Essa dissertação é um estudo sobre o sistema Detecta, inicialmente apresentado pela Secretaria de Segurança Pública de São Paulo, em 2014. Ele seria um programa de videomonitoramento inteligente, instalado pela Microsoft, em uma parceria público-privada com o estado. Sua base era o programa de monitoramento da cidade de Nova Iorque, nos Estados Unidos. No entanto, até 2018, embora o sistema continuasse ativo, a função de videomonitoramento inteligente não havia sido instalada. Ela foi substituída pelo programa de monitoramento de rodovias do antigo projeto Radar. Nessa dissertação trabalhamos com a questão central: o projeto Detecta foi um instrumento de controle que impactou na apropriação do espaço público da cidade de São paulo?. A hipótese que chegamos foi que o Detecta funcionou como uma peça de propaganda de guerra psicológica, em favor da normatização do espaço público e sua transformação em território das forças de segurança. Essa hipótese se sustenta em um estudo sobre a repercussão do Detecta e do videomonitoramento em jornais e outras mídias brasileiras, segundo diferentes grupos sociais. / This dissertation is a study on the Detecta system, initially presented by the Public Security Secretariat of São Paulo, in 2014. It would be an intelligent video-monitoring program installed by Microsoft in a public-private partnership with the state. It was based on the monitoring program of the city of New York in the United States. However, by 2018, although the system remained active, the intelligent videomonitoring function had not been installed. It was replaced by the road monitoring program of an olf project called Radar. In this dissertation we work with the central question: Was the project Detecta an instrument of control that impacted in the appropriation of the public space of the city of São Paulo in Brazil?. The hypothesis we arrived at was that Detecta functioned as a piece of psychological war propaganda, in favor of the normatization of public space and its transformation into a territory of São Paulos security forces. This hypothesis is supported by a study about the repercussion of Detecta and videomonitoring in newspapers and other Brazilian media, according to different social groups.

Essa dissertação é um estudo sobre o sistema Detecta, inicialmente apresentado pela Secretaria de Segurança Pública de São Paulo, em 2014. Ele seria um programa de videomonitoramento inteligente, instalado pela Microsoft, em uma parceria público-privada com o estado. Sua base era o programa de monitoramento da cidade de Nova Iorque, nos Estados Unidos. No entanto, até 2018, embora o sistema continuasse ativo, a função de videomonitoramento inteligente não havia sido instalada. Ela foi substituída pelo programa de monitoramento de rodovias do antigo projeto Radar. Nessa dissertação trabalhamos com a questão central: o projeto Detecta foi um instrumento de controle que impactou na apropriação do espaço público da cidade de São paulo?. A hipótese que chegamos foi que o Detecta funcionou como uma peça de propaganda de guerra psicológica, em favor da normatização do espaço público e sua transformação em território das forças de segurança. Essa hipótese se sustenta em um estudo sobre a repercussão do Detecta e do videomonitoramento em jornais e outras mídias brasileiras, segundo diferentes grupos sociais. / This dissertation is a study on the Detecta system, initially presented by the Public Security Secretariat of São Paulo, in 2014. It would be an intelligent video-monitoring program installed by Microsoft in a public-private partnership with the state. It was based on the monitoring program of the city of New York in the United States. However, by 2018, although the system remained active, the intelligent videomonitoring function had not been installed. It was replaced by the road monitoring program of an olf project called Radar. In this dissertation we work with the central question: Was the project Detecta an instrument of control that impacted in the appropriation of the public space of the city of São Paulo in Brazil?. The hypothesis we arrived at was that Detecta functioned as a piece of psychological war propaganda, in favor of the normatization of public space and its transformation into a territory of São Paulos security forces. This hypothesis is supported by a study about the repercussion of Detecta and videomonitoring in newspapers and other Brazilian media, according to different social groups.

'Victoria per Mentum : Psychological Operations Conducted by the Australian Army in Phuoc Tuy Province South Vietnam 1965-1971' examines the Australian Army's conduct of psychological operations from 1965 to 1971 in South Vietnam. The study traces the first instances of psychological warfare in 1965, aided by the Americans, through to the establishment of 1 Psychological Operations Unit in April 1970 until November 1971, when Australians withdrew from South Vietnam. Most soldiers in the unit had no training in the art or practice of psychological warfare. Successes in the American sponsored South Vietnam amnesty program (Chieu Hoi) mirrored the success on the battlefield by Australian fighting soldiers. Psychological Warfare is a non-lethal weapon which has a multiplier effect on the enemy in the battle space. The inability to effectively demonstrate conclusively the effects of successful psychological warfare operations added to uncertainty and scepticism over the weapon's potential and actual impact on the battlefield. Conventional military leaders rejected psychological warfare as 'paper bullets' that had little or no place in a military focused agenda - shoot, blast bomb, fragment, kill and capture to defeat the enemy. Propaganda and counter-propaganda are examined to demonstrate how these effects influenced each side. The study examines difficulties the Australian 1 Psychological Operations Unit encountered when trying to provide demonstrable and tangible indicators, which meant that when forces to choose between leaflets, loudspeakers and firepower, combat leaders chose firepower. The result was that psychological warfare proved successful only in a limited tactical sense but never created the type of operational or strategic success sought by traditional weapons proponents.

As the world became at once more interconnected and more polarized during the twentieth century, the need for the major powers to effectively communicate their perspective to the rest of the world through propaganda grew stronger. However, although the United States was undeniably gaining prestige and influence by the late 1930s, the upstart global power struggled to implement a lasting and successful propaganda program. In the years immediately preceding the Second World War, when the United States was targeted by both Axis and Soviet propaganda, U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt proved reluctant to implement a peacetime state-sponsored propaganda program. Roosevelt’s successor Harry Truman, on the other hand, did not share this reluctance and throughout the first years of the Cold War sanctioned the establishment of several peacetime programs. However, because of Truman’s lack of understanding of and personal commitment to the use of propaganda, U.S. efforts in this field were uncoordinated, expensive, and largely ineffective. As a result, the highly centralized Soviet propaganda machine constantly tried to divide the United States and its allies and draw more countries into the communist camp. It was not until Dwight Eisenhower, arguably the first true psychological warrior to become president, took office in 1953 that U.S. Cold War propagandists began to match the efforts of their Soviet counterparts. Eisenhower used his organizational talents and military experiences with psychological warfare to restructure U.S. foreign information services into highly coordinated, cost-effective, and efficient Cold War weapons. With the establishment of the United States Information Agency in October 1953, the United States gained more control of its image abroad, casting both U.S. domestic and foreign policies in as favourable a light as possible while simultaneously condemning communists as disingenuous, autocratic imperialists. While U.S. officials struggled to implement effective psychological warfare programs, they were inevitably forced to confront difficult questions concerning the role of propaganda in a democratic society. Whereas a majority of Americans in the interwar period regarded propaganda as anathema, and a tool to which only fascists and communists resorted, by the time Eisenhower took office a growing number of officials had concluded that the stakes in the Cold War were simply too high to leave anything to chance. As a result, these officials argued, it was imperative that the U.S. government target not only international, but also domestic audiences with state-sponsored propaganda in order to ‘educate’ the public on U.S. Cold War objectives and the perils of communism. / Graduate

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2007. / "March 2007." AD-A467 086. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.S.)--Missouri State University, 2008. / "December 2008." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 97-101). Also available online.

Thesis (M.A. in Security Studies (Stabilization and Reconstruction))--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2005. / Thesis Advisor(s): Douglas R. Porch. Includes bibliographical references (p. 117-127). Also available online.

This thesis describes the development of psychological operations capabilities, introduction of forces, and the employment in Vietnam during the period 1960-1965. The complex interplay of these activities is addressed, as well as the development of PSYOP doctrine and training in the period prior to the introduction of ground combat forces in 1965. The American PSYOP advisory effort supported the South Vietnamese at all levels, providing access to training, material support, and critical advice. In these areas the American effort was largely successful. Yet, instability in the wake of President Ngo Dinh Diem's overthrow created an impediment to the ability of psychological operations to change behaviors and positively affect the outcome.

In 1953 President Dwight D. Eisenhower charged an ad hoc advisory group with assessing the current U.S. Cold War effort and offering recommendations for an 'unified and dynamic' way forward. This work investigates the case of Eisenhower's Presidential Committee on International Information Activities and its role in the United States' approach to the Cold War. Problematizing that which is often taken for granted, this empirical, interpretive study uncovers the discursive conditions of possibility for and the discursive activities taking place within Jackson Committee decision making processes. Employing a constructivist discursive framework, this project builds on an understanding of policy making as a process of argumentation in which actors intersubjectively define problems and delimit policy and strategy options. Revealing discursive conditions of possibility enables a deeper understanding of the substance, tensions and discursive maneuvers informing subsequent U.S. strategy and policy choices during the Cold War and may offer insights into understanding and addressing geopolitical challenges in the 21st century. The thick analytic narrative illuminates the 'witcraft' involved in conceptualizing the unique threat posed by the Soviet Union whose practices challenged existing categories, and in extending wartime discourses to the post-war geopolitical environment. It examines discursive practices informing the nascent concepts of national strategy, psychological warfare, and political warfare, including arguments for constituent elements and relationships between them. In so doing, this dissertation conceptualizes national strategy as practices underpinning a prioritized drive for competitive advantage over adversaries. Additionally, political warfare represents practices intended to create and present alternatives to foreign actors that are in the U.S. interest through the integration and coordination of diplomatic, economic, military, and informational activities. Based on its conceptualization of a long-term adversarial competition with the Soviet Union, the committee recommended solutions for a sustainable national strategy of political warfare prioritizing the free world and liberal world order. Its recommendations sought to recast strategic panic into strategic patience. / Ph. D.

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