The diploma paper is dealing with the matter of Provincial reconstruction team of the Czech Republic operating in Loghar province in Afghanistan. The goal of the paper is its assessment followed by a suggestion of optimalization of the present strategy of the Czech Republic and the project management in consideration of the Provincial reconstruction team in this province. On the basis of investigated information there will be submitted a proposal of a new strategic document of the Czech Republic for the reconstruction Loghar province. These thesis will also include a summary of correction measures in the area of operation and aim of the projects.

Pendant la guerre d'Algérie (1955-1962), le gouvernement général de l'Algérie met en place dans les campagnes et les banlieues des grandes villes d'Algérie une structure de pacification, les SAS (sections administratives spécialisées) et les SAU (sections administratives urbaines), dont on trouve le prolongement au sein des SAT (Service d'assistance technique) en métropole (Paris, Lyon, Marseille) et au niveau de la Force de police auxiliaire de Paris. Les officiers SAS, officiers de carrière, de réserve en situation d'active, et appelés, recrutent des supplétifs (moghaznis) et mènent une politique de pacification dans les domaines administratif, politique (promotion d'élus musulmans), économique (Plan de Constantine), social (aide aux indigents et résorption des bidonvilles), médical, scolaire, et militaire. Au cœur de la politique de la France en Algérie de 1955 à 1959, ces officiers se retrouvent, dès 1960, en porte-à-faux de la nouvelle politique du général de Gaulle. Si certains démissionnent ou partent amers de leur période de SAS, d'autres s'opposent au général de Gaulle lors du référendum sur l'autodétermination de l'Algérie de janvier 1961, du putsch d'avril 1961, voire ont la tentation de basculer dans l'organisation subversive de I'OAS. L'indépendance de l'Algérie risquant de menacer la vie des supplétifs, certains officiers SAS organisent des filières clandestines de rapatriement des supplétifs et de leurs familles, et les aident à s'insérer en France grâce à des associations, des initiatives individuelles et du soutien administratif et financier de l'État (SAT de Paris et de Marseille). / The mission of the SAS in Algeria is the current equivalent in NATO parlance civil-military cooperation. The SAS, the special administrative sections and SAU the city administrative sections were created by the governor general J. Soustelle. Its mission was to maintain contact with the population and collect the intelligence necessary for successful operation. The SAS and SAU would be irnplemented to administer the villages in Algeria to combat the economic misery and political inequality that were the root causes of the insurgency. With their civilian personnel and Muslin auxiliary troops (moghaznis), they were the administrative intermediaries responsible for development of their districts. They rebuilt schools. They cared for the sick by establishing fee medical assistance. They conducted censuses to establish welfare services and organized elections for municipal officials. They improved agriculture and husbandry, built roads and bridges. In military terms, the SAS officiers dismantled the FLN cells and collected intelligence on the ALN. They protected the village with their auxiliaries (moghaznis). ln three cities of metropolis, we find the presence of similar structures, with for Paris, an auxiliary police force. The SAS was an important policy to preserve French Algeria from 1955 to 1959, but then the new policy who wants to give at Algeria her independence (1960-1962) changed the SAS officer policy opinion. They try to oppose them during the referendum of Algerian auto determination (January 1961), at the time of the putsch (Apri11961), by tipping over to the terrorism (OAS), or by organizing Mussulmen auxiliary secret repatriation in France (April-May 1962).

This paper deals with the post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan after the NATO-invasion at the end of 2001 and its success. To ensure the stability of the country, the NATO-led coalition had not only to overthrow the Taliban regime, but also to create basic government structures and help them perform. Reconstruction is of course very common and necessary after conflict, it is however usually operated by strictly civilian measures, e. g. government institutions and humanitarian organisations. In this case, however, such approach was not possible due to volatile security situation, which in some areas grew to such intensity, it essentially became a war-conflict again. This paper focuses on the Herat province and NATO units, especially under ISAF command. It seeks to define the process of post-conflict reconstruction and using the process-tracing method, it then ascertains the extent to which ISAF units dedicated themselves to post-conflict reconstruction and made a positive progress in this area. Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)

The diploma thesis deals with deployment of German army within ISAF strategy in Afghanistan. The deployment of military forces is one of the most discussed queries in German politics and among German public. The thesis analyses the development in Afghanistan from 2001 to September 2013. The thesis is divided into three parts. Firstly, I define the theory of role and the concept of civil power, which is one of approaches for analysis of foreign policy. I define some criteria and according to them I examine, if Germany behaves in Afghanistan as civil power, for which is it considered. In the following part I deal with the development in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2009. I analyse the beginning of OEF and ISAF operations, mandate's extensions, the reasons for deployment in Afghanistan and the development of the security situation in country. The main part of this thesis is the deployment of German army within new ISAF strategy in Afghanistan, which was declared by American president Barack Obama in 2009. The thesis focuses on the attitude of Germany to the most important events in this period, for example to the declaration of new ISAF strategy, to international conference on Afghanistan in London, to transition to afghan lead, to the leaving of the international troops and to support after the year...

When Canada took on the leadership role of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction Team (K-PRT) in Afghanistan, the liberation of women and children via multi-departmental collaboration was promoted by the government as a critical goal of the operation. Research from the fields of public administration, international development, and critical security studies hypothesizes that collaborative approaches to governance, particularly in fragile states, ensures that greater resources are available to address human rights issues, including gender equality. It is therefore surprising that the gendered implications of Canada’s collaborative governance commitments within the K-PRT have not been deeply explored. Through a feminist frame analysis, informed by critical and post-structural feminist theory, this dissertation asks whether the Canadian collaborative approach permits more attention to be paid to policy and programming on gender equality. Framing the case of the K-PRT from a feminist perspective, this dissertation identifies the hegemony of masculinity within the policy context that guided the Canadian collaborative approaches in Kandahar, highlighting how international guidelines for collaboration legitimized the leadership of the military and instrumentalized gender for militarized purposes. It also exposes the masculine structure of the K-PRT, identifying how the design of the PRT favoured the might of the military, and presented the exceptionalism of women as the only marker of gender. Finally, this dissertation highlights the narrative of masculinity that is threaded throughout the K-PRT, working to normalize the militarization of civilian departments and actors implicated within the Canadian collaborative approach. The application of a gender lens to the case of the K-PRT reveals the necessity of feminist analysis of collaborative approaches, as these are increasingly being seen as best practices for addressing state fragility worldwide.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / The United States has spent over $2 billion during the last six years to reconstruct and stabilize Afghanistan through the Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). This effort is only one of several simultaneous programs attempting to stabilize Afghanistan using approaches including providing humanitarian aid, education, government and security reform, and construction. Construction often involves simple infrastructure development with tangible benefits including increased access, growing commerce and better security. Construction projects can also employ the local population and, if done correctly, develop a sense of community and social capital. What causes construction projects to miss the mark failing to result in creating a stable community? This research compares four different construction programs including CERP, National Solidarity Program (NSP), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) to determine their potential impact on Afghan stability. It uses a combination of statistical regression, correlation, geospatial and temporal analysis to compare completed construction with recorded SIGACTs (Significant Acts) reported by U.S. forces and NGOs. The results imply that the identified stabilization programs are not using construction effectively to create social capital and stability.