Thesis (LLM)--Stellenbosch University, 2013. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The right of way of necessity is a special type of praedial servitude that is established over neighbouring property in favour of landlocked property – that is, property without access to a public road. The purpose of granting the landlocked property a right of access to a public road is so that it can be put to efficient use. The servitude is created by operation of law and it binds the surrounding properties as of right at the moment when the property becomes landlocked. It can, however, be enforced only against a specific neighbouring property. This servitude can only be enforced by way of a court order, against the will of the owner of the neighbouring property. This servitude, specifically the manner in which it is established, may raise significant constitutional issues as regards the property clause of the South African Constitution. Therefore, it was necessary to investigate the constitutionality of the right of way of necessity in view of section 25 of the Constitution. To this end, the study provides an overview of the law relating to the right of way of necessity and the general principles regulating this servitude in South African law. Subsequently, the justifications for the right of way of necessity and specifically for allowing the courts to enforce this servitude are analysed in terms of public policy, jurisprudential views and law and economics theory. The conclusion is reached that, in terms of these justifications, there are sufficient policy, social, and economic reasons for having the right of way of necessity and for the courts to enforce it without cooperation and against the will of the affected servient property owner. These justifications are used to examine the constitutionality of the right of way of necessity, specifically to determine whether the enforcement of this servitude by court order constitutes a section 25(1) arbitrary deprivation or even a section 25(2) expropriation of the affected owner’s property rights. The study concludes that the granting of the right of way of necessity will not amount to an expropriation and, following the FNB methodology, does not constitute arbitrary deprivation of property either. Therefore, if all the requirements are met, the granting of a right of way of necessity will be constitutionally compliant. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die saaklike serwituut wat ten gunste van grond wat van openbare verkeersweë afgesny is (blokland) oor naburige eiendom gevestig word, staan bekend as noodweg. Die rede waarom toegang tot ’n openbare pad aan blokland toegeken word, is sodat die grond effektief gebruik kan word. Hierdie serwituut word deur regswerking geskep en dit bind omringende eiendomme vanaf die oomblik dat die blokland van openbare verkeersweë afgesluit word. Dit kan egter slegs teen ’n spesifieke naburige eiendom afgedwing word. Die serwituut kan slegs deur middel van ’n hofbevel afgedwing word, teen die eienaar van die naburige eiendom se wil. Wat die eiendomsklousule van die Suid-Afrikaanse Grondwet betref, kan hierdie serwituut en veral die wyse waarop dit gevesig word belangrike grondwetlike vrae opper. In die lig van artikel 25 van die Grondwet was dit dus nodig om die grondwetlike geldigheid van noodweg te toets. Om hierdie doel te bereik, verskaf die studie’n oorsig van die regsbeginsels aangaande noodweg en die algemene beginsels van hierdie serwituut in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg. Met verwysing na openbare beleid, regsfilosofiese benaderings en Law and Economics-teorie analiseer die tesis vervolgens die regverdigingsgronde vir noodweg, spesifiek vir die feit dat die howe dit afdwing. Die gevolgtrekking is dat daar ingevolge hierdie regverdigingsgronde genoegsame beleids-, sosiale en ekonomiese redes bestaan vir die serwituut van noodweg en vir die howe se bevoegdheid om dit sonder die dienende eienaar se medewerking en teen sy wil af te dwing. Hierdie regverdigingsgronde word gebruik om die grondwetlike geldigheid van noodweg te ondersoek, spesifiek om vas te stel of die afdwinging daarvan neerkom op ’n arbitrêre ontneming vir doeleindes van artikel 25(1) of op ’n onteiening vir doeleindes van artikel 25(2) van die Grondwet. Hierdie studie kom tot die slotsom dat die toestaan van ’n noodweg nie as ’n onteiening kwalifiseer nie en dat dit, indien die FNB-metodologie nagevolg word, ook nie op ’n arbitrêre ontneming van eiendom neerkom nie. Indien al die vereistes nagekom word, sal die toestaan van ’n noodweg dus aan die Grondwet voldoen. / South African Research Chair in Property Law (SARCPL) / National Research Foundation / Department of Science and Technology

Thesis (LLD (Private Law))--University of Stellenbosch, 2010. / Bibliography / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: South African courts seem to be adopting a new approach to the problem of building encroachments. For pragmatic and policy reasons courts are now inclined to exercise its discretion in favour of leaving building encroachments in place, against compensation, despite the common law right to demand removal. It has been widely accepted that courts indeed have the discretion to award damages instead of removal of the building encroachment. However, the circumstances involved and the consequences of these orders are uncertain and hence these orders result in confusion. It is unclear how this discretion is exercised. Furthermore, it is uncertain whether this discretion includes the power to order transfer of the encroached-upon land to the encroacher. There are doctrinal and constitutional implications that may be triggered by these court orders that leave building encroachments in place. The doctrinal issues centre on what happens when an encroachment is not removed and nothing is said about the rights of the respective parties after the order is made. Possible solutions are investigated to provide a doctrinally sound outcome in encroachment disputes. It is clear that the encroacher is allowed to continue occupying the portion of property on which the encroachment is erected. It seems as though a use right is indirectly created when the encroachment remains in place. The constitutional difficulty lies in the fact that the court orders may result in infringements that conflict with section 25 of the Constitution. The focus is specifically to determine whether these orders result in the compulsory loss of property or property rights. With reference to Germany, the Netherlands and Australia, a comparative perspective is provided in order to support the doctrinal and policy arguments. The comparative law provides a source of guidelines for what may work effectively and informs the ultimate suggestion of this project, namely the need for legislation to regulate building encroachments in South Africa. The legislation envisaged would have to prescribe with at least some sort of certainty how and in which circumstances the discretion should be exercised. It should also provide clarity with regard to the right that is created when the encroachment is not removed and how the compensation that is awarded in exchange for removal, should be determined. The unnecessary confusion and uncertainty that result from court orders made in the context of building encroachments may be cleared up by legislation. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Suid Afrikaanse howe begin al hoe meer om ‘n nuwe benadering te volg ten opsigte van oorskrydende bouwerke. Dit lyk asof howe meer geneig is om hul diskresie uit te oefen ten gunste daarvan om die oorskryding vir pragmatiese en beleidsredes teen vergoeding in stand te hou, ten spyte van die gemeenregtelike reg om verwydering te eis. Daar word algemeen aanvaar dat howe wel die diskresie het om in die konteks van oorskrydende bouwerke skadevergoeding toe te ken in plaas van verwydering. Die omstandighede betrokke by en die nagevolge van hierdie beslissings is egter onseker en daarom lei dit tot verwarring. Dit is nie altyd duidelik hoe hierdie diskresie uitgeoefen word nie. Daarbenewens is daar ook onsekerheid oor of die diskresie die bevoegdheid insluit om oordrag van die grond waarop die oorsrkryding staan, te gelas. Die beslissings kan ook doktrinêre en grondwetlike implikasies hê. In terme van die doktrinêre probleem is daar vrae oor wat gebeur as die oorskryding nie verwyder word nie en niks word gesê oor die regte van beide partye in die dispuut nie. Oplossings word ondersoek om die beste moontlike doktrinêre verduideliking te probeer vasstel. Die eienaar van die oorskrydende bouwerk mag voortgaan om die grond waarop die oorskryding staan te okkupeer. Dit lyk asof ‘n gebruiksreg indirek geskep word ten gunste van die oorskryder wanneer die oorskryding nie verwyder word nie. ‘n Grondwetlike probleem mag veroorsaak word deur die moontlike oortreding van artikel 25 van die Grondwet. Die beslissings mag lei tot die gedwonge verlies van grond of regte, wat aan die vereistes van artikel 25 moet voldoen. ‘n Vergelykende perspektief met verwysing na Duitsland, Nederland en Australië word verskaf om die doktrinêre en beleidsargumente te ondersteun. Die vergelykende reg bied ‘n bron van riglyne vir wat effektief kan werk en het dus die wetgewing wat in hierdie proefskrif voorgestel word geïnspireer. Die wetgewing wat beoog word sal moet voorskryf hoe en onder watter omstanghede die diskresie uitgeoefen moet word. Dit moet ook sekerheid gee ten opsigte van die reg wat geskep word as die oorskryding nie verwyder word nie en hoe die skadevergoeding bepaal moet word. Die onnodige verwaring en onsekerheid wat veroorsaak word deur hierdie hofbeslissings kan opgeklaar word deur die promulgering van wetgewing om oorskrydende bouwerke te reguleer.

Thesis (LLM (Public Law))--University of Stellenbosch, 2011. / Bibliography / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The protection of human rights is one of the main aims of international law. Since the Second World War, the United Nations and various other international organs have recognised the protection of human rights in various treaties. These treaties protect citizen.s rights against possible infringement on the side of the state. South Africa was isolated from the development that occurred in international human rights law due to the system of apartheid. When South Africa became a democracy in 1994, international law had to be made part of South African law so that South Africa could once again take its place in the international community. Therefore, the Constitution of 1996 contains various sections that deal with international law and its place within the South African legal system. In particular, section 39(1)(b) of the Constitution places an obligation on courts, tribunals and forums to consider international law in interpreting the bill of rights. With regard to section 39(1)(b), this thesis questions whether the Constitutional Court fulfils its obligation when interpreting the right to property and housing in sections 25 and 26 of the Constitution respectively. Through a discussion of Constitutional Court cases on the right to property, it is discovered that the Court does not optimally use the international law sources that are available. The Court does not reflect on the status of international law sources and confuses international law with foreign law. Therefore, the sources relating to the right to property in international and regional international law are outlined. On the basis of the available sources in international law that relate to the right to property, it is argued that there is no justification for the Court not considering the relevant international law sources. With regard to the right of access to adequate housing in section 26 of the Constitution and the case law relating to the right, the Constitutional Court is more willing to consult international law to aid its interpretation of the right. This is partly attributable to fact that the right to adequate housing is a well developed right in international law. As a result, the Court refers to a wide range of international law sources when interpreting the right of access to adequate housing. However, the Court does not indicate the status of the various international law sources it uses to interpret the right to adequate housing. Therefore, it is argued that in the instances where there are relevant international law sources available to aid the interpretation of the rights to property and adequate housing, they should be considered. In the event that the Constitutional Court uses international law sources, their status within South African law and their relevance to the rights in question should be made clear. As a result, a method for the use of international law as a guide to interpretation is proposed. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die beskerming van menseregte is van groot belang in internasionale reg. Na afloop van die Tweede Wêreldoorlog het verskeie internasionale agente, met die Verenigde Nasies in die voorgrond, menseregte begin erken in verskeie internasionale konvensies. Omdat Suid-Afrika die apartheidstelsel toegepas het, was die Suid-Afrikaanse reg geïsoleerd van die ontwikkeling rakende die beskerming van menseregte in internasionale reg. Met die koms van demokrasie was Suid-Afrika genoodsaak om internasionale reg deel te maak van Suid-Afrikaanse reg om te verseker dat Suid-Afrika weer die internasionale gemeenskap kon betree. Gevolglik bevat die Grondwet van 1996 verskeie artikels wat met internasionale reg handel. In besonder plaas artikel 39(1)(b) 'n verpligting op howe, tribunale en ander forums om internasionale reg te gebruik wanneer enige reg in die handves van menseregte geïnterpreteer moet word. In hierdie tesis word daar besin oor die vraag of die Grondwetlike Hof die verpligting in terme van artikel 39(1)(b) nakom wanneer die regte tot eiendom en toegang tot geskikte behuising in artikels 25 en 26 onderskeidelik geïnterpreteer word. Na 'n bespreking van die grondwetlike sake wat verband hou met die reg tot eiendom, word die gevolgtrekking gemaak dat die Grondwetlike Hof nie die verpligting in terme van artikel 39(1)(b) konsekwent nakom nie. Die Hof verwys nie na relevante internasionale of streeks- internasionale reg nie. Verder verwar die Hof internasionale reg met buitelandse reg. In die gevalle waar die Hof wel gebruik maak van internasionale reg, word die status van dié reg in die Suid-Afrikaanse regstelsel nie duidelik uiteengesit nie. Na aanleiding van die grondwetlike sake wat verband hou met die reg van toegang tot geskikte behuising, is dit duidelik dat die Grondwetlike Hof meer gewillig is om internasionale reg in ag te neem. 'n Moontlike rede hiervoor is die feit dat die reg tot behuising goed ontwikkel is in internasionale reg. Gevolglik maak die Grondwetlike Hof geredelik van internasionale reg gebruik om artikel 26 van die Grondwet te interpreteer. Nietemin, die status van die internasionale reg bronne wat die Hof wel gebruik word nie uiteengesit nie. Daarom word daar aangevoer dat indien daar internasionale reg beskikbaar is wat relevant is tot die geskil, behoort die Grondwetlike Hof sulke reg in ag te neem. Indien die Hof wel internasionale reg gebruik om die regte tot eiendom en toegang tot geskikte behuising te interpreteer, moet die status van die bronne uiteengesit word. Daarom word daar ook in die tesis 'n voorstel voorgelê hoe howe te werk moet gaan indien internasionale reg bronne geraadpleeg word.

La thèse vise à examiner l’applicabilité des règles du droit de la concurrence, comme une solution alternative aux solutions existantes de la propriété intellectuelle dans le cas spécifique d'un de refus du titulaire d’un tel brevet. Sont étudiés: les solutions existantes, l'étendue de la protection conférée par un tel brevet, et si un tel refus du titulaire d’un brevet sur une séquence d’ADN est donc examiné en tant que pratique potentiellement répréhensible en vertu du droit de la concurrence. / Doctorat en droit / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished