Conclusion of adhesion contracts by entrepreneurs Abstract The aim of this work is to describe the conditions under which the protective provisions of the Civil Code on the conclusion of contracts in an adhesive manner are applied in relations where the entrepreneur acts. In this regard, attention is focused on the definition of the weaker party and the individual conditions that the entrepreneur must meet if he is to enjoy the protection of the weaker party. Subsequently, the work deals with the institute of concluding contracts in an adhesive manner, formulating its individual features and manifestations, especially in commercial practice. This work consists of an introduction, four chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter forms the basis for the rest of this work, by defining the weaker party with an emphasis on relations between entrepreneurs. Furthermore, this form describes the form of protection of the weaker party with an analysis of private and public protection of the weaker entrepreneur. The second chapter deals with contracts concluded in an adhesive manner and burden of proof beard by the contracting party. Subsequently, this work captures the most common forms in contractual practice such as general terms and conditions, form documents or framework contracts. A specific form of adhesion...

Protection of a Weaker Contract Party and Private International Law The topic of this dissertation thesis is the protection of weaker parties in the context of determination and application of the applicable law. The dissertation seeks anchor and concept of protection of weaker parties in the Rome I Regulation. The thesis is divided into three main parts. The first part deals with the basis for protection of weaker parties, linking the theoretical and value foundations on which the protection stands with practical implications that ignorance of significantly unequal position might have. For a comprehensive understanding, it is necessary to look at the background of individual legal rules. However, dealing with these issues cannot be viewed solely in the context of private international law. Certain legal institutions of private international law may not be designated solely for the protection of certain categories of weaker parties but may be used to protect a weaker party with regard to the concept of a weaker party and the importance of its protection in substantive law (especially civil law). The second part, which is the focal point of this thesis, consists in the analysis of ways of protecting the weaker parties, both at a more general methodological level and in the form of a more detailed...

L’émergence depuis quelques années de nouvelles lois de police pour protéger certaines parties faibles au sein des contrats internationaux a été identifiée sous l’appellation de lois de police protectrices. En tant que renouvellement du mécanisme traditionnel des lois de police, cette émergence interroge, notamment quant à son bien-fondé. Cela suppose d’envisager les lois de police protectrices à la fois en tant que nouveau concept, et en tant qu’objet s’intégrant dans un environnement plus général. Ces nouvelles lois de police se sont imposées pour répondre à un besoin de protection sur la scène internationale. Cependant, la philosophie des lois de police apparaît difficilement conciliable avec l’objectif de protection d’une partie faible. Dès lors, il conviendrait de modifier certaines caractéristiques du mécanisme afin qu’il soit en mesure d’atteindre cet objectif de protection. Mais alors, se crée une déformation du concept initial de l’outil des lois de police. En outre, envisagées au sein de leur environnement, à savoir le droit européen des contrats, les lois de police protectrices sont susceptibles d’être limitées par des concepts propres au droit de l’Union. Elles peuvent aussi être dépassées par des outils d’inspiration européenne qui mettent en œuvre un autre lien entre l’impérativité d’une norme et l’exigence de protection de la partie faible. / These past few years, the advent of new mandatory provisions to protect certain weaker parties within the realm of international contracts have been identified as protective mandatory provisions. As a renewal of the traditional mandatory provisions mechanism, it raises several questions with regards to its merits. This requires to consider protective mandatory provisions as a concept in itself, as well as an object integrated in a more global legal environment. These new mandatory provisions have appeared as an answer to a need for protection on the international level. However, the philosophy of mandatory provisions can be considered to be incompatible with the objective of the protecting the weaker party. Therefore, it is necessary to change certain characteristics of the mechanism in order for it to effectively attain its protection objective. It would then, however, amount to a deformation of the initial concept of mandatory provisions. Finally, considered within their environment, i.e. European contract law, protective mandatory provisions can be limited by EU-specific law concepts. They can also be surpassed by other tools, of European inspiration, putting into effect another link between the imperative character of the norm and the protection requirement of the weaker party.

La loi doit trouver le moyen de prévenir et sanctionner de façon efficiente les abus de puissance économique constatés dans les relations commerciales déséquilibrés mais sans provoquer d’effets pervers sur le marché et sans ruiner l’efficacité des autres règles relevant du droit de la concurrence. Lorsque les rapports de force entre les parties sont particulièrement déséquilibrés, la partie forte peut imposer des conditions inégales à la partie faible, notamment à la faveur du « facteur crainte ». En effet, tant que le contrat est en cours d’exécution, la partie faible ne réagit pas de peur que la relation commerciale ne se termine. De ce fait, en dépit de la présence de nombreux textes réprimant les abus, la réalité montre qu’ils ne cessent de se répandre. Le législateur agit généralement dans la précipitation, abuse de palliatifs et néglige la faculté d’adaptation des entreprises les plus puissantes qui trouvent souvent le moyen de contourner les règles. En définitive, seul un marché plus équilibré, c’est-à-dire moins concentré, permettrait de remédier durablement aux abus de puissance économique. Dans ces conditions, la mise en place d’une véritable injonction structurelle mériterait d’être de nouveau envisagée. Le présent travail se propose de comparer les principales mesures de prévention et de sanction des abus mises en place en France et en Corée du sud qui, face à un phénomène similaire, adoptent parfois des réponses différentes. / Competition provisions seek to regulate the abuse of economic power in unequal commercial relationships. However, in the process, such provisions should not have the effect of adversely impacting the market or harming the proper functioning of other competition rules. When there exists a significant power disparity between parties, the stronger party can impose unequal conditions on the weaker party, particularly through what is called the "fear factor". During the duration of the contractial relationship, the weaker party will not be able to stand up to the stronger party in fear of the commercial relationship being terminated. This is why oppressive behaviors continue in reality, despite the presence of numerous regulations designed to prevent such behaviors. Law makers have a tendency to react by hastily enacting ad hoc regulations. The adaptability of powerful corporations to circumvent the rules is often overlooked. Ultimately, abuses of economic power can only be regulated on a sustainable basis through the creation of a more balanced and less concentrated market. It is in this context that a truly structural approach should be considered. This analysis compares the principal measures against abuses of economic power employed in France and Korea, which sometimes adopt different responses to similar circumstances.