tot die totstandkoming van 'n eiendomsregtelike regsorde waarin die sosio-ekonomiese en politieke doelwitte van ekonomiese groei en die vrye ontwikkeling en bemagtiging van die individu gedien word. Die klem word geplaas op die grondwetlike beskerming en regulering van eiendom as 'n meganisme waardeur die privaatregtelike Eiendomsreg in Duitsland en Suid- Afrika ontwikkel kan word. Die eerste deel van die uiteensetting begrond die keuse van regsvergelying as metode van analise en bespreek die terminologiese probleme wat in 'n ondersoek na die grondwetlike ontwikkeling van die privaatregtelike eiendomsreg kan opduik. Aandag word gegee aan die gebruik van begrippe wat verband hou met eiendom en publieke belang in sowel die privaatreg as in die grondwetlike konteks. Die gebruik van verskillende terme, veral in Engels, kan problematies wees, en daarom word dit breedvoeriger bespreek. In die tweede deel van die uiteensetting word die agtergrond waarteen die grondwetlike bestelle van Duitsland en Suid-Afrika funksioneer, bespreek: Eers word die formulering van die eiendomsklousules in Suid-Afrika en Duitsland vanuit 'n historiese perspektief ondersoek. In beide regsisteme is die grondwetlike eiendomsklousules op 'n kompromis tussen verskillende ideologieë gebaseer. Enersyds op klassieke liberalisme, in terme waarvan eienaars en ander reghebbendes 'n hoë mate van individuele vryheid en outonomie toegeken word; andersyds op sosiaal-demokratiese denke, in terme waarvan strenger regulerende maatreëls (ook op privaat eiendom) geduld moet word. Dan word sommige van die strukturele aspekte verbonde aan die grondwetlike beskerming en regulering van eiendom in Duitsland en Suid-Afrika bespreek. Die positief geformuleerde eiendomswaarborg in art 14 GG word vergelyk met die negatiewe formulering in art 25 FG en die positiewe waarborg in art 28 lG. Verder word die basiese struktuur en fases van 'n grondwetlike ondersoek in die beskerming en regulering van eiendom bespreek, met spesifieke verwysing na die verskille in die Duitse en Suid-Afrikaanse benaderings. Hierdie verskille is nie van so 'n aard dat dit regsvergelyking kortwiek nie. Nogtans is dit noodsaaklik dat die benaderingsverskille in ag geneem word vir 'n meer diepgaande vergelyking. Daarom word 'n vlugtige oorsig oor die rol van die howe in die hantering van eiendomsvraagstukke in grondwetlike konteks verskaf. Verder word die beginsels onderliggend aan die grondwetlike bestelle in Duitsland en Suid-Afrika bespreek met spesifieke verwysing na die betekenis daarvan vir die beskerming en regulering van eiendom. Daar word veral klem gelê op die regstaat- en sosiaalstaatbeginsels. Die legitimi teit van die regsorde in die algemeen, en meer spesifiek die Eiendomsreg, hang af van die mate van sukses waarmee hierdie beginsels in die gemeenskap geïmplementeer word. Daar word verder aangedui dat die toepassing van hierdie beginsels die mate van individuele vryheid in die uitoefening van eiendomsreg en/of die graad van regulering van eiendomsreg in 'n bepaalde regstelsel bepaal. Die derde deel van die uiteensetting konsentreer op die betekenis van die grondwetlike beskerming en regulering van eiendom vir die privaatregtelike Eiendomsreg. Die uitgebreide eiendomsbegrip wat in die grondwetlike konteks aangewend word, gee aanleiding tot die vraag na die sin van 'n voortgesette enger eiendomsbegrip in die privaatreg. Hierdie kwessie word bespreek met verwysing na die beskerming van eiendom in terme van die grondwet, en word vergelyk met die omvang van die eiendomsbegrip in die privaatreg. Daar word aangedui dat die sogenaamde uitsluitlik grondwetlike eiendomsbegrip geensins eksklusief aan die Grondwetlike Reg is nie. Die rol van die privaatregtelike eiendomsbegrip in 'n grondwetlike bestel word vervolgens uiteengesit. Verder word die beperkings op eiendom in die grondwetlike konteks geanaliseer. In beginsel is twee soorte beperkings regverdigbaar: (i) Beperking van eiendomsreg deur die vertikale aanwending van die grondwet, dit wil sê deur die breër kategorie wetgewende en administratiewe ontnemings (regulerings) van eiendomsreg en deur 'n enger en meer spesifieke kategorie, naamlik onteiening; en (ii) beperking van eiendomsreg deur horisontale aanwending van die grondwet, dit wil sê deur die inbreuk op eiendomsregte wat toegelaat word as gevolg van die uitwerking van die beskerming van ander regte in die Handves vir Menseregte. Daar word aangedui dat die vereiste van publieke belang in twee teenoorstaande opsigte gebruik word: Enersyds om die individuele belang bo dié van die gemeenskap te stel, en andersyds om die gemeenskap se belange as sulks te beskerm. Daar word ook aangedui dat grondwetlike "inmenging" met privaatregtelike eiendomsreg daarop gemik is om ongebalanseerdhede in die regsverhoudings tussen persone wat deur die reg as "gelykes" bejeën word en in effek nie gelyk is nie, uit te skakel. In die vierde deel van die uiteensetting word die grondhervormingsprogramrne in Duitsland (sedert hervereniging in 1990) en Suid-Afrika (sedert 1991) bespreek. Die klem val op die pogings van die wetgewer en howe om die verbeterde eiendomsbestel, soos wat dit in die grondwet in die vooruitsig gestel word, te konkretiseer. In beide regstelsels het politieke veranderinge 'n grondhervormingsprogram onontbeerlik gemaak: Die grondhervormingsprogram in Suid-Afrika het ten doelom die ongeregtighede in die grondbesitstelsel wat ontstaan het as gevolg van kolonialisme en apartheid uit te skakel. Vir dié doel berus die grondhervormingsprogram op drie verwante, maar uiteenlopende, beginsels. Die nuwe vorme van grondregte wat uit hierdie sisteem ontstaan, word aangedui, en die wyse waarop hierdie deel van die reg deur die howe hanteer word, word bespreek met verwysing na die betekenis daarvan vir die ontwikkeling van die Eiendomsreg. In Duitsland is die noodwendigheid van 'n grondhervormingsprogram aan die hervereniging van die DDR en die BRD gekoppel. Die sosialisties-georienteerde eiendomsbestel wat in die "oostelike" deel van Duitsland aanwending gevind het, moes vervang word deur die bestel wat reeds in die "westelike" deel van die "nuwe" staat in werking was. Verder moet die grondeise van persone wat grond of besigheidseiendom verloor het gedurende die sosialistiese regeringstyd en die voorafgaande Sowjetiese besetting, opgeweeg word teen die aansprake wat huidige besitters op sulke grond het. Die invloed van wetgewing en regspraak hieroor op die Eiendomsreg word geanaliseer. Die laaste deel van die uiteensetting bevat 'n samevatting van die gevolgtrekkings wat deur die loop van die analise gemaak is.

Thesis (LLD)--Stellenbosch University, 2015 / ENGLISH ABSTRACT : Section 25 of the South African Constitution authorises and sets the limits for two forms of legitimate regulatory interference with property, namely deprivation and expropriation. The focus of this dissertation is on the requirement in section 25(1) that no law may authorise arbitrary deprivation of property. According to the Constitutional Court, deprivation is arbitrary when there is insufficient reason for it. The Court listed a number of factors to consider in determining whether there is a sufficient relationship between the purpose to be achieved by deprivation and the regulatory method chosen to achieve it. The outcome of the arbitrariness question depends on the level of scrutiny applied in a particular case. The level of scrutiny ranges from rationality review to proportionality review. Deprivation that results in an excessively harsh regulatory burden for one or a small group of property owners will probably be substantively arbitrary and in conflict with section 25(1). Courts generally declare unconstitutional regulatory interferences with property rights invalid. However, invalidating legitimate regulatory measures that are otherwise lawful purely because they impose a harsh and excessive burden on some property owners may not always be justified if the regulatory measure fulfils an important regulatory purpose. Invalidating excessive regulatory measures may in some instances also be meaningless and may not constitute appropriate relief in vindicating the affected rights. The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate the appropriateness of alternative solutions to invalidating otherwise lawful and legitimate but excessive regulatory deprivations of property. The goal is to identify remedies that allow courts to uphold the regulatory measure and simultaneously balance out the excessive regulatory burden it imposes on property owners. One alternative solution is to transform the excessive regulatory measure into expropriation and require the state to pay compensation to the affected owner. This approach is referred to as constructive expropriation. However, in view of the Constitutional Court’s approach to and the wording of section 25 it seems unlikely that it will adopt constructive expropriation as a solution. Another alternative solution is for the legislature to include a statutory provision for compensation in the authorising statute. Examples from German, French, Dutch and Belgian law show that this approach balances out the excessive regulatory burden and allows courts to uphold the otherwise lawful and legitimate but excessive regulatory statute without judicially transforming the deprivation into expropriation. An overview of South African law indicates that there is legislation that includes non-expropriatory compensation provisions. In cases where the regulatory statute does not contain a compensation provision, the courts might consider reading such a duty to pay compensation into the legislation or awarding constitutional damages. In conclusion, it is possible for the state to deprive owners of property in a manner that may result in an excessive regulatory burden being suffered by one or a small group of property owners if the regulatory purpose is necessary in the public interest, provided that the legislature explicitly or implicitly provides for non-expropriatory compensation in the regulatory statute. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING : Artikel 25 van die Suid Afrikaanse Grondwet magtig en stel grense daar vir twee regmatige vorme van regulerende staatsinmenging met eiendom, naamlik ontneming en onteiening. Die fokus van hierdie proefskrif is op die vereiste in artikel 25(1) dat geen wet arbitrêre ontneming van eiendom mag toelaat nie. Volgens die Grondwetlike Hof is ʼn ontneming arbitrêr as daar nie ʼn voldoende rede daarvoor is nie. Die Hof het faktore gelys wat oorweeg moet word om te bepaal of daar ʼn voldoende verhouding bestaan tussen die doel wat die staat met ontneming van eiendom nastreef en die regulerende maatreël wat vir die doel gebruik word. Die uitkoms van die toets vir arbitrêre ontneming hang af van die hersieningsstandaard wat die howe in ʼn spesifieke geval gebruik. Die standaard wissel van ʼn redelikheidstoets tot ʼn proporsionaliteitstoets. ʼn Ontneming wat ʼn oormatige swaar las op een of ʼn beperkte groep eienaars plaas sal waarskynlik arbitrêr en teenstrydig met artikel 25(1) wees. Die howe se benadering is om ongrondwetlike ontnemings van eiendom ongeldig te verklaar, maar dit is nie altyd geregverdig om toelaatbare en andersins regmatige ontnemings wat ʼn oormatige las op sommige eienaars plaas ongeldig te verklaar nie. Die ongeldigverklaring van wetgewing wat ʼn oormatige ontneming magtig mag soms ook nutteloos wees en nie ʼn gepaste remedie wees om die eienaar se regte te herstel nie. Die doel van hierdie proefskrif is om die geskiktheid van alternatiewe oplossings tot die ongeldigverklaring van andersins regmatige maar oormatige ontnemings van eiendom te ondersoek Die doel is om remedies te identifiseer wat die howe toelaat om regulerende ontnemings in stand te hou en terselfdertyd die oormatige las op enkele eienaars uit te balanseer. Een alternatiewe oplossing is om die oormatige ontneming te omskep in onteiening en die staat sodoende te verplig om aan die eienaar vergoeding te betaal. Hierdie benadering staan bekend as konstruktiewe onteiening. Gegewe die Grondwetlike Hof se benadering tot en die bewoording van artikel 25 is dit onwaarskynlik dat die howe konstruktiewe ontneming as ʼn oplossing sal aanvaar. ʼn Ander alternatiewe oplossing is vir die wetgewer om ʼn statutêre bepaling vir vergoeding in die magtigende wetgewing in te voeg. Voorbeelde uit die Duitse, Franse, Nederlandse en Belgiese reg toon aan dat hierdie benadering ʼn oormatige las kan uitbalanseer en die howe toelaat om die andersins geldige en regmatige ontneming in stand te hou sonder om dit in onteiening te omskep. ʼn Oorsig van Suid Afrikaanse reg dui aan dat daar wetgewing bestaan wat wel voorsiening maak vir sodanige vergoeding. In gevalle waar die magtigende wetgewing nie vergoeding voorsien nie kan die howe oorweeg om ʼn vergoedingsplig in die wet in te lees of om grondwetlike vergoeding toe te ken. Hierdie proefskrif kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat dit grondwetlik moontlik is vir die staat om eienaars van eiendom te ontneem op ʼn wyse wat soms daartoe kan lei dat enkele eienaars ʼn oormatige swaar las moet dra, mits die ontneming ʼn belangrike openbare doel dien en die wetgewer uitdruklik of implisiet voorsiening maak vir vergoeding.

Thesis (LLM)--Stellenbosch University, 2014. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Inaedificatio entails that movables that have been permanently attached to land through building cease to exist as independent things and become part of the land. Courts have adopted different approaches over time to investigate whether or not inaedificatio had occurred. It is sometimes said that courts have moved away from the so-called traditional approach, which focused on the objective factors, to the so-called new approach, which places more emphasis on the subjective intention of the owner of the movables. This thesis analyses the applicable case law and concludes that there is inadequate proof of such a shift since both older cases associated with the traditional approach and later cases associated with the new approach emphasise the intention of the owner of the movables to establish whether accession had taken place. However, the case law does allow for a cautious different conclusion, namely that a certain line of both older and new cases emphasise the owner of the movable’s intention for commercial policy reasons, specifically to protect ownership of the movables in cases where ownership had been reserved in a credit sale contract. Constitutional analysis of these conclusions in view of the FNB methodology indicates that the courts’ decision to hold that accession had in fact occurred in cases that do involve permanent attachment of movables to land will generally establish deprivation of property for purposes of section 25(1) of the Constitution, but such deprivation would generally not be arbitrary since there would be sufficient reason for it. However, in cases where the courts decide that there was no accession because ownership of the movables had been reserved subject to a credit sale agreement, there is no deprivation of property because the landowner, who is the only one who might complain about the decision, could not prove a property interest for purposes of section 25(1). Moreover, the courts’ decision that accession had either occurred or not does not amount to expropriation under section 25(2) of the Constitution because there is no common law authority for expropriation. Therefore, the principal conclusion of the thesis is that the courts’ decision that accession had either occurred or not would generally be in line with the property clause of the Constitution. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Inaedificatio behels dat roerende sake wat permanent deur bebouing aan grond vasgeheg is ophou bestaan as selfstandige sake en deel word van die grond. Die howe het in die verlede verskillende benaderings gevolg in hulle pogings om vas te stel of inaedificatio plaasgevind het. Daar word soms beweer dat die howe wegbeweeg het van die sogenaamde tradisionele benadering, wat op die objektiewe faktore gefokus het, na die sogenaamde nuwe benadering waarin die klem op die eienaar van die roerende goed se bedoeling val. Hierdie verhandeling analiseer die toepaslike regspraak en kom tot die gevolgtrekking dat daar onvoldoende bewys van so ‘n verskuiwing bestaan, aangesien sowel ouer sake wat met die tradisionele benadering geassosieer word en later regspraak wat die nuwe benadering sou volg klem op die eienaar van die roerende sake se bedoeling plaas. Die regspraak bied wel bewyse vir ‘n versigtige gevolgtrekking op ‘n ander punt, naamlik dat bepaalde ouer en later sake die eienaar van die roerende goed se bedoeling vir kommersiële beleidsredes beklemtoon, spesifiek in gevalle waar eiendomsreg in ‘n kredietkoop voorbehou is. Grondwetlike analise van hierdie gevolgtrekkings in die lig van die FNB-metodologie suggereer dat die howe se beslissing dat aanhegting wel plaasgevind het in gevalle waar permanente aanhegting van roerende goed aan grond ter sprake was oor die algemeen ‘n ontneming van eiendom vir doeleindes van artikel 25(1) van die Grondwet sal daarstel, maar aangesien daar oor die algemeen voldoende rede vir die ontneming is sal dit nie arbitrêr wees nie. Aan die ander kant, waar die howe beslis dat daar geen aanhegting was nie omdat eiendomsreg van die roerende goed vir sekerheid onderhewig aan ‘n kredietkoop voorbehou is, is daar geen ontneming van eiendom nie omdat die grondeienaar, die enigste party wat beswaar teen die beslissing mag maak, nie ‘n eiendomsbelang vir doeleindes van artikel 25(1) kan bewys nie. Verder stel die howe se beslissing dat aanhegting óf plaasgevind het al dan nie in elk geval geen onteiening daar nie aangesien daar geen magtiging vir onteiening in die gemenereg bestaan nie. Die gevolgtrekking van die verhandeling is dat die howe se beslissing dat aanhegting óf plaasgevind het al dan nie oor die algemeen nie in stryd met die eiendomsbepaling in die Grondwet sal wees nie.

Thesis (LLM)--Stellenbosch University, 1989. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: English abstract not available / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die tradisionele opvatting was dat Outeursreg gemoeid is met die beskerming van die materiele vorm waarin idees vasgele is. Sedertdien het die klem egter verskuif na die beskerming van die idee self mits dit egter in stoflike vorm vervat is. In hierdie tesis word ondersoek ingestel na wat presies die objek van Outeursreg is en watter rol stoflike aanbieding in Outeursreg sped. Ter aanvang word gekyk na die ontstaan en ontwikkeling van Outeursreg. Daar word gekyk na die pick wat Outeursreg in die regsisteem beklee met spesifieke verwysing na die tradisionele indeling van subjektiewe regte. Dit blyk hieruit dat Outeursreg, as bestaandeel van Immaterieel goedereg, 'n onstoflike regsobjek het nl. die produk van die outeur se geestesarbeid of dan sy idee. Die verwysing na die vereiste van stoflike aanbieding van idees verg egter nadere ondersoek. Die Wet op Outeursreg 98 van 1973 word ontleel met betrekking tot die aard van beskermde werke; vereistes vir Outeursregbaskerming; definisies van terme soos "outeur" en "maak" asook die van die onderskeie werke; die eiendomsregterminologie en skendingshandelinge. Regsvergelykend word oorsigtelik ook na die Amerikaanse Reg verwys. Uit hierdie ontleding blyk stoflikheid vir doeleindes van die tradisionele Outeursregwerke te verwys na tasbare aanbieding daarvan, mar dat sb 'n eng definisie nie gehandhaaf kan word ten opsigte van moderne tegnologiese ontwikkelings soos uitsendings en programdraende seine nie, aangesien hierdie werke van sä 'n aard is dat tasbare vasle:gging daarvan nie noodwendig altyd plaasvind nie. Onder die skrywers wat hierdie probleem bespreek is professors Copeling en Van der Merwe wat aan stoflikheid 'n alternatiewe, wyer betekenis toedig nl. kommunikeerbare of sintuiglik waarneembare aanbieding. 'n Botsing tussen die tradisionele en aanbevole definisie van stoflikheid in die regspraak word ook uitgewys. Ten einde tegnologie te akkommodeer word die wyer definisie van stoflikheid in hierdie tesis voorgehou. Die implikasies van hierdie wyer definisie van stoflikheid is egter verreikend. Professor Copeling bevestig dan ook dat dit die moontlikheid van Outeursreg in mondelinge kommunikasies inhou. Gevolglik word daar veral gekyk waarom idees as sulks beskerm word deur Onregmatige Mededinging, maar nie deur Outeursreg nie - 'n vraag wat beantwoord word met verwysing na die invloed van moderne tegnologie op die tradisionele indelings van die Immaterieel goederereg. Uit hierdie ondersoek blyk dit dat Onregmatige Mededinging berus op die Immaterieel goederereg in plaas van die Deliktereg. Die uitgebreide definisie van stoflikheid veroorsaak dat die bestaande indelings van Immaterie61 goedereregte versmelt. Dit ruim ook die huidige konflik rondom die vereiste van stoflikheid in die Wet op Outeursreg 93 van 1973 uit die weg. Laastens word kortliks gewys op die drastiese veranderinge in die spelreels vir inligtingsprodukte wat nodig sal wees om die balans tussen die aansprake van Outeursreghebbendes en die gemeenskap te handhaaf indien die uitgebreide definisie van stoflikheid aangewend word. Uiteindelik dien stoflikheid ook in sy uitgebreide vorm steeds die tradisionele doe om die werk af te skei van die maker se persoonlikheid en dit sodoende buite die mens gelee te maak.